



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION/PRIVACY OFFICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-5995

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

January 22, 2002

Freedom of Information/
Privacy Office

Mr. John Young
CRYPTOME
251 West 89th Street
Suite 6E
New York, New York 10024

Dear Mr. Young:

References:

a. Your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of March 29, 2001, for records concerning various dossiers. Your request was received in this office May 8, 2001.

b. Our letter of April 20, 2001, informing you that additional time was needed to review the records and we were unable to comply with the 20-day statutory time limit in processing your request.

We have conducted checks of the automated Defense Clearance and Investigations Index and a search of the Investigative Records Repository to determine the existence of Army intelligence investigative records responsive to your request. As a result of these checks, we were able to locate records pertaining to Soviet Intelligence Services, ZF400108W. The records are enclosed for your use.

We have completed a mandatory declassification review in accordance with Executive Order (EO) 12958. As a result of this review, information has been sanitized and 20 pages of records are denied in their entirety as the information is currently and properly classified SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL according to Sections 1.3(a)(2), 1.3(a)(3), 3.4(b)(1) and 3.4(b)(6) of EO 12958. This information is exempt from the public disclosure provision of the FOIA pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(1). It is not possible to reasonably segregate meaningful portions of the withheld pages for release. A brief description of the applicable sections follows:

Section 1.3(a)(2) of EO 12958 provides that information shall be classified SECRET if its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security.

Section 1.3(a)(3) of EO 12958 provides that information shall be classified CONFIDENTIAL if its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security.

Section 3.4(b)(1) of EO 12958 provides that classified information more than 25 years old is exempt from automatic declassification if it would reveal the identity of a confidential human source, or reveal information about the application of an intelligence source or method, or reveal the identity of a human intelligence source when the unauthorized disclosure of that source would clearly and demonstrably damage the national security interests of the United States.

Section 3.4(b)(6) of EO 12958 provides that classified information more than 25 years old is exempt from automatic declassification if it would reveal information that would seriously and demonstrably impair relations between the United States and a foreign government, or seriously and demonstrably undermine ongoing diplomatic activities of the United States.

Since the release of some of the information deleted from the records would result in an unwarranted invasion of the privacy rights of the individuals concerned, this information is exempt from the public disclosure provisions of the FOIA per Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(7)(C).

In addition, since the release of the information in the records would reveal the identity of confidential sources, it is exempt from public disclosure pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(7)(D) of the FOIA. The significant and legitimate governmental purpose to be served by withholding is that a viable and effective intelligence investigative capability is dependent upon protection of confidential sources.

The withholding of the information described above is a partial denial of your request. This denial is made on behalf of Brigadier General Keith B. Alexander, the Commanding General, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, who is the Initial Denial Authority for Army intelligence investigative and security records under the FOIA. You have the right to appeal this decision to the Secretary of the Army. If you wish to file an appeal, you should forward it to this office. Your appeal must be post marked no later than 60 calendar days from the date of this letter. Your appeal will then be processed to the appellate authority. After the 60-day period, the case may be considered closed; however, such closure does not preclude you from filing litigation in the courts.

During the processing of your request, information was disclosed which is under the purview of other government agencies. This office has no authority to release these records and they are being referred, along with your request, for appropriate action under the FOIA, and direct reply to you.


We are coordinating with other elements of our command and other elements of the Army concerning the releasability of their information contained in the records. We will inform you as to the releasability of the information upon completion of our coordination.

The amount for professional review and reproduction of the first 100 pages has been waived. The reproduction cost of \$48.00 remains due and should be forwarded by postal money order or certified check made payable to the Treasurer of the United States.

We are continuing to review records regarding other titles you have requested and will respond to you by separate correspondence when our review is completed.

If you have any questions concerning this action, please feel free to contact Mrs. Query at (301) 677-4060. Refer to case #853F-01.

Sincerely,


for Russell A. Nichols
Chief, Freedom of Information/
Privacy Office

Enclosure

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DOSSIER NO. 2F 40-0108 **W**

As of 11/17/80 all material
(Date)

included in this file conforms with

DA policies currently in effect.

(
Signature)

(Date Signed)

(Printed Name) /

(Grade) GS-05

() 9/11/92

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REVIEW FOR RETENTION
CENTRAL OF AR 384-10
REVIEWED ()

Investigative Records Repository (IRR)
reviewed for retention criteria UP
AR 384-10, Reviewed
Date 2/2/92

IC Form 315
1 Sep 72

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CL-SR/44
31 May 1947

561003

EXCISE

HEADQUARTERS
7707 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE CENTER
APO 757
US ARMY

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AUTHORITY OF <i>Colonel</i>		
BY <i>RMW</i>		
ON	FEB 12 1962	

INDEX

of Terms Used by the

SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICES

Copy 52 Impersonal Files Section

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CI-SR/44

Preface

This is an alphabetically arranged index of Russian words and abbreviations known to be used by the Soviet Intelligence Service. Most of the information contained in this index was obtained from German wartime sources, and has been confirmed by information from recent sources. It should be borne in mind that the Soviet Intelligence Service is constantly varying or changing its structure and terminology.

Part I of this index contains the English transliteration of the words and abbreviations and an explanation of them, including any information pertaining thereto. All words underlined in the explanatory text are transliterations of Russian words and are contained in the index.

Part II contains English transliterations of the Russian abbreviations and of the Russian words they represent.

The abbreviation W/T always means wireless-telegraph.

For details of the organization and history of the MGB see CI-SIR/4, MIS Center, dated 2 July 1946; for Smorsh see CI-SIR/42, MIS Center, dated 24 March 1947.

ES/SK/rk

For the Commanding Officer:

(b)(7)(C)

Capt AUS
Chief, CI Section

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CI-SR/144

Corrections

1. Page 27, par 2: When the NKVD was established on 10 July 1943, should read When the NKVD was reorganized on 10 July 1934
2. Page 26, left-hand column: SM, SMK should read SM.
3. Page 59, left-hand column: tolpashchik should read topáleshchik.
4. Page 59, left-hand column: Tsentrálny Komité Vserossiyskoy Kommunisticheskoy Partii (bolshevikov) should read Tsentrálny Komité Vsesoyuznoi Kommunisticheskoy Partii (bolshevikov).
5. Page 70: KTFK should read KPK. Komissiya Táinago Partiy'nago Kontrol'ya (See Táiny Partiy'ny Kontrol) should read Komissiya Partiy'nago Kontrol'ya.
6. Page 75: Delete SMK Sovét Ministrov
7. Page 75: under Tak VPK (b): Tsentrálny Komité Vserossiyskoy Kommunisticheskoy Partii (bolshevikov) should read Tsentrálny Komité Vsesoyuznoi Kommunisticheskoy Partii (bolshevikov).

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CEATED MOSCOW

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

PK POLIT BURE
HE ZK WKP (1)

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

7

X

X

SOVIET INNER SECURITY &
CI NET (OPERATED BY MGB
WITHIN ARMED FORCES BY
SMERSH)

GRUPPA 6
SOVIET

ONE WAY

ONE WAY

G.R. COMM PARTY

ONE WAY

ALLIED
CC ARMIES

ALLIED MG
DP CAMPS
HINDIA

ALLIED ZONES

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SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICES

CI-SR/44

"Secret Party-Control" within the Politburo of the TsK VKP (b) *
(Determines Aims and Policies of Soviet Intelligence Services)

TPK

1. Non-Military Intelligence Services

a. Ministry of State Security

- (1) Foreign Department
- (2) Secret Political Department
- (3) Counterintelligence Department
- b. Intelligence Service of the Frontier Guards of the Ministry of Interior
- c. Occupied Zones Intelligence Organizations

MGB
INU
SPU
KRU
Foreign Ops
Shtab Operativnoy Zont

2. Military Intelligence Organizations

- a. Intelligence Organization
- b. Counterintelligence Organization

GRU
GUKR NKO (or MVS?) Smersh

3. Partisan Movement Intelligence Service (wartime only)

- a. Intelligence Organization
- b. Counterintelligence Organization (organized and controlled by MGB) ...

HQ of Central Partisan Hq
OC MGB

4. Departments, Organizations, and Institutions for Auxiliary Use

- a. Cultural organizations with foreign connections
- b. Communist Party international system
- c. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry for Foreign Trade, etc.

VOKS, etc.
Details not known
MIT, VT, etc.

* On the chart, opposite page, the abbreviation ZK VKP (b) should read TsK VKP (b).

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agenturist

Commanding officer of an agentura, usually an agentura of the Smereu, who direct the selection and employment of agents.

The term is rarely used.

agenturnaya obstanovka

Agentura situation.

The general situation or circumstances in the area where an agent is assigned and to which the agent has to adapt himself.

agenturnaya razvedka

Espionage carried out by agents.

agenturnoye delo

1. File containing all papers relative to the procedure and results of surveillance of more than one suspected person or of suspected groups or organizations. For each person of such groups, a case file (delo formulyar) is kept.

AG/d
AG-dol

2. General form applied to all matters pertaining to agents.

Agent ynterromnik

Interior agent.

AG V

A member of a suspected group of persons or of an organization, who is recruited by the investigating counterintelligence organization.

Akademiya General'nogo Shtaba, Akademy of the General Staff (of the Red Army).

The second department of the Academy trains highly qualified officers for the chief positions within the Soviet military intelligence service.

In 1941, six hundred officers are said to have been enrolled for the course given at the Academy. The postcourse training period is normally four years. During the war, this period was reduced to one year.

aktivnaya razvedka

1. Active intelligence.

2. Sabotage of military installations and material.

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Sec divortsiya.

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CI-SR/44

ágent

Agent.

A, As

The term is applied to all Soviet agents working abroad, to only such Soviet agents in the USSR as are employed on a specific and difficult mission, and to all foreign agents working against the Soviet Union.

For meaning of informant, as used by the Russian intelligence services, see osvedomitel and sekrétny osvodomitel.

For different types of agents, see ágent kámerzhchik, ágent vnutrennik, zagránichny agent, zakordónny agent.

ágent dvoíník

Double agent.

ágent kámerzhchik

Stool pigeon.

The ágent kámerzhchik is employed by the chief of the Investigation Bureau (Sb) of Soviet counterintelligence organizations.

ágentúra

1. Net of informants and/or agents.

2. Department, section, or subsection of any intelligence organization, which recruits, trains, and employs agents. The ágentúra is the most important office in each of the Soviet secret service organizations. Because of its connection with agent work, the ágentúra is also called the Operative Section.

3. The use of agents.

See ágentúra po okružhniyu, mossoveaya ágentúra, storozhoveaya ágentúra, tsolovaya ágentúra, vovchnaya ágentúra.

ágentúra po okružhniyu

Surrounding agency.

Net of agents and informers of the military counterintelligence organization Smeresh, within the civilian population living near military installations.

See storozhoveaya ágentúra.

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anti-sovetsky

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Anti-Soviet.

A/S

An arrested person is charged with being anti-sovetsky if the specific charge against the person, who is usually an anti-Communist or a foreign agent, is to be kept secret.

arrest

Arrest.

This term applies only to an arrest effected with a warrant.

Soo/zadorzhaniye.

Squirrel.

beika

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Term applied to a type of radio transmitting set used by Soviet radio agents. The range of this transmitter probably does not exceed five hundred miles.

Coastal radio reconnaissance detachment.

These detachments are organized and directed by Navy Headquarters. The detachments usually comprise special stations for intercepting enemy radio communications and pin-pointing enemy radio stations, and control stations for communicating with Soviet intelligence units and agents.

Short-range military espionage and reconnaissance.

In peacetime, most short-range missions are assigned to agents of the intelligence sections of the Military Districts (KO).

Soo vol'skavaya razvedka.

Anti-Bolshevik elements.

butorbrat

German term for bread and butter (Butterbrat), used as slang expression by Soviet intelligence services.

Soo/zadorzhaniye Onrovichonnyye komissii.

Shoka

Ch X

W Ch V

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Chotvertoye Upravleniye

Fourth Department (of the Ministry for State Security (MGB)).

No other name is known up to now. This department has been in existence since 1942. It was formerly the Partisan Section of the NKVD.

Functions: To uncover and combat anti-Soviet partisans within the USSR. To organize a Soviet partisan movement (Partizanskoye Dvizheniye) against the contingency that the USSR might be invaded or occupied by an enemy. To make the necessary preparations for organizing Communist partisan movements in foreign countries, for use in time of war. These partisan groups may be used in peacetime as a means of aiding the USSR to apply political pressure in any foreign country.

The partisan movement during the Soviet-German war was fostered by the Fourth Department in conjunction with the Communist Party. The Fourth Department employed a vast number of spies and agents to form partisan units in the rear of the German lines.

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Chrezvichaynaya Komissiya

Soo Vserossiyskaya Chrezvichaynaya Komissiya

Ch K

(The Chaka)

V Ch K

dolo formulyar

Case file.

DF

File started by Soviet counterintelligence authorities as soon as they have reason to suspect an individual of anti-Soviet behavior.

The file contains a statement of reasons for suspicion, the biographical data on the suspect, and the results of surveillance and investigation.

In case the individual is arrested, the file is transferred to the interrogation section. Ultimately, the completed file is sent to the First Special Section of the Ministry of State Security (MGB).

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dolo razvedchiki

Work file.

DR

File kept by Soviet intelligence agencies, concerning the missions and reports of each of their agents. The personal papers of the agents are filed separately. (See lichnoye dolo.)

diversant

Soviet agent charged with mission of destroying targets of military importance.

diversionny otdel

Sabotage section.

One of the sections of the wartime Operative Group of the Red Army Central Intelligence Administration (GRU). Occasionally referred to as the section for active intelligence.

Employs sabotage agents and agent groups against targets of military importance.

In wartime, similar subsections are part of the intelligence departments (RU) of army groups in whose operational area there are no partisan detachments to carry out sabotage missions.

diversiya

Destruction of military targets by sabotage. Also called active intelligence (aktivnaya razvedka).

Dorozhno-Transportny Otdel

Road and Traffic Section.

DFO

Office within each of the local branches of the Ministry of State Security.

Dorozhno-Transportnoye
Otdeleniye

Road and Traffic Subsection.

DFO

See Dorozhno-Transportny Otdel.

Dorozhno-Transportnoye
Upravleniye

Road and Traffic Department.

DTU

Division of the Soviet Ministry for State Security (MGB), charged with surveillance of traffic and of communications other than W/T, as a means of checking on the reliability of personnel. To effect this, the division

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directs a broad net of agents. Special attention is paid to railroad traffic in the USSR and to railroad routes to and from foreign countries. The division also arranges for transportation across the Soviet border of agents from other Soviet intelligence organizations.

dubok

Little oak.

DBK

Slang term for any secret place where an agent or informant deposits letters to be picked up by another agent. Such places may be in hollow trees, under stones, etc., or in the room of a person who may be unaware that his room is being used for this purpose.

dvoinik

See pochtovy yashchik.

Double.

See agent dvoinik.

ekonomicheskaya razvedka

Economic espionage.

EKO/R

ekonomicheskoye otdeleniye

Subsection of an economic section.

EKO

The economic section is an office within the local branches of the Ministry of State Security. (See EKO.)

Ekonomicheskoye Upravleniye

Economic Department.

EKU

Department of the Ministry of State Security, charged with political surveillance of Soviet economic life. Directs a net of informants and agents in factories and other installations of economic importance which are not under direct supervision of the Ministry of the Armed Forces.

ekonomicheskoye otel

Economic section.

EKO

An office within the local branches of the Ministry of State Security. (See EKO.)

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filtratsiya

GI-SR/144

Screening process.

The screening of a large number of persons for suspects.

During the war, this was a routine security measure taken by the Red Army against all persons returning from behind the German lines, regardless whether the returnees were escaped PWs or Soviet agents. (All other persons coming from German-occupied Soviet territories were also screened.)

Freies Deutschland

Free Germany (Committee).

Russian-sponsored German committee for the development of a free, anti-fascist Germany.

This committee was founded in Autumn 1943. It is headed by Gen Seydlitz. During the war, the committee helped to establish model PW camps, where German PWs were indoctrinated in preparation for recruitment as propaganda and intelligence agents of the Soviets.

According to still unconfirmed reports, this activity continues now. Former PWs have been used as Soviet agents in administrative positions in the Soviet Occupation Zone. Camouflaged as German expellees from Poland, as returning PWs, etc., other turned PWs have been infiltrated into the various occupation zones.

Glavnoye Politicheskoye Upravleniye (Revolutsionnogo Voennoye Soveta) Raboche-Krestyanskoy Krasnoy Armii

Central Political Administration (of the Revolutionary Military Council) of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army.

Also called the Military Division of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks (abbreviated TsK VKP (b)).

GLAVPUR RKKA

The central office of the political organization within the Soviet Armed Forces.

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CI-SR/44

The Central Political Administration is the highest headquarters of the political organization within the Red Army. Its components are as follows:

political departments (PU) of the military districts
political departments (PU) of army group headquarters
political sections (PO) of army headquarters or corps headquarters
political subsections (PO) of division or brigade headquarters
political officers of regiment or battalion headquarters
party organizers (Partorg) in the companies

Until October 1942 the chiefs of these political divisions, who were called Commissars, and their assistants, the Politruks (political leaders), were authorized to countersign every order of their troop commanders. In October 1942 the titles of rank held by the Commissars and their assistants were changed to the corresponding military ones, the Commissars being redesignated deputy commanders.

GLAVPUR is said to have been renamed the Central Committee for Political Propaganda (GUPP), without undergoing any major changes in its structure.

Functions: To direct Party activities within the Red Army, to direct the political education of every single soldier, and to establish Party committees and cells. The political officers, formerly Commissars and Politruks, are charged with seeing that intelligence-personnel soldiers are indoctrinated to a greater degree than the ordinary soldier.

The political divisions maintain close liaison with the Red Army counter-intelligence organization Smersh in connection with the Smersh's duty of purging troops of anti-Bolshevik elements and foreign spies.

Central Intelligence Administration.

A department (probably the second department) of the Red Army General Staff.

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Glavnoye Razvedivatelnoye
Upravleniye

GRU

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CI-SR/44

Central Office of the Red Army Intelligence Service, with the following subordinate components:

Intelligence departments (RUs)	of army-group headquarters
Intelligence sections (ROs)	of army and corps headquarters
Intelligence sections (ROs)	of the military districts
Intelligence subsections (ROs)	of brigade and division headquarters
Deputy chiefs for intelligence (PNSh 2)	of regimental headquarters

Functions: Strictly of a military nature; serves operational and tactical purposes.

In peacetime the GRU, as well as the above-mentioned branches, is organized in two divisions, one for agent work (agentura) and the other for evaluation and dissemination (informatsionny otdel). The GRU has other important sections: a staff for training intelligence officers and qualified agents (see UPKShs, Akademiya General'nogo Shtaba) and a signal section for W/T communication and interception. During the war, an operative group was added to these sections, to send espionage and sabotage agents into enemy territories and to direct the reconnaissance activities of the lower intelligence echelons in the field. The GRU also publishes a comprehensive enemy situation map.

The GRU usually assigns especially difficult long-range missions to its own agents, frequently planting the agents in Soviet embassies and delegations, usually as deputies to the military attache.

In 1938 the Soviet Naval Intelligence Service separated from the Red Army Intelligence Service and formed an independent intelligence service of its own, which contained a GRU and ROs in the various naval headquarters, and, in general, was organized along lines similar to the Army Intelligence Service.

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Glavnoye Upravleniye,
Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti

GUGB

Central Administration for State Security, also called Operative
Central Administration.

(Until April/May 1943, the directing organization of the Soviet
non-military intelligence service.)

History: Established 10 July 1934, at the time the GPU was dis-
solved, as part of the People's Commissariat of the Interior (NKVD).
Assumed on a broader basis the duties of the GPU, especially those
connected with Soviet intelligence activities abroad. From February
1941 to July 1941 the GUGB was an independent People's Commissariat
for State Security (NKGB). In July 1941, it was again incorporated
into the NKVD under its former designation GUGB. In April/May 1943
the GUGB was finally removed from the NKVD organization and re-
designated People's Commissariat for State Security. In April 1946
the title was changed to Ministry of State Security (MGB).

Central Counterintelligence Administration of the People's Com-
missariat of the Navy, Death to the Spies.

Central Office of the Red Navy's counterintelligence. Directs an
organization of counterintelligence branches within the various naval
headquarters and units.

According to still unconfirmed reports, incorporated into the
GUKR MVS Smersh (see GUKR NKO Smersh).

Central Counterintelligence Administration of the People's Commissariat
for Defense, Death to the Spies.

Now probably called Central Administration of the Ministry of the Armed
Forces, Death to the Spies (GUKR MVS Smersh).

The principal counterintelligence aim of the GUKR is to deceive and
disrupt foreign intelligence organizations. This is done by planting
subversive agents in the midst of these foreign intelligence organi-
zations.

Established April/May 1943 as successor to the UOO NKVD. Directly

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Glavnoye Upravleniye
Kontrrazvedki Narodnogo
Komissariata Voenno-Morskogo
Flota.
GUKR NKVMF Smersh

Glavnoye Upravleniye,
Kontrrazvedki NKO Smert
Shipnam

GUKR NKO Smersh

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CI-SR/44

responsible to the chief of the NKO. Its forerunners were the Cheka (1917-1922); the military sections of the GPU (1922 to 1934. See Vo GPU); Special Sections of the NKVD (1934 to April 1943. See OO NKVD).

Organization: As the central office of the Red Army counterintelligence service, the GUKR controls the following intelligence units which are attached to their own troop headquarters but are not subordinate to them:

- counterintelligence departments (UKR NKO Smersh) army group level
- counterintelligence sections (OKR NKO Smersh) army and corps level
- counterintelligence subsections (OKR NKO Smersh) division and brigade level
- counterintelligence representatives and agents regiment to squad level

Functions: To maintain general political and disciplinary surveillance over all troop units and over the civilian population areas where troops are stationed. To do counterintelligence work within Soviet military units. To carry on military counterespionage in foreign countries. To maintain surveillance over agents of the Red Army Intelligence Service (see GRU).

The GUKR is composed of several principal departments, each with its own special function. These functions include maintaining surveillance over the General Staff, the military districts, and the various army groups; handling general counterintelligence and counterespionage work; handling technical equipment for agents; dealing with personnel conducting investigations and interrogations. (The exact details are not known.)

If recent reports about a redesignation of the NKO as Ministry of the Armed Forces (MVS) are true, the new official name of the GUKR should be GUKR MVS Smersh. In that case, the organization would also be responsible for the hitherto independent Smersh of the Red Navy.

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Glavnoye Upravleniye
Militsii

Central Administration of the Militia.

GUM
An integral part of the Ministry of the Interior (MVD). GUM directs the police forces and registration offices. If necessary, it co-operates closely with Soviet intelligence organizations, especially with the counterintelligence.

Glavnoye Upravleniye
Pogranichnoyi Vnitrenni
Okhrani

Central Administration for Security of the Interior and of the Border Areas.

GUPVO

This organization is within the Ministry of the Interior. It has departments for the Frontier Guards (see Pogran Upr) and for the Interior Troops (see VOKHR).

Glavnoye Upravleniye Svyazi

Central Administration of the Signal Corps.

GUS

Part of the Red Army General Staff. GUS assigns W/T stations, as well as interception and direction-finding units, to the various army intelligence and counterintelligence organizations. It assists all authorities of the Soviet Intelligence Service in matters pertaining to W/T equipment.

Glubokaya razvedka

Long-range military espionage.

In peacetime, most agents assigned to long-range missions are sent out by the Red Army and Navy Central Intelligence Administrations (GMI). In wartime, the intelligence departments of the army groups (RG) are the most active long-range intelligence units.

Gorodskoy Otdel MGB

Office of the Ministry of State Security (see MGB) in all larger towns.

Gor Otdel MGB

Gorodskoy Otdel MVD

Office of the Ministry of the Interior (see MVD) in all larger towns.

Gor Otdel MVD

Gorodskoye Rayonnoye
Otdeleniye MGB

District subsection of a city office of the Ministry of State Security.

Gor Ray Otd MGB

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Gorodskoye Rayonnoye
Otdeleniye MVD

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District subsection of a city office of the Ministry of the Interior:

Gor Ray Otd MVD

Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti

..... of State Security.

GB

This designation was formerly added to the title of rank of all officers of the Central Administration of State Security (GUGB) in the People's Commissariat of the Interior (NKVD). It was also added to the title of rank of all officers of the counterintelligence organization of the NKVD, within the Red Army (OO NKVD). When the OO NKVD was reorganized in April/May 1943 as the Smersh, the GB title of rank was changed to the corresponding army rank, and the designation GB was dropped. However, the GB continued to be used for the officers of the People's Commissariat of State Security which succeeded the GUGB in April/May 1943.

State Political Department.

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Gosudarstvennoye
Politicheskoye Upravleniye

GPU

Established in 1922 by reorganizing and redesignating the Chekas of the various Soviet republics. On 23 November 1923, the GPUs of the various Soviet republics were centralized into a United GPU (Obyedinennoye GPU, abbreviated OGPU).

Function: To maintain counterintelligence service within the entire Soviet Union, including counterintelligence service in the armed forces (see VOGPU) and non-military intelligence and counterespionage abroad.

On 10 July 1934, the GPU ceased to exist as an independent organization. It was then incorporated into the NKVD and renamed Central Administration for State Security (GUGB).

Grúppa RO pri kordone

RO group for the Russian side of the frontier area.

Subsection of the intelligence sections (RO) stationed with the various headquarters of the MVD Frontier Guards.

Functions: Counterintelligence work and surveillance of the Soviet

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population living near the border, in order to prevent penetration of foreign influence.

See FO.

Grúpa FO za kordonom

FO group for the area beyond the frontier.

Subsection of the intelligence sections (FO) stationed with the various headquarters of the WVD Frontier Guards.

Functions: To gather intelligence information within an area ranging about 70 miles beyond the Soviet frontier. This function is sometimes combined with performance of minor acts of sabotage. To help agents of other Soviet intelligence organizations get across the border into foreign countries.

Informatsia

Information.

The counterintelligence organization of the Polish Army, established Summer 1943.

Organization and functions resemble those of the Red Army counter-intelligence service Smeresh (see GUKR), to which the Informatsia is responsible.

The headquarters of the Informatsia, titled Central Administration, is said to be in Warsaw. Its top ranking personnel are Russians who direct the activities of Polish Communists formerly resident in the USSR or France.

Informatsionnoye otdeleniye

Information subsection.

See Informatsionny otdel.

Informatsionny otdel

Information section.

A section within all army intelligence organizations (see GUK, RU, FO). Evaluates and disseminates intelligence. In wartime, interrogates PIs who might have information about the enemy situation.

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Inostrannoye Upravleniye

INU

Foreign Department. Sometimes called Intelligence Department (INU). One of the most important departments of the Ministry of State Security (MGB) of the USSR, in Moscow. For its local branches see Inostranny Otdel (INO).

The INU is said to be subdivided into sections. Each of these sections handles intelligence matters concerning a particular foreign country.

Functions: To maintain surveillance over all foreigners in the USSR, over Russian emigration, and over Soviet citizens abroad. To collect intelligence, mainly of political and diplomatic nature. To carry on sabotage and subversive activities in foreign countries. These duties are assigned to highly qualified and specialized agents, who usually organize a net of local informants and sub-agents abroad. The top-ranking agents usually operate under cover of the Soviet embassies and legations abroad.

The INU operates in close liaison with all departments of the Ministry of State Security, with the Foreign Ministry (MID), with the Army intelligence and counterintelligence organizations, and with the Communist Party and its subsidiaries abroad, as well as with pro-Soviet societies in foreign countries.

Inostranny Otdel

Foreign Section.

INO

First section within
a) the Ministries of State Security of the various Soviet republics
b) the departments for State Security (UMGB) of provinces adjacent to foreign countries.

See INU.

Intelligentsky Otdel

Intelligentsia Section

Probably one of the sections of the Foreign Department (INU), or of the Ministry of State Security. In Russia, subgroups, or recruits the intelligentsia among Russian emigre circles.

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istrebiteľny otryad

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Annihilation detachment.

Semi-military units throughout the USSR, drafted and trained by local Party committees and the local branches of the Ministry of State Security. The detachments are for use against possible invasion by an enemy.

Functions: When activated in wartime these units provide protection against enemy parachutists, agents, and enemy sabotage agents. Immediately before an expected enemy invasion, these units are charged with the destruction of all important factories, agricultural machines, and other installations. Afterwards, the detachments are supposed to retreat before the enemy and to form partisan troops.

During World War II, these partisan troops did effective work.

(Russian word not known.)

Abbreviation used on Soviet documents to denote top secret character.

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kamera predvaritel'nogo
sanktsionirovaniya
KPZ

kandidat

Candidate.

Person to be recruited as an agent or a secret informant, who has to wait for approval from higher counterintelligence headquarters.

(See raport na sanktsiyu.)

Cover name.

Intelligence chief.

a) General term for the commanding officer of a military intelligence unit.

b) Deputy commander of a partisan detachment, who is also charged with carrying on intelligence operations.

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kl'obka
komandir razvedki

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Komendant

Commandant.

CI-SR/44

Officer in the various units of the Red Army counterintelligence organization Smersh (see GUKR), charged with administration and security of his unit. Responsible for the maintenance of a prison (see KPZ) and transport of prisoners, for which purpose he uses troop detachments attached to the various Smersh units.

Komissar

Commissar.

Until October 1942, the designation of rank for members of the Party organization within the Soviet Armed Forces (see GLAVFUR). After October 1942, the various commissar ranks were changed to the following corresponding military ranks:

Junior Politruk	1st Lt
Senior Politruk	Capt
Battalion Commissar	Maj
Senior Battalion Commissar	Lt Col
Regimental Commissar	Col
Brigade Commissar	Brig Gen
Divisional Commissar	Maj Gen
Corps Commissar	Lt Gen
Army Commissar	Gen

The Commissars were made deputy commanders of their respective troop units. N.B. The former ranks of the political commissars should not be confused with the rank of a Commissar GB (of State Security), which is equivalent to that of a Maj Gen.

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Комиссия Партийного
Контроля

Commission for Party Control.

КПК

A board appointed by the council of the TsK VKP(b), but responsible only to the Politburo and Secretariat. Checks to ascertain whether the decisions of the TsK VKP(b) are carried out within the Party. A politically very influential commission of which Mikoyan, a Georgian and Stalin's confidential aide, was formerly the chairman. The name of the present chairman is not known.

Коммунистический Союз
Молодежи

Union of Communist Youth.

Комсомол

Vast source of officers and agents for the Soviet intelligence service.

During the Soviet-German war, the Komсомол was a kind of reserve for Soviet intelligence organizations. Many Komсомол training camps taught the principles of intelligence work. Numerous agent schools used the name of Komсомол institutions as a cover.

конспиративная фамилия

Alias.

КФ

конспиративная квартира

Secret quarters.

конспиративный адрес

Secret address.

КА

контрольно наблюдательное

Control observation file. (see TD.)

дело

контрольный пропускной пункт

Checking points established by Soviet security authorities, near especially secret places or places of tactical importance.

КПП

контрразведчик

Officer or agent, performing counterintelligence or counterespionage work.

К/Р

контрразведательный отдел

Counterintelligence section.

КРО

A general term denoting any section of the Soviet intelligence (cont'd next page)

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organizations concerned with counterintelligence matters, e.g., the counterintelligence sections of the Smersh, of the former OO NKVD, of the operative groups which work in Soviet-occupied territories.

In particular, the term refers to the local branches of the Counterintelligence Department (see KRU) of the Ministry of State Security of the USSR. The KROs are the third sections of 1) the Ministries for State Security (MGBs) of the various Soviet republics 2) the departments of the Ministries for State Security (UMGBs) of the Soviet provinces.

Counterintelligence subsection.

Third subsection of the city offices of the MGB and of the district sections of the MGB (EO MGB). See kon'trazvedivatel'ny otdel.

Counterintelligence Department.

Third department of the Ministry of State Security of the USSR, in Moscow. Directs non-military Soviet counterintelligence organizations and representatives within the USSR. (For its local branches see KRO.)

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The KRU is organized into two divisions, one directing counterintelligence activities within the USSR, the other handling counterespionage work abroad. (Details of the entire organization remain to be clarified.)

Functions: To prevent foreign influences from penetrating the USSR. To protect Soviet diplomatic representatives abroad. To maintain surveillance over Soviet agents operating outside the USSR. To carry on counterespionage work against all foreign intelligence services, with the ultimate aim of suborning or turning the agent personnel of the foreign intelligence service.

Methods: The KRU and its local branches employ a vast number of agents and informants in all non-military institutions within the USSR. Within all Soviet republics adjacent to foreign countries, the KRU and its counterintelligence sections (KRO) assign counterespionage missions to highly qualified agents. Often, use is made of Soviet embassies, delegations, and trade missions as a cover for the operations of the agents.

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The KNU operates in close liaison with all other Soviet intelligence agencies, particularly with the Army counterintelligence organization Smerish.

kontrrazvedka

Counterintelligence.

KR

The Russian term also includes counterespionage. KR is contained in the names of most Soviet counterintelligence organizations, e.g., GUER NKO Smerish, KRU.

krisna

Roof. Cover for an agent and his activities.

kursi razvedchikov

Intelligence courses.

Courses conducted by the military intelligence service (see GRU) and intended for instruction of a) officers who are to be assigned to the army intelligence service - in wartime, such courses were held at Central Headquarters (GRU) and at army group level (RU), and lasted from three to six months; b) agents - in wartime these courses were given at Central Headquarters (GRU), army group level (U), and army level (NO). The courses usually lasted thirty days.

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The main purpose of the courses was the careful study of the agent's legenda (cover story).

In peacetime, it is preferred to give each agent individual training in a secret place (see KR).

legalizatsiya

Legalization.

Behavior and actions of an agent, by means of which he is able to adapt himself to general circumstances and to fulfill the legal requirements prevailing in the place of his assignment. During the process of his legalization, and agent usually refrains from intelligence activities.

legenda

Cover story of an agent.

The story is usually concocted between the agent and his parent organization and is based upon the agent's actual background. To memorize

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CI-SR/44

the legend is the most important part of a Soviet agent's preparation for his mission.

Some of the most common legends used at present are: (The agent) was forced to flee from Russia because he is an enemy of the USSR; his parents were killed by the NKVD. (The agent) committed a crime in the USSR and then escaped to Germany. This type of story is related when the agent hopes to be sent back to the USSR. (The agent) is a former DP who had gone back to Russia, but found conditions there so bad, that he returned to Germany. (The agent) was dealing in black market operations.

Personal file (of an agent).

The file contained all personal documents and papers of a Soviet agent or informant, and is kept by the intelligence office which uses him. All personal files of Soviet agents, except those of the Military Intelligence Service (GIU), are ultimately filed by the First Special Section (see SO 1) of the Ministry of State Security (MGB).

Doubtful matter.

A slang expression taken over by Soviet agents from the criminal argot, meaning forged document, or, in a general sense, wrong information. The adjective lipovoy in connection with any other word means forged.

Lying boot.

Slang for forged pass.

Itinerant agent.

1. Traveling agent with the mission of carrying out general espionage while following a certain proscribed route. A type of agent frequently used during the Soviet-German war, especially in German-occupied Soviet territories.

2. Agent-guide who instructs other agents or agent groups where to cross the border or front-line.

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ID

lichnoye delo (agents)

lipa

lipovoy zapis

marshrutchik

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massovaya agentura

CI-SR/44

A mass agentura.

A net of informants on the watch for possible suspects or offenders within an otherwise unsuspected group of persons.

General surveillance of large groups of persons.

See agentura.

Ministerstvo
Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti

Ministry of State Security. (Until Spring 1946, People's Commissariat for State Security, NKGB).

MGB

Most efficient and centralized instrument of Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence activities within as well as outside the USSR.

History: The MGB represents the latest phase in the development of Soviet security organizations. The development began with the Cheka and continued with the GPU and the GUGB of the NKVD. The NKGB was established in February 1944, taking over the organization and tasks of the Central Administration of State Security (see GUGB) of the NKVD. It was dissolved in July 1944 and re-incorporated into the NKVD. In April/May 1943 it was re-established as an independent People's Commissariat for State Security (NKGB).

Regional organization of the Ministry for State Security, throughout the USSR:

Ministry of State Security of the USSR, in Moscow (MGB USSR)

Ministries of State Security of the various Soviet republics

Departments of the MGB in the provinces (UMGB)

Sections of the MGB in the cities (Gor Otdel MGB)

Sections or representatives of the MGB in the districts (RO MGB)

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Functions of the ~~entire~~ organization:-- Officially, to protect the revolutionary order and the security of the state. In carrying out this assignment the MGB not only watches all trends in the USSR and in foreign countries, which might constitute a threat to the security of the Bolshevik state, but it also conducts positive espionage in foreign countries.

The principal departments and sections of the MGB in Moscow correspond to similar sections and subsections of the MGB branches mentioned above. These units are principally: The Foreign Department (INU), Secret Political Department (SPU), Counterintelligence Department (KRU), Fourth Department (Chetvertoyo Upravleniye), Economics Department (EKU), Road and Traffic Department (DTU), Investigation Department (SB), three Special Sections (SO 1, SO 2, SO 3). (For details, refer to cross references.)

The latest development (still to be confirmed) is that after the Summer of 1946, the MGB assumed control of the intelligence organization in Soviet-occupied territories (see Shtab Operativnoi Zoni).

Most of the departments mentioned above extend their activities beyond the frontiers of the USSR into occupied territories, satellite states, and other, possibly all, foreign countries. The departments employ a large number of agents, frequently using Soviet delegations abroad as well as Communist Parties in other countries, as a cloak for their operations.

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Ministerstvo Inostrannikh
Del

Ministry for Foreign Affairs (until Spring 1946, People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, NKVD).

MVD

Besides its diplomatic tasks as a Foreign Ministry, the MVD participates in intelligence work by keeping in close liaison with other agencies, particularly with the Foreign Department (see INU) of the Ministry of State Security (MGB) and with the attache section of the Central Intelligence Administrations (GCU) of the Red Army and Navy.

Ministerstvo Vneshney
Torgovli

Ministry for Foreign Trade (until Spring 1946, People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade).

MVT

Participates in intelligence activities by planting its own agents or those of other intelligence organizations in Soviet trade delegations and branches of Soviet firms abroad.

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Del

MVD

Ministry of the Interior.

CI-SR/44

Until Spring 1946, the MVD was known as the People's Commissariat of the Interior (NKVD). Until it transferred most of its responsibilities for state security to the NKGB, in April or May of 1943, the NKVD was the most powerful Soviet intelligence agency. At present it is of minor importance, having retained only its border intelligence service, police functions, and border administrative duties. Many intelligence activities erroneously imputed to the MVD are really directed by the MGB. Even Soviet agents are sometimes unaware of this fact, and Soviet authorities do everything to encourage the continuance of this erroneous belief.

When the NKVD was established on 10 July 1943, it consisted of two major divisions, one to deal with internal affairs and the other with state security (see GUGB). The last-named succeeded the dissolved GPU. In February 1941, the GUGB became an independent People's Commissariat for State Security (NKGB). In July 1941, it was again fused with the NKVD. In April or May 1943, the NKVD was finally relieved of its state security functions. Simultaneously, the NKVD's counterintelligence organization within the Soviet Armed forces, the OO NKVD, was placed under control of the People's Commissariat of Defense (NKO) and redesignated Counterintelligence NKO, Death to the Spies (see GUKR NKO Smersh).

The regional organization is as follows:

Ministry of the Interior, in Moscow.

Ministries of the various Soviet republics.

Departments of the MVD, in the provinces (UMVD).

Sections of the MVD, in the cities (Gor Otdel MVD).

Sections of the MVD, in the districts (RO MVD).

The principal divisions are as follows:

The central administrations of the Militia (GUM)

The central administrations of the Frontier Guards (see Pogran Upr) and of the Interior Troops.

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The central administrations of the Fire Department.

The central administrations of the Labor Camps.

The central administrations of the Highways.

A section for the registration of the population.

Other sections essential to carrying out administrative duties connected with a Home Ministry.

The MVD schools, which probably still combine police and counterintelligence training as carried on before April or May 1943, and are therefore also attended by MGB and Smerish personnel.

The establishment of new departments of the MVD, to do police and administrative work in the territories occupied by the USSR or incorporated into it, may be assumed. However, no details are known.

Of the aforementioned divisions, only the Central Administration of the Frontier Guards and Interior Troops has intelligence functions. This central administration directs the border intelligence service and the Frontier Guards and Interior Troops serve as executive units to the MGB, the Smerish, and the Operative Groups of Soviet-occupied territories.

Ministry of the Armed Forces.

According to still unconfirmed reports, the MVS, which was established in Spring 1946, was a merger of the former People's Commissariat of Defense (NKO) with the People's Commissariat of the Navy (NKVMF).

Navy Signal Section.

Signal station of an intelligence section (RO) of the Soviet Navy. Maintains radio communication with RO agents.

Observation file. Also called control observation file (KND).

File initiated by a higher counterintelligence echelon, regarding someone working in a subordinate echelon. Also used as a means of controlling a

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subordinate intelligence echelon's treatment of a particularly important case. The file contains only results of surveillance.

nachalnik agenturnoy razvedki Commanding officer of an intelligence section employing agents (see agentura).

nachalnik razvedivatel'nogo otдела Commanding officer of a reconnaissance unit (see vol'skovaya razvedka - VR)

NR

Nachoper Svyazi

Chief of secret communications.

Expert on agent (W/T) communications.

napravnik

The second man of a pair of agents.

The term is used by Smerash officers particularly.

Narodnyy Komissariat
Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti

People's Commissariat of State Security. (See MGB.)

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NKGB

Narodnyy Komissariat
Inostrannikh Del

People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. (See MID.)

NKID

Narodnyy Komissariat
Oborony

People's Commissariat for Defense.

NKO

Until Spring 1946 the supreme headquarters of the Red Army and Air Force. For possible development since then, see MVS.

Narodnyy Komissariat
Vneshney Torgovli

People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade. (See MVT.)

NKVT

Narodnyy Komissariat
Vnutrennikh Del
MKVTM

People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs. (See MKD.)

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Naródný Komissariat Voenno
Morskogo Flota

People's Commissariat of the Navy. Until Spring 1946, supreme head-
quarters of the Red Navy.

NKVMF

For possible development since then, see NWS.

or

NKM

narúzhnogo nablúdeniya

See narúzhnoye nablúdeniye.

NN

narúzhnoye nablúdeniye

1. Field observation, the shadowing and tracing of a suspect.

NN

2. The abbreviation NN, standing for narúzhnogo nablúdeniya, may also
refer to an agent who is shadowing a suspect.

3. NN section. Any section of Soviet counterintelligence organizations,
which handles field observation of suspects. Refers particularly to
the Third Special Section of the Ministry of State Security (SO 3).

nash, nash chelovek

One of ours. One of our men. Refers to a Russian agent.

na svidaniye

To the rendezvous.

Partisan slang for to prepare an ambush.

na svyazi

To be in contact with someone (an agent).

Oblastnoye upravleniye MGB

Local office of the MGB for an óblast (Russian province).

UMGB

See Upravleniye MGB.

Oblastnoye upravleniye MVD

Local office of the MVD, for an óblast (Russian province).

UMVD

See Upravleniye MVD.

Obshechaya Shkola

General School system of the Ministry for Interior.

OSH MVD

Until Spring 1946, the school system was known as the General NKVD School.
The schools are used to train personnel for the Ministry of Interior, and

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they are established at the central MVD in Moscow, at the MVD of the various Soviet republics, and possibly also at the MVD departments of the more important provinces.

Despite the transfer of counterintelligence duties from the NKVD to the NKGB in April/May 1943, the schools are said to teach counterintelligence subjects, including History of the Communist Party, Soviet criminal law, history of suspected groups within the USSR (Trotskyites, Bukharinites, Mensheviks, Zionists, Social Revolutionaries, and various nationalist groups). Also in the curriculum are studies of the activities of the White Russians and other emigres from the USSR, of agents, keeping of records on suspects, and methods of investigation and interrogation.

Because of the counterintelligence nature of these subjects, MGB and Smersh personnel are said to be also enrolled as students. Peacetime training lasts one year; during the war this period was reduced to three months.

General army reconnaissance,

See voiskovaya razvedka.

LC
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See Gosudarstvennoye Politicheskoye Upravleniye (GPU).

Obyedinennoye GPU

OGPU

obyekt razrabotki

Intelligence target. Pertains to persons and to organizations.

Operativnaya Grupa

Operative Group.

Oper Grupa
A unit or group of any Soviet intelligence organization, which performs agent work or employs agents.

Operativnaya Grupa,
Partizanskoye Dvizheniye
pri..... Armii
A group of representatives from the Partisan Movement. Attached to army headquarters during the war to maintain liaison with partisan detachments behind enemy lines. (See Partizanskoye dvizheniye.)

The group is charged with assisting agents of higher partisan headquarters to cross the front line, and it is responsible for supplying partisan detachments behind enemy lines with food and equipment.

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Operativnaya Grúppa
Sovetskoy, Voennoy
Administratsii

Lowest echelon of the Soviet intelligence organization, attached at Kreis level to the Soviet Military Administration of the occupied zones in Germany and Austria (see Shtab Operativnoi Zóni).

Oper Grúppa SVA

For executive purposes, one company of MVD troops is attached to it.

operativnaya rabóta

Operative work.

(Operativnaya) Troika

General term referring to secret intelligence activities of any kind.
(Secret) Three-Man Court:

a) Troika: General term for any three-man court (People's Court), as set up after the Bolshevik revolution. During the 1930s, the Troikas were replaced by ordinary courts within the USSR.

b) Operativnaya Troika: Temporary courts formed, particularly during the war, by members of the various field echelons of Soviet counter-intelligence organizations. These courts tried enemy agents where and when apprehended.

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operativno

When used in connection with other Soviet intelligence Service terms, this term always means secret activities connected with agent work.

Operativny Otkrug Sovetskoy
Voennoy Administratsii

Echelon of the Soviet intelligence organization. Attached to the Soviet Military Administration of the occupied zones (see Shtab Operativnoy Zóni) at the level of a German Regierungsbezirk (equivalent to a province).

Oper Otkrug SVA

Executive arm consists of one regiment of MVD troops.

operativny organ

Secret operative organ.

Oper Organ

Term used in referring to the entire Soviet intelligence service.

operativny otdel

Operative section.

Oper O

General term pertaining to a section of any Soviet intelligence organization, which use agents to obtain information.

operativny personal

Operative personnel

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General term for all personnel of Soviet intelligence organizations, connected with agent-work. The operativny personnel are to be distinguished from tekhnicheskyy personnel, the technical personnel.

operativny punkt

Operative point.

Op

Outposts of the Soviet Intelligence Service, used as starting points for agents who are assigned to duty in foreign countries.

In wartime these intelligence outposts, all near the front line, are used as starting and reception points for Soviet agents, as supply stations, and frequently also as relay W/T stations.

Operativny Sektor Sovetskoy
Voennoy Administratsii

Echelon of the Soviet intelligence organization. Attached to the Soviet Military Administration of the occupation zones in Germany and Austria (see Shtab Operativnoi Zoni) at the level of a German Land.

Oper Sektor SVA

An echelon is assigned to the Soviet sector in Berlin.

Operativny Tribunal

Secret Tribunal.

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Special courts of the Ministry of State Security (MGB), of the Ministry for the Interior (MVD), and of the counterintelligence organization Smersh. Composed of high officers who try offenders among the intelligence personnel.

Operuyolnomochnyy

Operative Representative (literally, Operative Plenipotentiary).

Op/Vp

Functional designation used for officers up to the rank of captain in Smersh, the Ministry of State Security (MGB), and the Ministry of the Interior (MVD). Such officers direct and organize agent work, in contrast to office personnel.

organ

See operativny organ.

Osobaya Inspektatsiya

Special Inspection Section.

A section within higher echelons of the Soviet Intelligence Service, particularly within counterintelligence units. Charged with surveillance

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of intelligence personnel, especially with surveillance of the more important agents of these organizations. Conducts investigation of offenders. Chief of the special section is responsible only to the chief of the echelon.

osoby upolnomochenny

Special representative.

a) Designation given to an officer of the Red Army counterintelligence organization Smersh, an officer of the Ministry for State Security, or an officer of the Ministry of Interior, who is assigned a special mission.

b) Designation given to an officer who carries out duties connected with special inspection (see Osobyaya Inspektziya) in lower echelons of the Soviet intelligence services, in particular those of counterintelligence organizations.

Osoby Sekretnosti

See Otdel Osoby Sekretnosti.

Osoby Soveshchaniye

Special Council (of the Ministry of State Security).

Established in 1938, when the so-called Troikas (three-man councils) of the central NKVD and of NKVD offices in the provinces (UNKVD) were dissolved.

The organization includes a president, two deputies, and thirty members. Any three men from the organization, including the president or the deputies, can constitute a Troika.

Functions: To try political criminals, traitors to the Soviet, and foreign agents, if special secrecy is required for the case.

Cases for trial must be referred to the Special Council by an MGB office not lower than an MGB department (UMGB) or by a Red Army counterintelligence unit of the Smersh, not lower than a UKR NKO Smersh. The Special Council theoretically can impose no more than ten years' imprisonment, but in reality even the death penalty is imposed.

(Details on this organization remain to be clarified.)

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Osobý Otdel NKGB

OO NKGB

CI-SR/44

Special Section of the People's Commissariat of State Security. During wartime, the OO NKGB assigns NKGB branches to all partisan headquarters and units (see partizanskoye dviženiye).

Functions: To maintain general surveillance over the partisans in order to check their reliability. To carry on counterintelligence and counterespionage activities.

Established at the beginning of the Soviet-German war, as part of the People's Commissariat of the Interior (NKVD); transferred in April or May 1943 to the People's Commissariat of State Security (NKGB). Probably de-activated at present. Reactivation possible in the event it is desired to form pro-Soviet or Soviet-sponsored detachments on foreign soil.

Osobý Otdel NKVD

OO NKVD

Special Sections of the People's Commissariat of the Interior. Until April/May 1943 the counterintelligence organization of the NKVD within the Red Army, then succeeded by the Smerish (see GUKR).

Organization and missions identical with those of the present Smerish. It may be assumed that since the present Ministry of the Interior (MVD) continues to be responsible for the reliability of its Frontier Guards and Interior Troops, it still directs Special Sections (OO MVD) to keep general surveillance over those troops.

Osvedomitel

Osv, O

Informant. (Sometimes written sekretny osvedomitel - secret informant.) Most common type of personnel used by the Soviet intelligence service, particularly by counterintelligence agencies.

After having signed up to work for one of the organizations of the Soviet Intelligence or Counterintelligence Service, the secret informants are employed on general surveillance tasks and minor missions. Six to eight informants are placed under the supervision of a chief informant (see rezident), to whom they report periodically. As a rule, the informants do not contact the intelligence officer for whom they work.

Dense nets of secret informants are spread over the entire USSR by the

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Ministry of State Security, one informant to every fifteen inhabitants being the ratio. The Red Army and the Red Navy counterintelligence organization Smersh employ about one informant to every five or six soldiers. The Operative Groups (see Shtab Operativnoy Zoni) use one informant to every one hundred persons in the Soviet-occupied territories. The counterintelligence organizations of the Soviet satellite states also make use of this system, patterning theirs on the model of the MGB.

No shed light (on the case of a suspect by means of investigation).

Personnel section.

Part of all the higher echelons of Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence organizations. Responsible for the selection, training, employment, and supervision of intelligence personnel.

Counterintelligence Section of the People's Commissariat for Defense, Death to the Spies. 5

(For details on the highest headquarters of this organization, the general functions and the latest developments, see GUKR.)

a) Counterintelligence section of the NKO Smersh. Attached to army headquarters. Personnel is composed of 50 to 60 officers and officials, and 100 to 150 guards and miscellaneous personnel. The principal subsections are used for surveillance of army headquarters, counterintelligence and counterespionage operations, surveillance of lower echelons of the Smersh, and of headquarters and support troops, and for investigations and interrogations.

b) Counterintelligence Section of the NKO Smersh, attached to corps headquarters. Personnel is composed of seven to eleven officers who carry out the functions of the above-mentioned subsections, with the exception of those related to counterespionage work. Eighteen to twenty guards are also used.

(See Otdeleniye Kontrrazvedki NKO Smert Shmolenam.)

Section of Special Secrecy.

Section of higher, army intelligence headquarters (GK and RIs of the

osveshchat

otdel kadrov

OK

Otdel Kontyrazvedki NKO,
Smert Shmolenam

OKR NKO Smersh

Otdel Osoboy Sekretnosti

OOS

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Red Army and Red Navy) charged with counterintelligence work for the protection of its own intelligence headquarters. This section works in close liaison with the corresponding units of the Army's counterintelligence organization, the Smersh.

Section for Political Security.

Otdel Politicheskoy
Bezopasnosti

A sub organization of the Central Committee of the Soviet Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (TSK VKP(b)).

The Section for Political Security is said to be the supervising political authority for the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Interior.

Signal section.

Otdel Svyazi

Attached to higher intelligence headquarters to maintain w/T communications with agents.

OS

Counterintelligence Subsection of the People's Commissariat for Defense, Death to the Spies.

Otdeleniye Konttrazvedki TKO
Smert Shpionam

(For details on the highest headquarters of this organization, general functions, and latest developments, see Glavnoye Upravleniye Konttrazvedchik TKO Smert Shpionam.)

OKR NKO Smersh

a) Counterintelligence Subsection of the TKO Smersh, attached to division headquarters. Personnel is composed of five to seven officers for the division's Smersh, plus one officer for each regiment and each battalion under the command of the division. Fifteen to twenty guards are also used. This unit maintains general surveillance over troop units; it does not do any counterintelligence or counterespionage work.

b) Counterintelligence Subsection of the TKO Smersh, attached to brigade headquarters. Personnel is composed of eight officers, including the Smersh representatives in the subordinate battalions. The unit also uses twenty men for guard work and other duties. Its missions are the same as those under a) above.

(See Otdel Konttrazvedki TKO Smert Shpionam.)

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Otdel'nyya Razvedivatel'naya
Grupa

Independent reconnaissance group.

ORG

General term for reconnaissance units of the reconnaissance sections within the RO organizations of the Red Army and Navy headquarters.

For further details see ORB.

Otdel'nyy razvedivatel'nyy
bat'alyon

Independent reconnaissance battalion.

ORB

Special troop unit of the reconnaissance subsection of an army intelligence section (RO), activated probably only in wartime. Its personnel is composed of young, able-bodied soldiers, the majority of them being members of the Communist Party or Party Youth (Komsomol). The strength of the ORB is approximately 350 men. Members receive thorough political indoctrination to prevent them from deserting; they are taught tactics of reconnaissance, the use of arms and of enemy equipment. The battalion is armed with light and heavy machine guns.

Functions: To make reconnaissance of enemy lines, operational area of the enemy, and enemy troops. To raid enemy headquarters, for the purpose of capturing documents and soldiers for questioning (see Yazik).

During the Soviet-German war, the reconnaissance battalions were rarely employed at full strength, but were split up into groups of two to five men who sometimes penetrated as far as twenty miles behind the enemy lines. Qualified soldiers were often transferred to the agentura of the RO, for assignment to agent work.

partizani

Partisans.

(For intelligence tasks of the Partisan Movement, see Partizanskoye Dvizheniye.)

Partizanskoye Dvizheniye

Partisan Movement.

During the Soviet-German War, one of the most important organizations taking part in Soviet intelligence activities.

The partisan movement was planned after the end of the Russian Revolution.

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The organization was activated by the Communist Party and the People's Commissariat of the Interior (see Chetvertoye Upravleniye), in Winter 1942.

In all territories threatened by a German invasion, para-military organizations (see Istrebitelny Otryad) were mobilized by the local Communist Party committees and by the local branches of the NKVD. When the enemy approached, these para-military units retreated to the forests and formed partisan units, which were then reinforced by drafting other personnel and by accepting stragglers or strays from the Red Army. The units then carried out raids on German troop quarters, troop transport columns, and communication lines. Even during the early stages of the war, the partisan controlled areas served as bases and hide-outs for agents of the Soviet intelligence services.

In 1942 a central partisan organization was set up. This included the following partisan intelligence units:

In Soviet territory -

Intelligence dept (RU) of the Central Staff of the Partisan Movement
Intelligence section (ROs) of the various staffs of the partisan movements in the different republics.

Intelligence sections (ROs) of the representations of the partisan movements of the different Soviet republics. Attached to different army group headquarters.

Intelligence officers of the Operative Groups of the partisan movements of the different Soviet republics. Attached to the various army headquarters.

In enemy territory -

Intelligence sections (ROs) of all partisan headquarters down to battalion
Intelligence officers of all smaller partisan units
Intelligence schools (sabotage, espionage, W/T) were attached to most of

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these intelligence sections. For counterintelligence organizations attached to these headquarters, see OO NKGB.

Functions: To fight enemy forces in the rear of enemy lines. To reconnoiter for the Red Army. To obtain military as well as political and economic information.

Present Status: Whereas the organization exists only in wartime, its organizing offices within the Ministry of State Security, particularly the Fourth Department (see Chetvertoye Upravleniye), and the Communist Party are prepared to reactivate the Partisan Movement anywhere, at any time. The Partisan Movement is a latent component of Soviet espionage and sabotage services, and it can become active whenever needed.

Partisan detachment of any size, but usually not exceeding the strength of a battalion. The PO has one intelligence representative who is responsible to the intelligence section (RO) of the higher partisan unit, and it has one counterintelligence representative from the Ministry of State Security (MGB).

The PO collects detailed information on surrounding enemy forces, does sabotage work, and spreads political propaganda and terrorism among the civilian population.

To throw over, in the sense of sending an agent across the front line or the frontier.

Transfer of material.

1. Pertains to an agent's handing over espionage documents to an intelligence officer.

2. Pertains to transfer of files on an agent or suspect, from one intelligence authority to another.

Transfer to a new contact man.

Denotes the transfer of responsibility for a newly recruited agent or informant from the recruiting officer to a resident or intelligence officer.

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partizanskyy otdel

PO

perebroška (agentov)

peredacha materiala

P/M

peredatka svyaz

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CI-SE/ML

pereverbovat

Re-recruit.

To turn an agent.

pereverbovka

Re-recruiting.

The turning of a foreign agent.

perlustratsiya
korrespondentsii

Abbreviation used in the records of suspects who are to have their correspondence censored.

PK
perlustriruyemuyu
korrespondentsiyu konfiskovat

Abbreviation used on the mail of suspects to indicate that the censored mail is to be confiscated.

PKK

perlustriruyemuyu
korrespondentsiyu neprevit
adressatu

Abbreviation placed on mail of suspects after it has been censored. Indicates that the mail can be sent to the addressee.

PKA

pochtovy kontrol

Mail censorship.

PK

pochtovy yashchik

Mail box.

Secret place where two or more persons working on intelligence missions deposit their letters and reports. A person may be recruited for the specific purpose of using him as a "mail box".

See DBK.

po gran upr

See Upravleniye Pogranichnykh Voisk.

pogranichny rassledivatelny
punkt

Border intelligence post.

PRP

Most advanced, peacetime border units of the Red Army Intelligence Service. Stationed along the Soviet frontiers. Responsible to the local intelligence

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section (RO) of the military district where the PRP is located.

Personnel includes five to seven officers and several W/T operators.

Function: To collect information continuously on territory beyond the frontier - which is always considered a possible theatre for Soviet military operations. To collect detailed information on foreign fortifications, troops, transportation, and on the political and economic situation in foreign countries.

Special Function: To seize foreign documents.

To carry out these functions, the PRP uses agents, establishes agent nets abroad, maintains a pool of agent reserves against the eventuality of war, and maintains close liaison with the border intelligence service of the Frontier Guards (Pogran Upr) and with the organs of the Ministry of State Security (MGB).

Political Bureau.

politburo

Office of the Central Committee of the Soviet-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks). Directs the domestic and foreign policies of the USSR. One of its committees, the Secret Party Control (see TPK) decides, among other things, what are to be the aims and general targets of the Russian Intelligence Service. See TSK VNP (b).

politicheskoye otdeleniye

Political subsection of an army division's headquarters.

PO

See GIAPUR for details.

Politicheskoye Upravleniye

Political Department (at army group headquarters). Sometimes written Politicheskoye Upravleniye Fronta and abbreviated PUFK.

PU

The PU works in close liaison with the Army intelligence department (RU) and with the counterintelligence department (UKR Smersh) of an army group. The PU furnishes to these departments the names of politically reliable soldiers who can be used as agents, and it cooperates with the RU and the UKR Smersh in ferreting out those who are politically unreliable.

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For political organization and missions connected with its work in the Red Army, see GLAVPUR.

Politicheskoye Upravleniye
Fronta

See Politicheskoye Upravleniye.

PUFR

politicheskyy kontrol

Political control.

PK

Abbreviation frequently used in the records and files on persons suspected of political offenses.

politicheskyy otdel

Political section of army headquarters.

PO

See GLAVPUR for details.

pomoshnik nachalnika shtaba 2

Second deputy to the chief of staff of a regiment (see GRU).

(also written 2. pomoshnik
nachalnika shtaba)

PNSH 2

The PNSH 2 is charged with obtaining information on the enemy situation up to seven miles behind enemy lines. For this purpose the second deputy has at his disposal one infantry reconnaissance platoon and one cavalry reconnaissance platoon. (See razvedivatelnyy vzvod.)

pomoshnik upolnomochennogo
pom upolnomochennyy

Junior representative.

The functional designation of an officer, usually a second lieutenant or a first lieutenant of the Ministry of State Security (MGB), or of the Red Army counterintelligence organization Smerch, or of the Ministry of the Interior (MVD).

praktikant

Apprentice agent.

Usually an agent who after receiving complete training is given missions of minor nature, as preparation and training for missions of a more important nature.

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proizvesti telefonnoye
podslushivaniye

M

prosvечivat

provodnik

punkt, zbora i otryavki
doneseniy

PZ

rabota sredi okruzheniya

radio division

radio pelengatsionnaya
tochka

radio razvedka

radio stantsiya

ratsiya

radio usel

Telephone conversations are to be monitored.

The abbreviation M, representing the above, is usually written in Soviet investigation files when the telephone conversation of a certain individual is to be monitored.

To screen a person.

Guide.

Accompanies or directs agents across the front line or border.

Relay or intermediate station of an intelligence radio net.

Acts as collection and dissemination center for intelligence reports.

Agent work in the surrounding areas (see storozhevaaya agentura).

Radio division or unit.

A part of the Red Army Central Intelligence Administration (CHU). Charged with monitoring and pin-pointing foreign W/T agent communications.

The radio division is not a division in the military sense of the word.

Direction-finder radio station.

Usually a motorized substation of the radio division.

Radio reconnaissance by means of W/T interceptor or direction-finder stations.

General term for any W/T receiving and transmitting station.

Chief station of a wireless net.

Attached to the intelligence departments (HU) of army groups and to the

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Intelligence sections (RO) of armies. Maintains communications with W/T agents of these intelligence organizations and with the central radio stations (see Tsentralnyy Radio Uzel) of the Central Intelligence administrations (GRUs) of the Red Army and Navy.

Special W/T main station of the intelligence department (RU) of an army group.

Functions: To maintain agent communications, to advance motorized W/T posts to the frontier where the W/T posts act as intermediate stations between W/T agents abroad and the main station.

Radio set used for intelligence purposes.

W/T reconnaissance company.

Part of the signal regiment attached to the intelligence department (RU) of an army group. Has ten to twelve advance listening posts near the frontier or front line. Detected foreign W/T senders are pin-pointed by special detachments of the reconnaissance company.

Report for approval.

Report made by a recruiting officer or agent of the Soviet intelligence service to his superior officer, to obtain permission to recruit an agent. The agent to be recruited is the subject of the report.

District section of the Ministry of State Security (see MGB).

In the districts, the MGB is frequently represented only by a representative from the MGB.

District section of the Ministry of the Interior (see MVD).

Scout sent out on military reconnaissance. (See voiskovaya razvedka.)

radio uzel osobogo
naznacheniya

RU OSNAS

radiooperatúra razvedki

Rap/R

radio-razvedivatel'naya rota

report na sanktsiyu

rayonnyy otdel MGB

RO MGB

rayonnyy otdel MVD

RO MVD

razvedchik

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razvedivatel'naya rota

Rt

Reconnaissance company.

Combat reconnaissance unit employed by the intelligence subsections of Red Army divisions (see RO). Strength: 100 to 150 men. Equipment: Submachine guns and hand grenades.

Functions: To make aggressive reconnaissance of enemy positions up to a depth of seven miles behind the lines. To capture enemy soldiers, for questioning.

razvedivatel'noye upravleniye

Intelligence department.

RU

General term used for any department of Soviet organizations charged with handling military espionage and sabotage.

The following intelligence departments are most often referred to:

1. The intelligence department (RU) of an army group. In peacetime, this department is not so active as the GRU. During wartime, the RU is one of the most active of Soviet intelligence organizations, its function being to obtain as complete a picture as possible of the enemy situation and the operational area where the enemy is located. To do this, the RU employs qualified agents and agent groups in areas from two hundred miles to three hundred miles deep in enemy-held territory. The RU directs the reconnaissance activities of subordinate intelligence echelons and it conducts the interrogation of important P's. It has main sections for espionage, frequently with an attached subsection for sabotage, and numerous operative outposts, which are advanced towards the front line; reconnaissance; evaluation and dissemination; W/T communication, with attached W/T reconnaissance company; agent training, with attached intelligence schools where espionage, sabotage, and W/T agents are trained. In peacetime it is preferred to train the individual alone in konsul'skaya kvertira, if possible. The personnel of the RU consists of thirty to thirty-five officers and others. (For survey on Red Army intelligence service, see Glavnoye Razvedivatel'noye Upravleniye.)

2. Intelligence Department (RU) of Naval Fleet Headquarters. This department is charged with obtaining naval information on the foreign

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countries adjacent to or near the area where the units of the Russian fleet may be operating. Its organizational functions are similar to those of an army RU. During wartime, an additional section was added for operational intelligence. This section used its agents to support the activities of the Red Army intelligence services.

3. Intelligence Department (RU) of the Central Administration of the Frontier Guards of the Ministry of the Interior (MVD). For general functions, see Upravleniye Pogranichnikh Voisk. (Details about the above-mentioned department are not known.)

4. Intelligence Department (RU) of the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement. This wartime organization directs the intelligence activities of lower partisan echelons. It sends out comparatively few but highly qualified agents and agent groups. It maintains numerous partisan schools where intelligence personnel and agents are trained. Details about the organization are not known.

(For survey on partisan intelligence, see partizanskoye divizleniye.) 51

Intelligence Department of the Ministry of State Security.

This designation is sometimes given to the Foreign Department of the MGB.

(See Inostrannoye Upravleniye.)

Reconnaissance group.

Subordinate units of the task forces and reconnaissance troops employed by the reconnaissance subsections of the various intelligence sections (ROs).

Intelligence section or subsection.

A general term used for a section or a subsection of any Soviet organization charged with carrying on espionage and sabotage activities for military purposes.

The following intelligence sections are most often mentioned:

1. ROs of the Red Army Intelligence Service (see GRU), which are stationed

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Razvedivatelnoye Upravleniye
MGB

RU MGB

razvedivatelnyy dozór

RD

razvedivatelnyy otdel (or)
razvedivatelnoye otdeleniye

RO

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at Red Army headquarters lower than that of an army group (see RU). These include the intelligence sections of military districts, particularly border districts. An RO of a military district is responsible to the Central Intelligence Administration of the Red Army (GRI). Its functions include gathering military information about foreign countries which border the respective military district and staging border incidents which can be officially ascribed to the activities of bandits. The military district RO has three main subsections, one for carrying on reconnaissance, a second for creating border incidents, and a third for evaluating and disseminating information. The military district RO establishes numerous border intelligence posts (see PRP) along the frontier.

2. The intelligence sections (ROs) of armies. The RO of an army uses agents, task forces, and reconnaissance units to reconnoiter the enemy situation to a depth of approximately one hundred miles behind the enemy lines. It has three main subsections, one for agent work, a second for reconnaissance, and a third for evaluation and dissemination of information. It also has a wireless station. Its personnel includes ten to fifteen officers and some miscellaneous help.

3. The intelligence sections of an army corps. A corps RO is similar in structure and function to that of an army RO, but is set up on a smaller scale.

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4. The intelligence subsections (ROs) of divisions. A divisional RO reconnoiters the enemy situation up to fifteen miles behind the enemy lines. It uses the divisional reconnaissance company (see RP) for this purpose.

It does not have any agents of its own and it is required to assist agents of higher intelligence authorities in crossing the front line. Its personnel includes three to four officers and an interpreter.

5. The intelligence subsections (ROs) of a brigade. These are similar in structure to those of a divisional RO, but are on a smaller scale.

The Red Navy Intelligence Service also has ROs. These are stationed at navy headquarters lower than that of fleet (see RU). The ROs have a structure and function similar to those in the Red Army Intelligence Service.

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CL-SK/ML

The Frontier Guards Intelligence Service also has ROs. (For a survey of the organization and its functions, see Upravleniye Pogranichnikh Voisk; for intelligence department of the Frontier Guards, see RU.) There are two types of ROs with the Frontier Guard Intelligence Service. One comprises the intelligence sections (ROs) of the border districts. These have subdivisions for counterintelligence work on the Russian side of the border area of the particular section (see Gruppa RO pri kordonu); for direction of the operations of subordinate counterintelligence divisions at the level of a border detachment; for espionage work in the border area of the foreign country, within a radius of one hundred miles from the border (see Gruppa RO za kordonom); for evaluation and dissemination of information; and for W/T communications. One liaison officer from the Red Army intelligence section of the local military district is attached to each of the border district ROs.

The border detachments have intelligence subsections (ROs). These in turn have subsections for counterintelligence work in the border area, with outposts stationed along the border; subsections for espionage, in which case agents are sent as deep as seventy miles into foreign territory; and subsections for W/T work.

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The Partisan Intelligence Service has ROs which come into existence only during wartime or when political tension exists in some area. (For survey of organization and function, see Partizanskoye Dvizheniye; for intelligence department of the Central Staff of the Partisan Movement, see RU.) The sections and subsections of this organization include intelligence sections of the various partisan group headquarters of the different republics of the USSR. The sections are responsible to the intelligence Department (Hf) of the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement. The functions of the sections include directing intelligence activities of lower intelligence echelons, using special agents to carry out intelligence and sabotage missions, supplying cadres to train partisan agents and saboteurs, and moving supplies for partisan agents into enemy territory.

There are intelligence sections (ROs) which represent the intelligence organizations of the partisan movements in the Ukraine, White Russia, etc. These sections are stationed at army group headquarters. Their functions are the same as those mentioned in the paragraph directly preceding. However, these sections are limited in scope to the operational area of

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the army group. The sections also coordinate with the Red Army on tactical and intelligence missions. These sections have intelligence subsections or intelligence representatives of the various partisan movements, who are attached to army headquarters (see Operativnaya Grupa Partizanskogo Divizheniya pri ... Armii). Finally, there are intelligence sections and subsections (ROS) with the various partisan headquarters in enemy territory. The general function of these sections includes collecting intelligence particularly of a military nature. To this end, these ROS use agents and combat reconnaissance units. The sections also support Red Army agents and other agents who use partisan headquarters as an operational base.

Razvedivatelny vzvod

Reconnaissance platoon.

Reconnaissance combat unit attached to the regimental intelligence officer (see PNSH 2). For function and equipment see RR.

Unit ranges approximately seven miles behind enemy lines.

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razvedka

Intelligence.

1. Refers to agent missions, primarily on espionage of a military nature.

2. Refers to military intelligence organizations performing espionage and minor sabotage activities.

3. Refers to reconnaissance carried out by military units.

(For the various kinds of razvedka, see agenturnaya razvedka, aktivnaya razvedka, blizhnaya razvedka, ekonomicheskaya razvedka, glubokaya razvedka, radio razvedka, voiskovaya razvedka, vozdushnaya razvedka.)

resident

Resident.

1. Person in the service of Soviet counterintelligence organizations (see MGB, GUKR). Acts as a chief informant and intermediary between the counterintelligence officer to whom he is responsible and a group of from five to ten informants (see O, s/o) assigned to him. The resident usually holds a cover position (shopkeeper, innkeeper, first sergeant in the army, laborer, craftsman, etc.)

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Rez
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2. Chief agent of a Soviet intelligence net in foreign countries. Always has a fixed post.

rezidentúra

Stationary net of informants and/or agent directed by a rezident.

rezident zapása

Reserve resident.

RZ

For each rezident of the Soviet surveillance and counterintelligence nets, one reserve resident is appointed.

See rezident.

sabotazh

Sabotage.

General term for destruction of any objects or for obstruction (non-compliance with) of orders.

Sabotage acts committed within the USSR are usually ascribed to foreign, anti-Soviet agents.

(For military sabotage, see Diversiya.)

sabotazhnik

Saboteur agent on a sabotage mission within the USSR.

sapog

Boot.

Slang term used by Soviet agents to denote identification papers, pass, personal document.

See lidovyy sapog, zheleznyy sapog.

satssepka

First information on a suspicious person.

Sekretno-Politicheskoye
Upravleniye

Secret Political Department.

SPU

Second department of the Ministry of State Security (GB). Combats all anti-Soviet elements, maintains surveillance over all groups suspected of being anti-Soviet. This surveillance includes illegal political parties or groups, national minorities, the clergy and the intelligentsia, and all cultural institutions of the USSR.

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To this end, the SPJ uses a very dense net of agents, residents, and informers.

Sekretno-Politicheskyy Otdel

Secret Political Section.

SPJ

Local branch of the Secret Political Department (SPJ) of the Ministry of State Security. Established in all regional offices of the Ministry of State Security (MGB).

sekretny osvedomitel

Secret informant.

Sek Os

See Osvedomitel.

SO

s/o

sekretny otdel

Secret section.

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SO

General designation of a secret section within the higher echelons of any Soviet surveillance or counterintelligence organization. Charged with safeguarding security and the reliability of intelligence personnel.

Because of its authority to investigate all intelligence officers, the SO is one of the most powerful sections within Soviet intelligence organizations, even though it takes no part in other intelligence activities.

The secret sections most often referred to are the SO of the Ministry of State Security (MGB) and the SO and Special Inspection Section of the Smeresh.

sekretny sotrudnik

Secret collaborator, secret denouncer.

Seksot,
SS

These persons are not regular recruits to an intelligence organization. Their aid is usually given in the form of a denunciation delivered to the surveillance and counterintelligence organizations of the USSR.

sever

North.

A type of radio set most frequently used by Soviet agents.

Sever bis, a second type of radio set used by Soviet agents.

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sever bis

See sever.

shkola agenturnoy razvedki

Military intelligence school for agents.

SHAR

shkola kontrrazvedki

Counterintelligence school.

SHKR

shpik

Observer.

Usarist equivalent for secret informant (see osvedomitel.)

shpion

Spy.

shp

The term is applied only to foreign agents.

shpionazh

Espionage conducted by foreign agents.

shp

Abbreviation applies also to the foreign agent.

Shtab Operativnoy Zoni

Also known at present as Shtab Serov.

Headquarters for secret work in the Soviet occupation zones. Central Headquarters of the Soviet non-military intelligence and counterintelligence organizations in the Soviet-occupied zones in Germany and Austria. A divisional headquarters of MVD troops is attached as an executive arm.

The following echelons are under its control:

Oper Sektor

On a level with the Soviet Military Administration of a German Land and of the city of Berlin. A regimental headquarters of MVD troops is attached.

Oper Otkrug

On a level with the SVA of a German Regierungsbezirk. A battalion headquarters of MVD troops is attached.

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Oper Grupa

On a level with the SVA of a German Landkreis and city district. A company headquarters of MVD troops is attached.

Opor Upolnomochny In larger towns. A squad of MVD troops is attached.

The forerunner of the Shtab Operativnoy Zoni is the Operative Groups of the NKVD. These were activated after the battle of Stalingrad and were to pave the way for the Red Army by doing intelligence work in German-occupied provinces and, after receipt of these provinces, by uncovering collaborators and re-establishing the normal NKVD system. When the Red Army crossed the Soviet borders, these Operative Groups continued their tasks on foreign soil. In the liberated countries, they set up a Soviet control system on the pattern of the NKVD and NKGB, and they established similar security ministries and intelligence organizations, as, for example, the Czech Ministry of National Security (ZNB) and the Polish Ministry of National Security (KBP). At present, the territorial organization of these operative groups in Poland is directed by the Shtab Selivanovsky. In Germany, the territorial organization is under the Shtab Operativnoy Zoni headed by Gen Serov. According to still unconfirmed reports, the entire organization was put under the Soviet Ministry of State Security (MGB) in Spring or Summer 1946.

CO
M

Functions: To coordinate centrally all non-military Soviet intelligence activities in the occupied zones. This includes coordinating any work of the Smerch which pertains to surveillance of the civilian population (see storozhovaya agentyura). To collect intelligence of every nature in the Allied occupation zones and in western Europe. To maintain political surveillance over the native population of the Soviet zones and to eliminate anti-Soviet groups. To elevate Communist elements to leading positions.

Methods: Organizes a tight net of informants and agents in the Soviet zones of occupied countries, allegedly one informant to every one hundred persons. Screens all persons entering the Soviet zones, as to their possible connection with Allied intelligence services. Employs agents and agent nets in the Allied zones, in Allied armies, in DP and UNRRA camps, among expellees, and in circles known to be anti-Communist.

The structure of the Shtab Operativnoy Zoni, with respect to its sections, is

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said to correspond to the departments and sections of the Ministry of State Security (MGB).

Its personnel includes officers assigned from the various departments of the MGB, from the Red Army counterintelligence organization Smersh, and from the Ministry of the Interior (MVD), particularly from the Security Troops and Frontier Guards. (The foregoing information is subject to further clarification.)

Shtab Selivanovskago

Selivanovsky Headquarters.

Headquarters of the Soviet non-military intelligence system and counter-intelligence security system in Poland. Named after its present commanding officer, Gen Selivanovsky the successor to Gen Serov. No other name known as yet.

For development and functions, see Shtab Operativnoy Zoni.

Shtab Serov

See Shtab Operativnoy Zoni.

CS
LS

slédovatel

Investigating attorney of the investigation bureau (see SB) of a Soviet counterintelligence organization. Charged with interrogating suspects and with preparing their case for the prosecutor.

Sledstvennoye Buro

Investigation bureau.

SB

General designation for the investigation department or section of Soviet counterintelligence organizations.

Investigates and thoroughly interrogates suspects. Prepares legal dossier and makes transfer of the case to state prosecutor - a military tribunal conducts the trial. Especially secret cases are transferred to the Special Court of the MGB (see Osobyoye Soveshaniye). The SB collects information about the organizations and methods of foreign intelligence services. During wartime, it interrogates PWs of intelligence interest.

Methods: In difficult cases, the Buro conducts uninterrupted interrogations, some of which last up to seventy-two hours. Uses stool pigeons.

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The abbreviation SB usually applies to the investigation departments of the Ministry of State Security (MGB) and to the investigation departments and sections of the different echelons of Smersh (see GUKR).

slédstvennoye délo

Investigation file.

SD

Contains all information about a suspect, which has been obtained by the investigator or interrogator handling the case.

Smert Shpionam

Death to the Spies.

Smersh

Short name for the Red Army and Navy counterintelligence organization (see GUKR NKO Smersh).

sovershenno sekretno

Top secret.

SS

Soviet Ministrov

Council of Ministers.

SM, SMK

Until Spring 1946, the Council of People's Commissars.

The Soviet Ministrov is the national cabinet of the USSR, and is composed of all the ministers. At present, its chairmen (Stalin) and eight vice-chairmen are also members of the Politburo, thus maintaining the influence of the Party over the state administration.

For Communist Party influence on intelligence policies, see TPK.

Sovetskaya Voennoyey
Administratsiya

Soviet Military Administration established in the Soviet occupation zones of Germany and Austria. For intelligence organization in these zones, see Shtab Operativnoy Zoni.

SVA

spetsialny otdel

Special section.

SO

A general term for any section of the Soviet intelligence service, carrying out special tasks. The term is most frequently applied to the following special sections of the Ministry of State Security:

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спісак

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старшы аддзавател

Slang expression for to liquidate a person.
Senior investigating attorney.

старшы ўполномоченны

Member of the investigation bureaus (see SB) of Soviet counterintelligence services such as the Ministry of State Security (MGB) and Smersh.
Senior representative, literally senior plenipotentiary.

старознавая агентура

Functional designation of an officer, usually a captain, of the Ministry of State Security (MGB) or of the Smersh, or of the Ministry of the Interior (MVD).
Guard agentyura.

Surveillance net of the Red Army counterintelligence service Smersh (see GUKR), drawn around Red Army headquarters and units in order to protect them from penetration by anti-Soviet elements and foreign agents among the civilian population.

1) First Special Section (1st SO). The File section. Keeps all files and documents pertaining to Soviet citizens and foreigners in or out of the USSR, who were at any time suspected of anti-Soviet behavior or found guilty of it. The 1st SO also keeps records of all persons who are in the Soviet intelligence service or who have been in it, excepting the records of persons connected with the Red Army intelligence services.

2) Second Special Section (2nd SO). Section for Operative Technique. Handles W/T equipment and documents for agents; handles interception of foreign agent W/T communications; handles controls of government and intelligence communications.

3) Third Special Section (3rd SO). Operative Section. Shadows suspects (see NW) and conducts house searches.

4) Fourth Special Section (4th SO). Consors the mail of suspected persons.

5) Fifth Special Section (5th SO). Cryptograph section.

To write off.

Slang expression for to liquidate a person.

Senior investigating attorney.

Member of the investigation bureaus (see SB) of Soviet counterintelligence services such as the Ministry of State Security (MGB) and Smersh.

Senior representative, literally senior plenipotentiary.

Functional designation of an officer, usually a captain, of the Ministry of State Security (MGB) or of the Smersh, or of the Ministry of the Interior (MVD).

Guard agentyura.

Surveillance net of the Red Army counterintelligence service Smersh (see GUKR), drawn around Red Army headquarters and units in order to protect them from penetration by anti-Soviet elements and foreign agents among the civilian population.

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stuk

The knock.

Slang term for secret informant.

(See osvedomitel.)

svi'danye

Rendezvous.

See na svi'danye.

svyaz na dubok

Communication via the mail-box.

See DBK.

svyaznik

Intermediary.

A person acting as go-between for communications between two agents.

Tainy Partiy'ny Kontrol

Secret Party Control.

TPK

A secret organization within the Politburo. Not officially mentioned in any Russian tables of organization. The existence of the TPK is known to very few persons in the USSR. Even members of the higher echelons of the Soviet Secret Service do not know of it. It is believed that the TPK directs the secret agent net which keeps the highest officials of the State and Party under surveillance. It indirectly affects the aims and policies of the principal Soviet institutions, including the intelligence services.

According to unconfirmed reports, the TPK now has Stalin as over-all coordinator. Beria as head of all intelligence operations within the USSR, and Valenkov as director of all affiliated Communist parties abroad.

See Tsk TPK (b).

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tehnicheskyy personal

Technical personnel.

General term for all Soviet intelligence personnel not connected with agent work.

See operativnyy personal.

Stroller.

Person shadowing a suspect.

Three-man council.

See Osobyey Soveshchaniye.

See Operativnaya Troika.

Target agentura.

Agent or net of agents directed against a specific person or group of persons.

The recruiting of a person, with the intention of using him for work on one particular target.

See agentura tselevaya.

Central Committee of the Soviet-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks).

Permanent party consisting of seventy-one members and sixty-eight candidates elected by the Soviet-Union Party Congress.

The Central Committee selects three bodies: The Secretariat, the Org (Organization) Bureau and the Politburo. These three bodies practically run the Party as well as the State, their most important members holding the top positions in the Council of Ministers and in the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. The Secret Party-Control Office (SPK), a sub office of the TsK VKP (b), may be considered the office which has behind-the-scenes control of the Soviet Intelligence Service.

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Tsentralny Radio Uzel

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Tsentralny Shtab
Partizanskogo Divizheniya

Central Radio Station of the Red Army Central Intelligence Administration (GRU). Maintains communications with all lower echelons of the army intelligence service, as well as with the W/T agents of the GRU. Operates W/T stations at the Soviet borders, where the stations are usually attached to the Border Intelligence Posts (see PRP) and are used as intermediate stations between agents on long-range missions and the central station.

Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement.

War-time organization for central control of all partisan headquarters and units. Responsible to the Central Committee of the Communist Party (see Tsk VTP (b)). Works in close liaison with the Ministry of State Security (MGB), as well as with the Red Army. For its intelligence organization, see Partizanskoye Divizheniye.

Preparatory School for Staff Officers.

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Uchilishche Podgotovki
Komandirov Shtabnoy Sluzhbi

Govername for the intelligence academy of the Red Army, which trains Red Army intelligence officers and highly qualified agents.

Normal period of training is two years. There are three courses of graded difficulty.

uchonnoye delo

Inactive file.

UD, Uch D

A file used for persons who have been the object of an investigation because of their anti-Soviet behavior. These persons include DPs, former DPs, all persons barred from the Communist Party, and all counterintelligence suspects. The files are kept by the First Special Section of the Ministry of State Security (see 1st SO).

Ugolovny Kodeks RSFSR

Criminal Codex of the Russian Soviet Republic, promulgated in 1926.

UK RSFSR

Paragraph 58 of the Codex pertains to all counterrevolutionary and political offenses, including espionage and sabotage.

Uley

Beehive.

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Where can partisans be found here? Password of the Partisans

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Upravleniye Konttrazvedki
(KBF) Smersh

Counterintelligence Department of the (Red Baltic Fleet)..., Death to the Spies.

UKR (KBF) Smersh

(The counterintelligence departments attached to the different headquarters of the Red Baltic Fleet insert into their official designation, the abbreviated name of the fleet to which they are attached.)

The organization (and its functions) is similar to that of the counterintelligence departments of the army groups. See UKR NKO Smersh.

Upravleniye Konttrazvedki,
NKO Smert Shpionam.... Fronta

Counterintelligence Department of the People's Commissariat for Defense, Death to the Spies, attached to the ... army group.

UKR NKO Smersh ... Fronta

For controlling headquarters and its functions, see UKR NKO Smersh.

The main sections of the UKR NKO Smersh ... Fronta each have separate functions. One section maintains surveillance over army group headquarters personnel in order to protect them against anti-Soviet elements, another section directs and supervises subordinate Smersh units, a third section carries on counterintelligence and counterespionage activities, a fourth section investigates, and a fifth section trains personnel and agents.

The personnel of the organization is composed of eighty to one hundred officers and others of unknown number.

Department of the Ministry of State Security (MGB). Local office of the MGB, for an oblast (a Russian province).

UMGB

Upravleniye MGB

Department of the Ministry of the Interior (MVD). Local office of the MVD, for an oblast (a Russian province).

UMVD

Upravleniye MVD

Upravleniye Osobikh
Otdelov NKVD

Department for the Special Sections of the People's Commissariat of the Interior.

UOO NKVD

Until April/May 1943, this office supervised all the special sections of the NKVD (see OO NKVD) within the armed forces of the USSR. It was then

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reorganized into the present Central Counterintelligence Administration of the NKO Smerzh (see GUKR NKO Smerzh).

Upravleniye Pogranichnikh
Votsk

Department of the Frontier Guards (of the Central Administration for the Frontier Guards and Interior Troops of the Ministry of the Interior (MVD)).

Pogran Upr
UPV

The Frontier Guards have a border intelligence service of their own which works in close liaison with the local branches of the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of the Interior, as well as with the intelligence sections (ROs) of the Red Army military districts.

The organization of the Pogran Upr is as follows:

Intelligence Dept (RU)

of the Central Administration of the
Frontier Guards and of the Interior Troops.

Intelligence Section (RO)

of the Dept of the Frontier Guards in
the MVDs of the various Soviet republics.

Intelligence subsections (RO)

of the border detachments.

CO
CO

Deputy Intelligence Chief

of the border commands.

Functions: Primarily, to conduct espionage in the area beyond the frontier, usually not beyond one hundred miles (see gruppa RO za kordonom). To perform counterintelligence duties along the Russian border, on the Russian side (see gruppa RO pri kordone).

Uzel svyazi

Communication point.

US

A point from which communications between agents and their parent organizations are maintained.

See radio uzel.

verbovat

To recruit an agent or informant.

verkovka

The act of recruiting an agent or informant.

V-Ka

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verbovschnik

Recruiting agent or officer.

Visshaya Shkola MVD

High School of the Ministry of the Interior.

VSh MVD

Such schools are known to be in Moscow and Leningrad.

The VSh MVD trains higher MVD officials, up to and including subsection chiefs. The courses take two years. Students are carefully selected.

It may be assumed that, as was the case until May 1943, the VSh MVD still teaches subjects connected with police work, as well as with intelligence work, and that it therefore also trains the officials of the Ministry of State Security and those of the Smersh (see VKR MVD).

Visshaya Shkola Rezervida

Intelligence High School.

Intelligence academy of the Red Army, usually referred to by its cover name Preparatory School for Staff Officers (see UPKShS).

Visshiy Kurs Rabotnikov MVD

Advanced courses for officers of the Ministry of the Interior.

VKR MVD

Special courses of the MVD given to section chiefs and deputies of the MVD. Three-month courses in which the students are taught all details of the MVD organization and its functions. Courses may be attended only after the student has completed studies at the High School of the MVD (Visshaya Shkola MVD).

Until April 1943, the curriculum included the police functions of the NKVD, as well as the intelligence functions of the OGPU (Central Administration for State Security, predecessor of the MGB). It is not known whether these courses were removed from the curriculum at the time the NKVD transferred its intelligence functions to the MGB, in 1943.

vnedreniye

Penetration.

Favorite method of the Soviet intelligence services. Done by planting agents in the center of anti-Soviet groups and intelligence organizations or by recruiting members of such groups. The purpose of this type of penetration is to carry on subversive work. The collection of information connected with such work is considered of secondary importance.

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vnútrennaya kontrazvedka

Inner counterintelligence work.

Vojska Vnutrenney Otkhrani

Security work to prevent penetration by foreign agents.
Troops for Inner Security.

VOKHR

Special troop units of the Ministry of Interior (MVD). Responsible to the Central Administration for Security of the Interior and of the Border Areas (see GU PVO) of the MVD.

Functions: Carries out administrative and security measures of the MVD (combats anti-Soviet partisans, evacuates unreliable national minorities, guards transports of prisoners and especially important government installations).

The interior troops are also used by the Ministry of State Security, as executive units for its intelligence and counterintelligence organizations. During the war, the interior troops were frequently used as a kind of field police to prevent desertions and to combat enemy agents and parachutists. At the beginning of the German-Soviet war, the NKVD had sixteen divisions of Interior Troops.

voiskovaya razvedka

Army reconnaissance. Carried out by task forces and special reconnaissance units of the intelligence sections (ROs) at army level, by the intelligence subsections (ROs) of the divisions, and by the intelligence officers (PNSH 2) of the regiments.

VR

voynennaya agentura

Military agentura.

Net of informants and/or agents of the Red Army counterintelligence organization Smerish (see GUKR), within Soviet troop units.

Not to be confused with guarding agentura (see storozhevnaya agentura).

voynennaya tsenzura

Military censorship.

VTs

The abbreviation VTs is frequently found on the mail of suspects (e.g. "this letter has to pass VTs").

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Voyenny Otdel GPU

VO GPU

vozdushnaya razvedka

Military Sections of the State Political Department (see GPU). Charged with the surveillance and protection of the armed forces of the USSR against foreign agents. Forerunner of the Smersh (see GUKR).

Air reconnaissance.

Section of the Red Army Intelligence Service (see GRU); possibly responsible to the Department for Combat Reconnaissance of the Central Administration (GRU). The subsection is probably responsible to the Section for Central Reconnaissance of the Intelligence Department of army headquarters.

Extraordinary Commission (of the Soviet Union). (The Cheka.)

Established 1917 to detect and liquidate counterrevolutionary civilian and military elements in the USSR. The original organization out of which the present Ministry of State Security (MGB) has developed. In 1922 the Cheka was reorganized and renamed the GPU.

Society of the Soviet Union, for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.

One of the comparatively few Soviet organizations officially permitted contact with foreign countries.

This organization exchanges scientific, cultural, and technical information or experiences with foreign countries, for the purpose of supporting and promulgating Soviet scientific and cultural life. It maintains a press agency which provides cultural information about the Soviet Union to foreign news agencies and to libraries and other cultural institutions. By 1928, the VOKS had established twenty-one societies in eleven foreign countries, and it was working in close liaison with more than 2,000 cultural organizations in foreign countries.

The VOKS is a channel by which Soviet agents penetrate the scientific and cultural life of foreign countries.

(Laying) / tongue.

PW's captured in combat or kidnapped from their own lines by special reconnaissance units. (see ORB, ORG) for the purpose of extracting information from them.

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yezik (zhivoy)

VOKS

Vsesoyuznoye Obshchestvo
Kulturnoy Svyazi s Zegranitsey

(Vserossiyskaya)
Chrezvichaynaya Komissiya
Ch K, (V) CH K
(pronounced Cheka)

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zader zhen'ye

Detention, custody. Effected without an arrest warrant.

Practically all intelligence suspects are taken into custody. An arrest warrant is served only after they have been investigated.

zagrani'chny agent

Foreign agent.

zakordónny agent

Agent for beyond the frontier.

Soviet agent assigned to foreign countries.

zasilka

The act of sending an agent on a mission.

zhelezny sapog

Iron boot.

Slang term used by Soviet agents to denote a genuine pass.

See sapog, lipovy sapog.

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AD	агенту́рное де́ло.
Ag	а́гент.
Ag/d	а́генту́рное де́ло.
Ag-deló	а́генту́рное де́ло.
Ag V	а́гент вну́тренник.
A/S	а́нтиво́етский.
BRD	бе́регово́й ра́диора́зведывате́льный отря́д.
BRRO	бе́регово́й ра́диора́зведывате́льный отря́д.
Ch K	че́резвиче́йная ко́мисси́я. (known as the Cheka.)
	Also abbreviated to Ch K.
	Восро́сшая че́резвиче́йная ко́мисси́я.
DBK	ду́бка.
DF	де́ло фо́рмуля́р.
DR	де́ло ра́зрабо́тки.
DFO	1. Доро́жно-Транспо́ртный О́тдел.
	2. Доро́жно-Транспо́ртное О́тделе́ние.
DTU	Доро́жно-Транспо́ртное У́правле́ние.
EXO	1. Э́кономиче́ский О́тдел.
	2. Э́кономиче́ское О́тделе́ние.

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IKO/R	ekonomicheskaya razvedka.
EKU	Ekonomicheskoye Upravleniye.
GB	Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti.
GLAVPUR	Glavnoye Politicheskoye Upravleniye (Revolutsionnogo Voenenago Soveta)
RKKA	
Gor Otdel' MGB	Gorodskoi Otdel' MGB.
Gor Otdel' MVD	Gorodskoi Otdel' MVD.
Gor Ray Otd MGB	Gorodskoye Rayonnoye Otdeleniye MGB.
Gor Ray Otd MVD	Gorodskoye Rayonnoye Otdeleniye MVD.
GPU	Gosudarstvennoye Politicheskoye Upravleniye.
GRU	Glavnoye Razvedivatelnoye Upravleniye.
GRUB	Glavnoye Upravleniye Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti.
GRUR MVS Smersh	See Glavnoye Upravleniye Konttrrazvedki NKO Smeri Shpionam.
GRUR NKO Smersh	Glavnoye Upravleniye Konttrrazvedki NKO Smeri Shpionam.
GRUR NKVD MVS Smersh	Glavnoye Upravleniye Konttrrazvedki Navodnogo Kontsearista Voenno-Morskogo Flota Smeri Shpionam.
GUM	Glavnoye Upravleniye Miltitsi.
GRUP	Glavnoye Upravleniye Politicheskoy Propagandi.
GRUPVO	See Glavnoye Politicheskoye Upravleniye.
	Glavnoye Upravleniye Pogranichnoy Vnutrennei Otkrani.

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QIS
INO
INU
IO
K
KA
KF
KK
KND
Komsomol
KPP
KPZ
KR
K/R
KRO
KRU
KTPX

Glavnoye Upravleniye Svyazi.
Inostranny Otdel.
Inostrannoye Upravleniye.
Intelligentskiy Otdel.
Top secret. (Russian word not known.)
Placed on Soviet documents to indicate that contents are top secret.
konspirativnyy adres.
konspirativnaya familiya.
konspiretivnaya kvartira.
kontrolno nebluydatelnoye delo.
Kommunisticheskiy Soyuz Molodezhi.
kontrolnyy propuskniy punkt.
kamora predstavitel'nogo zaklucheniya.
kontrrazvedka.
kontrrazvedchik.
1. kontrrazvedivatelnyy otdel.
2. kontrrazvedivatelnoye otdeleniye.
kontrrazvedivatelnoye upravleniye.
Komissiya Tainogo Partiy'nogo Kontrolya.
(See Tainy Partiy'nyy Kontrol.)

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M
ID
MID
MGB
MPS
MTD
MVS
MVT
ND
NEGB
NKID
NKM
NKO
NKVD
NKVMF
NKVT
NN
NR
O

lichnoye delo (agent).

Proizvesti telefonnoye podslushivaniye.

The particular word represented by the letter M is not known.

Ministerstvo Inostrannikh Del.

Ministerstvo Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti.

Morskoy Punkt Svyazi.

Ministerstvo Vnutrennikh Del.

Ministerstvo Voornuzhennikh Sil.

Ministerstvo Vneshney Torgovli.

nablyudatelnoye delo.

Narodnyy Komissariat Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti.

Narodnyy Komissariat Inostrannikh Del.

See Narodnyy Komissariat Voenno-Morskogo Flota.

Narodnyy Komissariat Oborony.

Narodnyy Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del.

Narodnyy Komissariat Voenno-Morskogo Flota.

Narodnyy Komissariat Vneshney Torgovli.

naruzhnoye nabludenkiye.

nachalnik razvedivatel'nogo otdela.

osvodomitel.

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OGPU	Obyedínennoye OGPU.
OK	See Gosudarstvennoye Politicheskoye Upravleniye (GPU). otdel kádrov.
OKR NKO Smeresh	Otdel Kónttrazvedki NKO, Smert Shpiónen or Otdeleniye Kónttrazvedki NKO, Smert Shpiónen.
OO MYD	Osoby Otdel MYD.
OO NKGB	Osoby Otdel NKGB.
OO NKVD	Osoby Otdel NKVD.
OOS	Otdel Osoboy Sekretnosti.
OP	operativny punkt.
Oper Grúpa	Operativnaya Grúpa.
Oper Grúpa SVA	Operativnaya Grúpa Sovétskoy Vóyennoy Administratsii.
Oper O	operativny otdel.
Oper Okrug SVA	Operativny Okrug Sovétskoy Vóyennoy Administratsii.
Oper Organ	Operativny Organ.
Oper Sektor SVA	Operativny Sektor Sovétskoy Vóyennoy Administratsii.
op/up	oper upolnomochenny.
ORB	otdelny razvedivatelny batalyon.
ORG	Otdelnaya Razvedivatel'naya Grúpa.
OS	1. Otdel Syzasi. 2. Osoboy Sekretnosti (See Otdel Osoboy Sekretnosti).

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OSH MVD

Osv

Obshechaya Shkola MVD.
osvodomitel.

PK

1. perlustre'tsiya korrespondentsil.

2. politichesky kontrol

3. pochtovy kontrol.

PKA

perlustrirovannuyu korrespondentsiyu napravit adressatu.

PKK

perlustrirovannuyu korrespondentsiya konfiskovat.

P/M

peredacha materiyala.

PNSH 2.

pososhnik nachal'nika shtaba 2.

PO

1. Partizansky Otdel.

2. politichesky otdel.

3. politicheskoye otdeleniye.

Po'strem Upr

Upravleniye Postranichnikh Vol'sk.

Politburo

Politicheskoye Buro.

Pom Upolnomochenny

Pomoshtnik Upolnomochenny.

PRP

postranichnyy razvedivatelnyy punkt.

PU

Politicheskoye Upravleniye.

PURR

Politicheskoye Upravleniye Fronta.

Seo Politicheskoye Upravleniye.

punkt zbora i otprazhki denezheniy.

PZ

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Rep/R

ratsiya

RD

Rez

RO

RO MGB

RO MVD

RR

RU

RU OSNAZ

RZ

SB

SD

Sek Os

Sek sot

SHAR

SHKR

Shp

radioapparatnaya razvedka.

radio stantsiya.

razvedivatelnyy dozor

rezident.

Also abbreviated Rad or R.

1. razvedivatelnyy otdel.

2. razvedivatelnoye otdeleniye.

rayonnyy otdel MGB.

rayonnyy otdel MVD.

razvedivatel'naya rota.

razvedivatelnoye upravleniye.

radio úzel osobogo naznacheniya.

rezident kuznasa.

sledstvennoye buro.

sledstvennoye delo.

sekretnyy oovedomitel.

Sekretnyy sotrudnik.

shkola agenturnoy razvedki.

shkola kontrrazvedki.

1. shpion.

2. shpionazh.

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SM

Sovetskaya Khabarovsk

Smerish

Smert shpionam.

See Glavnoye Upravleniye Kontrrazvedki NKo Smert Shpionam.

SMK

Sovet Ministrov.

SO

1. sekretny osvedomitel (also abbreviated s/o).

2. spetsialny otdel.

For details on SO 1, SO 2, etc., see spetsialny otdel.

SO 1

SO 2

SO 3

SO 4

SO 5

SPO

Sekretno Politicheskoy Otdel.

SPT

Sekretno Politicheskoye Upravleniye.

SS

1. sekretny sotrudnik.

2. sovershenno sekretno.

SVL

Sovetskaya Voennoy Administratsiya.

TPK

Tainy Partiny Kontrol.

Tsk VKP (b)

Tsentralny Komitet Vserossiyskoy Kommunisticheskoy Partii (bolshhevikov).

Uch D

uchotnoye delo.

UD

uchotnoye delo.

UKR KBK Smerish

Upravleniye Kontrrazvedki (IBK) Smert Shpionam.

UKR NKo Smerish

Upravleniye Kontrrazvedki NKo Smert Shpionam.

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VSh MVD

VR

VOKS

VOKHR

VO GPU

VKB MVD

V-Ka

V Ch K

US

UPV

UPKShS

UOC NKVD

UMVD

UMGB

UK RSFSR

UKR NKO Smerzh ... Fronta

Upravleniye kontrrazvedki NKD Smerzh Shtabnoy Sluzhby ... Fronta

Ugolovny Kodeks RSFSR

Upravleniye MGB

Upravleniye MVD

Upravleniye Osoblich Otdelov NKVD

Uchilishche Podgotovki Komandirov Shtabnoy Sluzhby

Upravleniye Pogranichnikh Voysk

Uzel svyazi

Ysrossiskaya Chrezvichaynaya Komissiya

See Chrezvichaynaya Komissiya

Verbovka

Vishniye Kursi Rabotnikov MVD

Voyenny Otdel GPU

Voyska Vnutrenney Otkhrani

Vsesoyuznoye Obshchestvo Kulturnoy Svyazi s Zagranitsy

Voyakovnaya razvedka

Vishnaya Shkola MVD

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B/L: GAGGH, Office of Chief of Intelligence, 23 March 1947, Subj: White Paper of Industrialist Mechnberg.

III-4117

1st Ind.

Headquarters, Counter Intelligence Corps Region III, 970th CIC Detachment, APO 757, U.S. Army, 3 April 1947

TO: Commanding Officer, Hqs. 970th CIC Det., European Command, APO 757, U.S. Army (Attn: Capt. ())

1. Reference is made to Sub-Region Warburg report, dated 21 March 1947, subject: The Relationship Between Russian Intelligence and Soviet Foreign Policy in Europe Following World War I Down to the Present Time, which report was forwarded to your office by 1st indorsement of this office dated 2 April 1947.

2. Inclosed is a photostatic copy of RECHBERG's text as intercepted by Civil Censorship Division.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

1 Incl: n/c

Tel: Mechnberg 2183
Mr ()

()
Special Agent, CIC
Operations Officer



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B/L: Hqs. CIC, USFET, Region III, S/R Marburg, 26 March 1947,
Subj: The Relationship Between Russian Intelligence and Soviet
Foreign Policy in Europe Following World War I

III-4117

1st Ind.

Headquarters, Counter Intelligence Corps Region III, 970th CIC
Detachment, APO 757, U.S. Army, 2 April 1947

TO: Commanding Officer, Hqs. 970th CIC Det., European Command,
APO 757, U.S. Army (Attn: Capt. ())

Attention is invited to the inclosed report, Sub-Region Marburg,
dated 21 March 1947, subject as above, and particularly to para-
graph 3 thereof.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

1 Incl: MOIC (quad)

Tel: Friedberg 2183
Mr. ()lh

Special Agent, CIC
Operations Officer



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OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT
FOR GREATER HESSE

Office of Chief of Intelligence

APO 633, U.S. Army

28 March 1947

SUBJECT: White Paper of Industrialist Rechberg

TO: CIC, Region III, Bad Nauheim, APO 757, US Army

1. Transmitted for your interest is a letter constituting
CCD intercept B/L7/3156 together with photostat copies of the
inclosures thereto.

2. RECHBERG's death has been reported during the last
sixty days.

FOR THE DIRECTOR:

(b)(7)(C)

Incl: as stated

(
Lt Colonel FA
Chief of Intelligence

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HEADQUARTERS
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS
UNITED STATES FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER
REGION III (BAD NAUHEIM)

SUB-REGION MARBURG
APO 757 822

26 March 1947

111-M-1126

SUBJECT: **The Relationship Between Russian Intelligence and
Soviet Foreign Policy in Europe Following World War I**

TO : CHIEF, COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS, REGION III (Bad NAUHEIM),
APO 757, U.S. ARMY.

- (b)(7)(C)
- ☒ FOR YOUR INFORMATION.
 - ☐ FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION.
 - ☐ FOR INVESTIGATION.
 - ☐ REPORTS OF INVESTIGATION TO BE SUBMITTED TO THIS OFFICE.
 - ☐

Incl: MOIC dtd 21 March 1947
Subj. as above ()

(b)(7)(C)

TEL: MARBURG 2838

SPECIAL AGENT, CIC
Commanding

1ST IND

CHIEF, COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS REGION III, (BAD NAUHEIM), APO 757, U.S. ARMY,
TO:

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HEADQUARTERS
SUB-REGION MARBURG
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS REGION III

APD 757

21 March 19 47

MEMORANDUM FOR THE OFFICER IN CHARGE

SUBJECT: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE AND
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY IN EUROPE FOLLOWING WORLD WAR I
DOWN TO THE PRESENT TIME.

Re: Arnold RECHBERG

1. Attached copies of a treatise by Arnold RECHBERG, Well known German author, made from a draft which had been forwarded to acquaintances of the author, were turned over to this office by O-127-III-M, Giessen (L51/G62), Kreis Giessen, Sub Region Marburg. Copies of this treatise, Incl. 1 in German and Incl. 2 in English, are forwarded for information, Intelligence Branch.

O-127-III-M gave the following information concerning the background of Arnold RECHBERG:

2. a. Arnold RECHBERG was born on 9 October 1879 at Hersfeld (L51/H35), as the son of a clothing manufacturer. By profession he was a sculptor, and for many years lived in Paris, France, as "Associe de la Soc. Nat. d. beaux arts, Paris". He became engaged as an author, and perhaps because of his numerous acquaintances and connections, frequently delved in politics. After the first World War, his name was mentioned in connection with the "Jungdeutscher Orden" and other organizations. As an officer in the Hussars, he participated in the first World War, and after the collapse of the German army, he became active in the "Freikorps". He had personal contacts with numerous politicians, statesmen, and officers of high rank. In industrial circles, he also gained prominence, especially in the textile and fertilizer industries. His name was mentioned in political books which appeared before the second World War, as political advisor to General LUDENDORFF and Mr. [redacted] leader of the "Jungdeutsche Orden". He was known to have advocated a German alliance with the Western powers, and his treatise deals with this subject, and brings about the dangers that Russia appears to represent in Europe in ever increasing measures.

b. On 8 March 1947, O-127-III-M learned that according

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to a notice in the "Darmstaeter Echo", Arnold RECHBERG recently died at his home at Kampfenhausen, BAVARIA.

3. Agent's Notes, Comments, and Recommendations:

Notes: None

Comments: This treatise by Arnold RECHBERG apparently has not been printed. It seems that as a manuscript it has been distributed to the acquaintances of the author. It is very likely that RECHBERG, because of his political prominence, might be well known to Allied authorities, and might have been questioned by CIC or other intelligence agencies some time in the past concerning his connections and relations with high Nazi officials. Nevertheless, the information contained in his treatise may not have placed in the hands of the proper agencies.

Recommendations: None

Tel: Marburg 2838

(b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(C)

SECRET Agent CIC
MANDING

Special Agent CIC

- Incls: 1. German copies of the treatise by Arnold RECHBERG
2. English translations of the treatise by Arnold RECHBERG

Distribution: 6 copies Forwarded
1 copy File

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Arnold Reehberg

Kampfenhausen am Starnberger See
Haus Reehberg.

(b)(7)(C)

Der große bolschewistische Angriff gegen Europa scheiterte nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg. Die europäischen Nationen, obwohl durch den Krieg erschöpft, hatten noch soviel Lebenskraft und Widerstandsfähigkeit. In Deutschland wurde die bolschewistische Revolution durch eine Hand voll Freiwil- ligen aus der völlig zusammen gebrochenen kaiserlich- preussischen Armee niedergeschlagen. Es war das Korps des [] in Norddeutschland, das Garde-Kavallerie- Korps, in dessen Stab ich in Berlin als Rittmeister diente, das Korps des Generals Märker in Mittel- deutschland, das Korps [] in Oberbayern [] ist niemals selbst Soldat gewesen, aber die bayrischen Bauern folgten ihm blindlings, das Korps des Generals von Epp, ebenfalls in Bayern und einige andere. München, wo die russische Revolution durch den Bolschewisten Levine' 1919 eine Sowjetregierung ausgerufen hatte, konnte befreit wer- den und der Bolschewismus wurde nach und nach in ganz Deutschland niedergekämpft. Die deutsche demokratische Regierung, vertreten durch den Reichswehrminister Noske, hatte nur geringen Einfluss auf alle diese Ereignisse, sie hat auch später gegenüber den deutschen Soldaten keine Autorität gehabt und ist niemals von ihnen geachtet worden.

In Ungarn konnte die bolschewistische Rote Armee, welche 1920 Polen angriff, um den überall in Deutschland emper- flackernden bolschewistischen Aufständen die Hand zu reichen, bei Warschau von dem französischen General Weygand und dem polnischen Marschall Pilsudsky besiegt werden.

Während der Kämpfe der deutschen Freiwiligen, der soge- nannten Freikorps, gegen die Bolschewisten, war der General Hoffmann deren politischer Führer. Der General Hoffmann war während des Krieges 1914/18 der welt aus genialste militärische Führer. Er ist es gewesen, der tatsächlich den Plan für die Schlacht bei Tannenberg entworfen hat, die eine der größten glänzendsten Schlachten der Weltge- schichte gewesen ist. Der Feldmarschall von Hindenburg und General Ludendorff, die beide erst in Ostpreussen

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eintrafen, a. Hoffmann den Aufmarsch für die Schlacht vollendet zu haben nur dessen Plan ausgeführt. Während der zwei letzten Jahre des Krieges 1914/18 war General Hoffmann unter dem nominellen Oberbefehl des Prinzen Leopold von Bayern, der eigentliche Führer der deutschen Armee in Russland. General Hoffmann verhandelte mit den Bolschewisten den Waffenstillstand und den Friedensvertrag von Brest-Litowsk. Er erkannte sogleich, dass der Bolschewismus die furchtbarste Gefahr war, die jemals die zivilisierte Welt bedroht hat. Infolge dessen war der General Hoffmann überzeugt, dass Europa und die Welt nur gerettet werden konnten, wenn sich die zivilisierten Mächte gegen die Gefahr, welche sie alle bedrohte, einigen würden.

General Hoffmanns Plan und die Verhandlungen darüber.

General Hoffmann und ich arbeiteten gemeinsam einen Plan aus, dass Großbritannien, Frankreich und Deutschland zu einem engen Bündnis, beruhend auf der Verschmelzung ihrer industriellen, militärischen und politischen Interessen kommen sollten. Dieses Bündnis, gestützt durch die finanzielle Macht der U.S.A., würde den großen europäischen Staaten die Aussicht bieten, ihre Wohlfahrt wieder zu gewinnen und dadurch gleich ein wichtiger Markt für die amerikanischen Erzeugnisse zu werden. Dieser Plan wurde von General Ludendorff gebilligt, der als Führer der deutschen Patrioten angesehen wurde. Damals hatten General Hoffmann, General Ludendorff und ich Verhandlungen mit dem General Malcolm, dem ersten englischen Geschäftsträger nach dem Kriege 1914/18 und eben mit Monsieur () und Monsieur () später auch mit General Nolle, den französischen Vertretern. Obgleich die Vertreter von England und Frankreich unsere Pläne unterstützten, erkannten ihre Regierungen die bolschewistische Gefahr nicht hinreichend. General Hoffmann, General Ludendorff und ich entschlossen uns daher, mehrere Interviews in der deutschen, französischen, ~~XXX~~ englischen und amerikanischen Presse zu veröffentlichen, um die Lage darzulegen. Viele dieser Interviews habe ich als Dokumente aufbewahrt. Sie erregten großes Aufsehen, aber es war nicht zu vermeiden, dass auch der Kreml über die Pläne des Generals Hoffmann informiert wurde.

Der Kreml ändert die Taktik.

Infolgedessen änderte der Kreml die Taktik. Vor allen Dingen suchte der Kreml Führung mit der deutschen Reichswehr. Der Kreml hatte erkannt, dass die deutsche demokratische Regierung nicht in der Lage war, die Führer der Reichswehr ernstlich zu beeinflussen. Die Bolschewisten fanden einen sehr intelligenten Vermittler in dem Obersten Nicola, dem ehemaligen Chef des Nachrichtendienstes in der kaiserlich deutschen Armee, der schon während des Krieges 1914/18 gewissermaßen der Verbündete der Bolschewisten gewesen ist. Auf seine Veranlassung kamen die bolschewistischen Führer von der Schweiz durch Deutschland während der Kerensky-Revolution nach Russland fahren. Der Oberst Nicola hat die Führer der Bolschewisten mit der Mentalität der deutschen Generale vertraut gemacht, die sehr verschieden von bolschewistischer Mentalität ist. Infolgedessen konnten die Führer des Bolschewismus unschwer Argumente finden, um die Generale, welche damals die Reichswehr kontrollierten, zu beeindrucken. Die deutschen Soldaten, ~~XXX~~ Offiziere ebenso wie die Unteroffiziere und Mannschaften, hatten während des Krieges ihre Pflicht getan. Sie alle fühlten sich tief erniedrigt durch den Friedensvertrag von Versailles und dadurch, dass Deutschland entwaffnet, ein machtloses Land geworden war und alles Ansehen in der internationalen Politik verloren hatte. Die Bolschewisten haben die Generale der deutschen Reichswehr glauben gemacht, dass die Lage nach 1918 der von 1806 sehr ähnlich sei, als Napoleon Deutschland insbesondere Preussen niedergeschlagen hatte und das 1815 Deutsch-

b.w.

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und Preusse nur durch die Hilfe Russl d's ihre Stellung zurück erorbern konnten. Deutschland und Russland sollten also nochmals ein Bündnis gegen die Westeuropäischen Mächte schliessen, welche unterstützt durch die USA, Deutschland versklaven wollten. Die Generale der Roten Armee behaupteten ausserdem, dass die bolschewistische Rote Armee früher oder später den Bolschewismus in Russland stürzen und wieder eine National-Russische Armee werden würde und dass Russland und Deutschland verbündet, die beiden mächtigsten Länder der Welt sein würden.

Alle bolschewistischen Argumente waren selbstverständlich lediglich Propaganda, denn die Generale und Offiziere der Roten Armee sind völlig im Netz der GPU. Aber die Propaganda wurde von den deutschen Reichswehr - Generalen geglaubt.

Bündnis zwischen der Deutschen Reichswehr und der Roten Armee.

Es hat sich tatsächlich ein Bündnis zwischen der Reichswehr und der Roten Armee entwickelt. Die Reichswehr konnte in Russland all die Waffen erproben, die ihr durch den Friedensvertrag von Versailles verboten waren. Und die Reichswehr sandte nach Russland sehr befähigte deutsche Offiziere des ehemaligen deutschen Generalstabes, die beschäftigungslos geworden waren und ebenso hervorragende Unteroffiziere. Sie alle haben die Rote Armee organisiert. Veranlasst durch die Reichswehr hat die deutsche Schwerindustrie den Russen dabei geholfen, eine mächtige Kriegsindustrie aufzubauen.

Obgleich ich den General von Seeckt, den Oberbefehlshaber der deutschen Reichswehr, und den General von Schleicher, seinen politischen Berater kannte, konnte ich beide nicht davon überzeugen, dass sie vom Kreml dupiert wurden, dass der Kreml lediglich Deutschland in einen neuen Krieg jagen wollte, in dem Deutschland, damals unzureichend gerüstet und Rohstoffe entbehrend wiederum geschlagen würde, dass der Kreml nicht den Sieg sondern die Niederlage Deutschlands wolle, um Deutschland für den Bolschewismus sturmreif zu machen und zugleich durch den neuen Krieg die Widerstandskraft aller europäischen Staaten zu brechen. Das Argument, das die Generale von Seeckt und von Schleicher den Generalen Hoffmann, Ludendorff und mir entgegenhielten war, dass wir - obwohl in der internationalen Presse gehört - die Unterstützung der englischen, französischen und amerikanischen Regierungen nicht erreichen könnten. So wurde Deutschland mehr und mehr in eine Politik des Selbstmordes verwickelt.

Industrielle Verschmelzung der grossen Europäischen Länder.

Mehr Erfolg hatte der Hoffmann-Rechberg-Plan in der industriellen Verschmelzung der grossen europäischen Länder. Da die Industrieführer von Deutschland, England und Frankreich die Vorteile, die dieser Plan für alle drei bedingte, nicht sogleich erkannten, mussten ich viele Interviews in der französischen, englischen und amerikanischen Presse veröffentlichen, von denen die meisten noch in meinem Besitze sind. Ebenso hatte ich zahlreiche Verhandlungen mit englischen und französischen Industrieführern, so mit Mr. von der "Arbed" in Luxemburg, Mr. () vom Etb., Pohlmann, mit () und () von der Imperial-Chemical-Industrie, mit () und vielen anderen.

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Ausserdem hatte ich Unterredungen mit französischen und britischen Staatsmännern, denn ich war mir klar darüber, dass solche Riesenkonzerne nur mit Zustimmung der Staatsmänner verwirklicht werden konnten. Ich hatte daher Aussprachen mit Mr. () Mr. () Mr. () und mit () der damals der führende Mann im Englischen auswärtigen Amt war

Sie alle haben mit mir übereingestimmt. Diese Verhandlungen sind in der deutschen und internationalen Presse erörtert worden und mehrere französische Minister haben dafür in der französischen Kammer geredet.

Zusammenarbeit der deutschen, französ. und britischen Schlüssel-Industrie.

1926 wurde das erste französisch deutsche Industrie-Bündnis zwischen der deutschen Kali-Industrie, in der ich, als beteiligt, unmittelbar Einfluss hatte, und der französischen Kali-Industrie unterzeichnet. Nachdem sich dieses Kalibündnis als sehr vorteilhaft für beide Parteien erwiesen hatte, folgten die Schwer-Industrie von Deutschland, Frankreich, Belgien und Luxemburg, () sich in der Internationalen Rohstahl Gemeinschaft zusammenschliessen. Zwischen der Chemischen Industrie von Deutschland und Frankreich sind ähnliche Übereinkommen getätigt worden.

Am 28. August 1929 veröffentlichte die britische Zeitung Daily Mail einen sehr eingehenden Artikel über diese Entwicklung und warf die Frage auf, ob Grossbritannien sich davon ausschliessen könne. Dieser Artikel löste eine sehr interessante Erörterung zwischen den britischen Industrie-Führern in der Daily Mail aus, in deren Folge die meisten englischen Industrien sich den Deutsch-Französischen Industrie-Allianzen angeschlossen haben.

Marschall Foch's Plan.

Während meiner Verhandlungen mit Mr. () der erkannte, dass ein gigantisches deutsch-französisches Industrie-Bündnis nicht ohne weitreichende politische und militärische Konsequenzen bleiben könne, wurde ich von ihm mit Marschall Foch in Verbindung gesetzt, dessen Ansichten Mr. () wissen wollte. Marschall Foch ist ein sehr ausgesprochener Feind Deutschlands gewesen. Als ich ihn aber zum ersten Male im Jahre 1923 gesprochen habe, hat der grosse französische Soldat ein erstaunliches Verständnis für die bolschewistische Gefahr gehabt. Er war infolgedessen zu der Schlussfolgerung gekommen, dass die alten Gegensätze zwischen den europäischen Nationen überholt seien und dass ihre industrielle Zusammenarbeit durch ein militärisches Bündnis garantiert werden müsse. Marschall Foch und ich haben den folgenden Plan zusammen ausgearbeitet: 90

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Zwischen der französischen und der deutschen Armee sollte ein Verhältnis von 5 : 3 festgelegt werden, bei gleicher Rekrutierung und gleicher Bewaffnung der Armeen. Ausserdem sollte ein Oberkommando aus französischen und deutschen Generalen geschaffen werden, mit dem Recht, im Frieden beide Armeen zu besichtigen und im Kriege deren Führung zu übernehmen. In jedem deutschen Stab vom Divisionsstab aufwärts - sollte ein französischer Stabsoffizier und in jedem französischen Stab vom Divisionsstab aufwärts ein deutscher ()

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-sein deutlicher Stabsoffizier kommandiert werden. Dadurch wäre materiell völlig unmöglich geworden, dass ein neuer französisch-deutscher Krieg, weder von Frankreich noch von Deutschland aus vorbereitet werden könnte. Sobald dieses deutsch-französische Militärbündnis, dessen Bedingungen von General Hoffmann und General Ludendorff vorbehaltlos gebilligt wurden, abgeschlossen sei, sollte England eingeladen werden, sich anzuschliessen. Dabei sollte es England überlassen werden, die Stärke seiner Armee selbst zu bestimmen. Ausserdem schlug Marschall Foch ~~xxx~~ ein gleichzeitig abgeschlossenes Abkommen zwischen Deutschland-England und Frankreich vor, um ein Verhältnis auch zwischen den Flotten der drei Länder festzulegen, ebenfalls unter gegenseitiger Kontrolle. Der Marschall ist dabei so weit gegangen, dass England den Oberbefehl über die 3 Flotten übernehmen sollte. Der französische Marschall hat mir ausserdem vorgeschlagen, meine Auffassung in dem französischen offiziellen Militärorgan "La France Militaire" darzulegen. Ich bin der erste deutsche Offizier gewesen, der damals in dieser Zeitung eine Anzahl Aufsätze zugunsten eines deutsch-französischen Militärbündnisses veröffentlicht hat. Allerdings konnte Marschall Foch seinen grossen Plan nicht öffentlich für eine derartige Neuorientierung der französischen Politik einsetzen, ohne sicher sein, dass die deutsche Regierung und die deutsche Reichswehr vorne herein zustimmen würde. Herr ein persönlicher Freund von mir, der damals deutscher Aussenminister war, hat mit Marschall Foch durchaus übereingestimmt. Das Bündnis zwischen der deutschen Reichswehr und der bolschewistischen roten Armee war aber schon zu fest und Herr Stresemann hatte keineswegs die Macht irgendwie gegen den Willen der Reichswehr zu handeln. Es war ein harter Schlag für die von mir befürwortete Politik, als der General Hoffmann im Jahr 1927, sehr wahrscheinlich durch ein bolschewistisches Agenten vergiftet, gestorben ist. Der General Ludendorff hat von 1919 bis 1922 einschliesslich sucht, die Unterstützung der französischen, englischen und amerikanischen Regierung für unsere Politik zu erreichen. Nach mehreren Unterredungen, die General Ludendorff in meiner Gegenwart in Berlin mit den Botschaftern Mr. Laurant (Frankreich), Lord d'Abernon (Grossbritannien) und Mr. Houghton (USA) gehabt hat, die zwar alle unseren Auffassungen zustimmten, die aber von den Regierungen nicht bevollmächtigt waren, ein endgültiges Übereinkommen zu unterschreiben, verlor der General den Glauben, dass ein solches Übereinkommen heranreifen werde. Er ist infolgedessen dem extremen deutschen Nationalismus in die Arme getrieben worden, unter dem Hitler aufgetaucht war. So kam es, dass Ludendorff gegen meine Warnung in den Hitlerputsch 1923 verwickelt worden ist und ~~xxx~~ er hat bei diesem Abenteuer viel von seinem internationalen Kredit verloren. Später ist General Ludendorff an Krebs erkrankt und dadurch ist seine frühere grosse Intelligenz allmählich zerstört worden.

Die Gegensätze des Kreml.

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Innerhin war der Plan eines gigantischen deutsch-französischen bzw. englischen Industrie-Bündnisses nach einigen Jahren von Erörterungen darüber verwirklicht worden. Auch der Plan eines Militärbündnisses zwischen den drei Ländern wurde mehr und mehr günstig besprochen.

Der Kreml hielt es daher für notwendig, wirksam zu handeln. Der Kreml hatte damals etwa 50 Millionen Goldmark im Jahre unter den deutschen Nationalisten ausgegeben, von denen viele durch die

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Inflation verarmt und infolgedessen kauflüch geworden waren. Andere, ohne bestochen zu sein, hielten ein Bündnis zwischen Deutschland und den Westmächten grundsätzlich nicht für patriotisch. Auch einige deutsche Diplomaten von grossem Einfluss sind von Moskau gekauft worden und viele Journalisten in der deutschen Nationalen Presse. Obgleich ich ein wohlhabender Mann bin, konnte ich doch nicht gleiche Summen gegenüber der Aktion des Kreml ausgeben. Ich hatte damals in der deutschen und internationalen Presse enthüllt, wie die Bolschewisten die deutschen Nationalisten beeinflusst und bestochen haben, um Deutschland in einen neuen Krieg gegen die Westmächte zu treiben. Einer meiner Aufsätze ist im Kasseler Tageblatt vom 19. Mai 1929, ein anderer in der französischen Zeitung "Nouvelle" vom 20. 11. 1930 erschienen. Aber die Regierungen haben nichts getan, um die Katastrophe zu verhindern.

Der Kreml sucht einen Diktator in Deutschland.

Trotz allem gewann ich Schritt für Schritt an Boden und so hat sich der Kreml zu entscheidendem Handeln veranlasst gesehen. Der bolschewistische Diktator erkannte, dass der General von Schleicher, der politische Führer der Reichswehr, nicht der Mann war, um das Risiko eines neuen Krieges gegen die Westmächte auf sich zu nehmen. Stalin musste also einen finden, der als Diktator in Deutschland einen solchen Krieg anfangen würde. Hierfür kam damals der Kapitän () der bekannte Freikorpsführer, in Frage. Aber er war auf meiner Seite für den Hoffmann-Plan. Herr () der Führer des Stahlhelms, war weder intelligent noch energisch genug, um einen Diktator, wie Stalin ihn brauchte, zu werden. Ausserdem (war noch der Jungdeutsche Orden da. Aber der Führer, Hauptmann () war ebenfalls mein politischer Verbündeter.

Hitler taucht wieder auf.

Damals war Hitler, nachdem sein erster Putsch in München, am 9. 11. 23. misslungen war, der Führer einer kleinen Partei, die nicht mehr als 12 Reichstagsabgeordnete zählte und für bedeutungslos galt. Seine Partei machte aber am 14. 9. 1930 einen plötzlichen Sprung auf 107 Abgeordnete, was damals ein sehr überraschendes Ergebnis war. Als die Ergebnisse der Wahl, durch welche die Hitler Partei so stark geworden ist, bekannt wurden, frühstückte ich im Hotel Adlon mit General Schleicher und wir sprachen über Tagesneuigkeiten, damals auch über Hitler.

Stalin finanziert die Hitler-Diktatur.

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General von Schleicher sagte mir " Dass aus dem geheimen Reichswährungsfonds, der damals sehr erheblich war, an Hitler 40 Millionen Mark von ihm gegeben worden seien, so, dass Hitler, seine Partei und den Wahlkampf im grossen organisieren konnte. General von Schleicher erklärte mir, dass er die Absicht habe, die deutsche Armee wieder aufzurüsten, dass er einen Agitator brauche, um die öffentliche Meinung für eine solche Politik zu bearbeiten und dass Hitler der Mann sei, den er für eine solche Aufgabe brauchen könne. Und dann fuhr der General fort; " Wissen Sie Reichberg, w mir diesen Rat gegeben hat? Sie behaupten immer, dass die Bolschewisten unsere Feinde sind. Gerade das Gegenteil ist wahr, Stali

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hat sich iormieren lassen, dass die Lage mehr und mehr für Deutschland und Russland reif werden wird, weil England und Frankreich in ihrem törichtem Glauben an den Völkerbund ihre Rüstungen vernachlässigen. Aber um zu einer aktiven deutsch-russ Politik zu kommen, ist eine sehr schnelle Aufrüstung Deutschlands notwendig. Sie müssen sofort eine Kampagne ansetzen. Ich und Stalin glaube, dass Hitler der beste Mann dafür ist. Infolgedessen müssen Sie Hitler finanzieren."

Ich meinerseits erkannte sofort die wirklichen Absichten Stalins, aber der General glaubte mir nicht. Ich fügte hinzu, dass Hitler versuchen würde, selbst Diktator zu werden, und dass General von Schleicher Hitler rechtzeitig erschiessen lassen möge, andernfalls werde Hitler ihn erschiessen lassen. General von Schleicher antwortete mir lachend, dass ich manchmal doch total verrückt sei und dass Hitler nicht die militärische Macht in der Hand habe, sondern niemals Diktator werden könnte. Tatsächlich hat dann sehr bald Hitler den General von Schleicher überwältigt und hat ihn umbringen lassen, um sich eines unbequemen Zeugen zu entledigen. Als Hitler deutscher Diktator wurde, konnte Stalin sicher sein, dass er den neuen Krieg, den der Kreml brauchte, haben werde. Stalin war genau informiert über Hitler's ehrgeizigen Charakter und über seinen Mangel jeder tatsächlichen Kenntnis der internationalen Möglichkeiten.

Stalin treibt Hitler zur Verfolgung der Juden.

Ebenso ist Stalin - wie ich erfahren habe - sehr befriedigt davon gewesen, dass Hitler die Juden verfolgt hat. Oberst Nikolai, Stalins Verbündeter seit langer Zeit, übernahm nach der Machtergreifung Hitlers die Herstellung einer geheimen Verbindung zwischen Stalin und der neuen deutschen Diktatur.

Der deutsch-bolschewistische Pakt von 1939.

Als Hitler 1939 zögerte, das Kriegsrisiko zu laufen, provozierte ihn Stalin dadurch, dass er den bolschewistisch deutschen Vertreter im August 1939 von Stalin, Molotow und Ribbentrop unterzeichnet worden ist, veröffentlichte. Ich habe keine nähere Kenntnis über die Beziehungen Herrn von Ribbentrops zum Kreml, aber Herr v. Ribbentrop war von Oberst Nikolai beeinflusst, der ein geheimes politisches Büro in Berlin, Viktoriastrasse 51 hatte und der mit Leib und Seele der Mann von Stalin gewesen ist. Es ist Stalin gewesen, der den Krieg gemacht hat und Hitler ist von ihm dupliert worden.

Stalins Rechnung.

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Die Diplomatie von Stalin ist sehr kühn, aber auch sehr erfolgreich gewesen. Stalin brauchte einen neuen Krieg in Europa - Er konnte diesen Krieg nicht ohne die Wiederaufrüstung Deutschlands haben und nur, wenn Hitler der deutsche Diktator wurde, denn Hitler war der einzige Deutsche, der den Krieg riskieren würde. Andererseits war sich Stalin durchaus bewusst, dass ein wiederaufgerüstetes Deutschland und Hitler als Diktator eine Gefahr für Russland und den Bolschewismus selbst bedeuteten, aber er rechnete und hat richtig gerechnet, dass Hitler aus mehreren Gründen zu dem Krieg mit den westeuropäischen Ländern kommen werde und dass die deutsche Armee, sobald Deutschland in den Krieg gegen Frankreich, England und sehr wahrscheinlich gegen die USA verwickelt seien, den

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russischen Bolschewismus nicht mehr besitzigen und besiegen können dessen Rote Armee vom deutschen Generalstab selbst organisiert und ausgebildet worden ist. Der General Hofmann hat mir erklärt, dass ein deutscher Kampf gegen den russischen Bolschewismus mit der weitesten Ausdehnung des russischen Reiches zu rechnen habe. Russland ist so gross, dass es nicht entscheidend beschädigt wird, wenn auch gedehnte russische Länderstrecken von Deutschland besetzt würden und wenn es Millionen von Soldaten verlieren werde. General Hoffmann glaubte daher, ~~unmöglich~~ dass der russische Bolschewismus nur durch eine Invasion Deutschlands in Russland gestürzt werden könne, die mindestens den Ural erreichen müsste. Er war überzeugt, dass Deutschland für diese Invasion nicht stark genug sein werde. Der General würde es auch niemals für möglich gehalten haben, dass Deutschland mit irgend einer Aussicht auf Erfolg den russ. Bolschewismus bekämpfen könne, wenn die erwähnten Mächte dabei gegen Deutschland wären. Stalin brauchte sich also nicht davor zu fürchten, gegebenfalls von Hitler angegriffen zu werden, sobald als Hitler sich vorher in den Kampf gegen die Westmächte verwickelt hatte. Ausserdem hat Stalin seit vielen Jahren eine mächtige Kriegsindustrie hinter dem Ural aufgebaut, für eine deutsche Armee schwer zu erreichen. Stalin konnte ausserdem in Rechnung stellen, dass - je weiter die deutsche Armee in Russland eindringe, sie in ein immer stärkeres Missverhältnis zu dem Raum geraten müsste, in dem sie operieren und den sie besetzen wollte. Dies musste umso schlimmer werden, je mehr die deutsche Armee auch noch in anderen Ländern engagiert würde. Der endgültige Zusammenbruch war umso sicherer voraus zu sehen, als die angelsächsische Erzeugung von Kriegsmaterial von Tag zu Tag wachsen musste.

Meine Vorschläge an Hitler 1940 und meine erste Verhaftung.

Seitdem Hitler der deutsche Diktator geworden war, habe ich mich von der auswärtigen Politik zurückgezogen, denn ich war mir dessen bewusst, dass ich viele seiner Ansichten nicht teilen konnte. Ich habe auch nach der Niederlage Frankreichs 1940 im Interesse Deutschlands Hitler den Rat gegeben, dass er Frankreich einen grosszügigen Friedensvorschlag mit für Frankreich günstigen Bedingungen machen möge, wobei vor allem der territoriale Bestand Frankreichs nicht getastet werden dürfe. Hitler möge dann versuchen, ein enges Bündnis mit Marschall Pétain zu schliessen. Danach sollte Deutschland und Italien mit der Hilfe Frankreichs Grossbritannien den Frieden auf der Grundlage des britischen Vorkriegsstandes anbieten. Ich hielt es nicht für ganz unmöglich, dass die englische Regierung in der damals gegebenen Lage ein solches Anerbieten nicht ablehnen würde. Als Herr von Ribbentrop und Oberst Nikolai von meinen Vorschlägen hörten, die ihren Absichten und ebenso dem Interesse Stalins entgegengesetzt waren, haben sie ganz unerwarteter Weise erreicht, dass ich auf Hitlers Befehl mehrere Monate in Ehrenhaftung genommen wurde und es wurde mir verboten, mich weiter mit der auswärtigen Politik zu befassen. So hat der Kreml, der hinter Herr von Ribbentrop stand, erreicht, dass ich mundtot gemacht wurde. Nur Herr Frick, Hitlers Minister des Innern, hat - allerdings vergebens - versucht, mich zu unterstützen.

Hitlers Verhandlungen mit mir. 94

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Im Jahre 1943, als sich die militärische Lage Deutschlands verschlechterte, sandte Herr Himmler den () seinen nächsten Vertrauten zu mir () teilte mir mit, auch Herr

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Himmler sei überzeugt, dass ich Recht habe und dass der Führer suchen sollte, ein Uebereinkommen mit den Angelsachsen zu erreichen. Himmler liess mich fragen, ob ich ihm helfen würde. Ich antwortete, dass ich im Interesse Deutschlands vergessen wolle, wie ich behandelt worden war. Aber auch diesmal erwies sich Herr von Ribbentrop und Oberst Nikolai, die inzwischen Herrn Martin Bormann als Bundesgenossen erhalten hatten, der ein sehr einflussreicher Mann geworden war, mächtiger wie Himmler. Ich wurde zum zweiten Mal verhaftet und als Ehrengefangener nach Dachau gebracht. Aber Himmler setzte sich durch, sodass ich schon nach 14 Tagen wieder freigelassen wurde.

Himmlers Schwierigkeiten.

Ich erfuhr gleichzeitig, dass Himmler selbst in einer schwierigen Lage war. Er war Chef der Gestapo, aber in allem, was auswärtige Politik anging, hatte er den Befehlen des Herrn von Ribbentrop und des Herrn Bormann zu gehorchen. In den besetzten Ländern, in Frankreich, Polen und in allen andern, hatte er nur die Befehle auszuführen, die ihm von Ribbentrop und Bormann zugingen. Ausserdem wurde der wohlbegründete Verdacht gegeben, dass einige von den höchsten Beamten der Gestapo von Moskau bestochen waren, die Grausamkeit gegen ihre Opfer zu steigern, Grausamkeiten, die bis dahin nur von der bolschewistischen GPU angewandt worden sind. Derartige Handlungen mussten überall die Stimmung gegen Deutschland zu dessen Ungunsten sehr beeinflussen. Im Mai 1944 sandte Herr Himmler einen anderen seiner Vertrauten, den (b)(7)(C) zu mir nach Kampfenhaus. Wir hatten eine mehrere Stunden lange Unterredung und er versicherte mir, dass Himmler diesmal seine Auffassung durchsetzen werde. Aber noch einmal blieben Herr von Ribbentrop, Herr Bormann und Oberst Nikolai die Stärkeren und ich wurde zum dritten Mal als Ehrengefangener, diesmal im Hotel Dreesen in Godesberg am Rhein, interniert.

Als sich die amerikanische Armee näherte wurde ich durch Deutschland nach München gebracht und erst einige Tage vor dem endgültigen Zusammenbruch befreit.

Stalins Erfolg.

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Durch die Ereignisse des Europäischen Krieges hat der russische Bolschewismus erstaunliche Fortschritte gemacht: ~~Exxxxxx~~ Polen

- 1.) Polen, das den russischen Bolschewismus von Europa trennte, ist zusammengebrochen und völlig in der Hand der Bolschewisten. Hätte Stalin in seiner beabsichtigten Expansion nach Westen Polen angegriffen, dann würde ein solcher Angriff höchstwahrscheinlich alle europäischen Nationen gegen ihn geeinigt haben wie schwach auch Polen immer gewesen sein mag. Dadurch, dass Stalin gelungen ist, Hitler zum Angriff auf Polen zu provozieren, hat er Hitler zum Angreifer gemacht und mit der Kriegsschuld belastet. Infolgedessen haben sich die Nationen gegen Deutschland zusammengeschlossen.
- 2.) Auch während der letzten Verhandlungen in Berlin zwischen Molotow und Hitler, dessen Reizbarkeit Stalin genau bekannt war, hat der Sowjetdikator durch Molotows übertriebene Forderungen Hitler gerade gezwungen, auch Sowjetrussland anzugreifen. Ich glaube, dass Hitler recht hatte, wenn er überzeugt gewesen ist, dass Stalin Deutschland sehr bald angreifen werde, denn Stalin konnte es keineswegs dulden, dass Deutschland, nachde

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es Frankreich besiegt hatte, der Krieg auch gegen Grossbritannien gewinne. Es war für Stalin ein grossartiger politischer Vorteil, dass er Hitler dazu gebracht hat, Sowjet-Russland anzugreifen, anstatt dass Stalin Deutschland angreifen musste.

- 3.) Die deutsche Armee, welche vielleicht in der Welt das einzige Machtmittel gewesen sein mag, das den russischen Bolschewismus hätte besiegen können, ist völlig zusammengebrochen.
- 4.) Zwischen den westeuropäischen Nationen und dem Volk der USA einerseits und dem deutschen Volk andererseits, ist neuer Hass gesät worden, schlimmer als nach dem Krieg 1914/18. Dadurch ist die Einigung zwischen ihnen gegen den Bolschewismus sehr erschwert.
- 5.) Deutschland und die anderen Nationen Europas sind durch den Krieg teilweise oder ganz zugrunde gerichtet worden. Die Wiederkehr der Wohlfahrt in Europa scheint für lange Zeit unmöglich. Hunger, Mangel und der wirtschaftliche Niederbruch machen die Europäischen Nationen für die Propaganda der Bolschewisten sehr empfänglich.
- 6.) Stalin gewinnt dadurch, dass seine Armeen Mitteldeutschland und Ostreich besetzt haben, eine überaus günstige strategische Basis für die weitere Offensive gegen Westen.

Kann und wird der Kreml den Krieg jetzt beenden?

Wenn Stalin den Krieg jetzt beenden wollte, dann würden die britischen und amerikanischen Staatsmänner die überwältigende Macht des russischen Bolschewismus als unerträglich empfinden. Der Hass zwischen den zivilisierten Nationen würde allmählich abnehmen und die Widerstandskraft Europas erneut wachsen. Endlich kann Stalin keinesfalls irgend eine wirtschaftliche Besserung in Europa dulden.

General von Seydlitz' deutsche Rote-Armee

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Sicherlich wird Stalin seine wirklichen Absichten nicht sogleich zeigen. Zunächst wird er versuchen, zu erreichen, dass Grossbritannien und die USA ihre Armeen aus Europa zurückziehen. Wenn Grossbritannien und die USA nur wenige 100.000 Mann in Europa zurücklassen, wird Stalin mehrere Millionen Soldaten gegen sie haben. Ausserdem hat er die von Gen. von Seydlitz befehligte deutsche Armee zu seiner Verfügung. Der Name von Seydlitz ist in der deutschen Armee berühmt durch den genialen General von Seydlitz aus der Epoche Friedrichs II.

Von Seydlitz ist ein sehr fähiger Mann, den der verstorbene Gen. von Seeckt als einen seiner besten Offiziere bezeichnet hat. Gen. v. Seydlitz wurde in Stalingrad gefangen genommen und ist zu den Bolschewisten übergegangen. Er hat in Sowjetrussland aus den Gefangenen von Stalingrad eine deutsche Armee erstkl. Offiziere und Soldaten aufgebaut. Sie sind vor die Wahl gestellt worden, entweder in sibirischen Bergwerken zu arbeiten und zugrunde zu gehen oder in der deutschen Roten Armee zu dienen. Diese Armee ist durch weitere deutsche Kriegsgefangene verstärkt worden. Wie ich zuverlässig erfahren habe, soll sie nunmehr über eine Million Mann stark sein. Die Generale der Hitlerarmee konnten sich nicht aus dem Netz der Gestapo befreien. Noch viel weniger können sich die Generale der deutschen Roten Armee aus dem Netz der GPU befreien, die sehr viel stärker organisiert ist, als die deutsche Gestapo war. Durch die Auflösung der deutschen Roten Armee würden die

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deutschen O. ziere verarmen und sich in Elend bedroht fühlen. Stalin wird genau im Gegenteil ihnen den Dienst in der Roten Armee anbieten und sie besser bezahlen, als sie in der Hitler Armee bezahlt worden sind. Er wird sie glauben machen, dass ein neuer bolschewistisch deutscher Krieg ~~war~~ gegen die angelsächsischen Mächte sehr patriotisch sei, denn er wird gegen die Angelsachsen den Vorwurf erheben, dass sie an der Verelendung in Deutschland schuld sind. Stalin kann also den Tag wählen, an dem er mit der russischen und deutschen Roten Armee an den ~~Rh~~ Rhein marschieren wird und gegen eine Besatzungsarmee von wenigen hundert tausend Mann britischer und amerikanischer Soldaten wird er nach menschlichem Ermessen die Rheine in kurzer Zeit erreichen und überschreiten können. Wird General de Gaulle dann mit einer neu aufgestellten französ. Armee Frankreich gegen solch einen neuen überwältigenden Angriff verteidigen können? Das wird umso schwieriger sein, als Stalin, um das französische Volk einzuschläfern, der französischen Regierung das linke Rheinufer versprochen hat, was seit Jahrhunderten der Traum der Franzosen gewesen ist.

Stalin braucht mit keiner öffentlichen Meinung in Russland zu rechnen, denn er beherrscht das russische Volk durch die GPU absolute als Hitler das deutsche Volk durch die Gestapo beherrscht hat. Stalin kann also jederzeit - sobald er will - den Krieg beginnen und gewinnen.

Ich kann nicht einsehen, wie die britische Insel geschützt werden kann, wenn Stalin mit seiner russischen und deutschen Armee einen Kontinent beherrscht, der sich von Wladiwostock bis zum französ. Atlantik einschliesslich Belgien und Holland erstreckt. Die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika können sich auf ihren eignen Kontinent zurück ziehen, aber dann müssen sie alle ihre eignen Positionen in Asien und Afrika räumen, oder aber unter sehr ungünstigen Bedingungen für sie kämpfen.

Der General von Seeckt und Hitler haben, gegen meine Warnung, geglaubt, dass sie die Bolschewisten niedermäpörieren könnten. Ich erinnere mich, dass ich einmal zu General von Seeckt sagte, er sei der Mann, der glaube, er könne Gift essen, ohne sich zu vergiften.

Das Ergebnis des wesentlichen Irrtums, dem General von Seeckt und Hitler verfallen sind, ist die Zerstückelung Deutschlands.

Ich denke, dass die angelsächsischen Staatsmänner und Soldaten klüger sind, als es der deutsche Führer war.

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Translation of a Treatise by Arnold Rechberg

Arnold Rechberg

Kampfenhausen - Starberger See
Haus Rechberg

(S)(X)(C) The first bolshevistic aggression against Europe failed after the war of 1914-18. The European Nations, although exhausted by the war, still had too much vitality and power to resist. In Germany the bolshevist revolution was smashed by a handful of volunteers taken from the completely collapsed Imperial German Army. In Northern Germany it was the troops of Capt. [redacted] the "Garde-Kavallerie-Schützen-Korps", where I served as a staff officer at Berlin; in Central Germany the troops of General MARKER; in Upper Bavaria the troops of [redacted] was never a soldier but the Bavarian peasants followed him blindly; the troops of General von HPP, also in Bavaria, and some few others. Manich, where the Russian revolution had established in 1919, a Soviet Government through the bolshevist LEVINE, could be liberated and step by step Bolshevism had been crushed in all of Germany. The German Democratic Government, represented by the Minister of Defence, NOSKE, had only a limited influence upon these events. Also, later on, this Government did not have any authority over the German soldiers and did not enjoy his respect.

In Hungary, the bolshevistic Red Army, which attacked Poland in 1920 in order to join hands with the bolshevistic revolutions flaring up all over Germany, was defeated near Warsaw by the French General WEYGAND and the Polish Marshal PILSUDSKY.

During the campaigns of the German volunteer corps against the bolshevists, General HOFFMANN was their political leader. During the war of 1914-18 General HOFFMANN had been by far the most able military leader. It was he in fact, who developed the plan for the battle at Tannenberg, which has been one of the most brilliant battles of world history. Marshal von HINDENBURG and General LUDENDORFF who arrived in East Prussia after General HOFFMANN had completed the preparations for the battle, only executed his plan. General HOFFMANN during the last two years of the war of 1914-18, under the nominal command of Prince LEOPOLD of Bavaria, was the commander-in-fact of the German Army in Russia. With the Bolshevists, General HOFFMANN negotiated the armistice and the peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Immediately he recognized that Bolshevism was the most terrible danger ever having threatened the civilized world. Consequently, General HOFFMANN had been convinced that Europe and the world could only be saved from this danger, threatening all of them, if the civilized powers would unite.

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assistance of the U.S.A., intended to enslave Germany. Besides, the Generals of the Red Army stated that sooner or later the Bolshevik Red Army would overthrow Bolshevism in Russia, re-instate a National Russian Army and that Russia and Germany, allied, would be the two most powerful countries in the world.

Of course, all Bolshevik arguments were nothing but propaganda, for Generals and Officers of the Red Army were completely in the clutches of the GPU. But the propaganda had been believed by the Generals of the German Reichswehr.

Alliance Between the German Reichswehr and the Red Army.

Out of this there actually developed an alliance between the Reichswehr and the Red Army. The Reichswehr could test, in Russia, all those weapons which had been prohibited by the Treaty of Versailles. From the former General Staff there were sent to Russian organizations, very able officers who could not follow their profession any more, likewise there were sent very capable non-commissioned officers. All of them together organized the Red Army. The German heavy industry, prompted by the Reichswehr, assisted the Russians in building a powerful war industry.

Although I knew General von SEECKT, Commander in chief of the German Reichswehr, and General von SCHLEICHERL, his political advisor, still I did not succeed in convincing them that they were being duped by the Kremlin, that the Kremlin merely intended to involve Germany in another war in which Germany, being insufficiently armed and lacking raw materials would be defeated again, that the Kremlin did not want Germany's victory, but her defeat so that Germany would be unable to resist Bolshevism and at the same time to break the power of resistance of all the other European countries. The argument put forth by Generals von SEECKT and von SCHLEICHERL as opposed to Generals HOFFMANN, LUDENDORFF and I, were that we - although heard in the international press - would not succeed in securing the support of the British, French and American Governments. Thus Germany became more and more involved in a policy of political suicide.

Industrial amalgamation of the great European countries.

The Hoffmann-Rechberg plan met with more success in the industrial amalgamation of the great European countries. Since the industrialists of Germany, England and France did not realize immediately the advantages to be derived from adhering to this plan, it became necessary to publish a large number of interviews in the French, British and American press, most of these are still in my possession. Likewise, I held various conferences with British and French industrial leaders such as with Mr. () of the "Arbed" in Luxembourg, () of the Etb. Pohlmann, () and () of the Imperial Chemical Industry, with () and many others.

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(b)(7)(C) Besides, I held conferences with French and British statesmen, because I was fully aware of the fact that such giant concerns could only be developed with the consent of the statesmen. I therefore had conferences with Mr. _____ M. _____ M. _____ and with _____ who at that time had been the most influential man in the British Foreign Office.

All of them agreed with me. These conferences were mentioned in the German and international press and several French Ministers pleaded in its favor before the Chamber of Deputies.

Cooperation between the German, French and British key industries.

In 1926 the first Franco-German industrial alliance was signed between the German Fertilizer Industry, in which I, being engaged in this industry, had direct influence, and the French Fertilizer Industry. After this alliance had proven to be of considerable advantage to both parties, the heavy industries of Germany, France, Belgium and Luxembourg followed by combining in the International Steel Trust. Similar agreements were put into effect between the chemical industries of Germany and France.

On August 28, 1929, the British newspaper "Daily Mail", published a very detailed article about this development and put the question before the public; if Great Britain could exclude herself. This article brought about a very interesting discussion between British industrial leaders and the "Daily Mail", in the course of which most of the British industries joined the German-French Industrial Alliances.

The plan of Marshal FOCH.

(b)(7)(C) During my conferences with M. _____ who recognized that a gigantic German-French Industrial Alliance could not remain without far reaching political and military consequences, I was placed in contact with Marshal FOCH who's view points M. _____ wanted to know. Marshal FOCH very pointedly had been an enemy of Germany. However, when I spoke to him for the first time in 1923, the great French soldier had an astonishing understanding for the Bolshevistic danger. Consequently he had reached the conclusion that the inherent oppositions between the European Nations were superseded and that their industrial cooperation should be guaranteed by a military alliance. Marshal FOCH and I cooperated in formulating the following plan:

Between the French and the German Armies there shall be established a ratio of 5:3, recruiting features and armament to be alike. Besides, a High Command consisting of French and German Generals was to be created, having the right to inspect both armies during peace time and to assume their command during war time. To each German staff - from divisional staff upwards - there should be a German officer. By this means it would have

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been impossible to prepare for a new Franco-German war, either by France or by Germany. Just as soon as this German-French alliance was concluded, the conditions contained therein having been completely approved by Generals HOFFMANN and LUDENDORFF, England was to be invited to join. It should be left to England to decide herself about the size of her army. In addition Marshal FOCH proposed a simultaneous agreement between Germany, England and France to proportionately establish the sizes of the fleets of the three countries, likewise under joint supervision and control. In this respect the Marshal went as far as to propose that England should assume the command over the three fleets. The French Marshal proposed to me to publish my view points in the official French Military Publication "La France Militaire". I have been the first German officer, who at that time published in this magazine, a series of treatises fostering a German-French military alliance. However it was impossible for Marshal FOCH to publicly assert himself in favor of this great plan bringing about a re-orientation of French politics without having the assurance that the German Government and the German Reichswehr would acquiesce. Mr. [redacted] a personal friend of mine who at that time had been German Minister of Foreign Affairs completely agreed with Marshal FOCH. The alliance between the German Reichswehr and the Bolshevist Red Army had in the meantime become too strong and Mr. [redacted] by no means had the power to act contrary to the wishes of the Reichswehr. It was a hard blow to the policy recommended by me when in 1927 General HOFFMANN died, most probably poisoned by a Bolshevist agent.

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From 1919 until 1922 inclusively General Ludendorff tried to secure the support of the French, British and American Governments for our policies. After various conferences having taken place between General LUDENDORFF and the ambassadors at Berlin, M. LAURENT (France), Lord D'ABERNON (Great Britain) and Mr. HOUGHTON (USA) at which I was present, all of these ambassadors fully agreed with our view points, however, they were not authorized by their Governments to sign a final agreement; thus, the General finally lost faith in the possibility of ever entering into such agreement. Consequently, LUDENDORFF was driven into the arms of the extreme German Nationalism under which HITLER had appeared. Thus it came about that LUDENDORFF, in spite of my warning, became entangled in the HITLER revolt of 1923; by this adventure his international standing suffered considerably. Later on General LUDENDORFF became a victim of cancer through which his former great intelligence was gradually destroyed.

The opposition of the Kremlin.

At any rate, after some years of discussion the plan for a gigantic German-French, respectively British, Industrial Alliance had become a reality. The plan for a military

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alliance between the three countries was being discussed more and more favorably.

The Kremlin therefore considered it necessary to take some effective measures. At that time the Kremlin spent about 50 Million Goldmark annually amongst the German Nationalists, many of whom had become paupers during the inflation and were subject to being purchased. Others, without having been bribed did not consider it patriotic to enter into an alliance with the Western Powers. Some German diplomats of great influence were purchased by Moscow too, besides many journalists in the German national press. Although I am a man of means, I could not spend sufficient sums to offset the Moscow action. At that time I revealed in the German and International Press, how the Bolsheviks influenced and bribed the German nationalists in order to engage Germany in a new war against the Western Powers. One of my articles appeared on 19 May 1929 in the "Kasseler Tageblatt", an other in the French paper "Nouvelle" on 20 November 1930; but nothing was done by the Governments to avoid the catastrophe.

The Kremlin is looking for a dictator in Germany.

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In spite of everything, I gained ground step by step, so that the Kremlin considered decisive action necessary. The Bolshevik dictator realised that General von SCHLEICHER, political leader of the Reichswehr, was not the man to assume the risk of a new war against the Western Powers. STALIN, therefore, had to find a man who as dictator in Germany was willing to start such a war. Consideration was given to Capt. [redacted] the well known leader of the volunteer corps, but he had been on my side in favor of the HOFFMANN plan. Mr. [redacted] the leader of the "Stahlhelm", was neither sufficiently intelligent nor energetic enough to become a dictator as required by STALIN. There remained yet the "Jungdeutsche Orden", but his leader, Capt. [redacted] likewise had been my political ally.

HITLER reappears.

HITLER after his abortive revolt on 9 November 1923, had been the leader of a small party having but 12 delegates in the Reichstag and was considered as being of no importance. However, on 14 September 1930 his party suddenly gained 107 seats, a quite surprising result at that time. I had lunch with General von SCHLEICHER at the Adlon when the results of the election, giving that much strength to the HITLER Party, were made public and we discussed topics of the day including HITLER.

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STALIN finances the HITLER Dictatorship.

General von SCHLEICHER told me that out of the secret Reichswehr funds which at that time had been very considerable, 40 Million Marks had been given to HITLER by him, so that HITLER could efficiently organize his party and the election campaign on a large scale. General von SCHLEICHER told me of his intention to re-organize the German Army, of his being in need of an agitator to create a favorable public opinion for this policy, and that HITLER would be the man he could use for this purpose. And then the General continued: "Do you know, RECHBERG, who gave me this advise? You always claim the Bolshevists to be our enemies. Just the contrary is true; STALIN has been informed that circumstances will ripen more and more in favor of Germany and Russia, because England and France in their foolish believe in the League of Nations are neglecting their armaments. Therefore a quick re-armament of Germany is necessary to bring about an active German-Russian policy. You have to start a campaign immediately. STALIN and I believe HITLER to be the best man for the job. Consequently you must finance HITLER."

I for my part immediately recognised the real intentions of STALIN, but the General would not believe me. I added that HITLER would try to become dictator himself and that the General should take care to have HITLER shot in time or else HITLER would have him shot in due course. Laughingly General von SCHLEICHER replied that I was completely crazy at times, HITLER did not have the military power in his hands and, therefore, never could become dictator. As a matter of fact, shortly thereafter, HITLER did overpower General von SCHLEICHER and had him killed in order to put away an undesirable witness. When HITLER became dictator of Germany, STALIN could be sure to have the new war needed by the Kremlin. STALIN was thoroughly informed about HITLER's ambitious character and his lack of knowledge about international possibilities.

STALIN drives HITLER into persecution of the Jews.

Likewise, STALIN - as I have learned - has been very much satisfied about HITLER persecuting the Jews. Colonel NICOLAI, STALIN's ally of long standing, after HITLER's assumption of power, established a secret connection between STALIN and the new German Dictatorship.

The German-Bolshevist Alliance of 1939.

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When in 1939 HITLER hesitated to run the risk of war, STALIN provoked him by publishing the Bolshevist-German Alliance which had been signed during August of 1939 by STALIN, MOLOTOW and RIBBENTROP. I have no further knowledge about the relationship of Mr. RIBBENTROP to the Kremlin, but Mr. von RIBBENTROP stood under the influence of Colonel NICOLAI,

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who maintained a secret political office at 51 Victoriastrasse, Berlin, and who has been STALIN's man with body and soul. It was STALIN who promoted the war and HITLER had been duped by him.

How STALIN figures.

STALIN's diplomacy was very audacious but very successful too. STALIN needed a new war in Europe. He could not have this war without Germany's re-armament and then only when HITLER became German Dictator, because HITLER was the only German who would risk this war. On the other hand STALIN was fully aware of the fact that a re-armed Germany with HITLER as dictator would represent a danger for Russia and for Bolshevism, but he figured and he figured correctly, that for many reasons HITLER was bound to engage in war with the Western European Nations and that the German Army after having been involved in war with France, England and most probably with the USA, would not be in any position to eliminate nor defeat Russian Bolshevism whose Red Army had been organized and trained by the German General Staff. General HOFFMANN explained to me that a German battle against Russian Bolshevism had to be considered in connection with the immense extension of the Russian territory. Russia is so large that she will not be damaged decisively even if large tracks of land might be occupied by Germany and even if she should loose millions of soldiers. Therefore, General HOFFMANN was of the opinion that the Russian Bolshevism could be overthrown only by a German invasion of Russia extending at least up to the Ural. He was convinced that Germany was not strong enough for such an onslaught. Never would the General consider it possible for Germany to fight Bolshevism with any measure of success if the afore mentioned powers should be against Germany. Therefore, STALIN did not have to be afraid of an attack by HITLER as long as HITLER was engaged in warfare with the Western Powers. Besides, for many years STALIN had built on the other side of the Ural mountains, a powerful war industry, difficult to reach for a German army. In addition, STALIN could count upon the German Army finding herself in an ever increasing misproportion to the territory where she had to operate and which she had to occupy. This condition would become worse yet, if the German Army was engaged in combat with other countries too. The final collapse was to be much more readily anticipated as the Anglo-Saxon production of war materials would grow daily.

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My proposals to HITLER in 1940 and my first arrest.

After HITLER had become the German Dictator, I withdrew from foreign diplomacy for I was convinced of not being able to share many of his views. After the defeat of France in 1940 I suggested to HITLER, in the interest of Germany to propose generous peace terms to France and especially not to interfere with the territorial possessions of France. HITLER then should

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try to form a close alliance with Marshal PETAIN. After that, Germany and Italy with the assistance of France should make peace proposals to Great Britain upon the basis of conditions prior to the outbreak of the war. I did not consider it quite impossible for the British Government to accept such an offer in view of the then existing circumstances. When Mr. von RIBBENTROP and Colonel NICOLAI heard about my proposals, which were contrary to their intentions and quite contrary to STEALIN's interests, they quite unexpectedly succeeded, upon HITLER's orders, to have me placed in honorable custody; this custody lasted several months and I was prohibited from further engaging in foreign politics. Thus the Kremlin, standing behind Mr. von RIBBENTROP, succeeded in having me eliminated from further voicing my opinions. Only Mr. FRICK, HITLER's Minister of the Interior, tried to support me, however in vain.

HIMMLER confers with me.

In 1943, when Germany's military position became worse, HIMMLER sent his confidential man () to me. () informed me that HIMMLER too was convinced of my being right and that HITLER should try to come to some understanding with the Anglo-Saxons. HIMMLER was asking if I could assist him. I replied that in the interest of Germany I was willing to forget how I had been treated. But this time too Mr. von RIBBENTROP and Colonel NICOLAI proved to be more powerful than HIMMLER; they, in the meantime, had acquired an other ally, Mr. Martin BORMANN, who had become a man of great influence. For the second time I was taken in custody and brought to Dachau. However, HIMMLER succeeded in having me released within two weeks.

HIMMLER's difficulties.

At the same time I learned of HIMMLER being in a very difficult position. He was chief of the Gestapo but in all matters concerning foreign politics he had to obey orders of Mr. von RIBBENTROP and Mr. BORMANN. In the occupied territories, in France, Poland and in all the others, he had only to carry out orders issued by von RIBBENTROP and BORMANN. Besides there existed the well founded suspicion that some of the highest officials of the Gestapo had been bribed by Moscow in order to increase the cruelties against their victims, cruelties which up to that time had only been applied by the GPU. Everywhere such actions were bound to create feelings to the detriment of Germany. During May of 1944, HIMMLER sent another one of his confidential men to me, a () We had a conference lasting for many hours and I was assured that this time HIMMLER was in a position to force acceptance of his view points. But once again Mr. von RIBBENTROP, Mr. BORMANN and Colonel NICOLAI remained to be the stronger ones and for the third time I was placed in honorary custody, this time I was interned at the Hotel Dreesen at Godesberg on the Rhine.

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Upon approach of the American Army I was brought through Germany to Munich and only a few days prior to the final collapse was I liberated.

STALIN's success.

Because of the events of the European War, Russian Bolshevism made astonishing progress:

- 1.) Poland, once separating Bolshevism from Europe, has collapsed and is completely in the hands of the Bolsheviks. If STALIN had attacked Poland in his intended expansion towards the West, most probably such an attack would have united all the European Countries against him, however weak Poland might have been. By succeeding in provoking HITLER to attack Poland, he stamped HITLER as the aggressor and gave the war guilt to him. Consequently, the nations united against Germany.
- 2.) During the last conferences in Berlin between MOLOTOW and HITLER, the Soviet Dictator, through MOLOTOW, placed such excessive demands before HITLER, of who's ill temper he was aware, that HITLER became compelled to attack the Soviet Union also. I believe that HITLER was correct in being convinced that STALIN would attack Germany at an early date, for under no circumstances could STALIN tolerate that Germany, after having defeated France, should win the war against Great Britain too. For STALIN, it has been an extraordinary political advantage in succeeding to have HITLER attack him instead of Russia attacking Germany.
- 3.) The German Army, which perhaps may have been the only weapon able to defeat the Russian Bolshevism, is now completely collapsed.
- 4.) New hatred has been sown between the Western Nations and the USA on the one side and the German people on the other side, much worse than after the war of 1914/18. Therefore unification against Bolshevism has been made much more difficult.
- 5.) Germany and the other nations of Europe have partially or completely been broken down through the war. The return of prosperity to Europe seems to be impossible for a long time to come. Hunger, want and the economical breakdown make the European Nations an easy prey for Bolshevistic propaganda.
- 6.) Because of having his armies as occupational forces in Central Germany and Austria, STALIN has gained a favorable strategic basis for his further offensive against the West.

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Can and will the Kremlin finish the war now?

If STALIN chose to finish the war now, then the British and American Statesmen would consider, as unbearable, the overwhelming power of Russian Bolshevism. The hatred between the civilized nations would gradually diminish and the power of resistance of Europe again would grow. Finally under no circumstances can STALIN tolerate an improvement in the economic conditions of Europe.

The German Red Army under General von SEYDLITZ.

Assuredly, STALIN will not reveal his real intentions immediately. First he will try in succeeding to have Great Britain and the USA withdraw their troops from Europe. If Great Britain and the USA will leave only some 100,000 men in Europe, STALIN will have several millions against them. Besides, he has at his disposal, a German Army under the command of General von SEYDLITZ. The name von SEYDLITZ is famous in the German Army through the outstanding General von SEYDLITZ, during the epoch of FREDERIC II.

Von SEYDLITZ is a very able man, designated by the late General SEECKT as one of his best officers. General von SEYDLITZ was made a prisoner at Stalingrad and went over to the Bolsheviks. In Soviet Russia, from the prisoners of Stalingrad, he formed a German Army consisting of first class officers and enlisted men. They could choose between going to Siberia to work in the mines and perish, or serve in the German Red Army. This Army has been enlarged by additional German prisoners of war. According to reliable sources this Army now has a strength exceeding one million men. The Generals of the Hitler Army could evade the net of the Gestapo. Much less can the Generals of the German Red Army evade the net of the GPU, which is organized much stronger than the German Gestapo ever was. By the dissolution of the German Red Army, the German officers would become paupers and be exposed to deprivation. Quite to the contrary STALIN will offer them service in the Red Army and he will pay them better than they have been paid in the Hitler Army. He will make them believe that a new Bolshevik-German war against the Anglo Saxons will be very patriotic for he will accuse the Anglo Saxons of being the cause of the impoverishment of Germany. STALIN therefore can choose the day when he will march to the Rhine with the Russian and German Red Army and it is to be within human conception that he will reach and bridge the Rhine within a short time, against the resistance of some hundred thousands of men of the British and American Armies of Occupation.

Will General de GAULLE be in a position to defend France with a newly formed army against such an overwhelming attack? This will be so much more difficult because STALIN promised to

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the French people the left bank of the Rhine, a dream of the Frenchmen for hundreds of years.

STALIN does not have to consider public opinion in Russia because he is dominating the Russian people through his GPU more absolutely than HITLER ever dominated the German people through the Gestapo. Therefore STALIN can at any time - as soon as he chooses - begin the war and win it too.

I cannot see how the British Isle can be protected after STALIN governs a continent with his Russian and German Army, a continent that is stretching from Wladiwostock to the French Atlantic inclusive of Belgium and Holland. The United States of America can withdraw to their own continent but then they have to evacuate their positions in Asia and Africa or else they will have to fight for them under very disadvantageous conditions.

General SEECKT and HITLER, contrary to my warning, believed that they would outmaneuver the Bolsheviks. I remember having once remarked to General von SEECKT that he believed to be the man who could eat poison without becoming poisoned.

The result of the grave error as committed by von SEECKT and HITLER was the disintegration of Germany.

I believe the Anglo Saxon Statesmen and Soldiers to be smarter than HITLER was.

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
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SUBJECT: Interim Study of the RIS

REF : SPD-S 33733-927

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CI-SIR/21
22 Oct 46

HEADQUARTERS
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE CENTER
UNITED STATES FORCES EUROPEAN THEATER
APO 757

TOP SECRET
Auth: CO MISC
Date: 22-10-46
Init: 24

CI SPECIAL INTERROGATION REPORT (CI-SIR/21)

Source: GRISHCHENKO, Evgeni

Position: MVD Interpreter

5250

GRISHCHENKO served as interpreter in Opergrupp - SVA, Kreis Hoyerswerde. After three months he managed to obtain his release from the RIS in order to be repatriated, but when he heard reports about the probable fate awaiting him in Russia, he changed his mind and fled into the American Zone, where he gave himself up to the authorities.

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II. Military Units Reported

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1. REFERENCES:

SAFETY AND Security CI- 518/21, 200 22 Oct 46
"The Opergruppe in Germany"

2. PERSONAL DATA:

- a. SURNAME: GRISHCHENKO
- b. FIRST NAME: Evgeni
- c. ALIASIS: none
- d. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 21 Sep 21 in DMITRIEV/Kursk
- e. NATIONALITY CLAIMED: Russian
- f. OCCUPATION: Student
- g. RELIGION: Orthodox
- h. DESCRIPTION:
 - (1) HEIGHT: 1.72m
 - (2) WEIGHT: 65 kg
 - (3) BUILD: slender
 - (4) FACE: Slavic
 - (5) HAIR: black
 - (6) EYES: gray
 - (7) PHYSICAL PECULIARITIES: Burn scar on left side of chest.
- i. LANGUAGES: Russian, German
- k. FATHER: Serge GRISHCHENKO, living at PODALSK/Moscow
- l. MOTHER: Olga MOISEEVA, " " "
- m. BROTHER: none
- n. SISTER: Alisa GRISHCHENKO " " "
- o. WIFE: none
- p. CHILDREN: none

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3. REPORT: Life History of Evgeni GRISHCHENKO

a. Pre-RIS Career

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Subject was born in DMITRIEV (in the province of Kursk), as the son of a factory worker, in 1921. After attending school in PODALSK (in the province of Moscow), where his parents and sister still live, he proceeded to MOSCOW in 1939, and there studied radio and signal communications until May 1941, when he was drafted into the Signal Company of the 15th Inf Regt. He was captured by the Germans in the Crimea in the summer of 1942, and was sent to work in a labor camp in POWANIA (Lower Silesia) until early in 1945 when he was evacuated. From there he tried to escape but failed. He was then sent to his work.

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Americans sent him to a repatriation camp, and from there he was sent to various DP camps in Germany in June 1945. Here he worked as radio technician until November, when he took up work at a gasoline refinery in RUHLAND near HOYERSWERDE.

b. GRISHCHENKO as a member of the RIS

At this time a Russian officer, Lt DAVIDOVSKI, who happened to draw his gasoline from the RUHLAND refinery, was looking for Russians who could speak German, and GRISHCHENKO was suggested to him. The latter accepted the offer, providing a friend of his, Michail JIRGUSHEV, might be allowed to join him. Thus, on 5 Apr 1946, subject began work as interpreter for the Overgruppe - SVA, Hoyerswerde.

At first subject was given a few unimportant translations to do, but at the end of May he was registered as official employee of the RIS, and became interpreter for 2nd Lt Vasili PRIGUNOV. He had to help in the preparation of reports and accompany the officer when he met informants, interrogated prisoners and carried out arrests or field investigations.

c. GRISHCHENKO leaves the RIS

Subject served with the RIS until early August of this year, when, in order to be repatriated and secure release from the RIS-- which was impossible under ordinary circumstances, he drugged himself with sleeping pills and succeeded in having himself hospitalized. Upon his recovery, he was actually discharged from the RIS, but in the repatriation camp in DOEBELN near DRESDEN he heard rumors which discouraged him from the idea of returning to Russia. He therefore decided to seek refuge in the US Zone and procured the necessary German identity papers from a girl friend in LEIPZIG. He crossed the border between the zones of occupation with the help of a farmer's son near WURZBACH, and at once reported to an American unit, which turned him over to CIC.

4. COMMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS:

GRISHCHENKO has a certain native shrewdness, as shown by the way he made his escape from the RIS. However, the very fact that he was discharged proves that the Russians did not consider him too valuable and had not entrusted him with important information. Actually he had not been in the RIS long enough to know very much, and besides, in the opinion of the interrogator, his knowledge of German is so limited that all his attention was probably required for his actual work as interpreter.

GRISHCHENKO appears honest enough, and what little information he was able to give seems to be correct. Some of it served to confirm information received from another former MVD interpreter (see CI/SIR Nos 10, 12 and 16, this HQ).

5. RECOMMENDATIONS

Although subject entered the US Zone illegally, he is not believed to be on any Russian wanted-list since he did not desert from the RIS. He still enjoys the status of a Displaced Person and should be released from this Center without unnecessary delay. It is recommended that he be turned over to MG authorities for proper action.

MS/FHM/jrb

For the Commanding Officer:

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THE OPERGRUPPA SVA. HOYERSWERDE

a. Position within the RIS in SOVZON

The Opersektor-SVA, provincial HQ of RIS, Saxony, is in DRESDEN and is headed by Brig Gen KLEPOV. Below this, on the Bezirk level, we have the Operokrug Bautzen, headed by Maj VANIUNIN, who is reportedly assisted by some 35 officers and their interpreters.

The Operokrug consists of the following Opergruppi: Bautzen, Goerlitz, Zittau, Weisswasser, Kamenz, Lobau and Hoyerswerde.

b. Organization of the Opergruppa Hoyerswerde

Opergruppa Hoyerswerde is headed by Capt Vladimir VOSNESNENSKI and his deputy, 2nd Lt Ivan MALEROV, who also serves as investigator. There are two other representatives, 1st Lt DAVIDOVSKI and 2nd Lt Vasil PRIGUNOV, each of whom is provided with an interpreter.

The Opergruppa is supported by a platoon of MVD Frontier Guards, whose Bn HQ is reported to be at BAUTZEN.

c. The Agentura (Informants' net)*

The net of Secret Observers and Agents consists of some 100 people, among whom there are five Residenti. A large number of informants are said to report directly to the officers acting as RIS Representatives and meet them at the following K/K (secret meeting place) :

K/K No 1: Hotel STADT DRESDEN, Room No 2.
K/K No 2: BAI-NHOFS-HOTEL, Room No 8.

d. Work performed by the Opergruppa and its Agents

Informants were told to observe political trends in the Russian Zone; and to obtain similar information about the other zones of occupation by inconspicuously questioning people who had just come from there, such as released PWs. The parties in which the RIS showed particular interest were the LDP and the CDU. Agents were detailed to the surveillance of former Nazis, people known to be anti-Soviet, and other suspects. Naturally anyone connected with the Opergruppa was to seize every opportunity to praise Soviet and Communist achievements.**

The recruiting of new agents and informers must have been carried on only on a very limited scale while GRISHCHENKO was a member of the unit, since he remembers having been present at only two interviews of this type.

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* In confirmation of earlier reports, GRISHCHENKO attests to the fact that most members of the Agentura are people who have reason to fear punishment or prosecution because of their political or criminal record.

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** Every Monday evening, all intelligence personnel of the unit meet at the offices to discuss current events and to read the political news. The reported aim of these discussions is the dissemination of hostile propaganda regarding the Western democracies, and, according to GRISHCHENKO, similar meetings are held by other Opergruppi in the Opersektor Saxony. (This last information is new, and the meetings mentioned may well be a recent development.)

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e. Personalities of Opergruppe

When GRISHCHENKO left the RIS in August 1946, the following officers were connected with the Opergruppe Hoyerswerde:

1. VANIUNIN, (fnu) Major, Chief of Operokrug SVA Bautzen
Address: MOSCOW? Born about 1900 1.70m fat black hair
ruddy complexion Jewish nose

2. VOZNESENSKI, Vladimir, Captain, Chief of Opergruppe SVA
Hoyerswerde
Address: not given born about 1916 1.78m muscular black
hair ruddy complexion

His father a leading Tchekist, employed in MGB HQ, MOSCOW.
Fanatical, competent Communist and experienced Intelligence Officer.

3. DAVIDOVSKI, (fnu) 2nd Lieutenant, Representative SVA
Hoyerswerde
Address: GOMEL, White Russia born about 1903 1.70m muscular
brown hair pale complexion

Limited education. Reportedly poor material for Intelligence
Service. Former partisan. Reportedly dissatisfied with his assign-
ment and with Communism.

4. MALIKOV, Ivan, 2nd Lieutenant Dep Chief and Investigator
Opergruppe SVA Hoyerswerde

Address: not given born about 1911 1.65m muscular brown
hair fair complexion gray eyes

Education very limited, but old Tchekist and competent,
fanatical Communist

5. PRIGUNOV, Vasili, 2nd Lieutenant Representative SVA
Hoyerswerde

Address: CHAPAI VSK, Russia born about 1923 1.85m slender
black hair Slavic features

Former student of MVD School. Reportedly dissatisfied with
his assignment in RIS and secretly opposed to TCHAKIST fanaticism.

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ANNEX II

MILITARY UNITS REPORTED

a. OSCHATZ (between LIPZIG and DRESDEN)

A new unit, believed to be one or two regts, moved into barracks about July 1946 (type and identity of unit not known, but said to be additional troops rather than replacements.)

b. GROSSHEIN (near OSCHATZ)

2nd Guardia Air Division, and 13th ATP (Aviatsionny Tekhnicheskyy Polk--Air Technical Regt); type of equipment not known.

c. ZEITZ (near OSCHATZ)

A tank unit, identity and other details unknown. This unit, which arrived early in 1946, occupies space formerly used by an NAVD Screening Camp.

d. BAUTZEN

This area is occupied by some unidentified tank units.

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RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (RIS)

IN SOVIET ZONE

1. GENERAL

During the past two months there have been no significant changes in the operational methods and techniques of the RIS in Soviet Zone of Germany. The majority of reports continue to confirm that the Soviet intelligence personnel use compromising material and threats to recruit and retain agents, suspect the majority of individuals as being anti-Soviet, arrest those individuals who have in their possession some document which would indicate their connection in any way with the Western Powers, conceal the identity of their agents by the use of code names and arrange meeting places in so-called "safe houses". As far as is known the methods used in the interrogation of the suspects have not materially changed and threats and coercion continue to predominate. There has been few indications of a wholesome "policing" of the various UVD prisons and the meals have not improved in any particular respect.

On the other hand, there are some indications of a change in the physical location of the UVD headquarters in POTSDAM and the MGB office in KARLSHORST to locations near BEERSWALDE. This may have no significance as such, but it is possible that this may be an indication of a shakeup of the territorial organization of this unit. Since Genmaior 'ALIKOV's visit to MOSCOW in the beginning of the year, there has been nothing definite on the reported reorganization of the UVD.

2. PERSONALITIES

Information is still lacking to substantiate the report of a Genmaior VUL having replaced Genmaior SIDNIEV as Commanding General of the BERLIN MGB Operative Sector.

An unconfirmed report indicates that Genmaior KLEPOV, head of the MGB Operative Sector in Land Saxony, was arrested and sent back to the USSR as the result of a slight departure from the Party line.

Other intelligence agencies have indicated that a Genmaior YEVSIGNIEV might possibly be the man in charge of the military intelligence (RU) activities in the Group of Occupation Forces rather than Colonel T. V. SAPONOV. This office, however, will continue to carry Colonel SAPONOV in that position, due to the lack of other firm information.

3. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

An analysis of the KEI's of the RIS of the Soviet Zone of Germany, particularly those of the MGB, together with a lack of information concerning the activities of the agents of the RU would lead one to believe, and such belief is supported by known internal organization of the MGB, that the RU activity in the Soviet Zone is very limited. The first section of the MGB is the responsible for the collection of positive intelligence and reports received by this office concerning any aspects of the RU in the Soviet Zone are conspicuous by their absence.

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SPECIFIC NETS ON THE RIS IN SOVIET ZONE

Location of Main Headquarters	Has the UVD Hqs moved from POTSDAM? If so, where? MGB Hqs still at KARLSHORST?
Military Intelligence (RU)	Commanding officer, use of agent nets, EBI's?
Internal and/or Territorial Organizational Changes of the MGB-UVD	Location of MGB/UVD major Hqs?, Breakdown and missions of the subdivision of Hqs at all levels.

4. MOVEMENT OF A MAJOR RIS HEADQUARTERS FROM THE BERLIN AREA

Numerous reports during April noted the packing of furniture, office equipment, filing cabinets and wooden crates in the MGB office located on Zeppelin Strasse in POTSDAM and the movement from this office of the equipment by both van and trucks to an unknown location. Two independent sources reported the movement of the MVD School located on Luisen Strasse in Berlin to another location. One source states that an MVD headquarters for the entire Soviet Zone of Germany, formerly located on Luisen Strasse in BERLIN was transferred during April to a new location in the NIEDERLEHME-KOENIGSWESTERHAUSEN (V-02) area. (It is believed that the office on Luisen Strasse was the BERLIN MGB Operative Sector Headquarters). According to this source, Marshal BERIA inspected the new installation in April and attended a conference there. A second source noted that the Central MVD headquarters for the Soviet Zone of Germany may have moved from POTSDAM to EBERSWALDE (V08) with the actual physical location in the latter city being in a large office building situated on Frankfurter Strasse.

To further complicate the matter, a third independent source reported that a large unidentified MVD headquarters which until 15 April 1948 was located in WEIMAR was transferred about that date to a new location in KARLSHORST. In addition, the female interpreter of Colonel SETAKHANOVSKI, the known Commanding Officer of the UVD Province Saxony-Anhalt, stated that the Colonel had informed her in the early part of this year that it would not be necessary for him to continue to make his frequent trips to BERLIN to contact this higher headquarters as the UVD Headquarters in POTSDAM area would soon be moving to WEIMAR.

The true significance of the above is not definitely known but it is possible that a general move took place in April in an echeloned manner. It seems as though the MGB headquarters located on Zeppelin Strasse in POTSDAM moved to the EBERSWALDE area since it has been previously reported that the Soviet intelligence population in POTSDAM was excessive. Even if there are no further indications of the movement of MVD headquarters in POTSDAM to EBERSWALDE, the possibility still exists that RIS in the Soviet Zone is consolidating its headquarters.

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PART II

PRO-SOVIET GERMAN ACTIVITY

The primary intelligence target in the United States Zone of Germany is the Communist Party. That this is the situation is not due to the party's popularity, for on the contrary, in spite of vast expense and ceaseless toil, the Communists in the United States Zone hold less esteem with the electorate than practically at any time in its turbulent history. Moreover, during the past year it is estimated that the Party has lost about 4% of its registered membership and in many areas, particularly rural, party functionaries are in despair. The SPD is a priority target because it is the overt and covert arm of the Soviet Foreign Office in Western Germany. This taken in conjunction with Western Germany's situation as a section of the "fringe" of the "iron curtain" and her vital role in the recovery of Western Europe compels us to execute maximum penetration into the party apparatus.

A pessimist surveying the situation would find much that would make him unhappy and a Communist rejoice. Western Europe's all-pervading apprehension of the USSR is even greater here in Germany where the people have first hand experience with the Soviet machine. Living standards are drastically curtailed and hunger is an ever present guest. Moreover, a large percentage of the population falls into the category of the "uprooted and disinherited" --- bombed out, refugees, and expellees. Finally, the natural benefactor and exploiter of this state of affairs, the Communist Party is a relatively wealthy, well-organized, closely knit organization, whose leaders are in the main experienced, old-line Communists, whose wit and conspiratorial expertness are attested by their very survival.

However, there are a number of factors which have precluded the Communists from battenning on these favorable conditions. Communism and the USSR are anathema to the average German. The stand of the Church, the reports of soldiers and appearance and tales of returned prisoners of war, Soviet policy as executed in its zone and fresh memories of Nazism's anti-Bolshevistic crusade, have all combined to far outweigh the favorable factors.

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Party policy then is geared to the intensification of the favorable factors and the ignoring, suppression or attack of the unfavorable factors. To this end, the Party is continually improving the calibre and reliability of its cadres and administrative apparatus. The key to its activity is current Soviet strategy and directives for Western Germany as implemented by the party's general staff, the SPD Central Secretariat in Berlin. While on the one hand the SPD serves as the overt apologist and protagonist of the USSR, on the other hand it seeks aggrandizement through professional infiltration of key positions in the German governmental, economic and social structure and sets the stage for "direct action," such as strikes and outright sabotage. The Party also relentlessly pursues the aim of shattering the SPD in order to forge a united worker's movement on its own terms.

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AVERAGE EFFECT OF KID DESTRUCTION
OF TRADE UNIONS IN US ZONE

1 KEY JOBS	2 TRADE UNION	3 ATTACHED STRENGTH	4 SYNTHETIZERS	5 ACTUAL STRENGTH
25	METAL	16	15	30
20	UTILITIES	9	10	19
15	TRANSPORT	12	19	31
7	COMMUNICATIONS	8	8	16
21	BUILDING TRADES	14	12	26
19	FOOD	11	11	22
21	AGRICULTURE	7	6	15
20	PRINTING	9	5	14
10	TEXTILES	11	7	18
15	CHEMICALS	12	9	21

KID DESTRUCTION OF KID
KID DESTRUCTION OF KID
IN THE ZONE

KID	SPD	KID	OTHERS
BECKUM	15	7	4
GELSENKIRCHEN/PUER	6	5	3
GELSENKIRCHEN	10	3	1
RECKLINGHAUSEN	9	3	1
DORTMUND	12	-	2
BOCHUM	3	4	-
HELF	3	2	-
MUNSTER	3	2	3
KESPEID	1	6	1
SOLINGEN	1	3	4
DUESSELDORF	8	2	3
DUISBURG	3	-	2

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This aim incidently is most obviously manifest in the Party's frenzied attempts to launch the ST in Western Germany and its recent move to jettison its burdensome Communist appellation in favor of the less noxious "Socialist People's Party." Finally, great effort is expended on perfecting illegal communication across the long Soviet-United States Zone border in order to maintain uninterrupted flow of material support from the Soviet Zone.

Faced with the obvious failure of its overt policy in the West, growing awareness to the true nature of its aims and resuscitation of Germany under the constructive leadership and assistance of the Western Powers, one may well expect the Party's intransigence and along with it, its covert activity to increase. With this in mind one may briefly review the whole gamut of Communist covert activity in Western Germany as it stands today.

In the realm of penetration, aside from United States installations, principal Communist targets are the police, housing, food, welfare, economics and building offices, public utilities, workers' plant councils, Trade Unions, and denazification bodies.

The pattern is clear. The Communists have marked for infiltration those offices and agencies which play a large part in the security and orderly development of Western Germany or are closest to the well-being of the average German and therefore enable the party to wield a club over his head.

Much remains to be done before knowledge of Communist penetration of the police is satisfactory. However, an examination of the police force in Wiesbaden will serve to illustrate Communist potentialities in this field. In that city which houses the headquarters of the Air Forces in Europe and Military Government for the state of Hesse, the chief of the riot squad, the chief of the mounted squad, the custodian of the weapons room, 2 criminal police chief assistants and one precinct head are all rabid Communists. Moreover, the chief of materiel and chief of maintenance and distribution of weapons and ammunition for the State Police are both Communists.

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Communist penetration of the police takes on added significance when it is remembered that the reduction in troop strength for the United States Zone was coordinated with the formation of an adequate German police force and that in time of emergency reliance must be placed on police units. Moreover, the German police carry the burden of controlling illegal traffic across the Zonal boundaries. From a long range point of view the coup d'etat in Czechoslovakia provides ample evidence of the danger.

Likewise, the Trade Unions and workers' councils in the various plants are prime Communist targets. The chart on page B-4 illustrates the extent of Communist infiltration into governing bodies of the ten most important Trade Unions in the United States Zone. One will note that metals, transport, communications and utilities are among the most heavily penetrated. In every case the Communist control of key positions is greater proportionately than its Communist membership which is indicated under the heading

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"Apparent Strength." However, if one adds to this "apparent strength," the figures for Communist sympathizers he will arrive at the actual strengths which correspond closely to the figures for key jobs. Of particular interest, however, is Communist penetration in the Ruhr. The chart on page B-4 illustrates the actual Communist membership on Kreis Trade Union Committees which represent all Trade Unions in a particular county in the Ruhr. Here actual Communist representation is on the order of 30%. This figure must be interpreted against the fact that the Ruhr is not only the key to German recovery but also that of Western Europe and is therefore the Communist target. Two additional points are of interest: First, in the 1947 Works' Council elections in the Ruhr Communist strength dropped 10% from its strength of 38% in 1946, although the Ruhr has always been a Communist stronghold. Second, during the strikes of last January and this May the Ruhr miners did not walk out for fear of jeopardizing their present favorable position due to incentive subsidies of food and consumer goods.

These charts however do not present a complete view of the situation. One of the post-war developments in German labor was the constitution of workers' councils in industrial plants and public enterprises. These plant councils are not connected with the trade union movement and are not linked on higher levels by regional associations. Their legal function is to represent the workers at plant managerial level. Extension of these powers to include an actual share in performing managerial functions is before the parliaments of Hesse, Württemberg-Baden and Bremen at the present time. Suffice it to say that the Communists have energetically infiltrated these bodies and in such enterprises as the Dunlop Rubber Company at Hanau, the Daimler-Benz Plant in Mannheim, Robert Bosch in Stuttgart, MAN in Nurnberg, the large Reichsbahn Repair Shops in Esslingen, United Ball Bearing Works in Canastadt and the Vulcan Shipyards in Bremen, the Communists are in control. The Communists incidently have tried to establish regional federations of these plant councils, thereby creating organizations potentially capable of competing with the Trade Unions. In the Soviet Zone, on the other hand, works councils have been deprived of all but a figurehead role!

By-products of penetration are intelligence, sabotage and strikes. Up to the present time it has not been possible to make out a strong case against the Party for espionage activity. Soviet and Soviet satellite state intelligence agencies actually refrain from compromising the Party or its members by assigning missions. However, it is a well-established fact that the pre-war Communist Party and the illegal party of the Third Reich engaged in extensive intelligence activities on behalf of the USSR and there is sufficient information to point to a resumption of this activity today. However, it has been proven that the party's internal counter intelligence system is functioning vigorously. Most potent Communist capabilities are in the field of strategic economic intelligence and reconnaissance for sabotage.

As a means of preserving its position in the face of any eventuality, the party is separating key individuals, particularly those in important positions, from all but clandestine association with the Party. This development will undoubtedly be accelerated by implementation of United States policy to

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remove Communist indigenous personnel from the employ of all United States agencies. Incidentally sufficient evidence has been obtained of the rage, despair, discomfiture and paralysis of the party's will resulting from dismissal of KPD employees to demonstrate the wisdom of this policy, aside from any considerations of Army security. During the stormy days of street brawls with storm troopers and the dangerous years of the Third Reich, the life blood of the party was successful clandestine penetration --- for penetration meant advance warning. Even today, ever so often one notes that the KPD will testify at the denazification proceedings of an ex-Gestapo man to the effect that he had been placed in that position on behalf of the party! An outstanding example of ostensible separation from the party is the case of a member of the Executive Board of the Bavarian Trade Union Association. The party dismissed him with such fanfare a number of months ago, after 23 years of so honorable service. Yet it is reliably reported that he quietly maintains contact with the party and has never given concrete evidence of his break by reciting his long sad story to the CIC --- as have certain other famous ex-comrades of his.

In Bremen in 1945 two prominent KPD members resigned from the KPD and were welcomed into the ranks of the SPD. Subsequently they both have become luminaries of that party and should anything happen to the present SPD Bürgermeister one or the other would in all probability become mayor. Yet party documents have been intercepted which prove that these two men are top flight KPD penetration agents and that their movements are actually directed by the SPD Central Secretariat.

Up to the present time Communists have not yet been willing to risk perpetration of sabotage. The party is well aware that such acts would bring swift retribution and although it has laid plans for the resumption of an underground role it is well aware that the key functionaries in the hierarchy are identified and subject to surveillance. Sufficient recent indications of the flatbushness of the party's will also exist to render problematical its ability successfully to assume a broad covert role. The SPD Central Secretariat has actually had to advise its executives to the Western KPD pointing out that flight to the Soviet Zone without adequate and compelling reason therefore would be considered as treason and dealt with accordingly--- comrades in Western Germany are in the front line of the fight against capitalism and imperialism. One concrete example of KPD inspired sabotage does exist, however, and may well be a tactical laboratory for future operations. Over the past half year the Dunlop Rubber Plant in Hanau, just a few miles from Frankfurt, and the 2nd largest tire factory in Bizonia has suffered production losses as a result of deliberate acts of sabotage to critical plant machinery. This plant is absolutely in the hands of the KPD and evidence points to party complicity. A major difficulty in combatting this industrial sabotage is the fact that violation of no military law is involved.

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With regard to para-military activity of the KPD in Western Germany the intelligence problem has been primarily one of ascertaining the party's potential. Except for the appearance of goon squads at scattered party meetings, and a few concrete cases of international and inter-Zonal arms running, the KPD has engaged in no activity of a para-military

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nature. In contrast to France and Italy, the KPD at the end of the war did not have at its disposal large numbers of well armed, well trained Communist partisans. The old KPD Militaerischer Apparat had been virtually shattered by the Gestapo (at the cost of unbelievably large effort) prior to the outbreak of war. The Party's potential strength in this field however is imposing: many party leaders are veterans of covert activity during the Weimar Republic and Third Reich; many are veterans of the Spanish Civil War; and a large percentage of the rank and file are veterans of the last War. Finally, access to arms and training courses in the Soviet Zone is relatively easy. Moreover, recent reports from the Soviet Zone point to possible formation of a para-military force, possibly under cover of the police. The presence of such men in Dresden as Albert Schreiner, Wilhelm Zaisser, Ludwig Renn and Bernhard Gabelin who have variously figured prominently in the KPD Militaerischer Apparat, served with the Red Army, held important positions with the International Brigade in Spain and who are known as the most capable German Communist military theorists still alive, coupled with the testimony of an outstanding ex-Communist that a Military Institute is being constituted in Dresden, is an indication of possible future developments. However, it is felt that the party will probably not risk the establishment of an M-Apparat in Western Germany since it would be a direct threat to the occupying powers. Accordingly, reconstitution of the M-Apparat and large scale arms-running, it is believed, might be a forerunner of Soviet military action--either course is doubtful, however, because of the likelihood of compromise. Interestingly, on more than one occasion KPD leaders have delivered themselves of the opinion that it will be the duty of the Party to prevent as many as possible of the "imperialistic exploiters" from leaving the country in the event of hostilities--which, needless to say they await with unalloyed eagerness. The sight of their comrades in the Soviet Zone living in the fat of the land is almost more than they can stand.

The principal "direct action" weapon which the KPD possesses is that of the strike. Unfortunately for the Communists, however, a strike may legally be ordered only by the Trade Unions and since the state union organs are controlled by the more rational SPD, a Communist-inspired general strike is almost out of the question. The Communists, however, have managed to maneuver plant works councils into bringing pressure to bear on the Trade Unions, as in the case of the January strikes. Where the issue at stake has been of sufficient importance--in this case, food--this pressure has resulted in strikes--even though the Trade Union leadership has been well aware of the futility of striking. In January the Trade Unions called token strikes to take the pressure out of the Communist drive, give the worker a chance to let off steam and retain control of the situation. However, to the extent that the worker felt that his strike efforts had mitigated his admittedly bad lot, the Communists gained.

During the series of strikes in May, which also stemmed from ration cuts, the towns most affected were also KPD labor strongholds. The strikes were mostly wildcat affairs and were undertaken without Trade Union sanction. As much as possible the Communist Party remained in the background in order to avoid censure, but its agents actively promoted walk outs.

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The Communist agitator fanned the worker's very real anxiety over ration cuts and prompted him to strike in spite of Trade Union demonstrations. It has, moreover, been definitely established that the SED Central Secretariat has dispatched special emissaries to party headquarters in Western Germany to coordinate and guide party strike machinations in accordance with the will of the Central Committee. The basic party aim, aside from disrupting orderly recovery, is to develop the strike as a purely political weapon, not only to instill class consciousness into the worker but also to prepare him for the impending battle over the rights of works councils to determine plant policies in conjunction with management. This is the most serious challenge which free enterprise faces in Western Germany today and one which we may expect the Communists to press to the utmost.

Another phase of Communist activity which has lately been increasing in importance is the direct, broad support of the KPD in the West by the SED. According to recent directives SED echelons at all levels have been charged with the support of specific KPD units. Thus SED Landesleitung Thuringia has "adopted" KPD Landesleitung Hesse and SED Saxony, KPD Bavaria and North Rhine-Westphalia, SED Weimar-KPD Frankfurt, SED Leipzig-KPD Duesseldorf and so on town for town, county for county. It is incumbent on the SED units that they provide the KPD with financial and material support, propaganda, services of speakers, and training facilities. During the recent election campaign this assistance was particularly noticeable. An outstanding example of the operation of this system was the transfer of a printing press with all necessary accouterments from Thuringia to Frankfurt where it was installed in the basement of the KPD Landesleitung for Hesse. This press has a greater capacity than the presses of any of the Frankfurt newspapers!

To organize and control the large flow of overt and covert traffic between the Soviet Zone and Western Germany which the implementation of this policy requires as well as provide for the travel of couriers, special agents and supply of contraband including money and arms, the SED Central Secretariat established a department titled SED/KPD Arbeitsgemeinschaft which translates roughly as "working association." This Department is under the direction of a little known gentleman who goes by the alias of Richard Stahlmann. That Stahlmann is well equipped for his job is attested by his "service record": Militaerischer Apparat, Department IV Red Army General Staff (Intelligence) and the International Brigade in Spain. Under his competent guidance one will see the Soviet Zone develop into an increasingly efficient base of operations for the KPD in the zone of operations in the West. Successful combatting of this activity will be of major importance in isolating and controlling the KPD, particularly as the Party assumes an increasingly clandestine role.

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This development is closely allied to the SED's unsuccessful attempts to found an SED in Western Germany in place of the KPD and to organize a German-wide Trade Union organization. While the USSR through its policy precludes a Germany united by quadripartite cooperation, she is attempting through the SED, the Trade Union movement and latterly the national German People's Congress movement to gain a position

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from which she can proceed to establish de facto German unity. Part and parcel of this program has been a crescendo of patently unalloyed nationalistic propaganda, which the Communist machine in the West has faithfully echoed. Measured against Soviet expectations, the program has been a dismal failure. Germans simply have not risen to the bait. Soviet ingenuity, however, is far from exhausted and we may expect many variations on the nationalistic theme in the future.

In this connection it is well to remember that an influential sector of the German officer and industrial class in the past has argued strongly for Russo-German collaboration. Their prophet was Bismarck and one of the high priests, General Von Seeckt, post World War I Reichswehr Chief of Staff. Fortunately, however, the Soviets are trapped by the inconsistency of their policy. As long as their ruthless oppression and exploitation of the Soviet Zone is exposed by fleeing Germans and so long as they adhere to the Oder-Neisse boundary for Eastern Germany their chances for success are small. Yet to establish a separate German state and seal off the long boundary on the pattern of the USSR would place the onus of overt division squarely on the Soviet Union. This is the cross the KPD has to bear! Although Western German opinion has not yet crystalized, it is believed that the decisions made on the future of Western Germany by the six power conference, particularly with respect to international control of the Ruhr, may have somewhat redressed the USSR's unfavorable balance.

For the future one may expect more emphasis to be placed on all covert phases of party activity, particularly strike agitation, sabotage, intelligence, and connections with the Soviet Zone. For the first time since the beginning of the occupation concrete reports are beginning to flow in--and not only from the United States Zone--of active preparations for a conspirative role. In conjunction with this, the Party's internal counterintelligence system will be developed to a high efficiency and special schools may be inaugurated to prepare younger party stalwarts for their new tasks. The Party has the capability of setting up a covert organization along the lines of the Apparat of the Weimar Republic period to conduct this activity. The Party will exert maximum effort to strengthen its position in the German Police and labor movement. Propaganda will become increasingly virulent and nationalistic; however, the Party will avoid steps which would provoke Military Government into revoking its license.

In spite of the apparently favorable situation, United States' policy has born fruit. Far from increasing its following, the KPD has actually lost strength and a recent recruiting drive centered around the birthday of Communist martyr, Ernst Thaelmann and the soliciting of signatures for the unity of Germany both ended in a fiasco. The KPD's uncompromising opposition towards the Marshall Plan and its attempt to change its name have provoked dissension in the ranks of the nationalist faction of party functionaries. While, although this dissension has not as yet reached serious proportions, it may become so, as conditions materially improve. Additionally, there is evidence that in rural areas, many Kreis and Ortsgruppen leaders are filled with despair over the attitude of the local populace and the fruitlessness of their incessant toil. The opposite face of the same coin is the fact that in

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Western Germany as a whole American policy vis a vis the USSR finds general support, (disregarding the results of the six power conference) regardless of the evident loss of the Soviet Zone. It is perhaps too early to state whether a reversal of Soviet policy in its Zone could swing Western Germany away from its present orientation or not. It must constantly be born in mind that the Soviet Zone is capable of becoming self-sufficient in food stuffs and that the USSR in fact holds new Poland. Aside from actual invasion, or the failure of Western German recovery, amelioration of Soviet policy in its Zone is the one development which might radically alter an otherwise grim outlook for the Communist Party of Germany today.

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R I S B R I E F

PREFACE

The purpose of this brief is to survey the scope of activity of the RIS as it affects the United States Zone of Germany primarily to serve as background and orientation for agencies in the field. This section is not subject to the instructions for destruction contained on page 1 of the summary, but may be retained and used as a reference by any of the users of the Counter Intelligence section of the summary.

INTRODUCTION

While a background history of Russia before 1917 is not presented in this brief, it would be well for the reader to keep in mind those salient features of Russian history which have led to the formation of the present government of the USSR.

With the approach of the end of World War I, the final collapse of Czardom occurred, bringing with it the February Revolution. Lenin, Zinoviev and others arrived in Russia from Switzerland in April 1917 and immediately began organizing the downfall of the provisional Government. They were joined by Trotsky, Kamenev and Stalin. In the October Revolution, they achieved their objective and set up the first Council of People's Commissars with Lenin as Chairman. One of the first tasks of the new Communist Government was the creation of a Soviet secret political police, CPEKA, whose function was to insure the permanency of the revolution or in fact the continuance of the Bolshevik Regime. At the same time Lenin translated the theoretical ideas of Bolshevism into action. However, the new government, far from being able to devote its attention to the problem of internal reforms, was involved from its inception in civil strife, the advance of forces supported by the Allied powers and in a war with Poland. This was the so-called period of "War Communism," the result of which was virtual economic stagnation and exhaustion. In order to mitigate the rigors of the unsuccessful experiments and to bring some measure of recovery, Lenin "retreated" to the "New Economic Policy" in March 1921. Peasants were permitted to sell their surplus products, private trade waxed and the capitalist world breathed easier. Meanwhile, the Bolsheviks continued to eradicate all opposition to their regime and their chief weapon, the Secret Police, achieved monstrous infamy. With the death of Lenin, a struggle for power ensued between the protagonists of World revolution lead by Trotsky and the advocates of consolidation of the revolution in the USSR lead by Stalin. Trotsky, however, was no match for the arch-conspirator Stalin, who from the first had assiduously gathered the reigns of power and the position of Stalin's opponents gradually deteriorated, culminating in Trotsky's expulsion from the country in 1929.

One of the signs that the internal struggle had been won was the inception of the first Five Year Plan on 1 October 1928. The main aim of the plan was to resume the collectivization of the Soviet economy which had been

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interrupted by the New Economic Policy. This plan met with great opposition in the rural areas, but the GPU, by deporting thousands of farmers to the far North and Siberia, played an important role in its enforcement. The industrial phase was implemented with far less human suffering, for the basis of the Soviet economy was agriculture. Quality, however, was sacrificed for quantity; waste and inefficiency were the rule.

Concurrently, the omnipotent Secret Police was active in carrying on secret trials and deporting all enemies of the Communist Party. In 1934, the assassination of one of Stalin's most trusted lieutenants, Sergei Kirov, unleashed a bloody purge of anti-Stalinist elements. The purge, which reached mercilessly into all strata of Soviet life, but which fell most heavily on the Party and Soviet officialdom, was climaxed by the famous Vishinsky trials of 1937 and 1938 and the liquidation of the NKVD (Political Police) Chief Yagoda whose organization had provided the victims and the condemning "evidence." By 21 December 1938 Stalin was the undisputed head of the Communist Party and the USSR and the Secret Police as well as being a state institution was actually his personal tool.

THE EVOLUTION AND FORMATION OF SOVIET IS

Political and State Intelligence Service of USSR.

During the reign of Ivan "the Terrible," the first Russian Secret Political Police was formed. It was a ruthless organization known as OTRICHINA which sought after and punished enemies of the Tsar. Its successors took various forms but it was the last of these, the OKHRANA founded in 1881 as a direct outcome of the assassination of Alexander II, which may be considered the prototype for subsequent Soviet intelligence and counter intelligence machines. For a half century previous, its functions had been performed by the 3rd Section of the Imperial Court Chancery. The Okhrana was divided into the two agencies on the basis of methods of espionage, one consisting of a corps of "Special Agents" and the other of informants and agents provocateurs. In addition to branches in the important cities of Russia, the Okhrana maintained a Foreign Agency in the centers of anti-Tsarist activity abroad. In spite of the first revolution of 1905, Okhrana maintained its power and successfully suppressed the opposition until World War I. Then the defeats and privation suffered by the Russian Army and the Russian people during World War I led to the final collapse of Tsardom in 1917.

With the ascent of the Bolsheviks to power in October, 1917, Lenin shortly thereafter on 20 December 1917, established the political police, CHEKA (Chrezvychaynaya Komissiya - The Extraordinary Commission (to combat counter revolution and sabotage)) under Felix Dzerzhinsky. In its duties of protecting and insuring the supremacy of the Political Party, it soon surpassed the reputation of the former Czarist secret political police for cruelty and ruthlessness. From initial duties of investigation it soon took over executions and developed the technique of hostages and execution of numbers of innocent individuals as "class enemies." This resulted in such world wide criticism, that the Soviet Government abolished CHEKA in 1922. The GPU (Gosudarstvennoye Politicheskoye Upravleniye - State Political Directorate) under Menzhinsky succeeded CHEKA but was merely a cloak for

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began to draw apart, Stalin purged the RU to rid it of pro-German personnel and by 1937 the RU was almost completely dependent upon the GUGB. With the outbreak of the war with Germany, the growing importance of the Red Army caused the RU to once again become prominent and it was elevated to the status of Chief Intelligence Directorate, the GUV (Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravleniye - Chief Intelligence Directorate). Until 1943 the duties of preventing subversive activities amongst the troops and the protecting of them from pro-foreign influence were the responsibility of the Special Sections of the NKVD (Osobiy Otdel NKVD = OO-NKVD). Naturally the NKVD was extremely unpopular with the members of the Red Army, since they were subject, at all times, to control by a non-military secret police. All reports instigated by the OO-NKVD were forwarded directly to the NKVD Headquarters and no action or intercession was allowed to be taken by the Red Army. As a special concession by Stalin to the Army, this system was abolished in 1943 with the establishment of a new organization, Smersh OKR ("Smert Shpionam" Otdel Kontr Razvedki - "Death to the Spies," Counter Espionage Section.) Smersh was nominally under the control of the NKO (Narodny Komissariat Obrony - People's Commissariat of Defense) however, it was composed mostly of the same officers as the OO-NKVD and it can be assumed that they continued to submit reports directly to the NKVD/NKGB. Information presently available indicates that Smersh OKR has been abolished and that the functions of Smersh are carried on under the GUKR (Main Administration of Counterintelligence for the Armed Forces) with reports flowing to the MGB.

PRESENT FUNCTIONING ORGANS OF THE RIS

Within the present Soviet Government there appear to be three main organizations, the MVD, the MGB and the GUV-GUKR, which are responsible for the intelligence and counter-intelligence of the USSR. The activities of these three main agencies are controlled and coordinated by the Polit Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Together they serve to further the Communist aim of world domination as well as to insure the stability of the Bolshevik regime. The intelligence agencies serve this end mainly by first protecting the Communist Party of the USSR from internal or external subversion, second, by conspiring to weaken the opposition, and finally, by supplying information to the Politburo to serve as a basis for planning. Briefly, their functions are outlined as follows:

MVD - (The Ministry of Internal Affairs). The MVD is charged with the internal security of the USSR with the main objective of protecting the party and state against insurrection. It operates within the USSR and in areas immediately adjacent to the border, usually up to a depth of 10 kilometers. The MVD, however, does send low-level agents and line crossers into adjacent territory of the USSR or territory occupied by the USSR on low-grade missions of value to border units of the MVD. Generally speaking, the MVD may be considered as the "short-range" intelligence organization of the USSR, a police agency, and a large construction firm due to its control of labor and slave camps. Its intelligence activity is not as important as the Soviets would have us believe; actually it is the executive arm of the MGB.

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the same functions under another name. With the adoption of the constitution of 1923, the GPU became the OGPU (Obyedinyonnoye Gosudarstvennoye Politicheskoye Upravleniye - The United Political Directorate). The OGPU took on the duties of providing high level police security and began mass arrests of dissident communists. It is important to note in this connection that with the reduction of the Russian society to an amorphous, pliable mass, the only force which could challenge the Party was the state machine itself. In short, the OGPU was charged with the overt task of operating administrative security services and the clandestine watch of the political orthodoxy of the population as well as the whole governmental machine.

In 1934 the OGPU was abolished as an independent institution. Its juridical functions were transferred to regular courts and its administrative functions to the NKVD (People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs). Having become alarmed at the German danger the USSR moved out of its isolation and sought collective security by establishing ties with the Democracies. This was the era of the USSR's joining the League of Nations, United States recognition, and the popular front of the Communists and Socialists against Fascism; therefore, it was natural that the Soviet Regime should go through the motions of dissolving its main prop whose name has become synonymous with terror. The secret section of the former OGPU, dealing with political activity at home and abroad became the GUGB (Glavnoye Upravleniye Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti - Chief Directorate for State Security) and was placed under the jurisdiction of the NKVD. By 1941 the NKVD-GUGB became so unwieldy in size and functions that a division took place, resulting in the establishment of an independent NKGB. This change, however, was almost immediately reversed, as the outbreak of war made far reaching organizational changes inopportune. In 1943 the GUGB was once again separated from the NKVD and became the NKGB. In 1946, the term, "People's Commissariat," which prefixed the names of the main governmental departments, was changed to the less innocuous, "Ministry" and the NKVD and the NKGB became respectively the MVD (Ministerstvo Vnutrennikh Del - Ministry for Internal Affairs) and the MGB (Ministerstvo Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti - Ministry for State Security).

As the political and state intelligence services were developing, the Soviet Army was also engaged in organizing a military intelligence service. This was begun in 1921 when the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army, the Razvedupr (Rasvedyvatelnoye Upravleniye - RU), or the fourth department of the General Staff was established. The RU was given the task of collecting all positive intelligence for the Red Army. Counter-intelligence was handled by CFEKA and its successors, namely the present MGB. Consequently, there was friction between the RU and the various security services (CFEKA, GPU, OGPU, NKVD) due to the competition of their espionage systems and the fact that the latter, were also responsible for preventing subversive political activities amongst the troops and for protecting them from pro-Western influences.

The RU had leant itself strongly to the friendship of Germany and Russia (1921-1933) and when the two countries

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MGB - (The Ministry of State Security). The MGB may be termed the "long-range" intelligence organization of the USSR, since it is responsible for most of the intelligence activity carried out abroad. It is also responsible for the secret political surveillance of all non-military agencies and personnel within the USSR. It is the most important agency of the KGB.

GRU - (The Intelligence Division or Main Intelligence Administration of the Armed Forces). The GRU is the principal positive intelligence agency of the Ministry of the Armed Forces (MVS). Its missions are limited to the procurement of military, air and naval intelligence, but in war time also include the conduct of sabotage in foreign countries and in enemy held territory. Present indications are that the activities of the GRU are limited, but would be expanded in wartime.

GUKR - (Main Administration of Counterintelligence). The GUKR having taken over from Smersh, is primarily concerned with the surveillance of armed forces personnel. As in the case of Smersh, the officers of the GUKR are obtained from the MGB staffs. In addition, it is actually subordinate to the MGB.

Thus the intelligence and counter-intelligence services of countries outside the Soviet dominion are confronted in the field by the MGB, the MVD and the GRU. The counter-intelligence agency of a country bordering on USSR or Soviet occupied territory (Western Germany and Austria) would be faced with the following:

1. The agent running activity of the MVD Frontier Guards, who set up a net of low grade agents to assist in their frontier control work. These agents do not normally penetrate foreign territory to a depth of more than 5-10 kms.

2. The local outstation of the MGB of one of the USSR's constituent republics bordering on foreign territory, which has a foreign agent running section and reports on conditions in the neighboring country.

3. The local outstations of the intelligence section of the appropriate Soviet Army military district which has a foreign agent running section and transmits military information on its neighboring foreign country.

In addition to these activities there are the operations originated by the MGB and GRU, and conducted from a point either within or well outside both the victim country and the USSR. Such operations may involve the assistance of the local Communist Party or the assistance of some non-political cover. Any diplomatic or other open Soviet representation in such a country is available to the MGB and the military department of an embassy is available to the GRU.

TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE KGB

Origin of Activity in the United States Zone

It must be constantly kept in mind that Soviet Intelligence activity against Western Germany is actually mounted in the

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Soviet Zone of Germany and the Soviet Sector of Vienna. The agencies responsible for the dispatch and briefing of agents are the MGB stations. The exception to this is that activity conducted by the Soviet Missions. For details see SIS No's 37-39.

Recruitment of Agents

As one of its main sources of individual agents, the RIS utilizes the Communist Party and its cover organizations. The recruitment of Communist Party members on a large scale has been fortified by the existence of world wide party records at Moscow. The reason the Soviets may rely upon members of the Communist Party becomes apparent when one considers that Communism itself is more than a mere political party, but is a way of life. Moreover, it offers potential satisfaction to the basic human urge for power. Allegiance to the Soviets therefore replaces patriotism and, fired with esprit de corps, Communists make ideal agents. Also the Soviets seek potential agents from various oppressed and deprived groups. Since the standards of living and the general economic conditions of Europe today are very low, a large group of individuals are therefore receptive to the recruiting efforts of the RIS and the Communist Party.

Specifically, the RIS might appeal to the following: to former criminals and gestapoleute, who would be promised exemption from punishment; to scientists, artists and specialists, offered high rewards and unrestricted possibilities to work in their fields; to refugees from the East and expelled Volksdeutsche, promised the right to return to their homes; to German PWS in the USSR, promised better treatment and an early return home; to little employees, promised higher wages, etc.

Further, the RIS employs physical and mental means of pressure to force wanted persons to work for them. As a common example, an individual might become pressed into service rather than risk the safety of his family. Also employed is the propaganda trick of reminding the individual that the Soviet Army will soon occupy all of Europe and consequently it would be reasonable, from this time on, to be on the good side of the Soviet Union.

Training of Agents

Although the RIS employs a vast army of low level agents, the agents on the top levels form a group who have received intensive professional training. Such men are the nuclei of informant nets used abroad. In addition to intensive study of Soviet ideology and history, for naturally the agent must be a resolute, unshakeable believer, potential German agents receive courses such as offered by the following school:

Espionage School in Khimki near Moscow - This school recruits its student agents from voluntary lists. The following persons are preferred:

1. Old-time Communists.
2. Officers and NCO's of the former German Army who were compulsorily transferred to SS Units.
3. Persons who lost their property or relatives by air raids.

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4. Former members of the Nazi Party.
 5. Adventurers without any political or moral principles.

Persons who are considered suitable are subjected unknowingly to a strict screening. If the results of this screening are satisfactory, they are admitted to the ranks of "the fighters for the establishment of a righteous national peace."

The course of instruction is sub-divided into three parts, the preparatory, intermediate and special phases. The preparatory phase lasts for one month and is concerned chiefly with a history and background study of the Communist Party, the Soviet Union and the Soviet Army. The programs of other political parties are also discussed, but with the truth greatly distorted. The intermediate phase lasts for two months. During this time the student agent receives advanced political training and is prepared for the special course of instruction. Also the general and military knowledge of each student is checked and in addition preparatory military training is given. The special phase lasts from three to five months. At this time the student receives instruction in military, economic and political espionage, the intelligence services of other countries and methods of combating them and illegal agitation and communications.

On completion of the various courses, the new agent receives a trial assignment prior to beginning his real work.

Other schools which have been preparing agents for missions in the United States Zone are the following:

PW Schools.

The Antifa schools in the USSR may figure importantly in agent training. German PWs in the USSR are especially selected to attend the schools, which attempts to indoctrinate them with the political ideologies of the Communist Party and it is believed that a few of the more promising students are selected for agent training courses. These PWs receive far better treatment. Their living conditions are superior to those of the average PW in the USSR. As a result of their better appearance such individuals are easily recognized in a group of PWs returning to the United States Zone. Not long after returning home, many of these returnees have been observed to report to the local KTD headquarters. It appears that except for those PWs who had been members of the KTD, the KTD has refrained employing Antifa students in sensitive positions, but is watching them closely. At the least it may be assumed that Antifa men living in the United States Zone are a quiescent reserve for the KTD and the KIS and might be expected to assume important roles in the event of United States withdrawal from the Zone.

Infiltration of Agents.

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There are a number of means by which Soviet agents are brought into the target area. After an agent has completed his course of instruction he is sent to a reporting station in the USSR or one of its occupied territories. He then receives at this time a means of identifying himself to other reporting stations, such as the wearing of certain

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particular articles of clothing, coupled with pass words or other tokens. He is then given his mission and falsified documents to facilitate his entry into the victim territory. Agents are also infiltrated under legal guise of PW's, Soviet deserters, refugees, or as official representatives of various missions and consulates. In such disguise they are able to get into the victim territory with the minimum of difficulty.

Financing of Agents.

Besides whatever approved funds are available, the RIS also utilizes black market activities to finance its agents. Various Soviet purchasing commissions are set-up to carry on these activities, a good example of which is Osobtorg. At its height, the activity of Osobtorg was zone-wide and had as its purpose the securing of United States dollar instruments, which of course could be used to support intelligence activities elsewhere in the world, as well as in Germany.

Briefly, Osobtorg operated as follows: Russian cigarettes were traded on the black market for German marks. These marks in turn were converted to United States Military Payment Certificates, mainly by various agent rings located in DP Camps. The certificates were then taken to Paris, Brussels or Switzerland where they were exchanged for dollars, which were sent to the Soviet Purchasing Agency headquarters in Berlin, thus completing the transaction. Also quantities of gold, silver and jewelry purchased with marks or cigarettes were exchanged against hard currency.

As indicated in a previous Special Intelligence Summary, #38 the activities of Osobtorg are not as prevalent as they were a year ago. It is felt that our more stringent attitude towards black marketing has greatly curbed the activities of the Soviet Purchasing Commissions. However, there are indications that the Soviets are operating through cover firms. These cover firms, although apparently engaged in legal enterprises are used by the Soviets to disguise their illegal purchases of large quantities of valuables which have resale value.

The policy of "paying off" low level agents in commodities, as fats, liquor and cigarettes still continues. German marks are also frequently used.

MISSIONS.

Low-level Missions.

The issuing of low level missions by the RIS, dovetails perfectly with their method of approach to the world outside the sphere of Communist influence. This approach is invariably dominated by a strong sense of distrust of anything springing from the "capitalist world." It is therefore almost an inherent quality that is displayed in the persistence of the RIS's placing more importance on information obtained from a clandestine source, rather than information normally readily available in unclassified publications. Therefore, it is not unusual to observe that the majority of missions assigned low level agents involve

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information which could be obtained easily from any number of overt sources such as telephone books, official newspapers, periodicals, etc. Also there is the fact that an individual who made use of this overt material would automatically be suspect from the point of view of absorbing too much from the western world. The Nazi Propaganda Minister Goebbels' efforts to restrict the circulation of the Sechsaus service wartime monitoring reports of foreign broadcasts is in the same vein.

Examples of low level missions issued agents entering the United States Zone of Germany are: Location of CIC installations, names of personnel attached to CIC installations, number of airplanes at various airfields, location of troops, troop strength, attitude of the German people towards the United States Occupational forces, etc. It is to be noted that most of this information could be obtained through observation of street signs, Stars and Stripes, telephone books, and other overt sources.

Also another type of low level mission is that of causing unrest and dissension amongst minority groups. This mission is entrusted to the agent provocateur who accomplishes his mission by spreading propaganda, rumors and through the fomenting of minor disorders.

In addition to the fact that the RIS relies almost solely on clandestine means to secure its intelligence information, it must also be remembered that information obtained from low level missions is of little value unless it is received in large quantities. Therefore the reason that the United States Zone is flooded with low level agents is apparent. The emphasis is on quantity rather than quality.

High Level Missions.

There is no doubt that the mass of low level information obtained by the RIS gives the Soviets a working outline of our operations in the United States Zone. It also enables them to narrow down their target of penetration for high level missions. In their pursuit of high level missions the Soviets display another inherent quality, that of their infinite patience. There seems to be no limit in the amount of time, preparation or money employed to properly place a high level agent so that he may successfully accomplish his mission.

Examples of high level missions in the United States Zone would be: Detailed information concerning industrial plants in the zone, i.e., production capacity, production ~~output~~, directors and technical leaders, methods of operation, research developments and prospects of plant being converted to war time production; reason for troop movements, missions of troops and aircraft; shape of United States policy; and activity of high German governmental offices, particularly the Bizonal establishment.

RIS IN THE UNITED STATES ZONE OF GERMANY. ~~FROM THE GENERAL~~
~~DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE.~~

Purpose

In considering the activity of the RIS in the United States Zone it is well to keep in mind the fundamental policies of the Soviet Union--to keep the USSR secure from outside "hostile"

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influence to make the world "secure" for the Soviet Union, and specifically, to bring all of Germany into its political and economic orbit.

Agencies Through Which the RIS Operates in the United States Zone of Germany.

Soviet Missions (Officially accredited to the United States Zone)

There are numerous reports to indicate that the Soviet dominated missions are engaged in activities which are of value to the RIS and activities that are not in keeping with their professed duties. These activities of the missions cover all fields of intelligence service, including the collection of military information and dissemination of propaganda. However most of the activity initiated by the missions may be considered as low level in as much as it appears to deal chiefly with the inciting of DF disturbances.

In carrying out intelligence activities, the individual officer of the mission hires his own agents. The agent receives his orders and payment from the officer concerned and delivers his reports to him. The latter method is especially convenient to the RIS because the dangerous courier trip and the illegal border crossing is eliminated. The various missions are able to utilize their official mail courier and so the information is passed on to higher headquarters as diplomatic mail.

It can be assumed that the Soviets in their search for quantities of low level information will continue to use the missions or whatever official cover is made available to them. It also must be pointed out that although the missions appear to be engaged only in low level activity, they do by nature of their official accreditation offer a perfect cover for high level operations. At the very least, they offer an opportunity to begin the initial spade work for such high level set-ups.

Cover Firms.

The Soviets have utilized cover firms which are legal businesses for the purpose of financing intelligence operations in the United States Zone as well as for the gathering of information.

In gathering intelligence information, a cover firm is of marked value in that the RIS has at its disposal the numerous contacts of a legal business firm. These contacts are not only zone wide, but often extend throughout Germany and into neighboring countries. Therefore, under this guise, the agent can move about freely and be at liberty to gather information, as well as to keep in close contact with his reporting stations.

This activity is exemplified by a recent report of an agent of the Polish Intelligence (Warsaw) who was instructed to form and operate a cover firm in the United States Zone of Germany. In his detailed instructions he was told to establish a branch of an already operating transport firm in the British Zone. His specific assigned duties were, managing the work of the branch firm as a whole, engaging of permanent and temporary agents, collecting information, processing of the information

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(technical preparation, encipherment, photo copies, etc.) and the managing of all money matters.

The agent was to maintain contact with a lead agent in Berlin, who was also operating from a cover firm. He was to contact Berlin either personally or by means of his courier who served as a driver in the transport firm. All written reports were submitted in code form.

The prime mission of this cover firm was to collect economic information in the United States and British Zones of Germany.

COMMUNIST PARTY.

It is a matter of historical record that the illegal Apparat of the KPD produced intelligence for the USSR during the period of the Weimar Republic and the early years of the Third Reich. However, it has only lately become apparent that the KPD may once again be producing information of intelligence value for the Soviets. For example, it has been established that the economic sections of the various echelons of party headquarters are gathering information on plant production, conditions within plants, personality data on managers and information on the local food situation. This type of reporting is more or less on a permanent basis and it is known that Dr. Alfred Kroth, former head of the Munich Landesleitung Wirtschafts Abteilung and presently with the Economic Ministry of Bavaria, directed the appointment of party Wirtschaftskorrespondenten throughout the kreise in Bavaria, who were to render regular reports on the local situation in accordance with the above EEIs. It is also known that Dr Kroth sent reports to Fritz Selbmann, who at the time was SED Minister of Economics in Thuringia. There is also good reason to believe that the KPD is providing the SED Central Secretariat in Berlin with reports on the activity of the Bizonal Administration. Information to date points to the involvement of Ludwig Becker, prominent KPD member for the British Zone and member of the Bizonal Economics Council and Emil Carlebach, also a member of the Council and head of the Editorial Section of the KPD Landesleitung for Hesse. In addition, the KPD has received orders from the Central Secretariat to report the presence of any refugees from eastern countries in its area and it is known that in at least one instance, Landesleitung Munich complied.

However, this activity is being conducted by individuals who are active in overt party affairs and regular party channels are being utilized to transmit the information. In other words there is no evidence that a covert intelligence organization exists parallel to the existing party framework, although such a development may well be forthcoming.

The other aspect of the problem is, assuming that the KPD does acquire information of value to the Soviets, at what point does the information pass into Soviet hands and through what channel does it reach Moscow? A recent interrogation report of a Soviet Officer deserter who had been a member of the Communist Party and assigned to the Information Department of the SMA and as a Censor in Dresden supports the tentative working hypothesis of this Division. It was the contention of this Division that Communist members of the SED were engaged

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in all manner of intelligence activities on behalf of the Soviets--primarily in the fields of politics, economics and sociology. (It is the function of the SED Informations Dienst to procure information in these fields). He stated furthermore that Colonel Tulpanov, head of the Information Department, "the general staff for the communization of Germany," forwarded regular reports to Foreign Minister Molotov and emergency reports direct to Zhdanov and Stalin, i.e., to the Politburo. In addition he stated that the MGB collaborated closely at all levels with the Information Department. It would therefore appear the information furnished the SED by the KTD may reach Moscow via Tulpanov and possibly the MGB. It is also known that derogatory information of propaganda value is utilized directly by the Sovietisches Nachrichten Bureau (Soviet News Bureau over which Tulpanov has control) in the various news media of the Soviet Zone.

With regard to the KTD it is also well to point out that the Soviets have studiously avoided contact between the Party and overt Soviet agencies and intelligence agents and informants in Western Germany, thus practically ruling out any transfer of information by those means.

Finally, with the failure of overt Soviet policy in Western Germany and the gradual worsening of relations between East and West it is very possible that the KTD activity in the field of information gathering will increase.

News Agencies of the SMA

The SMA through the Information Department maintains control over all news agencies in the Soviet Zone of Germany. Through such agencies as the SNB (Soviet Nachrichten Bureau), Tass and the ADN (Allgemeine Deutsche Nachrichten Agentur), the Information Department dictates the complete censorship of the news and controls the output of propaganda. In addition these news agencies offer an invaluable source of current general information, as well as information on any specific mission they may be given.

Generally speaking the information obtained by these agencies is forwarded directly to Moscow through the Information Department of the SMA. However close collaboration between the SMA and the RIS on all levels makes this information available to the RIS at whatever level it is desired, with the exception of special reports requested by Moscow.

For the most part these agencies are located in the Soviet Zone but also direct their activities towards the Western Zones. By way of example, these agencies often send reporters and photographers into the Western Zones with the intended purpose of obtaining authorized reports. However, it has been observed that the material sought and obtained is distorted and used for propaganda purposes against the United States Occupation. Particular emphasis is placed on obtaining pictures which can be used to indicate deplorable conditions in the Western Zones or any other agitating factor. Penetration is also used. For example, prior to his dismissal Dr Egel, former chief of the News Department and Joint Director of the Political and Economics Department of Radio Munich, furnished Herberg Gassner, commentator for the Soviet-dominated Radio Berlin, with thorough coverage of Bavarian affairs. Finally, the various KTD Land steitungen furnish the SED Central Secretariat with daily telephonic coverage of news events.

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AGENTS

Low Level Agents

The individual low level agent sent into the United States Zone, usually appears as an illegal border crosser with a mission that may be accomplished mainly by observation, as those described previously. The low level agent is invariably unschooled in espionage work and often is fulfilling a mission under coercion. He operates on a short range basis, and the turn over of his EMI's and information is rapid.

A typical example of a low level agent is the recent case of Harry Strohbach who was apprehended in the United States Zone as an illegal border crosser. In the course of his interrogation, it was revealed that he had been employed by the Soviet Reconstruction Battalion at Frankfurt am Od r. While there, he was contacted by an NKVD Lieutenant, Mischea Maximov, given the following missions to accomplish in the United States Zone:

1. How many troops are there in the United States Zone?
2. How many plans are there in the United States Zone?
3. Location and size of all airfields.
4. What do the people in the United States Zone think of the Soviets?
5. Where and how are the German Police being trained?
6. Where are dumps of US materials located in the United States Zone?

High Level Agents

In contrast to the low level agent, the high level agent represents a well trained and carefully picked man. He operates on a long range basis, and no amount of time, money or effort is spared to place such an agent so that his mission may be accomplished. In carrying out his missions, the high level agent hires and maintains his own net of subordinate agents.

At the present time there are several high level espionage cases under observation in the United States Zone. One of these is that of a high level agent who has been instructed by the NKVD to establish a radio transmitter in the United States Zone. This case has been under development for nearly a year, during which time the agent has received some schooling and has carried out minor missions. As yet the transmitter has not been installed. The present espionage group consists of the initial agent mentioned above, a trained radio operator and an additional agent whose mission is that of organizing an espionage net. This net will function with the prime mission of penetrating all industry now active in the United States Zone as well as surveillance of personalities in such plants. (C-5)

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The value of developing such a case as described above is unlimited, in that through the operation of a radio transmitter other agents and agent nets may be uncovered. On the other hand there are several additional points that should be considered. As indicated, the RIS has spent nearly a year in merely attempting to place the transmitter and the agents in a position to operate. When the transmitter is successfully installed, it would not be too unlikely to assume that during the first months the transmitter will operate on a trial basis. Further, the RIS may be chiefly concerned now with the establishing of such a transmitter, and have no immediate plans for its operation. Therefore, after its establishment, the transmitter may appear to drop out of operation until a more opportune time.

PROBLEMS

Sparseness of Uncovered High Level Activity

In considering the over-all activities of the RIS in the United States Zone the scarcity of high level activity becomes apparent. Although the small number of high level cases is the basis for this statement, it should not be assumed that it reflects the true state of affairs in the United States Zone. Rather, the problem should be approached from a long term view. As stated before, the RIS employs infinite patience in preparing and establishing the high level agent. Therefore, in one sense, the period of three years covered by the Occupation is a comparatively short time. Moreover, high level agents may well be in the process of being placed in the United States Zone, but may remain relatively inactive until the time when they could be of most value, as in case of hostilities between the East and West, in event of a United Germany or in face of the drying up of existing sources.

Possible Current Lines of Action

It seems apparent that the RIS will continue to gather great masses of low level type information; however, it would not be at all unlikely if some of this low level activity were to taper off and a more concerted effort made towards high level penetration, particularly of Western German Trizonal organs. For, it is only logical that the primary mission of the RIS will be the penetration of the Western Zones to determine the success of the Western Powers in the reconstruction of Germany.

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INTERNAL ROUTE SLIP

HEADQUARTERS, U. S. FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER

File in Russian
16139

FILE NO:

SUBJECT: Report on Russian Intelligence Services.

DATE: 23rd September, 1946.

(Number each memo or minute consecutively. Fill in each column, signed legibly draw a line across the sheet. Use entire width of sheet for long memoranda.)

No.	From	Pass to	Date	HAS THIS PAPER BEEN COORDINATED WITH ALL CONCERNED?
1.	Major	GIB Attn: Lt. Col.	23rd September 1946.	<p>1. Attached please find one copy of our latest publication on the Russian Intelligence Services.</p> <p>2. I would be grateful for detailed comments on this study from the European Section.</p> <p>3. Should you desire more copies, I can probably obtain them in limited numbers.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">MAJOR, G.S.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Z-628</p>
ENC.				

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Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
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Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

- ☒ Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

~~(b)(1)~~ ~~(b)(7)(D)~~

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

- ☐ Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.
- ☐ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.
- ☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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Page(s) 144-161

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

350.09(GBI/CIB/ES)

APO 757
17 June 1946

SUBJECT: Essential Elements of Counter Intelligence Information.

I. The EEI's published by this office dated 14 February 1946 subject same as above are hereby rescinded and the following is published for the information and guidance of all concerned.

A. The essential elements of counter intelligence information (EEI) desired on Soviet and Pro-Soviet activity in the United States Zone of Occupation in Germany are:

1. Extent and nature of Soviet-inspired intelligence or subversive agencies throughout Europe, which would influence United States interests in the European Theater.

2. Organization, methods and missions of the NKVD and other Soviet secret intelligence or security agencies in the United States Zone, showing their relationship to the parent organizations in the USSR.

3. Relations between Soviet liaison officers with the following:

- a. German nationals of KPD (German Communist Party).
- b. German members of NKFD (The Free Germany Committee) or NEUES DEUTSCHLAND.
- c. Soviet Baltic, Polish, Rumanian, Jewish, and Turkish DP's and RAMP's.
- d. UNRRA, AJDC (American Joint Distribution Committee--Jewish Relief Organization), Red Cross, and other social, welfare, and relief agencies.
- e. German POW's returning from USSR and from the Russian Zone in Germany.
- f. Scientists, technicians, Luftwaffe flying and ground personnel, V-1, V-2 experts, etc....
- g. Liaison officers of other nationalities such as Yugoslavs, Czechoslovakians, Poles and Danes.
- h. Personnel of German or other nationalities already known to be Soviet agents.
- i. US Army personnel or any persons employed by the US Government.

4. Activities of OZNA (Intelligence Service of the pro-Soviet Tito Government of Yugoslavia) regarding the following:

- a. Relations with Soviet officers.
- b. Relations with Yugoslav DP's and RAMP.
- c. Relations with ROYAL YUGOSLAWS.
- d. Organization of any subversive groups in the US Zone of Occupation.

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- e. Misuse and pilferage of US Army equipment and transport for purposes other than authorized.

5. Extent of WARSAW Pole intelligence activity in the US Zone, including BERLIN and BREMEN areas.

- a. Infiltration by WARSAW Polish agents into Polish guard companies employed by the US Army.
- b. Relay points on the US Zone borders for Polish agents.
- c. Propaganda, radio and publications among DP's and RAMP's in the US Zone.
- d. Misuse and pilferage of US Army equipment and transport for purposes other than authorized.

6. The organization and activities of the NKFD (Free Germany Committee).

7. Knowledge of any special badges, medals, passwords, or other identifying methods issued NKFD or other Soviet sponsored German organizations. See Annex I for an alleged example.

8. The organization and the activities of the KPD (German Communist Party) with respect to the following:

- a. Position of KPD on important issues such as:
 - (1) The disposition of the Rhineland.
 - (2) Internationalization of the Ruhr.
 - (3) Dismantling of German industry.
 - (4) Release of German PW's.
- b. Any illegal or subversive activities of the KPD and methods used therein.
- c. All data concerning cooperation or communication between German Communists and the USSR or any of its citizens or agencies.
- d. The activities of ex-PW's returning from the Russian Zone, insofar as they concern spreading of communistic doctrines, recruiting for KPD, or acting as informants for the USSR.
- e. All information about the use of "power politics" by the KPD, either recruiting of members or in agitating for a merger with other political parties. This includes such devices as requiring KPD membership for employment, giving extra rations or privileges to members, or use of force to further party aims.
- f. Background information of KPD leaders, as well as reports of their current contacts and activities.
- g. Technique employed by German Communists to transmit information concerning policy and procedure originating in the USSR.
- h. Relationship of US employed civilians on War Department assignments in the US Zone and German Communists.

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- i. Information and activities of any Communist groups now formed or to be formed other than KPD.
- j. Information concerning sources of material on German Communism and location of sources, i.e., Gestapo files, agents' reports, new propaganda, and newly established communistic newspapers.
9. Extent and nature of anti-Fascist Youth Committee in the United States Zone of Occupation and their affiliations with similar committees in the USSR Zone of Occupation.
10. Extent and nature of Communistic influence over:
 - a. Victims of Fascism.
 - b. Anti-Fascist Committee of Fight.
 - c. Anti-Fascist Democratic Committee.
11. Extent and nature of Communist influence or Soviet influence in cultural organizations in the US Zone and their affiliations in the Cultural Organization of Cologne, under the leadership of Dr. H. CYNWICH, or the Rhenish Art League Free Peoples Theater of Cologne, Inc., under leadership of FRIEDRICH KALPS.
12. Activities of the League of Friends of Soviet Russia in MUNICH, Germany.
13. Any plans of Soviet-sponsored agencies to sabotage our installations.
14. The extent of pro-Soviet Czech intelligence activity. Emphasis on aid that might be rendered passage of agents over the border of the US Zone—Czech border between HOF and PASSAU.
15. The structure and extent of pro-Soviet Ukrainian activity.
16. The extent of French pro-Soviet activity in the US Zone among Germans and other nationals.
17. The extent and character of operations of the Turkish and Ukrainian groups in the MUNICH area.
18. Communistically inclined personnel and activities within the armed forces of the United States in GERMANY with respect to the following:
 - a. The names, organization, military position, United States address, and all available background material of all members of the Communist Party presently employed by the US Forces in Germany.
 - b. All instances where communists or communist sympathizers have obtained employment in sensitive activities, and the extent to which these persons have been able to influence the operation of these activities.
 - c. Full data on all individuals whose words or actions denote adherence to any part of the "party line" (See Annex II) of the Communist Party, as well as details of their subversive actions.

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- d. Personnel connected with the following units or positions will be subjected to very close scrutiny and loyalty screening as prescribed by pertinent directives.
- (1) The Stars and Stripes and other Army publications.
 - (2) Cryptographic duties.
 - (3) Positions of trust which afford ready opportunity seriously to injure or impede the military effort.
 - (4) Information and Education services.
- e. All information on the organizational details and communist activities of any groups or societies dominated by communists.

II. In order to analyse the scope of activities of various dissident groups operating against the interests of the USSR within the US Zone of Occupation in such a manner as to bring possible discredit and misunderstanding in our relations with the USSR, the list of essential elements of information required follows:

A. THE ROYAL YUGOSLAWS.

1. The personalities, the organization and the operations of the ROYAL YUGOSLAV COMMITTEE and ROYAL YUGOSLAV ARMY.
2. The relationship between the ROYAL YUGOSLAWS IN MUNICH and VOERDE, Germany with those in AUSTRIA, ITALY, BELGIUM and FRANCE.
3. The extent of preparation for any possible conflict with the TITO Yugoslavs.
4. The relations between the ROYAL YUGOSLAWS and any Italian officials for the procurement of arms and supplies to equip the ROYAL YUGOSLAV; surrender of claim to lands in the North Adriatic which are being taken over by the TITO Government.

B. The LONDON Poles.

1. The structure and organization of intelligence activity among DP's and RAMP's.
2. The activities of the SWIETOKRZYSKA BRIGADA, an illegal organization of Polish civilian guard companies employed by the US Army in the US Zone of Occupation.
3. The extent of propaganda activity in the US Zone.
4. The relations and traffic with the ANDERS Army in Italy.
5. The location of the relay points on the US Zone borders through which Polish agents pass.

~~UKRAINIAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE~~

1. The size and organization of the UKRAINIAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE.
2. Relations between the UKRAINIAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE and the ROYAL YUGOSLAWS and the LONDON Poles.

III. All reports that are forwarded to this headquarters should include all the aspects of good reporting, namely:

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"Who, What, When, Where, How"

and any other facts that could have a bearing on the matter or personality reported upon. In the cases of Domestic Communists' place of birth, present position in the US Army are desired.

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Brigadier General, GSC,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

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
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ANNEX I

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This is a double magnification of a white metal badge allegedly issued by the Soviets to the members of the FREE GERMANY COMMITTEE.

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MARK II

17 June 1946

CURRENT "LINE" OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE UNITED STATES

The basic line of the Communist Party is to promote revolution in every country in the world with the exception of the Soviet Union, to assume control of the world and to establish a rigid, state-controlled economy. This line remains constant and never varies. Communist implements for effecting this "World Revolution" vary from time to time and these variations in methods, propaganda and means are known as "changes in the Party line". The present line of the Communist Party of the United States has been developing since the reformation of the Communist Party from the Communist Political Association in July 1945. It is set out as follows:

I. Military:

A. Promote any means to weaken the United States militarily and promote future weakness of the United States Armed Forces.

1. Demand faster demobilization of the Armed Forces.
2. Fight against peace-time conscription; give aid to any organization which opposes conscription on religious or other grounds.
3. Agitate against social segregation in the army.
4. Discredit all leaders of the Armed Forces. Promote enlisted men's distrust of officers. Belittle "brass hats".
5. Break down army discipline by attacks on the "caste system", "army hierarchy", and "officers' privileges".
6. Capitalize on soldier unrest and desire of soldiers' families to bring them back home; promote soldier mass meetings and "action committees" in overseas theaters.
7. Demand that the United States release the secrets of the atomic bomb to the rest of the world and especially to the Soviet Union.
8. Promote Communist ideologies within the Armed Forces.
 - a. Through infiltration of Information and Education and orientation activities.
 - b. By placing Communists, fellow travellers, and "Pinks" on Armed Forces' publications.
 - c. By publicizing feats of valor, decorations, etc., of known Communists in the Army.
9. Demand withdrawal of all Armed Forces from all foreign installations except "small occupational forces" in conquered Axis nations, to give the USSR a free hand.

B. Promote any means to stir up political unrest within the United States.

1. Discredit government officials and Congressmen, especially those who voice criticism of the Soviet Union, or Communists.

C. Encourage distrust of the present system of government of the United States.

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...extensive publicity to the Soviet system and portray it as

- S. Support legislation designed to establish further government control or nationalization and legislation favoring minorities.
- F. Demand freedom for all "colonial and quasi-colonial peoples".
- G. Demand withdrawal of recognition of "Franco Spain".
- H. Agitate for loan to RUSSIA.
- I. Demand withdrawal of all non-Russian troops from every part of the world (i.e. GREECE, CHINA, etc)
- J. Charge that United States is promoting imperialism throughout the world and is using the atomic bomb as a "blackjack" to gain its ends.
- K. Demand international trusteeships for American possession in the Pacific. No mention is made of any trusteeships for Russian occupied Pacific bases.
- L. Continually criticize phases of United States foreign policy which conflicts with Russian ambitions; defend the Soviet Union's foreign policy even though it is detrimental to the United States; discredit any State Department official who offers criticism of Russian activities outside of the Soviet Union; charge that United States is attempting to establish cartels, and is promoting an "anti-Soviet" economic block.

III. Economic:

- A. Promote economic unrest and dissatisfaction with the American system of enterprise.
- B. Divide "labor" against "capital".
- C. Discredit capitalist system; charge that it is organized for the exploitation of the many by the few.
- D. Campaign to dominate labor unions; publicize and defend those labor unions which are Communist dominated; discredit labor leaders who are anti-Communist; employ Communist controlled labor unions for promoting the Communist program in the United States and to pressurize the government to pass legislation or establish policies favorable to RUSSIA.
- E. Promote strikes and as much violence as possible in connection with same.

IV. Social:

- A. Promote social unrest.
- B. Appeal to minority groups by publicizing inequities.
- C. Promote race hate, religious hate and hate for "big business, capitalists" and distrust for authority.

Continually state that United States Government agencies for relief, etc., are inadequate to "meet the needs of the people".

This is not a complete list of all phases of the Communist Party Line. Such a list could continue almost indefinitely. However, this gives the main points. There is necessarily considerable over-lapping as various points mentioned apply to each section of the line.

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Initials:
Date 14 Feb 1946:

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

(GBI/CIB/TPF/eah)

APD 757
14 February 1946

SUBJECT: Essential Elements of Counter Intelligence Information.

I. The essential elements of counter intelligence information (EEI) desired on Soviet and pro-Soviet activity in the United States Zone of Occupation in Germany are:

1. Extent and nature of Soviet-inspired intelligence or subversive agencies throughout Europe, which would influence United States interests in European theater.

2. Organization, methods and missions of the NEVD and other Soviet secret intelligence or security agencies in the United States Zone, showing their relation to the parent organizations in the USSR.

3. Relations between Soviet liaison officers for repatriation with the following:

- (a) German nationals of KPD (German Communist Party).
- (b) German members of NKPD (The Free Germany Committee) or NEUES DEUTSCHLAND.
- (c) Soviet Baltic, Polish, Rumanian, Jewish, and Turkish DP's and RALP's.
- (d) UNRRA, AJDC (American Joint Distribution Committee - Jewish Relief Organization), Red Cross, and other social, welfare and relief agencies.
- (e) German POW's returning from USSR and from the Russian Zone in Germany.
- (f) Scientists, technicians, Luftwaffe flying and ground personnel, V-1, V-2 experts, etc.
- (g) Liaison officers of other nationalities such as Yugoslavs, Czechoslovakians, Poles and Danes.
- (h) Personnel of German or other nationality already known to be Soviet agents.

(i) Army personnel or any persons employed by

in activities of OZNA (Intelligence Service of the pro-Soviet TITO Government of Yugoslavia) regarding the following:

- (a) Relations with Soviet officers.
- (b) Relations with Yugoslav DP's and RALP's.
- (c) Relations with ROYAL YUGOSLAVS.

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- (a) Organization of any subversive groups in the US Zone of Occupation.
- (a) Extent of WARSAW Polish intelligence activity in the US Zone, including BERLIN and MUNICH areas.
- (b) Infiltration by WARSAW Polish Agents into Polish guard companies employed by the US Army.
- (c) Relay points on US Zone borders for Polish Agents.
- (d) Propaganda, radio and publications among DP's and RAMP's in US Zone.
- (e) Misuse and pilferage of US Army equipment and transport for purposes other than authorized.
4. The organization and the activities of the NKFD.
(The Free Germany Committee).
7. Knowledge of any special badges, medals, passwords, or other identifying methods issued NKFD or other Soviet sponsored German organizations. See Annex for an alleged example.
8. The organization and the activities of the German Communist Party from a subversive viewpoint, rather than a political one.
9. Any plans of Soviet-sponsored agencies to sabotage war installations.
10. The extent of pro-Soviet Czech intelligence activity. Emphasis on aid that might be rendered passage of agents over the border of the US Zone - Czech border between ROFF and PASSAU.
11. The structure and extent of pro-Soviet Ukrainian activity.
12. The extent of French pro-Soviet activity in US Zone among Germans and other nationals.
13. The extent and character of operations of the Turkish and Ukrainian groups in the MUNICH area.

II. In order to analyze the scope of activities of various dissident groups operating against the interests of the USSR within the US Zone of Occupation in such a manner as to possibly bring discredit and misunderstanding in our relations with the USSR, the list of essential elements of information required follows:

1. The ROYAL YUGOSLAVS.

- (a) The personalities, the organization and the operations of the ROYAL YUGOSLAV COMMITTEE and the ROYAL YUGOSLAV ARMY.
- (b) The relationship between the ROYAL YUGOSLAVS in MUNICH and VOERDE, Germany with those in Austria, Italy, Belgium and France.
- (c) The extent of preparation for any possible conflict with the TITO Yugoslavs.

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- (d) The relations between the ROYAL YUGOSLAVS and any Italian officials for the procurement of arms and supplies to equip the ROYAL YUGOSLAV ARMY to fight TITO, with the ROYAL YUGOSLAV surrender of claim to lands in the North Adriatic which are being taken over by the TITO Government.

2. The LONDON Poles.

- (a) The structure and organization of intelligence activity among DP's and RAMP's.
- (b) The activities of the SWIETOKRZYSKA BRYGADA, an illegal organization which has attempted to organize the Polish civilian guard companies employed by the US Army in the US Zone of Occupation.
- (c) The extent of propaganda activity in the US Zone.
- (d) The relations and traffic with the ANDERS Army in Italy.
- (c) The location of the relay points on the US Zone borders through which Polish agents pass.

3. UKRAINIAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE.

- (a) The size and organization of the UKRAINIAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, especially in the MUNICH area.
- (b) Relations between the UKRAINIAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE and the ROYAL YUGOSLAVS and the LONDON Poles.

4. The Baltic national groups.

- (a) The organization and operations of all Baltic nationals in the US Zone of Occupation.
- (b) The relations of these Baltic dissident groups with other dissident groups, such as the LONDON Poles.

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Brigadier General, GSC,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

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
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ANNEX 1

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DA policies currently in effect.

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Signature

MAR 10 1989

(Date Signed)

(Printed Name)

GS-05
(Grade)

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UPRAVLENIYE KONTRASBAZVEDENI

GOVERN-INTelligence D'ADVERSE

OF THE

SOVIET ARMY

7948

Revised by the Positive Intelligence Section, Headquarters
Central Intelligence Corps, APO 761, United States Army
in Europe

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PREFACE

The purpose of this workbook is to afford the working agent in the field a basis for confirming or denying basic "stories" told by persons claiming to have knowledge of the Soviet Army Counter Intelligence Corps in the Soviet Zone of Germany.

The information as set forth in this publication has been gained, for the most part, from actual Soviet officer members of the UKR in Germany whose information has been confirmed by information contained in the files of this organization. This information can be considered as "probably true." It is realized that the personalities listed herein are subject to constant change, due to normal rotation and/or security purges. Further, no attempt has been made, at this writing, to list the personalities on levels below UKR Headquarters for Germany. Such data, as compiled, will be forwarded for inclusion in this publication.

It is intended that the information set forth in this workbook be used for reference only. It is desired, in all circumstances, that: this information will not be disseminated to persons not cleared to handle classified material; this information will not be contained in EMI's to informants; and this information will not be presented during an interrogation.

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PART I

INTRODUCTION

The main effort of all Soviet Intelligence Services is concentrated on counter-intelligence. This emphasis is unique and is a natural result of the administrative apparatus of the Soviet Government itself. Operating through and parallel to the governmental structure, the Communist Party controls every aspect of the national life and national policy. It admits no opposition, and provides no practical legal channel for bringing dissatisfaction with Party or Government policies into the open. Opposition, which is normally a natural by-product of all forms of government, is therefore obliged to seek conspiratorial and illegal means of expression. In some respects this situation makes opposition seem more dangerous than it really is; in any case it makes accurate weighing of the extent and power of covert opposition difficult.

As a result, there has grown up a fantastically large security force with a current strength not far short of a million and a half (1,500,000) persons. There are approximately one hundred and fifty thousand (150,000) MGB workers and bureaucrats; eight hundred and fifty thousand (850,000) troops and agents of the MVD; and some four hundred thousand (400,000) members of the Armed Forces who are involved in some form of counter-intelligence activity.

The official designation, "Central Administration for Counter Intelligence" (GUKR) is misleading, in so far as it is not primarily a counter-intelligence organization dealing with foreign espionage, but mainly a political surveillance service of the Soviet Army. It should rightly be considered a military counterpart of the MGB surveillance of the civilian population.

The UKR exists at the headquarters of major Military Districts in the USSR and at Army Group Headquarters in Soviet Occupied Lands. UKR's are known to exist at the following Military Districts: LENINGRAD, MOSCOW, KIEV, TIBLIS, and ODESSA, and at the GSOV (Soviet Occupation Forces Group) in Germany.

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PART II

HISTORY

In June 1918, the Soviet Government officially created a surveillance organization named the "Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution, Speculation, and Sabotage." This organization was nicknamed "CHEKA." It was placed under the control of the Council of Peoples' Commissars of the RSFSR in LENINGRAD. This organization was principally the same one which had operated in an irregular manner without name since the October Revolution in 1917. The numbers of the CHEKA were drawn, for the most part, from revolutionary groups which had existed since 1906. With the founding of the Comintern on 4 March 1919, foreign intelligence, sabotage and control of Communist Parties abroad became a function of this organization. By 1922, the CHEKA, which had been renamed the "State Political Administration," or GPU (to reduce its notoriety), had risen to one hundred thousand (100,000) in strength.

The second Soviet constitution, on 15 November 1923, legalized the jurisdiction of the GPU over the entire USSR. At the same time its name was changed to the "United State Political Administration," or OGPU. At this time, with the adding of internal security and border security to its mission, the OGPU set up the so-called "Military Sections," or VO OGPU for the surveillance of the Red Army and Navy. The authority of the OGPU was greatly increased by promulgation of the sweeping Security Law of 27 April 1926.

In the summer of 1934 the name of the "surveillance system" was changed again to the "People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs," or the NKVD, the counterparts of which already existed in the Union Republics. This change was accompanied by absorption of all local police and firemen into the NKVD. All secret operations were consolidated into the "Main Administration for State Security," or GUGB of the NKVD. The military surveillance sections of the OGPU were enlarged and renamed "Special Sections of the NKVD or OO NKVD. The "Foreign Section," or INO, and the "Counter Intelligence Section," or KRO, in the GUGB of the NKVD continued to be the principal vehicles of secret operation for non-military purposes abroad. Concurrently with these organizational modifications, the NKVD received unlimited power through passage of the now notorious Paragraph 58 of the RSFSR Penal Code (20 July 1934).

The NKVD finally reached the peak of its power and grandiose organization in 1939, after the invasion of Poland. At that time, all counter-intelligence functions previously performed by the Army were absorbed by OO NKVD. Thus, the NKVD

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assumed full authority for the security of the Army in addition to its innumerable other duties which, at this time, ranged from secret foreign intelligence to the operation of fisheries with prison labor. Its total personnel numbered at least one million (1,000,000).

It was at this time, however, that measures were introduced to cut down the enormous concentration of power in the NKVD. By February of 1941 the GUGB was separated from the NKVD and was named the "People's Commissariat for State Security," or NKGB. In April of 1943 the OO NKVD was abolished and military counter-intelligence theoretically returned to military and naval control. By order of the State Defense Committee on 10 May 1943, the military counter-intelligence organ was renamed the "Main Administration of Counter-Intelligence," or GUKR, and placed it under the jurisdiction of the "People's Commissariat for Defense (NKO). The organization was nicknamed "SMERSH," which was derived from the organization's slogan, "Death to Spies," or, in Russian, "Smert Shpionam." A similar agency was organized under the People's Commissariat for the Navy.

This new organization proceeded with great vigor; desertion was greatly reduced in 1943 and was negligible by 1944. Active counter-espionage behind the German lines broke up main nets and seriously hampered German intelligence.

Shortly after the end of the war, in June 1945, the appellation, SMERSH, was dropped from the GUKR's title and the GUKR was again brought under the jurisdiction of the "Ministry of State Security," or MGB, which at this time replaced the NKGB. Although the GUKR continues to operate as a part of the Armed Forces, it is directly responsible, operationally, to the Third Central Administration of the MGB in MOSCOW.

At the beginning of the occupation, the functions of the UKR, GSOV were limited to intelligence and counter-intelligence within the armies; however, because there was little subversive activity among Army personnel at this time, the UKR, GSOV, was given the assignment of "democratizing" Germany. Democratization of Germany proved to be: mass arrests of Germans charged with being active Nazis, or Nazi sympathizers; liquidation of underground movements (werewolf, etc.), the Gestapo, and all German "intelligence" organizations; search for war criminals; and mass recruiting. The MGB Opersectors, who normally would perform these functions, were not yet organized authoritatively to perform these assignments.

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In addition, in 1946 the task of discovering and seizing all German scientists was assigned to the UKR, GSOV. This function was carried out in cooperation with the MGB Opersectors.

Also, in 1946, after several arrests were made in the Soviet Zone of agents allegedly working for Allied Intelligence, orders were given to all intelligence and counter-intelligence units to concentrate on the capture of foreign agents. This was the beginning of open activity against Allied agents and which culminated in the issuance of Directive No. 0072 (or No. 0073), in 1948 (this directive gave explicit instructions of methods and measures to be taken by all MGB organs for apprehending Allied agents).

As early as 1946, the Soviet Military Governor SOKOLOVSKI — made the statement that "...no agreement can ever be reached with the "Little Allies" (soyuznichki). Germans are like dumb sheep which have been sheared and will be sheared for a long time." SOKOLOVSKI could not have made the statement regarding the Allies if he had not had knowledge of the policy adopted by MOSCOW, towards its Allies, and without MOSCOW's support.

(b)(7)(C) In 1947 a readjustment of the UKR's functions took place. These changes were necessary for two (2) reasons: (1) The MGB Opersectors were then fully established and operating with full authority, performing the same "democratization" duties as the UKR, GSOV; (2) The normal duties of the UKR, within the armies, was increasing at a terrific rate (Soviet personnel deserting, foreign agents penetrating the armies, etc.). At this time the best "krokists" (specialists in intelligence work) were removed from the military intelligence units and assigned to the BERLIN MGB Opersector. Some of the men transferred were: Major () Major () Major () and Lt. Colonel ()

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PART III

A. THE PROSECUTION AND THE LAW

The Communist Party has its own surveillance service which penetrates all Government Departments. Besides, with its six million (6,000,000) members and candidates, the Party represents a pool of absolutely reliable personnel for the counter intelligence organization which serves the Party while working within the legal framework of the State. Extraordinary powers are allotted the counter intelligence organization on the strength of its duties of surveillance over all State and economic establishments and over the populace, as well as on the strength of its authority in executing punishment.

The prosecution of all crimes is the responsibility of the State Prosecutor of the USSR, who is elected for a seven-year tenure by the Supreme Soviet after he has been selected by the Central Committee of the Party. According to paragraphs 115 and 117 of the Soviet Constitution, the public prosecutors of the Union republics, krais and oblasts are responsible to him alone. These public prosecutors have far-reaching powers in the courts and determine, on the strength of the evidence submitted, what cases can be handled without witnesses by the Special Summary Court (TROIKA) of the MGB. The public prosecutors are in close touch with corresponding MGB offices; in fact, most prosecutors have had previous service in the MGB. It is because of this fact that it is possible to remove undesirable persons with a pretense of legality, although the actual basis for their removal is mere observation by informers of the MGB. In spite of their close contacts with the MGB, however, the public prosecutors and courts share the prevalent, deep-seated fear of the gigantic espionage machinery of the counter intelligence organization.

Sentences for virtually all counter-revolutionary crimes were established on 6 June 1927 by decree of the Supreme Executive Committee (now Supreme Soviet) in paragraph 58 of the Penal Code. This law sets forth punitive measures for the following crimes:

- Paragraph 58-1 Treason and desertion
- 58-2 Armed rebellion
- 58-3 Relations with an enemy country
- 58-4 Support of anti-Bolshevist movements in foreign countries
- 58-5 Warmongering against the USSR

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Paragraph 58-6 Espionage in behalf of foreign countries

58-7 Causing economic damage to the USSR

58-8 Attacks on officials of the Soviet State

58-9 Sabotage

58-10 Propaganda and agitation hostile to the Soviets

58-11 Organization activity in the above-named activities

58-12 Failure to report any of the above-named activities

58-13 Acts against the laboring classes by anyone occupying a responsible position or in the Secret Service

58-14 Deliberate failure to execute duties toward the Soviet State

This law is the legal basis which justifies punishment for undesirable acts or cases of neglect, ranging from high treason to the farmer's failure to grow his quota of turnips. The death penalty in all serious cases was justified under the provision for "measures for the protection of society." (The death penalty is reported to have been abolished by the Supreme Soviet on 25 May 1947.) For lesser crimes prejudicial to society the penalty is imprisonment for a maximum period of three (3) years. Paragraph 58-12, however, provides for a minimum penalty of six (6) months' imprisonment.

One of the most tranchant provisions contains the following extract from a section of Paragraph 58-12, concerning retaliation on the members of the family who had not taken part in the act:

"The other (non-participant) members of the family of the traitor, who lived with him, or for whose support he was responsible at the time of his crime, will be punished by withdrawal of active and passive voting rights and banishment to distant regions of Siberia for a period of five (5) years. (20/7/1934. Penal Code 30, Paragraph 183)."

In this connection the recent decree of the Supreme Soviet giving the right of citizenship to the old emigrants living abroad is noteworthy. Paragraph 58-12 also shows the

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stringency and scope of this punitive power, as it punishes failure to report any preparatory activities for a counter-revolutionary act by deprivation of freedom for not less than six (6) months. In such cases, information based on secret intelligence reports is accepted as reliable.

Of particular significance for counter-intelligence activities in foreign countries is the retroactive power of the law enacted 21 November 1929. According to this law, all activities of the former White Guard against the Soviet Union are subject to punishment by the Soviet counter intelligence organization in foreign countries. The law provides for sentence in absentia, and for declaring a suspect to be an enemy of the working class. Thus, the assassination and kidnapping of the White Generals Miller and Kutieпов in PARIS, were given a cloak of legality.

B. PARTY CONTROL

In counter intelligence even more than in positive intelligence the Central Committee of the Communist Party controls policy and operational planning. All reports concerning disturbances or efforts directed against the interests of the State, or against the policies of party leaders, are forwarded to the Central Committee. The reports come from the State Information Bureau and the Central Office of the Secret Intelligence Service in the Council of Ministers, as well as from the party organization itself through the Commission for Party Control within the Central Committee. It may be assumed that the Commission for Party Control within the Central Committee determines the points of emphasis for counter intelligence according to areas and types of targets within the USSR. It may also be assumed that the Politburo of the Central Committee determines the policies of counter intelligence against foreign countries.

Directives and suggestions from these offices form the basis for orders issued by BERIYA's coordinating Central Office in the Council of Ministers, where basic coordination of military and non-military counter intelligence activities is planned in regard to defining areas and missions, scale of commitments and exchange of personnel, and allocation of funds.

In consonance with the formalism of Soviet bureaucracy, it may be assumed that in the central office of Counter Intelligence all projected missions must be proposed and outlined in writing. These are probably consolidated in a ten (10) to thirty (30) day operational plan. Such timetables, which provided for systematic search of areas at definite intervals and for a definite schedule for security instruction

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of troops, were certainly familiar to the lower echelon offices of the GUKR. The basic orders are signed in the Ministry for State Security generally by the Minister or his deputy, and by the chief of the appropriate counter intelligence administration (KRU, SPU, ECU, DTU). GUKR orders for the military are signed by the Minister of Armed Forces or in his name by the Chief of GUKR and, in every case which touches security indoctrination of the troops, by the Chief of the Main Political Administration as well. In lower echelon military counter intelligence, the UKR and OKR offices normally receive their routine orders from the commanders of tactical units to which they are assigned. These orders are countersigned by Party representatives on the commander's Military Council. General policy directives, special orders, and important GUKR orders and regulations are addressed directly to lower echelon counter intelligence units by the GUKR.

An interesting characteristic of Soviet Counter Intelligence is the effort at all levels to maintain a constant check on the manner in which missions are accomplished and on the loyalty of personnel. This leads to assignment of the same objective to various agencies in order to obtain confirmatory and cross-checking evidence from each. Control of the various branches is reserved in the final analysis only for the Party Control Commission and there actually only for STALIN, or possibly for BERIYA.

Within the USSR, for example, a group of Ukrainian nationalists might be tracked down in an industrial plant in Krivoi Rog by the SPU or ECU officials of that plant, as well as by the MVD Militia, the MVD Fire Protection Troops, and the Party committee of the plant. In addition, the MGB would then assign its own observers to the case. Thus, if one of these six surveillance organizations were working in cooperation with the counter-revolutionaries, this fact would be reported by at least one of the other five. Another example of the multiplicity of counter intelligence agencies is the present picture in the Soviet-occupied Zone of Germany, especially in BERLIN. The direction of an enormous number of counter intelligence agents is divided among the following offices: UKR of the Headquarters of the Occupation Forces, Headquarters of the Political Administration of the Occupation Forces, Headquarters of the MVD Security Troops (which have the same counter intelligence duties in Germany as those of the Border Patrol Troops in the border areas of the USSR proper), and the Main Office of the KRU of the MGB.

A most effective control system has been obtained by keeping separate nets strictly apart from each other, by assigning the same objective to several organs using different approaches, by frequent surprise visits of control agents, and by periodic reports on activities.

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C. MISSIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The missions of the GUKR and the organizations subordinate to it are the supervision of the loyalty of the members of the Armed Forces, the detection of espionage carried on by the enemy and other foreign agencies and the execution of counter intelligence missions in enemy territory in time of war.

The military counter intelligence service conducted by the GUKR is dependent within the Armed Forces on a dense network of senior authorized agents, authorized agents, residents and secret informers. The total is estimated to number up to ten percent of the strength of the Armed Forces.

Beside reporting on loyalty, morale, and security within the Armed Forces, the UKR maintains surveillance of the civilian population in operational zones where there are no MGB or MVD agencies.

Overt control measures such as searches and arrests are taken by the MVD Security Troops so that the UKR workers may remain under cover. Military agents of foreign or enemy countries are usually apprehended by MGB or MVD agencies and then secretly delivered to the UKR or OKR unit which performed the basic investigative work leading to the arrest.

Secret informers are, as a rule, hired in terms of their party-political reliability and are bound by written agreement. Refusal to accept is regarded as an indication of counter-revolutionary tendencies. The informer is unobtrusively assigned to the unit where he is to work; his mission is limited to watching a particular group of people by eavesdropping on or participating in their conversations and determining the type of acquaintances each of these persons has. None of the secret informers knows the others. Reports of observations are given orally in the course of a chance meeting with the resident agent. All counter intelligence echelons are, in their turn, under surveillance by higher echelons. This spy system was effective in the early months of the war, when initial German successes had badly shaken Soviet morale, in reducing the number of cases of surrender by entire units. Although most soldiers and officers of encircled units were thinking together along the same lines, no one dared broach the subject even to his closest friend.

In wartime, military counter-espionage by armies and army groups in enemy territory is directed by the UKR organizations at army or army group level. The GUKR of the Ministry of Armed Forces directs the activities deep in the enemy rear and in foreign countries. In peacetime, counter intelligence

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work of the military UKR agencies is greatly curtailed in favor of increased activities of the KRU of the MGB, which even interprets foreign military news. Since the GUKR came into existence during the war, no clear precedent exists for determining the exact division of duties between the KRU of the MGB and the GUKR in peacetime. Because the GUKR thus far has no schools of its own to produce expert foreign agents, it is assumed that GUKR counter intelligence in peacetime will be concentrated mostly on penetration into foreign military nets in Soviet territory, and on attacking foreign intelligence centers in the military outposts of the USSR.

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PART IV

COOPERATION BETWEEN AGENCIES

The decentralized character of the counter-intelligence service of the USSR makes a lively exchange of information and close cooperation between agencies, even on the lowest levels, necessary. Because of the multiplicity of agencies and the competition between them, actual cooperation between such does not always conform with the rulings of the central intelligence authorities. This is particularly noticeable in the Soviet Zone of Germany where it is due, perhaps, to the military leaders' old distrust of the spy apparatus of NKVD of which elements were transferred to the GUKR.

Cooperation by GUKR with the Counter Intelligence Administration (KRU) of the MGB, which consists of the use of common channels, the exchange of reports of suspicious elements, and the exchange of technical information, extends down to the level of direct traffic between the OKR's of the divisions and the regional representatives of the MGB.

In addition to cooperation between the primary organizations active in the counter intelligence service itself, the Soviet News Service, with its representation in every state and military organization, has, by its very nature, a direct connection with almost all higher authorities. Personnel in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID), particularly the Information Sections of the Area Branches, the News Agency TASS, and the Lenin Library, act as observers of unfavorable activities or attitudes against the USSR in foreign countries. In the Interior, MGB personnel are detailed to positions in other ministries for specific counter intelligence functions; in the Chief Administration of Literature of the Ministry of Higher Education to censor all printed publications and radio broadcasts; and in the Ministry of Communications to control postal, radio, and telephone communications. In this last Ministry all key positions are held by MGB personnel or by MVD Signal personnel.

In the Soviet Zone of Germany, the UKR is obliged to work in unison with the MGB Opersectors on all cases involving investigations which concern the German population. The questioning of any civilian witness can be done only with permission of the MGB. This is also true concerning the recruitment of Germans as informants. The MGB has the legal right to prohibit the questioning of any German, by merely stating that they have serious agent material against the man.

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This may or may not be true. If it is not true, the MGB usually then starts an investigation on the person involved. For this reason, the majority of the cases involving German nationals include, on the part of the UKR, illegal questioning. This "unhealthy" situation exists between the two (2) units and for this reason, instead of maintaining close contact as they should, each conceals their operational activities from one another.

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PART V

PERSONNEL AND TRAINING METHODS

MGB Counter Intelligence officers and GUKR officers are selected by the personnel departments of the MGB and the GUKR in terms of their political reliability, according to previous merit ratings with the militia and other MVD organizations, and according to successes already attained in active operations. After the end of World War II, during demobilization, extensive recruiting of intelligence officers of the Soviet Armed Forces took place to fill vacant counter intelligence executive posts.

The GUKR organization does not have its own schools but sends its command personnel to MGB schools. Personnel put in executive positions in military and civilian counter intelligence must, under normal circumstances, go through the MGB college course, which during the war had been reduced from one and one-half years to six months. Training there is divided according to faculties: KRU, EKV, etc.

A characteristic of the personnel policy of the Soviet intelligence is the frequent transfer of executive personnel from one special type of work to another. There are transfers from the GUKR to the MGB, or between widely separated geographic stations within the same branch of service. This conforms to the general Soviet theory that a capable executive is successful more in terms of executive ability than of narrow, specialized knowledge.

For the selection of operative personnel such as residents, agents, and secret informers, political reliability is the deciding factor for personnel working within the USSR. For counter-espionage work in foreign countries, however, suitability for the job — in terms of a ready-made reputation as an anti-Soviet, or of knowledge of languages and local conditions — is the deciding factor.

In considering recruiting, a clear line must be drawn between the large army of inferior spies and the expert professional agents. Eighty percent of the former, mostly recruited under pressure, receive no training except for about fourteen (14) days' general instruction. The expert agents of the KRU and the GUKR go through a three to six months' course in the special MGB schools. Usually a period of practical training is connected with this course.

As is the case with executive personnel, operative personnel are constantly being shifted to different areas of activity and objectives.

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
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PART VI

ORGANIZATION

The UKR services the Staff of the Soviet Army Headquarters of the Group of Occupation Forces or of the Military District and supervises, inspects, and coordinates the efforts of the OKR which is attached to subordinate armies, corps, and/or divisions.

A distinctive feature of the UKR is that, while its subordinate OKR's are directly and specifically responsible to it, the UKR is directly responsible to the Third Main Administration of the MGB in MOSCOW and only technically responsible to the Commander-in-Chief of the GSOU or the Military District Commander. It may by-pass, in operation matters, its nominal superior, the MGB Directorate in its area.

The UKR is a powerful semi-autonomous instrument of the MGB policing Soviet Army personnel of all ranks and grades according to the will and dictates of the MGB. The MGB, in turn, is the security arm of the Communist Party. It is interesting to note that in the Soviet Zone of Germany, ninety-eight percent (98%) of the UKR personnel are Communist Party members and the remaining two percent (2%) are Komsomol members.

To facilitate a clearer understanding of the structure of the GUKR, the UKR, and the OKR, a chart showing the various departments and the flow of command is shown opposite.

The explanation of the various sections of the UKR, as set forth in this workbook, concerns those functions as effected in the Soviet Zone of Germany. Basically, the UKR in Germany will be identical to the UKR in Military Districts within the USSR.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF

The Administrative Staff consists of the Chief of the UKR, the first and second Deputies, the Secretary of the PARTBURO, and the Adjutant to the Chief. The UKR Chief and his two (2) Deputies control and direct all the counter intelligence activities within the UKR and its subordinate OKR's. The number of OKR's depend on the number of armies and/or divisions within a Military District or Occupation Group.

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THE PARTBURO (Party Bureau)

The Partburo is the Communist Party's electoral organ within the UKR. The Partburo is usually composed of five or seven UKR "administrative comrades." The UKR Chief is always a member of the Partburo and, being a loyal, trustworthy Communist, his decision is final at all Partburo meetings. The secretary of the Partburo is directly responsible to the Chief of the UKR.

The basic duty of the Partburo is to give daily assistance to the UKR administration in executing the orders of the Ministry of State Security (MGB). It controls the activities of the Party organization within the UKR, the political education of the UKR's Party members; reviews personal matters pertaining to Party members (confirming statements made by Party members); suspension of Party members until the case is settled at a general meeting; checking the character of Party co-workers; and, in general, interfering in the private life of communists.

The Partburo may be called the organ of force within the UKR, since it is composed of a small clique of high officials who reign over all the UKR's officers.

SECRETARIAT - UKR, MGB

Staff: Chief
Deputy Chief
Senior Representative
Representative
Assistant Representative

Typing Pool
Publications Section

Functions: The Secretariat maintains liaison with all UKR Departments; relays orders and directives issued by the UKR Chief; logs all incoming and outgoing correspondence; maintains a file on "suspense date" documents; disseminates important documents to the various departments; issues Directives, Orders, and Orientations to subordinate organs; periodically checks secretly handled missions in the field and within the Directorate; and prepares a monthly guard duty chart for the UKR (from UKR Operatives).

The Typing Pool and the Publications Sections are subordinate units of the Secretariat.

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THE CODE SECTION - (Shifr Otdeleniye)

Staff: Chief
Operative Representative (2)
Representative

Functions: Receiving and dispatching coded messages.

This Section is the most secret unit of the UKR. The Chief delivers the incoming/coded messages (telegrams) to the Administration. Outgoing coded messages are accepted for coding only when they bear the signature of the UKR Chief, or one of his deputies.

DEPARTMENT 1

Staff: Chief of Department
Assistant Chief

Sub-Department 1

Chief
Assistant Chief
Representatives
(Operatives)

Sub-Department 2

Chief
Assistant Chief
Representatives (Operatives)
PX Officer
Billeting Officer
Field Operatives

Functions:

The basic functions of Sub-Department 1 is to prevent foreign agents from penetrating the Headquarters of the Military District or Army Group; to perform "special clearances" on all Staff personnel; and to operate its own agent network. In addition to this, there is an extraordinary function — providing security for the Military Council during festivals and celebrations. This "chekist" service is more intense at affairs to which Allied representatives have been invited.

Sub-Department 2 has the same basic functions except that they pertain to the Headquarters of Rear Forces — surveillance is maintained over each field unit — Transportation, Quartermaster, VOSO (Communications), Topography, Political Administration, Purchasing, Medical, Supplies, Finance, Prosecution, and Military Tribunal.

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Agents:

Extreme care and caution is used by DEPARTMENT I (both Sub-Departments) in the recruitment of agents from Headquarters personnel. Recruitment may be made from a colonel down to the office clerk. Sub-Department 2 has many German and Soviet repatriates recruited as agents — neither group is completely trusted as loyal to the Soviets. (The Rear Forces employ Germans and Soviet repatriates in the various field units.)

Special Clearances:

Both Sub-Departments perform "special clearances" on all personnel at Headquarters handling Top Secret documents. These clearances are extremely detailed and require a great deal of time for execution. All requests for "special clearances" are directed to the Chief of DEPARTMENT I and, after clearance has been made, he will reply to the request, in writing, to the effect that "DEPARTMENT I has no objection to such and such person handling Top Secret documents." A copy of the result of the clearance is attached to the employee's file as a permanent record.

Members of Sub-Department 1 take part in the surveillance placed on Soviet officers (particularly those who must contact Allied representatives) at all celebrations. This type of surveillance operation is under the direction of one of the deputy chiefs of the UKR (or OKR, if at Army level).

DEPARTMENT II

Staff: Chief of Department
Assistant Chief

Sub-Department 1

Chief
Assistant Chief
Senior Representative (2)
Representative

Sub-Department 2

Chief
Senior Representative (2)
Secretary

At UKR GSOV in Germany

Special Operational Group
(Supervised by the Chief of Sub-Department 2)

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Functions: Detecting foreign agents, traitors and deserters:

Department II maintains a close contact with all the other UKR departments for the purpose of collecting every possible bit of information on its targets — foreign intelligence (agents and operations), Soviet deserters, and traitors. It plans the penetrations and apprehensions of its targets. All the information gathered is systematically filed by this Department and is used by operatives from other Departments for checking and orientating purposes.

DEPARTMENT II publishes a circular, the "Arientirovka," which contains current information on foreign intelligence organs, their official agents, Soviet deserters, traitors, and "wanted" persons. Circulars contain full descriptions and frequently photographs of personalities. Circulars are received by the GUKR in MOSCOW from all UKR's and OKR's; they are compiled and published in one large edition — publication are irregular. The "Arientirovka" is available only to the Department Chiefs, their assistants, and a few other operational people of an UKR or an OKR.

Operations of DEPARTMENT II, of UKR GSOV in Germany (UKR for the Group of Soviet Occupational Forces in Germany):

Prior to the reorganization which took place in October or November 1948, this Department was engaged in counter intelligence work in the Soviet Zone of Occupation and in the areas outside the Zone. An agent network was operated by this Department in the Soviet Zone of Occupation, the Western Sectors of BERLIN, and in the Western Zone of Germany. Agents were also dispatched across the borders. During this period (from the end of the war to November 1948) the Department collected considerable information on intelligence and counter intelligence activities of foreign agencies operating in the Western Zone of Germany and in the Western Sectors of BERLIN. This material is systematically and periodically being brought up to date. Operatives from all Departments check their agent reports for authenticity against the information on file in DEPARTMENT II.

The Department specialized in three (3) targets — American intelligence, British intelligence, and French intelligence. This narrow specialization had many advantages, as it offers the operative an opportunity to learn every phase of the intelligence organization to which he was assigned.

Agents:

Agents for operations abroad were recruited from among the Soviet repatriated citizens, Soviet citizens in DP camps

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given strictly defined duties pertaining to his target. Each Deputy Chief has as his target an Army OKR. The Senior Operative Representatives are assigned Division OKR's and/or separate units; in addition, they are assigned special work based on information received from the Third Central Administration, MGB, in MOSCOW (the GUKR).

The importance and significance of the functions of DEPARTMENT III, in the UKR Operational procedures, can be determined from the following:

A battalion's counter intelligence operative learns that an infantry soldier, at company level, has made an anti-Soviet statement. The battalion operative will immediately prepare a report on the subject for the Division OKR. The report will be received by DEPARTMENT III of Division OKR, where it will be noted and forwarded to the Army OKR, who, in turn, will note it and forward it to the UKR Chief. The UKR Chief will direct it to the Chief of DEPARTMENT III for handling. The operative handling the particular target (in DEPARTMENT III) will then receive the report with his Chief's request that a plan of action be prepared. The plan of action means written instructions for the investigation of the soldier; however, this plan must be signed by both the DEPARTMENT Chief and the UKR Chief and, at the same time that it is channeled for execution, a copy of the plan and the original report on the case are forwarded to the Third Central Administration, MGB, in MOSCOW (the GUKR). Only the original report on a case is directed to the UKR Chief; all information thereafter, emanating from the Army OKR, is directed to the Chief of DEPARTMENT III.

It is the duty of the responsible operative to check on the progress of the investigation and to visit his target to give any necessary assistance on the case.

In more urgent cases, the UKR may contact the Army OKR, or vice-versa, by VCh note (high frequency telephone communications). The note is typed and submitted to the UKR Chief, or his Deputies, for his approval and signature before it is transmitted. This type of note is always marked TOP SECRET, and must always pass through the hands of the agent on duty at the UKR, at the Army OKR, and the OKR Secretariat Chief. Code messages are used on more secret and more urgent matters; these are handled only by the code operators and delivered to the Army OKR Chief. (These means of communications are used by all of the UKR Departments.)

Operatives of DEPARTMENT III regularly visit their objectives to check on the operational agent work and to give practical aid. Before making an inspection tour, the operative

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must prepare a plan of his inspection tour -- the places he plans to visit and the matters to be taken up with his target. Once this plan is approved it serves as verification orders to be presented to the Chief of the OKR to be visited. The operative must also prepare a report on the results of his tour of inspection. (No target is ever found to be in perfect working order. And a report showing but a few minor faults of a target will bring severe criticism from the UKR Administration -- the Operative will be accused of showing indifference to his work, or of being friendly with the subordinate OKR's.) During such visits, the Operative reviews operational cases, assists field operatives in outlining plans of action, and checks agent reports of operational interest. After completing an inspection tour of his target, the Operative is required to report to the Chief of the OKR unit inspected, and to furnish him with a copy of the report covering his inspection tour (the report is prepared for the UKR Chief's signature).

The workers of DEPARTMENT III enjoy special authority over their subordinate OKR units. They are the favorites of the Army Command because they inform the Army administration of the smallest events taking place within the Army.

The members of DEPARTMENT III are the reservoir from which are drawn administrators of MGB organs.

In spite of the great trust placed in the workers of DEPARTMENT III, they are the most corruptible and mercenary. In return for a good "character report," or for concealing some inefficiency, the Operative is permitted to purchase a new leather coat (the latest fad among Soviet officers) for 100 or 150 marks, which would ordinarily cost 3,000 marks on the "standard" black market, etc.

The purge of the GSOV officer staff in Germany, which took place late in 1948 and early 1949, was conducted by DEPARTMENT III, UKR, POTSDAM, Germany. This operation was carried out in complete secrecy and no officer knew the specific reason for his unexpected transfer to the USSR.

DEPARTMENT IV (Investigations Department) (Sledstvenniy Otdel)

Staff: Chief
Deputy Chief

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<u>Sub-Department 1</u>	<u>Sub-Department 2</u>
Chief	Chief
Assistant Chief	Assistant Chief
Senior Investigators (2)	Senior Investigators (2)
Investigators	Investigators
Interrogators	
Interpreters	
Secretary	
Typists	

In addition to the above staff, this DEPARTMENT may draw additional investigators from subordinate units -- either to help out with the backlog, or for training purposes.

Functions: Investigations and interrogations, Administration of UKR Field Mobile Prison.

Sub-Department 1 -- Investigation and interrogations

Sub-Department 2 -- Investigations and interrogations plus the control and direction of investigations at subordinate field units.

The Investigations Department is the deciding organ in the UKR, inasmuch as it completes the investigation of all counter intelligence cases, recommends the sentence for the prisoner, and, also, since early 1949, selects the prison category to which the prisoner is to be assigned to serve out his sentence.

Arrestees and Prisoners

Included in the functions of DEPARTMENT IV is the assignment of prisoners to the UKR prison (PPT). This is handled by the Chief of Sub-Department 1. He keeps a list of the prisoners and their cell numbers. The data on a newly arrived arrestee is first turned over to the Chief of Sub-Department 1, DEPARTMENT IV, who assigns their cells, making certain that persons charged with similar crimes are not placed together. This assignment of cells is carefully checked by the DEPARTMENT IV Chief, since the progress of an investigation depends, to a great extent, on the correct quartering of arrestees. The Chief of Sub-Department 1 is also responsible for agent "coverage" of cells. (When no agent is assigned to a cell, or any other target, the Soviets refer to the target as "not

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covered.") He will also instruct his Senior Investigators in the recruiting of prison informants. Also, he receives a daily report from the Prison Chief on the number of arrestees (prisoners) in the PPT -- for whom they are held, by whom interrogated, and for how long interrogated. Because of this daily report, all investigators spend as much time as possible on interrogations; that is, they will have the prisoner brought in for interrogation while they spend hours reading a newspaper or a book.

According to Article 100 of the Code of Criminal Proceedings (UPK), an arrestee may not be held more than forty-eight (48) hours without being told the reason for his arrest. No one in the MGB and, particularly in DEPARTMENT IV of the UKR, abides by this law. The arrestee is not informed of Article 100 and assumes that once he has fallen into the hands of the "GPU" any protest on his part would be useless.

Sub-Department 2, DEPARTMENT IV

This Sub-Department receives reports from all subordinate investigative organs (counter intelligence) and the investigative organs located in the field which are in one way or another connected with investigative work. Each operative receives the reports from the area for which he is responsible (the operative is responsible for the collection of material, distribution of directives from higher authority, and his area's adherence to the directives).

Sub-Department 2 also has the duty of submitting information to the Third Central Department, MGB USSR. This is done in a monthly report entitled: "The Status of Investigative Activities in the UKR and Subordinate Organs." This report is prepared by the Chief of Sub-Department 2, and is based on the information gathered from the monthly reports submitted by the subordinate units. It reports on the cases of intelligence interest and the progress made on such cases, describes the successful methods used to complete cases, etc. It also reports the number of informants used in the UKR prison, the state of prison security at the UKR prison and the subordinate unit prisons, the number of escaped prisoners, and the measures taken for their recapture.

The operatives of Sub-Department 2 periodically travel to the Army OKR's to check on the investigative progress and to render any necessary assistance.

When a subordinate counter intelligence organ arrests a foreign intelligence agent, after two (2) or three (3) days

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he must be turned over to the respective Army OKR for questioning by qualified investigators. The Army OKR prepares a special report on the arrest to the UKR and, within five days following receipt of the special report, the UKR Chief will request that the foreign agent be turned over to the UKR for questioning by "more qualified" personnel. The request is made either by VCh or coded telegram; thus, the most important arrestees are concentrated in the UKR's Field Mobile Prison, and the interrogations are conducted by DEPARTMENT IV.

Cipher Section

Messages for coding are typed in the original only, on special printed forms. The form is headed "Top Secret" and carries an instruction line: "To be returned to the UKR Code Section within 48 hours," and below that, "Reproduction of copies forbidden." Ordinarily the specified time of return is not maintained.

Since early 1949 coded messages received at the UKR in Germany, from the USSR, are in the form of a paper ribbon, 18 to 20 mm wide, with several rows of varied sizes of perforations. Consequently, at the present time telegrams are decoded by machine method.

The Operational-Statistical Section (Oper Uchotnoye Otdeleniye)

Staff: Chief
Assistant Chief
Senior Representative
Operative Representatives (2)
Representatives (several)

Functions: Maintains records and statistics of all UKR operational activities, and cost of same.

This Section keeps records and files of all the UKR's operational activities; agents employed by the UKR (both headquarters and field organs); number of arrests made by the UKR; number of investigations (both current and completed); and searches and inquiries. All these records are kept with the aid of specially prepared cards.

This Section also maintains an alphabetical listing of all known foreign intelligence agents and Soviet deserters. In addition to this, all material to be turned over to the Archives (1st Spetsotdel MGB, USSR) is channeled through the Operational Statistical Section of the UKR.

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Each investigator of the UKR is obligated to prepare two (2) cards on every person made known to him through investigation or interrogation. One card is submitted to the Operational Statistical Section for their files, and the other card is forwarded to the 1st Spetsotdel in MOSCOW.

Surveillance Section (Ustanovochnoye Otdeleniye)

Staff: Chief
Assistant Chief
Senior Representative (2)
Operative Representative (12 to 15)
Chauffeur-Agent

Functions: Provide 24-hour surveillance on persons suspected by the UKR

This Section provides surveillance, conducts searches, and performs secret photography work for the various operational departments of the UKR.

The Operative Representatives in this Section are referred to as the "topalshchiki"; it is derived from the Russian word "topat" (to tread) — they do the surveillance work. According to an MGB directive, these Operative Representatives are not to meet with other MGB workers, nor are they permitted to wear a military uniform. Frequently women are employed as Operative Representatives for field surveillance. The members of this Section are the least disciplined and are heavy drinkers.

The various UKR Departments and subordinate organs must direct their requests for surveillance work to the UKR Administration, and the Administration in turn issues orders to the Surveillance Section to perform the necessary work.

Administrative-Supply Section (AKHO - Administrativno-Khozyaistvennoye Otdeleniye)

Staff: Chief
Assistant Chief
Senior Inspector
Inspector
Bookkeeper

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Functions: Issue Officers' clothing, ration cards, billets, permits for entering the UKR building (and compound); responsible for employees other than UKR (Soviet citizens or nationals of Soviet Occupied Lands) employed by the UKR; and arrange for all necessary construction work at the UKR building.

The AKHO storekeeper issues food products to the various operational departments which is used as payment to agents, and is known among the agents as the "devyatka" (#9). (Payments made to agents were covered by paragraph 9 of the old SOP. In the new SOP, paragraph 28 covers this item; however, the old term "devyatka" has been retained by the MGB agents.)

The AKHO is under the direct supervision of one of the UKR Deputy Chiefs. Its major duty is to supply the UKR personnel with clothing, billeting, PX cards, passes, etc. Another vital function is the surveillance of the UKR prison; to see that the prison rules and regulations and internal management are carried as per orders of UKR Administration.

The AKHO employs approximately twenty (20) civilians — in the USSR, Soviet citizens; and in Soviet occupied lands, nationals of the occupied land.

Field Mobile Prison (PPT - Polyevaya Peredvizhnaya Tyurma)

Staff: Chief
Assistant Chief
Senior Supervisor
Supervisor
Assistant Supervisors (8 to 10)
Secretary
Guards

Functions: Detention of UKR prisoners during their investigation and interrogation.

The name of the UKR prison has been retained from the war years, 1941-1945, when the UKR (OO-NKVD-SMERSH) was constantly changing its location; at the present time the prison is a stationary one — it usually adjoins the building occupied by DEPARTMENT IV of the UKR.

The Chief of the prison is directly responsible to one of the UKR Deputy Chiefs from whom he receives daily instructions. He receives all operational instructions from the Chief of DEPARTMENT IV (Investigative Department).

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To have a prisoner brought in for interrogation, the investigator must fill out a special form and submit it to one of the prison guards, who is charged with conducting prisoners in and out of their cells. The prison guard must submit this form to the Assistant Prison Chief before he can remove the prisoner from his cell. A special register is maintained by the Assistant Prison Chief in which he records the name of the prisoner released for questioning, to whom released, and length of interrogation.

Usually on the eve of a holiday - 1st of May, or 7th of November - the prison administration conducts searches of prisoners.

The prison is guarded by a Special Guards Battalion assigned to the UKR. The prison is always well fenced and wired.

The Special Guards Battalion

Staff: Full Battalion (approximately 250 soldiers)

Functions: Guarding of the Administration's Headquarters, the compound, the prison, and all other operative groups, as well as the railroad stations.

The battalion is equipped with machine guns and automatic rifles (PPD, or PPSH) and armored trucks. The soldiers and officers of the battalion are part of the Soviet Red Army and are not connected with the armies of the MVD. (NOTE: A UKR Representative from DEPARTMENT I is assigned to cover the battalion.)

Finance Section (Fin-Otdel)

Staff: Chief
Senior Bookkeeper
Cashier

Functions: Handle the UKR's finances.

Garage (UKR)

Staff: Chief
Automotive Parts Officer
Maintenance Officers (several)
Fuel and Oil Officer
Dispatchers (Sergeants)

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Additional Facilities:

Photography - Handled by one officer
Topography - " " " "
Library - " " Soviet civilian
Officers' Club
and Kino - " " " "

Interpreters

According to the personnel distribution in the UKR, the interpreters of the Directorate are attached to the UKR Secretariat; however, this is merely a formality, no interpreter works for the Secretariat. Interpreters are assigned to certain Departments. Only DEPARTMENT IV has permanent interpreters assigned to it.

The interpreter is the most independent person in the UKR. He has no desire to advance (to become an investigator, for example), in spite of the fact that the foreign language ability would qualify him for operation work or investigative work. This indifference to advance is probably due to the fact that they have seen so much of the wrongs committed by the organization, and know the pressure under which the majority of the MGB workers must operate, from the Department Chief down to the investigator, that they have no desire to live in constant fear — fear of losing their job; fear of straying from the "party line" in carrying out their duties; terror at the thought of losing a document (for this, an interpreter is sentenced to seven (7) years in a Corrective Labor Camp); and fear that a case might be returned for further investigation (that information received will not reach the proper desk within the specified time, that an item might have been omitted from a report, etc.). And yet, the operatives from other Departments envy the peaceful life of the investigators, because they spend sleepless nights over their targets — Soviet Army and civilian deserters who have fled to the Western Zone. Each operative, on his own initiative, will check nightly to learn where and what his "problems" are doing — in behalf of his own welfare. A primitive situation exists in the Soviet intelligence circles — an operative, in whose area a case of desertion has occurred, is immediately placed under administrative arrest and demoted; he may even be brought to trial. The interpreter of an MGB organ is responsible for one thing only — the correctness of his translation or interpretation. Each Interrogation Report prepared by the interpreter (in foreign interrogations) begins with a signed statement by the interpreter to the effect that he is responsible for the correctness of the translation as

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covered by Article 95, of the Criminal Code Procedures, RSFSR. According to this article, the interpreter may receive a two-year prison sentence for knowingly misinterpreting a report. Interrogation Reports which do not have this statement are invalid.

In addition to their duties as interpreters at interrogations, they also translate documents, participate in the recruitment of agents (prison inmates), and participate at Military Tribunal meetings which involve foreigners.

The Prosecution

The Judge Advocate has several aides; however, only one of these is "authorized." The "authorized" prosecutor has the right to check all the investigative activities of the MGB organs to determine whether or not MGB regulations are being carried out according to the established procedures of the RSFSR Criminal Code, check the dates and extension periods of investigations, give advice on investigative matters, etc.

The Prosecutor is a highly trusted person — yet he is not independent of the MGB and must protect himself against the MGB organs just as any other Soviet citizen. If he errs, or attempts to show any independence, he is quickly reminded that he is a servant of the Party. Although he does not have access to the MGB agent material, he is well acquainted with the MGB agent operations and knows that he is observed by them just as any other Soviet person.

The Prosecutor must sanction an arrest, either of a Soviet citizen or a foreign national. The sanction is not difficult to obtain — the MGB need only request the arrest and it is accomplished with the barest formalities.

The following documents are prepared for the Prosecution to obtain sanction for arrest:

1. Investigator's Report on the substance of the crime committed (closed interrogation of witnesses).
2. Request for arrest.
3. Methods adopted to curtail any attempt which would deviate investigation and trial of the accused.

The Prosecutor is definitely not interested in the legality and impartiality of witnesses' testimony, which

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very often is derived under pressure (this is particularly true in the field investigations). The Prosecutor never travels to the area where investigation has been carried out to determine the facts presented; such action would not meet with the approval of the MGB units — it might affect the number of arrests made per month.

Each case which is prepared for the Military Tribunal is first forwarded to the Judge Advocate's office and, from that office, it is forwarded to the Military Tribunal. The Prosecutor participates in the preliminary hearing of the Military Tribunal, at which time he informs the Chairman of the Military Tribunal with the facts of the case — the investigative material collected and the charges. The question decided at preliminary hearings is which Article of the Criminal Code has been violated.

The Military Tribunal

The Military Tribunal, an organ of Soviet justice, is also a Party-justice organ. The Soviet Military Tribunals are not a part of the MGB structure, and the personnel are not MGB workers. Like the Prosecution, they do not have access to the UKR's agent operational work.

The USSR Constitution states that the Military Tribunal is an independent organ engaged in the administration of laws only — this is a fictitious statement. The president of the Military Tribunal is a party man, and his decisions are based on his narrow party interests.

As required by law, the Military Tribunal is staffed with three (3) people: the chairman of the Military Tribunal (a major or lieutenant colonel of the legal division, Judge Advocate General's Department); and two (2) "arbitrators" supposed electees, however, they are appointed by the Group Forces' Political Directorate. The arbitrators are frequently changed — they may not attend more than one or two Military Tribunal meetings in one year. The rank of the two arbitrators will be chosen from among equal rank; sometimes they are privates or sergeants. The role of the arbitrators is not an important one; they take no part in the proceedings — all the work is handled by the chairman.

The Military Tribunal court session is usually conducted in the following manner:

At the opening of the court session the chairman of the court introduces himself, the two (2) arbitrators, the secretary, and the interpreter (the latter when the case involves a

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foreigner). The chairman informs the defendants that, according to Soviet law, they may challenge the court staff if they have grounds for doing so. The defendants are amazed at the existence of such a law. They are also informed that the interpreter may be replaced if there is language difficulty, or for personal reasons. (At this time the interpreter must sign a statement to the effect that he will carry out his duties faithfully and conscientiously. This document is signed in the presence of the defendants. Any infringement of this obligation will subject the interpreter to two (2) years in prison.)

The chairman then proceeds to inform the defendants of their rights according to Soviet law. They have a right to: Present the court with any evidence which might lighten their sentence, or free them from the charges against them; place questions with the court; answer questions of the court or of the witnesses; ask questions of the witnesses; and, lastly, the defendants have the right to speak before sentence is passed. In reality, only some of these laws may be exercised by the defendants — they may reply to the court's questions, give testimony, and make a final statement before sentence is passed. The defendants do not benefit from the other existing laws. Any attempts, on the part of the defendants to clear themselves — introduce new testimony, question the testimony of certain witnesses, etc. — is cleverly avoided by the chairman.

Having concluded with formalities, the chairman begins the questioning of defendants; this usually lasts a long time. The defendants are amazed by the statements which they supposedly have made and signed. "Stretching the evidence" is common practice among MGB investigators. The Military Tribunal is not concerned about this practice — there is no risk of the court returning the case for further investigation. By the end of the hearings, the defendants realize the hopelessness of their individual cases — that their final statements will have no bearing on their cases; consequently, their final statements are very brief.

After the defendants have made their final statements, the chairman and the two (2) arbitrators withdraw to the judge's office to prepare the sentence — this usually takes two (2) to three (3) hours.

The sentence is issued in the name of the Soviet Union. A case cannot be appealed. The Military Tribunal has one scheme for issuing sentences — for espionage the sentence is twenty-five (25) years; for treason twenty-five (25)

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years; attempted treason twenty-five (25) years; talk of possible treason twenty-five (25) years; aiding a traitor twenty (20) to twenty-five (25) years; etc.

The Special Council (Osoboye Soveschaniye)

The Special Council of the Ministry of State Security is not mentioned in the Soviet Constitution or in any Soviet official literature. Nevertheless, this unconstitutional court — organ of proletariat justice — does exist, and represents an extraordinary court at which the accused does not need to be present. This court is probably known only to those people who have suffered by it and to a small percentage of the USSR population.

During the NEP period, the "TROIKA OGPU" existed in the USSR; later it was changed to "TROIKA NKVD." At the present time this same organ has a more expressive name -- implying nothing dreadful -- "OSOBOYE SOVESCHANIYE of the Ministry of State Security" -- Special Council of the MGB.

According to the MGB directives, the Special Council reviews cases of persons suspected of belonging to a foreign intelligence service. In the following instances a suspect will be tried by the Special Council: (1) When information furnished by an agent discloses that the suspect had connections with a foreign intelligence agency (even though this information is erroneous); and (2) When a suspect has given a false statement, under pressure, that he belonged to a foreign intelligence agency.

Soviet MGB agents, who have violated their obligations while working for the Soviet intelligence or who have been recruited by a foreign intelligence service, are also tried by the Special Council. Soviet agents submitting false information to the MGB organs are also tried by the Special Council.

To give the above mentioned trials a legal appearance, in accordance with an MGB directive, a procedure has been set up for the formulation of investigative data to be presented to the Special Council, MGB, USSR, MOSCOW. First, an "accusatory" report is prepared. This is a highly elaborated report of the crimes committed and contains many alterations of facts. Many of the statements therein are followed with explanatory notes, such as "... the accused would not confess to this point, in spite of the fact that the crime has been proved by irrefutable data..." The "accusatory" report carries an indorsement by the Chief of the UKR, (also prepared by the investigator)... The indorsement enumerates in condensed form the crimes committed by the accused, and also carries a recommendation of sentence,

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which is the same in every case, as follows: "It is recommended that the accused (name) be committed to the Corrective Labor Camp for twenty-five (25) years." (Occasionally the investigator will draft the indorsement showing a lesser sentence; however, the UKR Chief will always change it to the maximum.)

The addendum (povestka) is another document which must be prepared on every case forwarded to the Special Council. This document briefly summarizes the data of the case, putting it in a specific category.

The final document prepared on the case is a list of the personalities, according to the accused, who had contact with him, who knew something of the crime he committed, or who had committed some crime.

When the above documents have been prepared, the case is ready for forwarding to the Special Council. The case (all documents) is forwarded first to the UKR's Operational Statistical Section for proper registry; from there it is forwarded to the Third Central Department, MGB, USSR, where it is reviewed by the Investigative Department of that headquarters. (It is reviewed for discrepancy in form — improper sequence of evidence; legibility of arrestee's signature on all interrogation reports, etc.) The case is then directed to the Secretariat of the Special Council, MGB, USSR, located in MOSCOW.

In a month or two, the UKR's Operational Statistical Section will receive a document (as follows) covering the hearing and the verdict of the case by the Special Council:

MINISTRY OF GOVERNMENT SECURITY
USSR

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THE SPECIAL COUNCIL OF THE MINISTRY OF STATE SECURITY

City of MOSCOW

E X T R A C T

Minutes No. Of the Meeting of the Special Council
held 1949.

HEARD

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DECREED

No. 54. Investigation Case No...
IVANOV, Ivan Ivanovich,
born 1920; Place of birth: VORONEZH;

That IVANOV, Ivan
Ivanovich, charged
with espionage,

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Education: 7th grade; served in the Soviet Army until 1941; in captivity since 1941; charged with the violation of the provisions in Article 58 of the Criminal Code, RSFSR.

be imprisoned in a Corrective Labor Camp for a period of 25 years.

CHIEF OF THE SECRETARIAT OF THE SPECIAL
COUNCIL OF THE MINISTRY OF STATE SECURITY

Lt. Colonel

(name not known)

The round seal of the
Secretariat of the Special
Council.

The number 54 indicates that the case was the 54th on the agenda of a particular meeting of the Special Council. It is known that as many as sixty (60) or sixty-five (65) cases are handled at one meeting.

The reverse side of the EXTRACT bears the statement: "I have been notified of the current decree of the Special Council." This is dated and signed by the accused.

Personnel Section (Otdel Kadrov - OKA)

Staff: Chief
Deputy Chief
Special Representative
Senior Investigator for the
Special Representative
Senior Representative
Operative Representative
Secretary

Functions: Distribution of counter intelligence personnel in the UKR area; assignments, promotions, decorations, and loyalty checks of its own personnel; and personnel records.

The Personnel Section is the second most secret unit of the Counter Intelligence Directorate — the first being the Code Section. This Section governs the security of not only the Soviet military persons in its area, but also the UKR

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personnel and any foreign nationals who are in some way connected with the Soviet military forces.

There are no sub-Sections in the Personnel Section of the UKR. It is set up on the same principles as DEPARTMENT III; i.e., each member of the Section has his own project for surveillance and control, and for which he is responsible.

All reports pertaining to the UKR's personnel are concentrated in the Personnel Section, as well as all inquiries and questionnaires which are frequently sent out by the Personnel Department and are filled out by the counter intelligence workers. (The only privileged characters, in this respect, are the UKR Chief and his two (2) Deputies; they do not fill out any questionnaires or prepare any autobiographies. However, this does not mean that they are free from check or control and pressure from above. They come under the jurisdiction of the Special Staff Section of the MGB and are subject to investigation by special investigation teams composed of members from various Departments of the Third Central Directorate, MGB, USSR.)

The "record material" file maintained by the UKR's Personnel Section contains duplicate copies of all information forwarded to the Third Central Directorate, MGB, in MOSCOW, and current checkups. All vital material on members of the counter intelligence organs is concentrated at the Third Central Directorate, MGB, in MOSCOW, and no one, other than the particular operational worker of the Personnel Section of the UKR, or the Administration, have access to these files. Two or three times a year a member of the UKR's Personnel Section travels to MOSCOW, the Third Central Directorate of the MGB, and brings his organization's personnel records up to date and arranges for special checkups to be made on some of the people in his area.

The Personnel Section is headed by a Chief and his assistant. The Chief is usually selected from the Party staff and has little knowledge of agent operational work.

The Special Representative assigned to the UKR Personnel Section may take over the duties of the Chief whenever the latter and his assistant are away. The Special Representative is an especially trusted person and his appointment must be confirmed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party. He specializes in the handling of investigations of counter intelligence officers and every case at the UKR which involves a counter intelligence officer is turned over to him for handling. He directs the work of his Senior Investigator in the investigation of the case. (This Senior Investigator is in no way connected with DEPARTMENT IV of the UKR.)

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The Senior Investigator to the Special Representative will collect information on the suspect and, if sufficient damaging data is gathered, he will prepare a special request for sanction of arrest by the Prosecutor for MVD Troops. After completing the investigation of the case, he will prepare it for forwarding to the Military Tribunal or the Special Council for trial. (Prior to a formal arrest, a suspect may be sentenced by the UKR Chief to serve twenty (20) days in the guardhouse. This precautionary step is taken to prevent any possibility of escape. Such a guardhouse was built in the UKR building in POTSDAM, Germany, to prevent suspected persons from escaping to Western Germany.)

The Senior Operative Representative of the Personnel Section is responsible for the UKR staff personnel. Since an agent network is not operated in this Section and, in order to keep up with the activities and events within the Directorate, he maintains close contact with the Chiefs of DEPARTMENTS, Sub-Departments, Sections, and the Party Director for the UKR. He is also a member of the Partburo. He is also kept informed by "kapalshchiks" (the Russian word for slanderers). These are the "informers"; they carry tales about their co-workers. They are extremely treacherous; pretending to be friendly — they drink and associate with their co-workers and then report on them. This fact has created a strong distrust among the Personnel Section workers — each sees the other as a "kapalshchik." The Senior Operative Representative also interviews the UKR personnel for possible promotions, transfers, etc. His opinions are highly valued by the Chief of the Personnel Section. However, all promotions and new assignments must be confirmed by the Chief of the Third Central Directorate, MGB, in MOSCOW, after they have been first approved by the UKR Administration and the Central Committee for the Communist Party. (Each new assignment, transfer, or promotion is proposed by special orders prepared by the Chief of the UKR Personnel Section; a copy of the orders is sent to the UKR Finance Section for payment records.)

The Operative Representative of the Personnel Section maintains an alphabetical card file, covering every Soviet counter intelligence officer in the UKR's area. The cards contain brief data on each worker — date of assignment, record of any disciplinary action, penalties, place of entry into organization, place of employment, etc. Each Representative in the Personnel Section has, in his safe, material records on every worker attached to his project.

Hiring and Releasing MGB Workers

If a person applies to an MGB organization for a job, he will not be accepted even though his grandmother was a

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proletariat; in case of necessity, he may be employed as a secret informant.

Only those persons are hired who have been named as candidates and on whom two or three agent reports have been furnished (covering all phases of their characters). This is followed by a special check and, only after this is done, the unsuspecting individual is called in for an interview with the Personnel Section. If it is evident from the interview that the person has no desire to work for an MGB organization, he is told that in accordance with the Party's mobilization he will have to work for the MGB, and since he is a Party member he has no alternative but to accept. (The MGB organs rarely hire a non-Party member, except in the case of specialists.)

During the war years it was impossible to make special checks and many were hired whose backgrounds were not favorable. The files and records had to be evacuated, or were in such a chaotic state that the effort was useless.

Releases from MGB organs, particularly the counter intelligence units, rarely occur. The Soviet intelligence workers have a saying about this fact: "One does not walk out from the organization; one is carried out!" A worker is not released upon personal request, because, as soon as he has been trusted with government secrets (MGB work and its methods of operation), he becomes a risk, if released, as he might talk to the wrong people. Releases occur only upon collection of sufficient proof of an employee's transgression, or transgression of close relatives. Release from an MGB organ means expulsion from the Party, which means that he will not be accepted for any more or less decent work anywhere.

Personnel Classification

All UKR personnel are secretly classified as either the "ballast" type, or the "active" type. This classifying is known only to a few of the operational workers. The "ballast" type includes persons who are not qualified to work independently, whose work must be supervised at all times. (Drunkards are typed "ballast" also.) Only in exceptional cases are promotions given to persons in this category. The "active" type includes persons whom the Personnel Section considers capable and qualified to hold responsible positions and who can work independently. (No one in the MGB actually works independently — the least significant step contemplated must first be approved, coordinated and confirmed by a superior officer. For this reason the UKR Chief is

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constantly in touch with MOSCOW, via the VCh.) The "active" list also includes the ardent political-minded persons.

The MVD Prosecutor is permitted to handle MGB cases and he is authorized access to information on all counter intelligence activities.

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PART VII

UKR HEADQUARTERS FOR GERMANY

The functions and staffs of the various DEPARTMENTS, Sub-Departments, and Sections within the UKR, POTSDAM, as of May 1949.

(The known personal data of all named personalities is included in Part XIII of this workbook.)

THE ADMINISTRATION

Functions: Direct and control all Soviet counter intelligence work in Germany.

Personalities (Staff):

67X10

Chief of UKR	-	{	Lt. General
1st Deputy	-	{	fnu, Major General
2nd Deputy	-	{	Colonel
Secretary of Party Bureau	-	{	fnu, Lt. Colonel
Adjutant to General	-	{	fnu, Sr. Lt.

SECRETARIAT

Functions: Self-explanatory

Personalities:

67X10

Chief	-	{	fnu, Lt. Colonel
Deputy Chief	-	{	Major
Sr. Representative	-		(Unknown)
Representative	-		(Unknown)
Assistant Representative	-		(Unknown)

NUMBERING MACHINE SKIPPED NUMBER

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Sections within the SECRETARIAT:

Typing Pool - () fnu, (typist)
Publications Section

DEPARTMENTS

PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT (Otdel Kadrov (OKA)

Functions: Distribution of counter intelligence personnel in Germany; assignments, promotions, decorations, and loyalty checks of its own personnel.

Personalities:

Chief - () fnu, Colonel
Deputy Chief - (Unknown)
Sr. Investigator - () Major
Special Representative of "OO"; at present Deputy Chief of Personnel Section - () fnu, Lt. Col.
Sr. Representative - () Major (operative Staff)
Operative Representative - () Sr. Lt. (Handles issuance of personal identification cards, passes, etc.)
Sr. Representative - () fnu, Captain
(on special assignment) fnu, Sr. Lt.
Operative Representative - () fnu, Sr. Lt. (on special assignment)
Secretary - () Lt.

DEPARTMENT I (Perviy Otdel)

Functions: Servicing Army Headquarters

Personalities:

Chief of DEPARTMENT - () fnu, Lt. Colonel

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Deputy Chief - (none at present)

Sub-Department 1

Functions: Servicing Army Headquarters - located at BOBBLESBURG

Personalities:

Chief - () fnu, Major (recently assigned)
Assistant Chief - () fnu, Major (recently assigned)
Sr. Representative - () fnu, Captain
German Interpreter - ()

Sub-Department 2

Functions: Servicing Headquarters - Rear Forces - at POTSDAM

Personalities:

Chief - () fnu, Major
Assistant Chief - (Unknown)
Sr. Representative - () fnu, Major
(Housing Procurement officer)
PX Officer (Univermag) - () fnu, Major
Operative Representative - () fnu, Lt. (former secretary of DEPT I)
Operative Representative - () fnu, Sr. Lt.
Sr. Representative - () fnu, Captain
(In charge of Officers' Club)
Field Representative - () fnu, Captain
(At Auto Repair Shop in BERNAU)
Other Field Representatives - () fnu, Captain
(field unknown)

DEPARTMENT II - Detecting Department (Roziskniy Otdel)

Functions: Uncovering agents, deserters, traitors, etc.

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Personalities:

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Chief - () fnu, Lt. Colonel
Deputy Chief - () fnu, Major
(Duties Unknown) - () fnu, Major

Sub-Department 1

Functions: Uncovering agents, and all wanted persons in the
BERLIN Sectors.

Personalities:

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Chief - () Major
Assistant Chief - () fnu, Major
Sr. Representative { } fnu, Captain
Sr. Representative { } Major
Representative { } Lt.

Sub-Department 2

Functions: Apprehending "wanted" persons in Western
Sectors of BERLIN and removing them to the
Eastern Sector.

Personalities:

Chief - () fnu, Major
Secretary - (Unknown)
Sr. Representative { } fnu, Major (has his office
at the SCHLESSE SEE RR BERLIN)

Special Department: American Section, attached to MGB
Headquarters Sector BERLIN/Weissensee
Hohenschonhausen.

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Sr. Representative - ()
Sr. Representative - () Major
(One (1) Assistant and six (6) Office Help)

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DEPARTMENT III - "Eyes and Ears" for the Administration (UKR)

Functions: Observe and report on the activities of the Soviet Occupation Forces, Soviet civilians, and Germans employed by the Army.

Personalities:

Chief - ()fnu, Lt. Colonel (formerly Major, now assigned to MGB Sector, BERLIN; and before that - Lt. Col ()

First Deputy - () Major

Second Deputy - () Lt. Colonel

Third Deputy - () Lt. Colonel

Sr. Operative Representative - ()fnu, Major

Sr. Operative Representative - () Major

Secretary - () (Unknown)

DEPARTMENT IV - Investigating Department (Sledstvenniy Otdel)

Functions: Investigations and Interrogations

Personalities:

Chief - () Lt. Col. (nicknamed - ()

Deputy Chief - () Major

Sub-Department 1

Functions: Conducts Interrogations and Investigations.

Personalities:

Chief - () Major

Assistant Chief - () Major

Sr. Investigator - () Captain

Sr. Investigator - ()fnu, Lieutenant

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Sr. Investigator - () Captain

Investigator - () Lt.

Interrogator - () Lt.

Secretary - ()

Steno-Typist - ()

Typist - (Unknown)

Sub-Department 2

Functions: Field Offices' Interrogations and Investigations
(Periphery Otdel)

Personalities:

Chief - (Formerly Major)

Assistant Chief - (Major)

Sr. Investigators - (Captain)

() fnu, Capt. Captain

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SECTIONS

(Operating as individual units, responsible
directly to the Administration)

Operational Statistics Section (Oper Uchothnoye Otdeleniye)

Functions: Maintain records and statistics of all UKR
operational activities; and cost of same.

Personalities:

Chief - () fnu, Lt. Colonel

Assistant Chief - (Unknown)

Sr. Representative - () fnu, Major

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Representatives - () -

() need

() fnu, civilian (former Soviet soldier)

Surveillance Section

Functions: Provides for twenty-four (24) hour surveillance, or shadowing, of persons suspected by the UKR.

Personalities:

Chief - () fnu, Major

Assistant Chief - () Major

Sr. Representatives - () Captain
() Lieutenant

Representative - () Sr. Lt., fnu

Chauffeur-Agent - () fnu, Sr. Lt. (drives an Opel Kapitän).

Approximately ten (10) additional Investigators (male and female) - names unknown.

Note: These surveillance personnel always travel in pairs in POTSDAM, for security reasons; they are armed with small pistols; and they may travel in civilian clothes or in uniform, as the need requires. Cars assigned to this Section are either ZIS or POBEDA.

Code Section (Shifr Otdel)

Personalities:

Chief - () fnu, Major

Operative Representatives - () fnu, Sr. Lt.

() fnu, Lt.
(usually in civilian clothes)

Note: Personnel in Code Section receive an additional thirty percent (30%), of basic salary, for their specialized work.

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Field Mobile Prison (Polyevaya Poredvizhnaya Tyurma (PPT)

Functions: Political and criminal prisoners are held here during their interrogation and investigation period. Its capacity: 100 - 110 prisoners. Vehicle used for transporting prisoners, known as the "chorniy voron" (black crow), is a bright blue bus, equipped with curtains which conceal the barred windows.

Personalities:

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Chief - () Sr. Lt.
Assistant Chief - () Sr. Lt.
Guards (3)
Sr. Supervisor - () fnu, Jr. Lt.
Supervisor - () fnu, Sgt.
Supervisors (8 or 10) - (Unknown)
Secretary - (Unknown)

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10th Special Guards Battalion (10-iy Otdelnyy Battalion Ikhrani)

Functions: Guarding of Compound, Administration Headquarters, Prison, and all other operative groups, as well as the railroad stations.

Personalities:

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Commanding Officer - () fnu, Major
Deputy Commander - (Unknown)
(In charge of Political Affairs)
Chief of Staff - () fnu, Major
Deputy Commander, - () fnu, Sr. Lt.
(Technical Affairs
and motor transport)
Company Commanders (3) - (Unknown)

Equipment: Machine guns and automatic rifles (PPD, or PPSH) - Armored trucks.

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Battalion consists of approximately 250 soldiers. They are rarely given leave or permitted to go to town. They are better dressed, but are constantly training - military and political.

Note: A UKR Representative (from the First Department) is assigned to the Battalion.

Administrative-Supply Section (Administrativno-Khozyastvennoye Otdeleniye (AKHO))

Functions: Issues officers' clothing, billets; ration cards; in charge of Pass Office at UKR building and compound; handles employment of German personnel; and in charge of CF (9).

Personalities:

Chief - () fnu, Lt. Colonel.
Assistant Chief - () fnu, Captain
Sr. Inspector - () fnu, Lieutenant
Inspector - () Jr. Lt.
Bookkeeper - (Unknown)

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Finance Section (Finotdel)

Personalities:

Chief - Recently assigned - name not known. (Former chief () fnu, Major - from 1945 to June 1949, reassigned to LWOW UKR)
Sr. Bookkeeper - New - not known. (Formerly () fnu, from 1945 to May 1949)
Cashier - M/Sgt (Name not known)

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Garage (UKR)

Personalities:

Chief - () fnu, Sr. Lt.
Automotive Parts Officer - () Jr. Lt.

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Maintenance Officer (several) - names not known

Fuel and Oil Officer - name not known

Dispatchers - Sergeants (names not known)

Photography Section

Personalities: Photographer - First name - Yura, last name not known - Sergeant.

Communications Section

Personalities:

Telephone Technician ()fnu, Sgt.

Typography Section

Personalities: Chief (name not known) - Jr. Lt.

INTERPRETERS at UKR

() Capt. - German language
() Lt. - German language
() Lt. - German language
()fnu - English - assigned to Department I.
()fnu - English and German (Dept II).
() - German - assigned to Department II.
()fnu - German
() - German - assigned to Dept I.
() Sgt - German, assigned to AKHO.

gistry - formerly ()fnu, Major

NON-OPERATIONAL PERSONALITIES

() nicknamed - () Lt. In charge of the Officers' Club in UKR building.
() - Guard at UKR building - POTSDAM.
() - Guard at UKR building - POTSDAM.

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PART VIII

THE OKR (COUNTER INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT)

Except for the strength of its personnel, the structure and functions of the Army OKR are identical to that of the UKR. Within a division, however, because of the scope of operations, the structure is somewhat streamlined. The staff of the OKR attached to an Army division is composed of the following:

At Division Headquarters:

"The Apparat" (OKR Headquarters)

OKR Chief:

In charge of the OKR's activities within the division (agent operations). He recruits and operates his own agent network; and submits operational reports to the next higher counter intelligence organ. (Army OKR).

Assistant Chief

Prepares operational reports for the Chief of the OKR. Maintains his own agent network within the division.

Senior Representative

Collects and compiles statistics of the OKR's activities (number of investigations - current and completed; number of agents maintained by the Division OKR; number of arrests; etc.)

Investigator-Interrogator

Investigates and interrogates all persons arrested or detained by the Division OKR.

Commandant

Supply officer for the Division OKR. (Prior to the elimination of the death sentence, the Commandant served as the executioner for the Division OKR - for each execution he received 250 grams of vodka.)

Secretary (and Code Operator) - (Frequently a woman officer)

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At each Regimental Headquarters: (Each Division has three
(3) Regiments)

Senior Operative Representative

He is responsible to the Division OKR Chief for counter intelligence activities at the Regimental Headquarters and also at one (1) of the Battalions.

Representative (2)

Each Representative is responsible for the counter intelligence activities of the Battalion assigned to him. He is directly under the supervision of the Senior Operative Representative at Regimental Headquarters.

Battalion Level

The Representative from Regimental Headquarters recruits a resident agent and informants within each unit of the Battalion. The resident agent serves as a liaison man for the Battalion Representative, as it would be impossible for the latter to handle alone all agents within his target. Resident agents must either be Party members or Komsomols, and are usually NCO's or clerks, as these two types have more leisure time and may leave their posts without causing any suspicion. A resident agent is not an "official" worker of the counter intelligence organ; however, his personal file will carry a record of his work as a resident agent, and this record will follow him wherever he goes.

Rear Echelons

One (1) Representative (OKR) is assigned to cover all Rear Echelons of a Division (quartermaster, ordnance, medical, chemical warfare, etc.). Here too, resident agents are used in the agent network. The Representative for Rear Echelons is directly responsible to the Senior Representative of Regimental Headquarters.

Other Units

Each division of the Soviet Armies has attached to it several units which will make the division self-sustaining in the field. Each division, therefore, has an Artillery Regiment, Engineering Unit, Mortar Unit - and perhaps several others. Each of these units will be covered by a counter intelligence Representative attached to the OKR at Division Headquarters.

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Every soldier in the Red Army knows that an agent network exists, but he is not aware of its intensity.

Up until 1948, a soldier could be tried by Military Tribunal Division Level; at the present time he can be tried only at Army or Group levels.

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PART IX

ARREST PROCEDURES

Soviet MGB organs demand detailed information from their agents and informants in every case. Thus, a report of planned desertion will state when and where the conversation took place, and who participated in the conversation. These participants are called in first, by the MGB organs, for "closed investigation"; that is, they are secretly interrogated and must sign statements that they will not reveal the essence of the interrogation. In this way, the MGB excludes any possibility of the suspect learning of his impending arrest.

(b)(7)(C) The prosecutor is furnished a report on the interrogation of witnesses — a request for arrest (Assignment for Arrest), and a document covering the charges against the accused (Decision). The documents, confirmed by the Chief of the UKR, are hand-carried by the Operative (or Investigator) of DEPARTMENT I to the Judge Advocate's office; they are examined by the Assistant Judge Advocate in the presence of the bearer, and, in the majority of the cases, the papers will immediately be taken in to the Judge Advocate (Major General () in Germany) for his signature, which will be affixed without delay.

(b)(7)(C) The Prosecution's blind subordination to the MGB organs is due to Soviet regulations which compel the Prosecution to accept the work of the MGB organs. The Prosecution never travels to the area to check witness testimony; such action would not meet with the approval of the MGB units, as it would decrease by half the number of arrests, and the performance of the UKR is evaluated by the GUKR on the number of arrests and sentences issued per month. The Prosecution exists only as a "fixture" within the MGB. The members of the UKR are aware of the fact that the Prosecution cannot refuse to sanction the arrest of any person for whom the UKR has entered a request.

(b)(7)(C) CONFIRMATION (I CONFIRM)
Chief of the UKR, GSOV in Germany
Lt General ()

ARREST OF ()
The Judge Advocate, GSOV
in Germany - Major General ()

" 1949

" 1949

ASSIGNMENT (MISSION)

of Arrest

I, Sr. Investigator of Section 1, DEPARTMENT IV, UKR, GSOV

NUMBERING MACHINE SKIPPED NUMBER

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in Germany - Captain () as of this date have examined the material covering the criminal activity of

IVANOV, Ivan Ivanovich
born 1917. His data
follows.

DETERMINED (FOUND)

That IVANOV in conversations with () and () on several occasions had expressed a desire to desert from the Soviet Army and to escape with his common-law wife; a German by the name of () to the Western Zone of Germany.

On 20 September of this year, IVANOV was taken into custody and for this reason could not carry out his intent.

DECISION

to arrest IVANOV, Ivan Ivanovich, and to institute criminal charges in accordance with Article 58 UK RSFSR.

Sr. Investigator, Section 1, DEPT IV,
Captain

AGREED: Chief of DEPT IV, UKR GSOV in Germany
Lt. Colonel

I have been notified of the current decision
" 1950

"AFFIRMED" by
Chief, UKR, GSOV in Germany.
Lt. General

Arrest of IVANOV sanctioned
by Judge Advocate, GSOV in
Germany.
Major General Justice

" 1949

" 1949

Decision
of restricting measures adopted

I, Senior Investigator of Section 1, DEPARTMENT IV,
UKR GSOV in Germany - Captain () as of this date
have examined the material evidencing the criminal activity of

232 IVANOV, Ivan Ivanovich

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AND HAVE FOUND:

that IVANOV attempted to desert from the Soviet Army, together with his common-law wife, a German by the name of SCHMIDT, and attempted to hide in the Western Zone of Germany; and that he has violated Article 58 of the Criminal Code, RSFSR.

Conceding that IVANOV might evade investigation and trial if left at liberty, the administrator Sr...../?/UPK

HAS DECIDED

in order to prohibit IVANOV from evading investigation and trial, that he be moved to the Field Preliminary Prison, UKR.

Sr. Investigator, Section 1, DEPT IV,
Captain

AGREED: Chief, DEPT IV, UKR GSOV in Germany
Lt. Colonel

I have been informed of the current decision

" 1949.

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PART X

INVESTIGATIONS AND INTERROGATIONS

According to UKR deserters, the UKR usually does not accept statements made by an arrestee, even though logical and plausible. Every effort is made to confuse the prisoner and to force him to deviate from his statements. This is basically due to the fact that the work of the Investigative Department is evaluated by the Administration only on the number of cases it has "broken." The other departments are rated according to the number of arrests made during the month. No one seems to be interested in the true circumstances of the crime, or the necessity for punishment.

Data, which could not be obtained during the process of investigation at lower echelons and agents, must be obtained by the Investigator of DEPARTMENT IV, UKR. Frequently, the evidence and testimony obtained at lower levels is so trivial, or may be so conflicting, that, instead of aiding the Investigator in breaking the case, it hinders the progress of the case, and prevents any possibility of the prisoner's release, even though he may not be guilty. According to Soviet counterintelligence reasoning, an arrestee whose investigation and interrogation has extended over several months is a threat, "... he knows too much about our organization and procedures -- he must not be released!" It is the duty of the Investigative Department of the UKR to prove him guilty ("break" him and obtain a signed confession) and prepare his case for trial by Military Tribunal or the Special Council. There is never an acquittal by either court.

Factually, the accused is sentenced by the Investigative Department (DEPARTMENT IV) at the close of a "satisfactory" investigation of a case. A satisfactory conclusion of a case occurs immediately after the accused has been "convinced" of committing the crimes he has been charged with (most of them imagined by the investigator), and has been "persuaded" to sign a confession of these crimes. Immediately after this a report of the case is prepared for presentation to the Military Tribunal or the Special Council (the latter handles the most important cases -- espionage, sabotage, etc.). In his report the investigator will recommend the sentence to be passed by either court and, since the early part of 1949, he has assumed the responsibility of deciding where the prisoner will serve out his sentence.

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An example of such a report is as follows:

"CONFIRMED BY
CHIEF OF THE UKR, GSOV, in Germany
Lt. General

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" 1949

DECISION

(For the confinement of a prisoner
in a special camp)

.. 1949, ... day, month.

I, Senior Investigator having examined
the material in the investigation case No. of the
condemned

(Surname, first name, patronymic
date of birth, and other data).

HAVE FOUND:

that has been sentenced by the
Military Tribunal, on 1949, for espionage
activity, to 25 years in a Corrective Labor Camp and, by
order of the MGB USSR, No. dated 1 1949

DIRECT

the prisoner be transferred to a
special camp for the purpose of serving out his sentence.

.....
Investigator's name

AGREED: Chief of DEPARTMENT IV, UKR.
Lt. Colonel

According to an MGB directive, the concentration
camps fall into two (2) categories: (1) The "customary"
or "normal" corrective labor camp; and (2) The "special"
corrective labor camp. The latter has a stricter regime
and maintains complete isolationism from the outer world,

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located far from populated centers, usually in lead and gold mining areas. The working conditions do not permit the prisoners to live long. The establishment of "special" camps was propagated by the bolshevik propagandists as a necessary compensation for the abolishment of the death sentence in 1947. It is stated that no one lives longer than one or two years at the "special" camps. Several of these "special" camps are located in the YAKUT and serve the Soviet YAKUT Gold Mine Trust.

After the case has been tried by either court, the investigator is informed of the sentence passed and it is then his duty to prepare a Request for Transfer of Prisoner to a Special Camp. The request is confirmed by the UKR Chief and it is then forwarded, with a copy of the court's decree, to the UKR's Operational Statistical Section. There, it is registered and then forwarded to the Central Directorate for Concentration Camps (GULAG), through the First Special Department, MGB, USSR (Perviy Spetsotdel). The Directorate for the Concentration Camps will prepare orders for the prisoner's transfer and imprisonment at one of the Special Camps and will channel the orders back to the UKR for execution.

Each Correction Labor Camp operates a large network of prisoner agents who operate as intensively among the prisoners as they do among the citizens "at liberty." The number of prisoners sentenced a second time has reached astronomical figures.

Methods of breaking a case:

It should be remembered that the Investigative Department of the UKR is mainly engaged in the "breaking of cases" and, therefore, the most logical and plausible statements made by arrestees are discounted by this Department. Every effort and trick is used to confuse the arrestee and to force him to deviate from his former statements.

The methods used for breaking arrestees are based on the principle of a well-known Russian phrase: "whip and cookie." The use of threats, pressure, starvation, etc. are utilized; then appeals to the prisoner with extra food rations and promises of a lighter sentence.

Beatings are sanctioned in exceptional cases; however, solitary confinement in a windowless cell (1 x 1.5 meters large) in which the prisoner is forced to stand, has a much stronger effect than an ordinary beating. To place a prisoner in solitary confinement, the investigator must first obtain written permission from the Chief, or Deputy Chief, of the UKR; permission is always granted for a five (5) day period.

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A prisoner cannot be confined for more than five (5) days; however, he is not aware of this and, once he is confined in the cell, he assumes that he will be left there to die unless he confesses. After two (2) or three (3) days in solitary confinement, he is ready to confess to any charges against him, even though he is innocent. These admissions, though later denied, are the basis for his 10 to 25 year sentence in a Correction Labor Camp.

Another method used to "break" a case is the use of prison informants. This method is used broadly by DEPARTMENT IV, as it may be directed at either the prisoner or the investigator. Prison informants are used by the Chief, Deputy Chief, Sub-Department Chiefs, and Senior Investigators of DEPARTMENT IV. The Chief of the Department may have his prison informant report on the conduct of a certain investigator, as well as a prisoner. This strictly Soviet "trust and check" method is maintained on all workers; however, the investigators are not too greatly concerned about it, as it is a normal occurrence to be called in by the Chief and told of one's non-Party-like conduct.

Prison informants are recruited from among the following types: prisoners whose cases are near completion; those who have already signed confessions; and those who have already been sentenced by the Military Tribunal. The candidates for recruitment must be approved by the Chief of DEPARTMENT IV. A prison informant is not given an alias; neither is his recruitment recorded in the usual MGB method. The information he collects is typewritten and only the first letter of his surname is used as signature on the report. However, his prison employment will be noted on his personal file records and that will follow him to the Correction Labor Camp to which he is sentenced.

The use of prison informants against Soviet citizens is only fifty percent (50%) effective — the Soviet citizen has learned to keep his tongue behind his teeth, and not to trust the first person who comes along and shows him sympathy. Germans are one hundred percent (100%) susceptible to this bait.

Another method used by the Investigators of DEPARTMENT IV is to tell the prisoner that, if he does not come to his senses and admit his guilt, he will be left to rot in the prison and will not be called in for further interrogation. The prisoner is left alone for a month or two. In that time he realizes that he is definitely doomed — he has been taken from his home secretly; his family does not know of his whereabouts and cannot aid him. The prisoner becomes panicky and begs for an interview with his investigator — he confesses, whether or not he is guilty.

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Other methods used — offering food to a prisoner who has been fed only enough to keep him alive; and promising a light sentence if he will sign a confession. The prisoner is told that the Investigator has all the incriminating evidence and that his signed confession will get him a lighter sentence; or, a prisoner will be told that his signed confession will hasten his trial by the Military Tribunal where he can give his true statements and deny the charges presented against him. (This, of course, is not true — once he has signed a confession he is doomed.)

At operational meetings and Party gatherings, the Chief of DEPARTMENT IV insists that the department personnel adhere to the rules of the UPK (Criminal Code Procedures), and that, for example, a prisoner should not be subjected to interrogations for months. They are constantly reminded by the Chief — "Comrades, we should cling to the revolutionary ideals STALIN teaches us, etc., etc." They also object to any infringement of the revolutionary laws (ideals); however, they — like their Chief — look at the matter from a "Party" point of view. Of course the rules of the UPK are violated; however, the administration insists on the investigators covering traces of violations.

DEPARTMENT IV may utilize the services of the court's medical expert, the graphology expert, and the technical laboratory. In the USSR, MGB in MOSCOW, cardiograph equipment is available.

If, in the process of interrogation, the Investigator succeeds in obtaining "leads" on other personalities connected with the arrestee's crime, the "leads" are quickly followed up and more arrests are made.

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PART XI

GENERAL

UNIFORMS

The official UKR uniform, described below, is never worn outside of the USSR. Uniforms are of the regular Soviet Army color with the following trimming:

Officers:

Cap: Dark blue top, crimson band with five-point star, black visor.

Blouse: Gold or silver epaulets with dark blue edging. Gold epaulets are worn by the Operative Staff; the silver epaulets are worn by non-operatives (clerks, bookkeepers, doctors, etc.)

Trousers: Have dark blue stripes.

Footwear: Boots, or half shoes — black.

(The Soviet soldier (UKR) wears dark blue epaulets.)

A UKR directive prohibits the wearing of the above uniform in Germany. In the USSR it is familiar to the Soviet citizen, and the mere sight of the uniform is a dire threat. The UKR personnel in Germany may wear the uniform of any other branch of the Soviet Army — infantry, tank, etc.

A few of the Counter Intelligence people possess an old "chekist" medal which they prize more highly than an "orden" (order). Only a small number of persons recognize it and understand its significance. The medal is an oval one, about two (2) or two and one-half (2½) inches long; a sword is designed through the middle of it — pointing downwards — with the hammer and sickle crossing just above the point of the sword. The medal is nickel plated; with blue and white enamel trim (definite color pattern could not be established; i.e., whether hammer and sickle are blue and white, or whether the sword is blue and white). It is stamped: "To a Deserving NKVD Worker." The individual who has earned this medal has a lot of blood on his hands.

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WORKING HOURS

In Germany, as well as in the US, the working day for the UKR personnel begins at 1000 hours and ends at 2400 hours, with a four (4) hour break for dinner, recreation, etc. (1600 to 2000 hours). However, every official of the UKR stays in his office, regardless of whether or not he has any work to do, until at least 0200 hours, six (6) days a week; he remains at his desk just in case his superior, or some other high official, should call his desk. Interrogations are carried on seven (7) days a week, and only a few hours a day are taken off for sleeping. Arrestees may be interrogated until 0300 or 0400 hours, and then they are awakened at 0600 hours.

QUARTERS

The Administrative-Supply Section of the UKR (AKHO) is responsible for quartering the UKR personnel. Type and size of quarters depend on rank and importance of position. Colonels and higher rank, whether married or bachelors, are quartered in individual private homes. A lieutenant colonel, or even a major, may be quartered in a private home if his position warrants it. Each married officer (from major down) is assigned an apartment — size of apartment depending on rank, position, and size of family. (The smallest apartments have two rooms in addition to the kitchen.) The bachelor officers (low rank) receive only one (1) room. Bachelor officers may be billeted in the same house with married officers, however, they are allotted only one (1) room.

The AKHO employs approximately ten (10) German women (thoroughly screened and carefully watched), who are assigned as maids in the homes of higher ranking officers (working a few hours each day in the different homes). All other UKR personnel living in the compound must do their own cleaning. Bachelor officers take care of their own rooms — if they wish to have them clean. Colonels, and higher rank, receive an allowance for maid service — whether or not they employ a maid. A lieutenant colonel may have a soldier assigned to him as a house servant, if his position is an important one. One Soviet colonel brought a housekeeper with him from the USSR; another officer (also living in the compound) had two (2) soldiers assigned to him — one as cook and the other as houseman.

The UKR personnel living outside the compound employed German housemaids, even though this was against the rules. Although this was known to the UKR authorities, nothing was

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done about it unless the individual involved was charged with some other offense, in which case the employment of a German was an additional offense. In the spring of 1949, it was rumored that all families (UKR) living outside the compound would be brought into the UKR compound, while the quarters left vacant would be assigned to members of the Surveillance Section which would enable the latter to operate more freely.

Enlisted men, attached to the UKR, live in a kaserne (a large home converted into a kaserne). Non-commissioned officers are separated from the other men. A soldier working for the UKR is considered a co-worker and is permitted to eat in the officers' mess.

MESS FACILITIES

The officers' mess is located in the compound, about 10 meters distant from the office building. Meals cost four (4) marks per day. Meal tickets are issued to each officer (and co-worker) for one (1) month. For an officer to bring in a guest would necessitate giving up one of his meal tickets; thus, the only officers who could bring in a guest were the married ones. (The only guest an officer could bring in was the Soviet soldier.) Formerly, German women were employed in the mess hall; however, they have been replaced with Soviet women (repatriates and young women (20 to 25 years old) recruited from the komsomol groups in the USSR.

Supper consists of a small piece of meat, macaroni, bread and butter. Beer is sold in the mess hall — it is not rationed. Dinner — a choice of menus — three (3) different soups, three (3) different meats, etc. There is always plenty of bread in the officers' mess.

The Soviet soldier is very poorly fed — even bread is rationed. Each soldier eats out of a bowl — plates are not used in a soldiers' mess. Soldiers are marched to and from their meals — singing.

SAFE HOUSES

A safe house is carefully selected for its location and suitable entrance. It is usually a house farther away from the street, with a side entrance providing little possibility for observation from the street. The apartment selected for contact is usually on the first floor, located close to the stairway. The worker employed to maintain the apartment, usually a resident of the house, must sign a paper that he is

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an employee of the UKR (or the MGB). Before a house is taken over by either the UKR or the Oper Sector MGB, a plan of the house is filed with both organizations for recording and checking purposes. After it has been set up as a safe house, it is checked (placed under surveillance) at irregular but frequent intervals. An operative may request a surveillance of the house at any time -- a twenty-four (24) hour surveillance is furnished for as long a period as requested. Safe houses are not used in the Allied Zones, as the risk to Soviet personnel would be too great; also, because of the fact that Germans (informants) can operate freely in the Allied Zones and transmit their information to agents in the Soviet Zone. Rent for use of safe houses is paid out of Confidential Funds (Paragraph # 28 -- formerly known as "devyatka" (# 9)).

It can usually be assumed that any house frequently visited by Soviet officers is a safe house.

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS

Paragraph 28, of the UKR "SOP" covers Confidential Funds; therefore, the Soviet counter intelligence personnel refer to these funds as the "28." (Formerly this item was known as # 9). The Third Central Directorate, MGB, SSR, allocates the sum for each UKR, for a three-month period. In addition to the sum of money, an allotment of food rations is designated for each UKR to be drawn from the Army's food supplies. Confidential Funds are forwarded by MOSCOW directly to the Chief of the UKR, and he, in turn, handles the matter with the Finance Officer and the Supply Officer; the sum for the amount of the check is deposited to the account of the UKR, and the amount of rations specified by MOSCOW are set aside for the UKR's use. Payment in food products is known as "sat otdacha" -- one of these equals a soldier's daily food ration. A payment for services rendered may consist of 150 marks and 20 "sat otdach" (twenty (20) daily rations). The recipient always signs a receipt for payment received. Dollars are furnished by MOSCOW only for Stateside purposes.

Each agent submits receipts for Confidential Funds paid out and, at the end of the month, the Chief of each Department forwards a statement to the Chief of UKR covering the amounts drawn by his personnel, giving the pseudonyms of informants to whom payment was made, and the amount of payment. Two (2) or three (3) times a year an accounting commission checks the accounts of each UKR.

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A statement (raspiska) written in Russian, which is verbally translated for the German informant, is signed by the informant upon receipt of payment. It reads: "I, the undersigned, have this day received (amount of currency and/or food products) from an officer of the Soviet Army in payment for my services." (signature)

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PART XII

DEFINITION OF TERMS

AKHO Administrative-Supply Section
(Administrativno-Khozyaistvennoye Otdeleniye)

arientirovka Orientation pamphlet published by the MGB Counter Intelligence organization. (This pamphlet contains latest information on foreign intelligence agents and activities, Soviet deserters, and all "wanted" persons.) The "arientirovka" is prepared by DEPARTMENT II, or the Second Section of each UKR and OKR; all are assembled and compiled at GUKR MOSCOW and distributed to all counter intelligence organs in the USSR.

cheka (Chrezvichainaya Kommissiya) Extraordinary Commission (of the Soviet Union). Established in 1917 and directed against counter-revolutionary elements in the USSR. The present MGB developed from the "cheka." (In 1922 it was reorganized and renamed the GPU.)

chekist Formerly this term meant a member of the cheka; today it is applied to old members of counter intelligence organizations, thoroughly disciplined in operational work.

devyatka (Russian word for the number nine.) Confidential Funds. (Paragraph 9 of the old SOP for Soviet Intelligence pertained to Confidential Funds; thus, the word "nine" was coined. The present SOP covers Confidential Funds in Par 28; however the term "devyatka" is still used.)

DTU (DOROZHNO-TRANSPORTNOYE UPRAVLENIYE) Rail Transport Directorate (MGB) charged with counter intelligence functions on all Soviet transport systems.

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EKU (Ekonomicheskoye Upravleniye) Economic Administration, MGB, charged with counter intelligence functions in all installations of economic importance.

GPU (GOSUDARSTVENNOYE POLITICHESKOYE UPRAVLENIYE) State Political Directorate. (Succeeded Cheka in 1923. In 1934 incorporated into the NKVD and renamed GUGB.) Maintained counter intelligence service within entire USSR, including military forces, non-military intelligence, and counter espionage abroad. All GPU's subordinates to OGPU.

GSOV (GRUPPI SOVIETSKICH OKKUPATSIONNIKH VOISK) Soviet Occupational Forces Group

GUGB (GLAVNOYE UPRAVLENIYE GOSUDARSTVENNOI BEZOPASNOSTI) Central Directorate of State Security (NKVD). Existed from July 1934 to May 1943 as the directing organization of Soviet non-military intelligence service, except for a brief period in 1941 when it was set up as NKGB.

GUKR (GLAVNOYE UPRAVLENIYE KONT-RAZVEDKI) Central Directorate of Counter Intelligence (Armed Forces). In 1946, merged into the MGB as the Third Central Directorate, of the MGB, MOSCOW.

GULAG (GLAVNOYE UPRAVLENIYE LAGEREI) Central Administration for Camps (concentration) in USSR. (An MVD organ)

INU (INOSTRANNOYE UPRAVLENIYE) Foreign Directorate (Its subordinate sections are known as the INO's) One of the most important departments of the MGB. Collects intelligence data abroad.

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KPZ (KAMERA-PREDVARITELNOVO ZAKLYUCHENIYA) Preliminary Detention Center for persons under investigation or interrogation.

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KRAI Territory. Large administrative and territorial unit within a Union Republic.

KRO (KONTR-RAZVEDIVATELNY OTDEL) Counter Intelligence Department (or Section). May be applied to any Department and/or Section of the Soviet Counter Intelligence organizations.

KRU (KONTR-RAZVEDYVATELNOYE UPRAVLENIYE) Counter Intelligence Directorate. Charged with counter intelligence functions directed toward the protection of Soviet non-military institutions from foreign penetration in the USSR and abroad.

Legenda An agent's cover story.

MGB (MINISTERSTVO GOSUDARSTVENNOI BEZOPASNOSTI) Ministry of State Security, formed in March 1946. The latest phase of Soviet security organization. It is the centralized administration of Soviet intelligence and counter intelligence activities within the USSR and abroad.

MID (MINISTERSTVO INOSTRANNIKH DEL) Ministry for Foreign Affairs. In addition to its diplomatic tasks, participates in intelligence work. Maintains close liaison with the INU, MGB, and the GRU.

MVD (MINISTERSTVO VNUTRENNIKH DEL) Ministry of the Interior. Until spring of 1946 the MVD was known as the NKVD and, until the reorganization (May 1943), it was the most powerful Soviet intelligence organ. At present its functions are restricted to border intelligence work, police functions, border administrative duties, and labor and concentration camps.

NEP (NOVAYA EKONOMICHESKAYA POLITIKA) New Economics Policy. Instituted in 1924. Permitted a certain amount of free enterprise in light industry, handicrafts, and agriculture.

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NKGB (NARODNY KOMMISSARIAT GOSUDARSTVENNOI BEZOPASNOSTI) People's Commissariat of State Security — 1943-1946, predecessor of the MGB.

NKO (NARODNY KOMMISSARIAT OBORONI) People's Commissariat for Defense. Until April 1946, the supreme headquarters of the Red Army and Air Force. In 1946 incorporated into the MVS (Ministry of Armed Forces).

NKVD (NARODNY KOMMISSARIAT VNUTRENNIKH DEL) People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs; established July 1943 and continued until March 1946. Replaced by the MGB and the MVD.

oblast Province

OGPU (OBYEDINENNOYE GOSUDARSTVENNOYE POLITICHESKOYE UPRAVLENIYE) United State Political Directorate. Central administration of the GPU's of various Soviet republics (united on 23 November 1923). In 1934, GPU's incorporated into the NKVD and renamed GUGB.

OKR (OTDEL KONTR-RAZVEDKI) Counter Intelligence Department of the GUKR.

OO NKVD (OSOBY OTDEL NKVD) Special Section of the NKVD — the counter intelligence organization of the NKVD within the Red Army. In 1943, succeeded by GUKR SMERSH. (Today the word SMERSH has been dropped from the GUKR.)

otdel Department and/or Section.

otdeleniye Sub-Department or Sub-Section.

PPT (POLEVAYA PEREDVIZHNAYA TYURMA) Field Mobile Prison.

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~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

RSFSR (ROSISKAYA SOVIETSKAYA FEDERATIVNAYA SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA RESPUBLIKA) Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. (Its capital is MOSCOW)

SMERSH An abbreviation for "Smert Shpionam" — Death to Spies. This term had been annexed to counter intelligence organizations until the last re-organization which took place in 1946, when the Counter Intelligence was incorporated into the GUKR, MGB.

SPU (SEKRETNO-POLITICHESKOYE UPRAVLENIYE) Secret Political Directorate. Charged with counter intelligence functions among anti-Soviet elements.

TASS (TELEGRAFNOYE AGGENSTVO SOVIETSOVO SOYUZA) Soviet News Agency, "Tass"

TROIKA Three-man council (NKVD). Superseded in 1938 by the Special Council (or Special Court) — today an MGB unit. Tried political criminals, traitors, and foreign agents, and all cases requiring secret handling.

UKR (UPRAVLENIYE KONTR-RAZVEDKI) Counter Intelligence Directorate, subordinate to the GUKR (Third Central Department of the MGB, SSR).

VCh (VYSOKA CHASTOTA) Direct high frequency telephone line which cannot be tapped.

VO GPU (VOENNIY OTDEL GPU) Military Section of the State Political Department. Charged with surveillance and protection of the Soviet Armed Forces against foreign agents. Forerunner of SMERSH (GUKR).

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PART XIII

SOVIET COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

PERSONALITIES

249


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(b)(7)(C)



(b)(7)(C)

()

Chauffeur for UFR Chief at
"CTSDAI" (Lt.Gen. ()

Very tall and very big - called
"the giant".

()

nu (Civilian)

Russian
28 or 29 years old, average
height, blond, long thin face,
average build. Single.


German interpreter at UFR PCT.
Has been in Germany for some
time.

Sec

~~Secret~~

No Photograph

(S)(M)



() Major

Senior Investigator in the
Personnel Section, UKR PCTSDAM

35 years old (approx.) above
average height, dark hair,
stout. Married, has two
children. Member of the
Partburo.

In Germany since the beginning
of the occupation.

() Sr. Lt.

Operative Representative,
Personnel Section, UKR PCTSDAM

Approx. 28 years old, shorter
than average, light brown hair,
thin. Married.

Has been in Germany for some
time.

Maintains card file on every
Soviet counter-intelligence
person in Germany.

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

60110

()

()

()

()

()

Engaged in propaganda work in
BERLIN. Very well educated.

Close friend of ()

()

fnu Sgt

Clerk in the Secretariat of
UKR POTSDAM.

60110

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~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

No Photograph

61710

() 1st Major

Oper-Statistical Section, UKR
TCTSDAM.

Formerly worked in Code Section.

() Sr. Lt.

Was Chief of the "CC" PKVD
attached to the 45th Guards
Infantry Div. (1942-1943).

52-55 years old, tall, dark
balding on top, large flat
nose, stout. Married to
battle. Coward in

No Photograph

Worked in intelligence organs
for 20 years, began his career
as a sleuth.

() Capt. (Second Assault Army OKR)

In March 1949 was employed as
Chief of an intelligence school
in Leningrad - was to receive
rank of Lt. Colonel.

Aprox. 30 years old, taller than
average, brown hair, pinched
closely grouped features, slender
build. A casanova.

He is very well known in intel
gence circles and in Leningrad.

Early in 1944 was transferred
to the UKR Leningrad Front, Fourth
Section.

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253

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6X10

() Major. ()

Chief of Sub-Department 1,
DETACHMENT IV, UKR POTSDAM

Approx. 37 years old, short, dark
hair and eyes, has a row of gold
teeth. Served with the GPU.

6X10

36 or 37 years old, average
height, light brown hair, stout

Served with the OKR, Second
Assault Army until January 1943
was with UKR POTSDAM until 1942
was Chief of the LEIPZIG IGB
Oper Sector until early 1949
when he was returned to I.O. CO
because one of his men had
deserted.

Present whereabouts not known.

No Photograph

6X10

() nu Sgt.

Investigator-Interrogator with
the "CO IKVD" attached to the
45th Guards Infantry Div.
(1942-1943).

Approximately 32 years old, short,
dark hair and eyes, hooked nose.
Like Russian with an Armenian
accent. Present whereabouts not
known.

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(b)(7)(C)

()
Representative in the Oper-
Statistical Section, UKR
TOTSDAI.

(b)(7)(C)
Approx. 36 years old, average
height, light brown hair cut
short, stout. Single. Has
been in Germany for some time.

() Major

Approx. 36 years old, short
than average, brunette, dark
piercing eyes, stout. A
careerist, and an old party
member.

Left TOTSDAI late in 1948 to
attend an IGB school in LARKO
(advanced school for administra-
tive and counter intelligence
personnel)

He interrogated () an
alleged American spy.

No Photograph

() Finu Major

(b)(7)(C)
Approx. 45 years old. Taller
than average, stout, light brown
hair, light eyes, married, has
14-year old child.

Until 1949 (June) was Chief of
UKR TOTSDAI Finance Section.
Transferred to UKR at LWOW.

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No Photograph

No Photograph

(b)(7)(C)

() fnu Captain

Chief of military censorship
(Second Assault Army - 1943-1946)

Informed OKR Chiefs of army
directives and MGB correspon-
dence.

Present activities not known.

() fnu Jr Lt

Platoon Commander of Special
Guard Company, attached to
OKR of Second Assault Army.
(1943-1946)

Approx. 27 years old, shorter
than average, blond, normal
build. Moved with army to
ARCHANGELSK.

(b)(7)(C)

No Photograph

No Photograph

() fnu, Sr. Lt.

Asst. Operative Representative
Second Assault Army (1943)

About 26 years old, average height
brown hair, light eyes, thin,
girlish complexion.

Transferred to another Division
as Representative (1943).

() (present rank -
Lt. General)

Approx. 45 years old, shorter
than average, bald (shaves his
head), stout, rough features.

In 1937 was Operative Represent-
ative in the LENINGRAD Region.

In 1942 made Chief of "OO NKV
LENINGRAD FRONT", held rank
"Commissar Second Class".

At present is Chief of UKR at
LENINGRAD Military District.

He is on very good terms with

(b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(C)

() Major

Chief of Second Section (Hqs)
Second Assault Army. (1943-1946)

About 36 years old, shorter than
average, brown hair, round head,
blue eyes, stout.

Was Secretary of the Party
within OKR of Second Assault
Army. Moved with army to
ARCHANGELSK and from there
transferred to the UKRAINE.

- - - - -

No Photograph

() Hon Major

Chief (or Deputy Chief) of
Section in DEPARTMENT II, UKR
FOTDML.

About 37 years old, average
height, light hair, blue eyes,
round full face, stout. Very
little education.

In Germany since 1945.

- - - - -

No Photograph

() Sgt.

Clerk in OKR Secretariat, Second
Assault Army. (1943-1946)

About 24 years old, average
height, brunette, thin.

Assumed he is with UKR at
ARCHANGELSK Military District.

() Hon Captain


Sr. Representative in Fourth
Section, "OO NKVD" Leningrad
Front.

No description available.

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~~Secret~~

(b)(7)(C)



(_____) Major
Sr. Representative, Sub-Dept. 2,
DEPARTMENT I. (Housing Procure-
ment officer)

(_____) fnu
Wife of Major (_____)

(b)(7)(C)

APPROX. 34 years old, average
height, stout, dark hair, brown
eyes. Divorced and remarried.
Former wife in USSR.

Member of Partburo. In Germany
for a long time; has caused a
great many arrests (Germans and
Soviets).

~~Secret~~

~~See~~

(b)(7)(C)

()

(b)(7)(C)

() Major

Chief of Sub-Dept. 2, DEPARTMENT IV, UKR POTSDAM.

Born () Taller than average, dark thick hair, dark eyes, hook nose, stout (about 195 lbs.) On right side, teeth widely spaced. Little education.

Has children of school age.

()

Sr. Investigator, Sub-Dept. 1, DEPARTMENT IV, UKR POTSDAM.

Born 1917 (approx.), average height, brown hair, slender, married, has one child.

Village born, attended counter-intelligence school in MOSCOW (together with Lt ()) Conducts investigations in combat manner. Has been in Germany since 1944.

(b)(7)(C)

()

~~See~~

— wife of Capt

(b)(7)(C)

() Pnu, Sr. Lt.

Oper. Representative in
Personnel Section, UKR POTSDAM
(On special assignment)

Approx. 30 years old, above
average height, blond, long
thin face, married.

Arrived in Germany in 1947.

(b)(7)(C)

No Photograph

() Capt.

Sr. Investigator in DEPARTMENT
IV until 1947. Transferred to
UKR, KIEV Military District.

About 33 years old, average
height, brunette, average build.
Music lover, plays several
instruments.

His greatest weakness is women.

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~~Sec~~

() Capt.
(Nicknamed ()

Asst Chief of Second Section,
OKR Second Assault Army.

About 30 years old, taller than
average, light brown hair, stout

Moved with Second Assault Army to
ARCHANGELSK.

Present whereabouts not known.

-0- - -

No Photograph

()

Chief of OKR, with Second Assault
Army (1942-1943).

About 42 years old, tall,
brunette, stout.

In 1942 was Sr. Lt in the () V
in the changeover to OKR MGB
received rank of Lt Col, and
one month later was made Colonel.

At end of 1943 became Chief of
OKR with 42nd Army.

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No PHOTOGRAPH

No Photograph

(S)(U)

() Sr Lt

Representative in Sub-Dept. 1,
DEPARTMENT II, UKR POTSDAM.

About 32 years old, shorter than
average, light brown hair, dark
eyes, stout. Married has two
children.

In Germany for a long time.

-0- - -

No Photograph

(S)(U)

() (O.. officer
status - no rank)

Representative in the "00 NKVD"
45th Guards Div. LENINGRAD Front.

Approx. 28 years old, taller
than average, blond, broad
shouldered, stout.

Prior to his assignment as Repr.
in a Regiment, was cook for the
Divisional Counter-intelligence
Chief.

In 1945 was with the Air Forces in
LENINGRAD.

() Enu Capt.

Sr. Representative in the Open
Statistical Section of OKR with
Second Assault Army.

Approx. 35 years old, taller than
average, brown hair, very thin.
Suffered with stomach trouble.
In 1945 was transferred to MOSCOW.

rumored he is presently working
with DEPARTMENT III, of GUKR,
wears a naval uniform (He is
either attached to a naval unit
or is with the Naval Counter-
Intelligence unit in MOSCOW.)

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No Photographs

(b)(7)(C)

() rnu (Former employee
at POTS DAM, DEPARTMENT II, UKR)

Was in charge of Soviet PX in
POTS DAM. In 1948 was trans-
ferred to SVERDLOVSK.

About 30 years old, average
height, thin.

()

(b)(7)(C)

()

()

nickname
Lt.

Manager of the Officers' Club
in the UKR building, POTS DAM.

Born () Member of the Party
since 1945.

average height, brown hair, long
nose, thin. Has a lump on right
side of forehead (reason for his
nickname). A Drunkard. Married
his family lives in the Soviet
Union. In POTS DAM he lives with
() a typist at the UKR.

(b)(7)(C)

() rnu Major (Formerly in
One-Statistical Section,
UKR POTS DAM)

Formerly worked in the Personnel
Section of the UKR, POTS DAM.

About 45 years old, taller than
average, shaved head, stout,
flat footed, walks with toes
pointing out to the side. Little
education.

Late in 1948, or early 1949, was
returned to MOSCOW for new
assignment.

Present whereabouts not known.

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No Photograph

No Photograph

(S)(X)(C)

() Lt.

Asst. Chief of the "00 NKVD" attached to the 45th Guards Infantry Division, Leningrad Front (1942).

About 40 years old, short, dark hair, long face, several gold teeth, thin. Suffered with stomach trouble.

Present whereabouts not known.

- - -

() Plu Sgt -

Representative, -"00 NKVD" 45th Guards Infantry Division, Leningrad Front. (1942-1943).

26 years old, average height, thin, blond, blue eyes.

Counter-intelligence representative for both the Engineers and Mortar units.

Present whereabouts not known.

- - -

(S)(X)(C)

No Photograph

No Photograph

()

Deputy Chief of Third Section (Hqs) OKR, Second Assault Army.

Approx. 30 years old, short, dark hair, stout.

Prior to this assignment, had been Sr. Operative Representative in same Section.

Moved to ARCHANGELSK with the Second Assault Army.

- - -

() Capt.

Sr. Repr., Fourth Section (Hqs) OKR, Second Assault Army.

Approx. 32 years old, taller than average, brown hair, pug nose, stout.

Very poor worker. Transferred 1944.

Formerly with POG at ORANIENBURG

Present whereabouts not known.

- - -

~~Secret~~

No Photograph

() (officer's status)

"OO MEVD" Representative in the 131st Regiment, 45th Guards Infantry Division (LENINGRAD Front).

25 years old, average height, brunette, blue eyes, thin. At beginning of the war served as medical instructor, at the same time being resident agent for the "OO MEVD".

Present whereabouts not known.

() Major
(Nicknamed)

Short, light brown hair, a very active communist and terrorist.

Started as Investigator in the UKR at POTSDEM, was made Chief of Sub-Dept. 1, DEPARTMENT IV.

In the middle of 1948 was transferred. At present is Chief of DEPARTMENT IV of an Army OKR in White Russia.

No Photograph

() Enu Capt - St. Repr.

Personnel Section, UKR POTSDEM

About 33 years old, taller than average, brunette, dark eyes, stout, married. In Germany since 1947.

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No Photograph

No Photograph

(b)(7)(C)

() Major

Chief of Sub-Dept. 1, DEPARTMENT
II, UKR POTSDAM.

Approx. 33 years old, shorter
than average, blond, round face,
high cheekbones, average build.
Recently married.

Member of the Partburo - attends
the Marx-Lenin university.

() Sr. Lt.

Assistant Chief of UKR prison,
POTSDAM.

34 years old, average height,
brunette, thin long nose, large
white spots on face. Married.

Assigned to his present position
late in 1948.

(b)(7)(C)

No Photograph

() fnu Sr. Lt.

In charge of the UKR Garage,
POTSDAM.

Approx. 40 years old, above
average height, light brown
hair mixed with grey, eyes
badly crossed. Married.

Came to Germany with General

() fnu

Typist in typing pool at U.
POTSDAM.

(b)(7)(C)

No Photograph

() fnu Capt. Asst Chief of
Investigations Section, UKR,
4th Mechanized Army, EBERSWALDE.

About 33 years old, average
height, bald (shaves his head)
dark eyes, thin, very quiet

~~Secret~~ 65

(b)(7)(C)

Secretary at UKR POTSDAM

Born () in ()
Average height, dark hair, brown eyes, stout, round face, has noticeable hair on face. Poor dresser.

Frequently works for ()
(Investigations Dept.).

Previously worked in WEIMAR.

No Photograph

(b)(7)(C)

() fnu Jr Lt

Automotive Parts Officer, UKR garage - POTSDAM.

32 years old, above average height, light brown hair, dark eyes, stout, married.

Has been in Germany for some time.

() Lt.

Interpreter (German), DEPT. UKR POTSDAM

Born () short, dark hair, brown eyes. Speaks German "fairly".

() Deputy Chief, DEPT IV, UKR POTSDAM.

Approx. 37 years old, taller than average, bald (shaves his head), dark eyes, stout. Married has one daughter.

Attends Marx-Lenin university. Member of the PARTBURO.

266

(b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(C)

() Inu Sgt.

Approximately 28 years old, brown hair, tall, thin.

Was second in command of the Special Guards unit attached to the OKR of the Second Assault Army (1945). Often performed agent duties for Fourth Section (Hqs).

Demobilized in 1946. Present whereabouts not known.

No Photograph

() Inu Capt. Sr. Repr.
Sub-Dept 2, DEPT I.
UKR POTSDAM.

approx. 36 years old, short, dark, thin, "eastern" features (may be a Tatar), married, has two children.

Good worker - arrests many people (arrested who lived in US Sector of BERLIN).

() Lt Col. () alias ()

Chief of DEPT IV, UKR POTSDAM.

Born () taller than average, light thick hair, slightly wavy, average build. Married has two children. Sly.

Advanced to present position by appointment - is not qualified for same. Does not know how to interrogate. He has been in Germany for some time.

No Photograph

() Inu Capt. Sr. Repr.
Sub-Dept 1, DEPT I, UKR
POTSDAM.

approx. 37 years old, Taller than average, dark hair (parted dark eyes, average build. Well educated, good speaker. Married

Has been in Germany for some time.

267

(b)(7)(C)

() Sr. Lt.
Interpreter-Interrogator, DEPT IV,
UKR POTSDAM.

Born() in()
Jewish nationality.
1.65 m. tall, weighs 85 kg., blond,
balding, blue eyes. Married, has
2 children.

Speaks Russian, German, some French
and English, and Yiddish.

Educated in the St. Petersburg, in
LENINGRAD.

In July 1942 worked as German Inter-
preter for the 00 NKVD, 55th Army.
Also performed intelligence work
for that unit. 1943-1946 was with
Second Assault Army OKR; in 1946
transferred to UKR POTSDAM, where he
worked as interpreter and interroga-
tor for DEPT IV, until July 1949.

() nee()
() or
Wife of Sr. Lt. ()

No Photograph

() Maj. Gen

Until 1948, Asst. Chief of
UKR POTSDAM

About 36 years old, born in
LENINGRAD, average height,
brunette, thin. Heavy
drinker.

Worked with "cheka" since
1933. Transferred to OKR
Rostov Military District.

Rumored he was robbed of
credentials and Party card
(subject to 10 years in
prison).

~~Secret~~

(b)(7)(C)

() Sr Lt.

Chief of UKR Prison at POTSDAM.

Ukrainian. Approx. 34 years old, taller than average, dark hair and eyes.

Formerly Commandant in Second Assault Army.

(b)(7)(C)

() Lt Col.

Assistant Chief, DEPT III, POTSDAM.

Jewish nationality, approx. 38 years old, tall, brunette, large full face, stout. Well educated. Married has two children. Very lazy, very greedy, deals heavily in the black market.

Checks on foreign missions in POTSDAM. Plants agents (waitresses and other German civilians.)

Has been in Germany for some time. Came from ODESSA.

(b)(7)(C)

() Frau (Frau of Lt. Col.)

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No Photograph

(b)(7)(C)

() fnu Col.

Former Chief Of Personnel
Section, UKR POTSDA.

Arrived in 1946, transferred
in 1947. Had strong ties
with MOSCOW.

Present whereabouts not known.

No Photograph

(b)(7)(C)

() fnu Lt.

36 or 37 years old, average
height, bald, large nose,
stout, coarse character,
little education.

Released because he could not
get along with his superior
officer while at UKR POTSDA.

At present living in LENINGRAD
in great poverty.

No Photograph

(b)(7)(C)

() fnu

Special Representative with
the "CO NKVD" Personnel
Section, LENINGRAD Front.

Approx. 45 years old, tall,
bald, thin.

()

Soldier in the 10th Special
Guards Battalion attached to
UKR POTSDA.

Born 1925 (approx.), average
height, blond hair, blue eyes,
thin. Intelligent.

No Photograph

() fnu Capt

1st Deputy Chief, 4th Section
OKR Second Assault Army.

Transferred in 1944. Present
whereabouts not known.

(No description available)

270

~~Secret~~

No Photograph

No Photograph

(b)(7)(C)

() Capt - Investigator
OKR Second Assault
Army.

Approx. 30 years old, average
height, shaved head, red face,
dark eyes, thin. Unpleasant
appearance.

Arrived in the unit in 1944;
in 1945, while in POLAND,
was charged with rape and re-
turned to the USSR.

Present whereabouts not known.

(b)(7)(C)

No PHOTOGRAPH

(b)(7)(C)

() fnu
Interpreter (German) assigned
to DET II, UKR POTSAM.

22 or 23 years old, average
height, round face. Attended
the Institute of Foreign
Languages, either in LENINGRAD
or in MOSCOW. Single.

() nu Cpt.

In 1943 and 1944 Adjutant to
Commissar "OO NKVD"
LENINGRAD Front.

Present whereabouts not known.

() Col. - Second
Deputy Chief, UKR POTSAM.

Approximately 38 years old,
average height, stout, brun-
dark eyes, finished milita-
ry academy in LENINGRAD. Has
three children.

Arrived in POTSAM late 1947
from KONINGSBERG.

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No Photograph

(b)(7)(C)

() fnu - State Security
Commissar, III Class.

With the "00 NKVD" attached
to the 67th Army Leningrad
Front - 1942.

Approx. 45 years old, tall,
dark hair, stout, upper front
teeth gold.

Prior to the war was on the
diplomatic force and spent
much time outside the USSR.
(He may have been with TORG
or some other commission.)

Present whereabouts not known.

(b)(7)(C)

() Major

Chief of Secretariat, Second
Assault Army, OKR.

Approx. 35 years old, medium
height, dark hair and eyes,
pock marked face.

In 1946 moved with the Second
Assault Army to Leningrad
Military District. It is
assumed he is still there.

(b)(7)(C)

() fnu Capt

Former Sr. Representative of
DEPT I, USSR POTSDAM.

An alcoholic.

Returned to Leningrad.

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No Photograph

(b)(7)(C)

() Lt. General

Chief of the UKR at POTSDAM

43 to 45 years old, average height, stout, light brown hair, round full face.

Arrived from Austria early in 1948. Married, has two children (10 and 12), the son is abnormally fat.

() Major

Born 1916 (approx.), average height, dark hair, dark eyes long face, average build.

In 1946 was Sr. Repr. in DEPT II, UKR POTSDAM.

In 1948 transferred to BERLIN Oper Sector (reportedly working on the English Desk).

Working for VUL.

Lives with () (latter handles American Desk).

Attended the LENINGRAD school.

He is a member of the Supreme Council, UKRAINE SSR, and frequently travels to KIEV by plane.

He is a member of the UKR Partburo.

Lives in a villa in POTSDAM. His wife has a mercedes car, with chauffeur. She is about 35 years old.

273

(b)(7)(C)

() Ifnu - wife of Major ()
(and their daughter)

Blonde, average height, blue eyes.

~~Sec~~

~~Secret~~

(b)(7)(C)

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(b)(7)(C)

() fnu Capt. - UKR
DOTSDM

Special Representative's
Investigator.

About 35 years old, average
height, dark hair and eyes,
(mongolian features), thin.

Had been in Germany for a long
time. Left early in 1949.


Present whereabouts not known.

() fnu Frau.
Wife of Capt ()

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~
No Photograph

(b)(7)(C)



() Lt.

About 35 years old, average height, brown hair, thin face, Finished Party school.

Worked as German interpreter for the "00 NKVD" Leningrad Front (1941). Remained with this unit when it changed to UKR Leningrad Military District remaining at his post until 1947.

His profession is dentist.

() Lt.

(b)(7)(C)

Interpreter (German) assigned to the Investigative Dept, (DEPT IV), UKR POTSDAM.

No Photograph

Jewish nationality. Born () in ()

() 1st Major (1943)

Tall, stout (approx. 200 lbs.) dark hair, speaks German fluently. Little education.

Deputy Chief of Personnel Section, "00 NKVD" attached to Leningrad Front. (1943).

Hates Soviet regime but will not desert because of his parents who live in the USSR. He is pro-American, loves American jazz.

No description available. Present whereabouts not known.

Late in 1947 was reduced in rank because of black market dealings in HOF area.

275

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

(b)(7)(C)

()

() Major.

Born() an alcoholic.

(b)(7)(C)

Former Sr. Investigator in UKR POTSDAM. Was returned to Southern SIBERIA, with family, where it is assumed he will be given a teaching post (his former profession) until he is arrested by the MGB.

- No Photograph

() Lt.

Secretary in the Personnel Section of UKR POTSDAM.

About 28 years old, very short, stout, blond, blue eyes, single.

(b)(7)(C)

()

Former steno-typist at UKR POTSDAM.

Transferred to UKR KHLARKOV Ukraine.

(Married to a worker in t KHLARKOV UKR).

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

No Photograph

No Photograph

(b)(7)(C)

Until autumn of 1948 was with UKR POTSDAM, then transferred to OKR, ODESSA Military District where he became Chief of AKHO.

During the war, saved life and thus became one of his favorites.

Inu Major - Chief of Surveillance Section, UKR POTSDAM.

Approx. 35 years old, taller than average, blond, full face, stout, athletic type.

Recent arrival from UKR Leningrad. Married.

Attends Marx-Lenin university

No Photograph

(b)(7)(C)

Inu Sr. Lt.

Representative ("OO NKVD") for the 131st Regiment, of the 45th Guards Infantry Div. Leningrad Front.

Approx. 30 years old, average height, brunette, dark eyes, thin. Sr.Repr. in 1943.

Present whereabouts not known.

No Photograph

Sgt.

"OO NKVD" Investigator-Interrogator, 45th Guards Inf. Div. Leningrad Front (1942-1943).

About 35 years old, born and raised in Leningrad. Average height, blond thick hair, low brow, blue eyes, thin. Little education. Was also Secretary of PARTBURE.

Released from intelligence organs - considered incapable of handling higher position.

Present whereabouts not known.

Interpreter (German) at UKR POTSDAM (AKHO Section).

Born () Jewish nationalit: average height, light brown hair, blue eyes, small build.

Until 1946 was chauffeur for CO of 17th Bat. (Major ()) transferred to Investigative Section and later assigned to AKHO.

May be returned to the USSR because of his close friendship with one Soviet deserter

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No Photograph

() fnu Capt.

(b)(7)(C) Sr. Repr., Personnel Section,
OKR, Second Assault Army
1943-1944.

About 40 years old, short,
stout, acted as liaison
officer between the army and
UKR Hqs.

Early in 1944 transferred to
UKR Leningrad Front.

No Photograph

() Secretary and Code Operator
"OO NKVD" 45th Guards Inf. Div.
Leningrad Front. (1942).

About 28 years old, average
height, light brown hair, dark
eyes, sharp nose, thin.

Late in 1942 married the Chief
of the "OO NKVD" unit.

No Photograph

() Deemed Colonel

(b)(7)(C) Chief of "OO NKVD" unit at-
tached to the 55th Army,
Leningrad Front (1943).

Description not available.
Present whereabouts not known.

()
Oper. Repr., OKR Second Assault
Army. (Secretariat).

(b)(7)(C) Approx. 30 years old, average
height, light brown hair (cut
short), blue eyes, stout, very
strong, athletic type.

Assumed she is with the unit
at the Archangelsk Military
District.

Formerly employed at the
Trokh-Gornoi Factory.

No Photograph

() fnu Lt Col.

Asst. Chief of OKR attached
to the Third Assault Army
located in MAGDENBURG.

Approx. 45 years old, short,
gray curly hair, light eyes,
stout. Recently assigned to
this army.

Old party member and chekist.
Little education.

Formerly with DEPT. III, UKR
POTSDAM.

~~Secret~~

No Photograph

() fnu Lt - Sr. Inspec-
tor, AKIO, UKR POTSDAM.

(b)(7)(C)

30 years old, average height,
brunette, dark eyes, normal
build. Married.

In Germany since 1947.

No Photograph

() Lt. General
Chief of DEPT III, GUKR, SSR,
(MOSCOW).

About 40 years old, dark hair,
full round face..

Formerly Chief of UKR POTSDAM

(b)(7)(C)

No Photograph

() fnu Col.
Deputy Chief, OKR attached
to Fourth Mechanized Army
at EBERSWALDE.

About 45 years old, taller
than average, brunette, dark
eyes, stout. Speaks with a
village dialect (has had no
more than 5 years of schooling).

Formerly Asst. Chief of
DEPT III, UKR POTSDAM.

No Photograph

() Capt
1st Deputy Chief, Fourth
Section, OKR, Second Assault
Army. (1942-1945)

Approx. 33 years old, taller
than average, light brown hair
full face, stout.

Transferred in 1945.

In 1947 was Chief of OKR at-
tached to Artillery Brigade
(in Germany), and held rank
of Major.

Present whereabouts not known

279

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~~Secret~~

No Photograph

() fnu, Maj. General

First Deputy to Chief of UKR,
POTSDAM.

36 years old, tall, thin, brun-
nette, dark eyes. Suffers
from stomach trouble, does not
drink vodka. Bachelor, lives
in UKR compound; on Albrecht-
strasse.

In Germany since early 1948,
prior to that worked in
KÖNIGSBERG.

Attended Big Three Conference
in 1941 (then was Major, by
order of STALIN was made
Colonel).

(b)(7)(C)

()

() fnu Major - Deputy
Chief, DET I, UKR
POTSDAM.

About 35 years old, tall,
blond, blue eyes, wavy hair,
long face and nose, thin,
married. Attends Marx-Lenin
university.

In Germany for some time.

(b)(7)(C)

No Photograph

No Photograph

() fnu Major

About 35 years old, short,
brunette, dark eyes. Inso-
lent. Frequently in civil-
ian clothes - wears a cap.

Formerly with UKR POTSDAM.

In 1947 transferred to the
Oper Sector where he directs
the agent network among
German political parties.

Owms an Opel Olympia car.

(b)(7)(C)

() fnu Lt Col.

Chief of UKR attached to
Anti-Aircraft Division,
located 5 km from POTSDAM.

About 32 years old, short,
bald, light eyes, stout.
Defective speech.

In Germany for some time.

Frequently rebuked for small
number of arrests in his
Division.

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
No Photograph

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(b)(7)(C)

() fnu Major - Sr. Repr.
Oper-Statistical
Section, UKR POTSDAM

About 38 years old, average
height, light hair, thin,
married.



(b)(7)(C)

() fnu Major -
Asst. Chief, First Section,
Hqs., OKR Second Assault Army.

About 45 years old, tall, brown
hair, light eyes, stout, smokes
a pipe.

At present, Chief of AKHC,
OKR ARCHANGELSK Military
District.

() fnu Madam
Wife of Major ()
OKR Archangelsk Military
District).

No Photograph

() fnu Capt. - Sr. Repr.
Sub-Dept 1, DEPT II,
UKR POTSDAM.

30 years old, shorter than
average, bald, blue eyes,
thin. Married, has one
child.

In Germany for some time.

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No Photograph

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No Photograph

(b)(7)(C)

() Inu Sr. Lt. - Investigator, (OKR) 4th Mechanized Army, EBERSWALDE.

About 34 years old, short, bald (shaves his head), average build, little education. Recent arrival from USSR (worked in MGB territorial organs).

(Handled case of German citizen, Russian born woman; she was tried and sentenced for being disloyal to the USSR.)

(b)(7)(C)

()

(b)(7)(C)

() Major

Former Sr. Investigator in DEPT IV, UKR POTSDAM.

30 years old, tall, stout, light brown hair, blue eyes, good teeth, bachelor, afraid of women.

Arrived in POTSDAM in 1947. Former Air Corps officer.

Had nervous breakdown in autumn of 1948, sent to Soviet insane asylum, in BUCH (near BERLIN) and then to USSR.

() Inu Major - DEPT II, UKR POTSDAM

Approx. 36 years old, short, light brown hair, thin. Married, wife employed as typist in Personnel Section UKR.

In Germany for some time. Attends Marx-Lenin university.

His duties, in DEPARTMENT II, not known.

No Photograph

() Lt. Col
Second Deputy Chief, DEPT III, UKR POTSDAM.

Approx. 36 years old, average height, blond, blue eyes, stout. Married, has three children. A drunkard.

Attends Marx-Lenin University.

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(b)(7)(C)

(
Major

Deputy Chief, DEPT. III, UKR
POTSDAM.

Approx. 32 years old, dark
hair, light eyes, thin, height
5'10", married, has one child.
Owns an Opel Kapitän.

Enjoyed all benefits Party had
to offer in way of education.
Studied seriously and has made
a career for himself in the
Intelligence Division. Very
capable, drinks very little.
Advanced rapidly.

Prior to the war was history
teacher.

Wears civilian clothes.

(b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(C)

(
Major (fnu - wife of

Short, light brown hair, loves
to dress well. Former typist
at UKR POTSDAM.

(
Capt.

Sr. Representative, Investiga-
tion Section, OKR, Second
Assault Army.

Ukrainian. 30 to 32 years
old, taller than average,
light brown hair, blue eyes,
long face and nose.

Was with this unit for a long
time and moved with it to
ARCHANGELSK Military District
where he became the OKR Party
Secretary.

No Photograph

(
fnu Capt

Representative, "00 NKVD",
in the 98th Artillery Regi-
ment, 45th Guards Infantry
Div. (LENINGRAD Front)
1942-1943.

No description available.

Present whereabouts not known.

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No Photograph

No Photograph

(b)(7)(C)

() Anu, Sr. Lt.

Representative, Fourth Section
Hqs, OKR, Second Assault Army.

Approximately 30 years old,
average height, brunette, dark
eyes, near sighted, wears
glasses. Finished the
LENINGRAD Judiciary Institute.

Arrived in the Second Assault
Army in November 1943, re-
mained until middle of 1944
when he was transferred to some
other unit.

In 1947 employed in LENINGRAD
as consultant in the OBKMS
(Department engaged in appre-
hending bandits, robbers, and
speculators). He was no longer
with the OKR.

Prior to Nov. 1943, subject was
with the POG (Coastal Operations
Group) in ORANIENBAUM (the city
of ORANIENBAUM and surrounding
area was known as the "PYATICHOK"
meaning Operations Area #5).
Some of the POG personnel were
taken into the Second Assault
Army OKR.

() Sr. Lt.

Operative Representative,
First Section, Hqs., OKR,
Second Assault Army.

Approximately 30 years old,
taller than average, dark
hair, dark eyes, thin.
Professional motor cyclist.

Early in 1946 assigned to
UKI POTS-DAL, at end of 1947
was declared surplus and re-
turned to the USSR (MOSCOW).

285

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No Photograph

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No Photograph

(b)(7)(C)

() fnu Major General

Asst. Chief of "OO NKVD" unit attached to the LENINGRAD Front.

About 42 years old, dark hair very stout, short. Considered one of the best counter-intelligence workers.

In 1947 caught in a currency exchange deal and transferred to a UKR in the USSR.

No Photograph

() Lt Col.

Second Deputy Chief of OKR attached to Second Assault Army.

About 42 years old, average height, thin, light brown hair, blue eyes, well educated. He is stubborn, persistent, and exacting. A heavy drinker.

Loved agent work (prepared cover stories, selected and dispatched agents). Disliked his chief and openly criticised him and checked on him.

In 1945 was made Director of an Oper Grup in PRUSSIA, there he made mass arrests. Later was assigned to SCHIERIN (TACKLENBURG) Oper Sector as Chief of City Administration; and later to LICHTENBERG District (BERLIN) as Oper Sector Chief, while there was involved in a scandal and returned to the USSR.

Home address in ()

(b)(7)(C)

() fnu Captain

Sr. Representative, Second Section, OO NKVD Unit attached to LENINGRAD Front.

No description available.

Present whereabouts not known.

() fnu Lt Col. - Secretary of Partburo, UKR POTS DAM

Average height, light hair, broad face, wide flabby nose, stout. Married, has two children. Education only along party lines.

Second in command to Chief of Political Affairs Section by virtue of being Party Secretary.

His opinion required on all recommendations for appointments and promotions of officers.

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(b)(7)(C)

()
fnu capt. - Sr. Rerr.
Secretariat, UK POTSDAM

No description available.

(b)(7)(C)

() Col.
(1942)

Chief of OKR attached to
Second Assault Army.

Nicknamed (-)

Jewish nationality.

Approx. 50 years old, medium height, bald head (shaved), round face, brown eyes, long nose, weighs approximately 180 lbs., well built. Part of index finger missing on right hand.

Married to ()

He is an old chekist and has been in the Soviet army over 25 years, serving mostly with the intelligence organizations, and has received many decorations for outstanding service.

In 1941 was Chief of OO NKVD with the 42nd Army, Leningrad Front. From 1942 to 1946 served with the OKR, Second Assault Army and moved with this unit to ARCHANGELSK in Feb. 1946. In 1947, at his own request was put on semi-retired status. At present lives in () on ()
(This building especially built for Colonels and Generals)

(b)(7)(C)

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No Photograph

(b)(7)(C)

()

Sr. Lt.

Sr. Operative Representative
"CO NKVD" unit attached to
the 45th Guards Infantry Div.
(131st Regiment).

Approx. 26 years old, blond,
stout.

In March 1943 transferred to
the "CO NKVD" unit at the
LENINGRAD Front. He is still
with this unit (now UKR
LENINGRAD Military District).

(b)(7)(C)

()

() fnu Major - CO of
10th Special Guards Bn.
attached to UKR POTSDAM

Approximately 37 years old,
average height, light brown
hair, stout, full face.
Married has one child.

In Germany for some time.

(b)(7)(C)

No Photograph

()

fnu, Lt. Col. -

Chief of Secretariat,
UKR POTSDAM

About 32 years old, taller
than average, blond, blue
eyes, stout, married.

Arrived in POTSDAM early in
1948.

No Photograph

()

fnu Sgt -

Commandant, 45th Guards Inf
Division "CO NKVD" unit.

About 30 years old, average
height, very thin, brown hair,
long face. A chronic alcoholic.
Much older looking than his
age.

Also served as the Division
executioner. Received 250
grams of vodka for each per
shot.

Present whereabouts not known.

No Photograph

()

fnu Lt Col - Chief,
DEPT I, UKR POTSDAM

About 37 years old, tall, thin
light brown hair, married.

Assigned to present position
at end of 1948.

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(b)(7)(C)

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() fnu Major - Chief of
Sub-Dept 1, DEPT I,
UKR POTSDAM

About 32 years old, taller than
average, stout, dark hair and
eyes.

In Germany since 1945. Received
his present assignment early in
1949.

His office is located in NEU
BABELSBERG.

(b)(7)(C)

()

() fnu Madam
Wife of Major ()

No Photograph

(b)(7)(C)

() fnu Capt - Sr. Investi-
gator, Sub-Dept 2, DEPT IV,
UKR POTSDAM.

Born 1918, taller than average,
light brown hair, blue eyes, thin.
Arrived in Germany in early 1949,
from UKR MOSCOW. Married, no
children.

289

() Lt Col.

In 1943, Deputy Chief of OKI
with Second Assault Army,
served in this capacity until
1946.

Approximately 42 years old, b
average height, blond hair,
blue eyes, well built, drinks
heavily.

In 1947 received assignment
for UKR POTSDAM, but by order
of Lt. General () (UKR
chief at that time) was sent
back to MOSCOW.

An old Party member and a
trusted chekist.

Present whereabouts not known.

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(b)(7)(C)

() Capt.

Sr. Operative Representative,
OKR Second Assault Army.

Approx. 32 years old, average
height, very stout.

Moved with Army to ARCHANGELSK.
Later released from intelligence
when it was disclosed that his
relatives had collaborated with
the Germans.

Present whereabouts not known.

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No Photograph

Enu (female) -
Interpreter (English)
DEPT I, UKR POTSDAM

About 23 years old, above average height, light brown hair, dark eyes, average build. Completed studies at the Institute of Foreign Languages (either at MCCOW or LINGUAD

In 1947 transferred to BELLINGHAM
as Asst. Deputy Chief to

At present in BERLIN.

= No Photograph

It.

Sr. Representative, Mes. Staff,
"CO IKVD", 45th Guards Inf. Div.
(LENINGRAD Front 1943).

Adjutant to Chief, UKR
NOTEDAM (Gen.)

32 years old, average height,
dark hair, dark eyes, stout.
Well educated, finished Central
HGB school in LOSCOW.

Approx. 26 years old, taller than average, brown hair, brown eyes, thin. Married.

Arrived in Germany with Gen.

At present working in LGB
Ministry, MOSCOW. Office
phone: K 6 58 20; home phone:

No Photographs

Recently received commendation
from

Interpreter (German)
DEPT I, UKR JOTSDAK

4. approx. 22 years old, above average height, full face, stout. Occasionally wears glasses.

(b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(C)

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Common-law wife of ()
Soviet Repatriate.

No. Photographs

() fnu Lt.

Sr. repr., Regiment 13.,
45th Guards Inf. Div.
LENINGRAD Front (OO NKVD).

In 1946 was with the Counter-intelligence in BERLIN. Advanced rapidly to his present position as Chief of American Section, OKR BERLIN.

Later received rank of Major.

Present whereabouts not known

Prior to his marriage lived with a Soviet Repatriate who was returned to the USSR in 1947.

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No Photograph

No Photograph

(b)(7)(C)

() fnu Lt. Col.
Chief of Personnel Section,
"OO NKVD" Leningrad Front,

Approx. 45 years old, average
height, brunette, wide black
brows, long nose, stout.

In Leningrad since 1943.
(At present still there.)

His name appears on personal
identity documents.

() fnu, Lt. Col
Third Section, "OO NKVD",
Leningrad Front.

No description available.
Present whereabouts not known.

(b)(7)(C)

() fnu Sr. Lt -
Oper. Repr., Fourth Section,
OKR Second Assault Army.

Approx. 35 years old, taller
than average, brunette,
balding, dark eyes, thin.
Drinks heavily - when drunk
has uncontrollable temper.

() fnu Sr. Lt - Chauffeur-
Agent, Surveillance
Section, UKR POTSDAI

Approx. 32 years old, average
height, light brown hair, dark
eyes, married.

(b)(7)(C)

() fnu Sr. Lt -
Oper. Repr., Fourth Section,
OKR Second Assault Army.

Approx. 35 years old, taller
than average, brunette,
balding, dark eyes, thin.
Drinks heavily - when drunk
has uncontrollable temper.

Moved to ARCA/ANGELSK with
Second Assault Army.

Prior to the war worked in a
concentration camp.

Present whereabouts not known.

() fnu Lt. Col - Chief,
DEPT III, UKR POTSDAI

Approx. 38 years old, tall,
blond hair combed straight back,
blue eyes, married. Holds
artillery rank.

Prior to 1948, was chief of
DEPT II, UKR POTSDAI.

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No Photograph

(b)(7)(C)

() fnu Lt.

Asst. Chief of "OO UKVD" with
45th Guards Infantry Div.
(LENINGRAD Front (1942-1943)).

About 33 years old, above
average height, broad
shouldered, dark hair.

Remained in the OKR (when
OO UKVD changed).

() Chauffeur (Sgt)
(name not known)

No Photograph

(b)(7)(C)

() fnu Lt.

Repr. (Rear Echelons), OO UKVD
45th Guards Infantry Div.
(LENINGRAD Front (1942-1943))

Approx. 28 years old, tall,
dark brown hair, long face,
thin. Began his career in
the Medical Battalion. Re-
placed in 1943.

() fnu Capt. Commander
10th Special Guards Bn.
(GSOV) assigned to UKR
ECTSDAN.

Present whereabouts not known

About 32 years old, tall, stout,
dark thick hair, rough features.
Arrived in Germany in 1947.
Has a wife in the USSR.

Several times has been caught
with German women.

Considered a good commander.

No Photograph

() fnu Capt - Field Repr.
Sub-Dept 2, DEPT I,
UKR ECTSDAN

Approx. 35 years old, average
height, light brown hair,
stout.

In Germany for some time.

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() fnu Capt

Commandant, Second Assault
Army.

Approx. 27 years old, average
height, dark hair and eyes,
stout.

Formerly served as Sr. Repre-
sentative (OKR), in the Special
Artillery Regiment, Third
Assault Army. While with this
unit was awarded four medals.

In 1947 was with the Second
Assault Army at ARCHANGELSK,
held rank of Lt.

No Photograph

() Fr. Lt.

Repr. Fourth Section, OCS,
OKR, Second Assault Army
LENINGRAD Front (1943-1946)

24 or 25 years old, Ukrainian,
shorter than average, dark hair
and eyes, stout.

Moved with the army to ARCHANGELSK,
in 1946. His father,
a Colonel, managed to get him
transferred from ARCHANGELSK.

Present whereabouts not known.

() Capt.
Chief of Fourth Section, OKR,
Second Assault Army (1944-1946).

About 30 years old, average
height, dark hair, blue eyes,
average build. Finished NKVD
school (LENINGRAD or MOSCOW).
An egotist. Married.

Prior to 1944 worked with the
UKR of LENINGRAD Front.

In 1946 moved OKR, Second
Assault Army to ARCHANGELSK.
His present rank is either
that of Major, or Lt. Colonel.

No Photograph

() Major - Sr.
Oper Repr. DEPT III, UKR
POTSDAM.

Approx. 40 years old, taller
than average, brown hair, blue
eyes, large full face, with
thick lips. Extremely long
hands.

()
Wife of Capt. ()

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~~Secret~~

(b)(7)(C)

()
fnu Lt. - Oper
Representative, Code
Section, UKR POTS DAM.

33 or 34 years old, average
height, light brown hair, thin,
red pimply face.

Recent arrival in Germany.

(b)(7)(C)

No Photograph

(b)(7)(C)

()
Representative in Personnel
Section, "OO NKVD" LENINGRAD
Front.

Average height, brunette, dark
eyes.

In 1946 was with UKR in POTS DAM,
returned to LENINGRAD (in 1946)
because of poor health.

()
fnu Lt. - Oper Repr.
Sub-Dept 2, DEET I,
UKR POTS DAM

27 or 28 years old, light brow
hair combed straight back,
dark eyes, thin. Bachelor,
modest fellow.

Recently promoted to present
position. Prior to that was
secretary in DEET I.

()

() Capt.

Repr. Fourth Section, OKR
Second Assault Army.

Shorter than average, thin,
brown hair - slightly bald,
lisps.

Arrived from a Brigade intelli-
gence unit. Remained with
Second Assault Army when it
moved to ARCHANGELSK.

At present is in the Third
Section, OKR, ARCHANGELSK
Military District.

297

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

No Photograph

(b)(7)(C)

() fnu Major

Formerly in DEPT III, UKR
POTSDAM.

About 45 years old, average
height, gray, stout. Jewish
nationality.

Late in 1948 transferred to
UKR TBILIS.

() fnu - Wife of Capt.
ARCHANGELSK Military
District (OKR).

No Photograph

(b)(7)(C)

() fnu Major - Chief
Code Section - UKR
POTSDAM.

Approximately 40 years old,
average height, bald, dark
brows, long nose, semitic
features, stout. Married.
His daughter is married to
the telephone technician at
UKR POTSDAM.

Has been in Germany for some
time.

() fnu Sr. Lt.

Formerly with UKR POTSDAM

About 35 years old. Jewish
nationality. Very tall,
stout, dark hair and eyes.
Rude character.

Transferred because of some
misdemeanor. Possibly in
KIEV at present.

(b)(7)(C)

298

() fnu Madam
Wife of Major
of Code Section, UKR POT D.

~~Secret~~

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(S)(X)(C)

~~Secret~~

() Major - Asst.
Chief, Surveillance
Section, UKR POTSDAI

Born () in () above
average height, dark hair and
eyes, heavy drinker. Married
has 2 children, afraid of his
wife.

Owens a reddish brown bulldog.

(S)(X)(C)

No Photograph

() fnu Sgt.

Representative for Regiment
134, 45th Guards Infantry Div.
(LENINGRAD Front) "OO PKVD".

Approximately 28 years old,
taller than average, dark hair,
tain.

Served as Representative in
the First Section, As, Second
Assault Army.

At present with UKR POTSDAI.

() fnu-Capt -

Sr. Representative in the OKR
Personnel Section, Second
Assault Army.

45 years old, tall, thin, one
eye sightless. An old cackist.

Moved with OKR to ARGIANG, L...
from there managed to get
transferred to LENINGRAD.

At present in LENINGRAD.

No Photograph

() fnu Col.

Chief of OKR, attached to
Fourth Mechanized Army,
EBERSWALDE.

Approximately 45 years old,
taller than average, brown
hair, light eyes, stout.

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60770

()

No Photograph

() fnu, Major - Chief of Staff, 10th Special Guards Battalion, UKR POTSDAI

Description not available.

() fnu, Sr. Lt. - Investigator, UKR POTSDAI

Returned to the USSR early in 1949.

Present whereabouts not known.

No Photograph

() fnu (civilian) AKH0, UKR POTSDAI

About 43 years old, average height, light brown hair, light brown eyes, stout. Bachelor.

In Germany for some time.

No Photograph

60770

() fnu, Jr Lt. - Sr. Supervisor of UKR Prison, POTSDAI.

Approx. 28 years old, average height, dark hair and eyes, stout. Married, has one child.

In Germany for a long time.

()

No Photograph

60770

() fnu, Major

Until 1948 Chief of Secretariat at UKR POTSDAI.

About 42 years old, tall, brunette, dark eyes, thin.

Present whereabouts not known.

300

() fnu Major

Former Chief of Oper-Statistical Section, UKR POTSDAI.

About 40 years old, average height, dark hair and eyes, thin. Russian.

Left the UKR at POTSDAI early in 1949. Present whereabouts not known.

Secret

No Photograph

~~Secret~~

(b)(7)(C)

() nu Lt Col.

Formerly with UKR POTS DAM.

Approx. 34 years old, taller than average, brunette, dark eyes, stout. Protege of () (Chief of Third Central Administration, GUKh), will advance rapidly.

From POTS DAM was sent to a chekist school for administrative training.

Arrived at UKR POTS DAM from Austria.

- - -

(b)(7)(C)

No Photograph

() Major

Chief of First Section, Hqs, Second Assault Army.

Approximately 40 years old, very short, bald, dark eyes, stout. Married, has 2 children.

Moved to ARCHANGELSK, from there managed to get transferred and at present working with the UKR at LENINGRAD (Personnel Section).

(b)(7)(C)

Was successful in getting his personal car (opel-cadet) shipped to the USSR.

- - -

() Capt

Formerly with the Second Assault Army (CKh)

Present whereabouts not known.

- - -

() Major - UKR
POTS DAM

Born 1915 or 1916. Lived in YAKOBLAVL for a long time. Average height, thin, light hair, blue eyes, bowlegged. Likes to drink. Married.

Present position at UKR POTS DAM not known.

Wife works in RAISON office POTS DAM.

301

~~Secret~~

(b)(7)(C)

() fnu.
(Wife of Major ()

Employed at RAIKOM Office,
POTSDAM.

No Photograph

() fnu - Spec. Repr.

Second Section Hqs, "00 NKVD",
LENINGRAD Front.

Description not available.
Present whereabouts not known.

No Photograph

() fnu, Lt. Col.
Chief of AKHO, UKR
POTSDAM

About 40 years old, taller than
average, light brown hair, stout.
Married, has one child.

Recently returned to Germany.
Had been in Germany earlier - was
returned to KHARKOV to attend
an IGB school.

Attends Marx-Lenin University.

() fnu Col. - Chief of
Personnel Section,
UKR. POTSDAM

Approx. 43 years old, average
height, brown hair (crew cut),
light eyes, stout. Member of
Partburo.

Prior to his arrival in Ger-
many, served with UKR in
AUSTRIA.

No Photograph

() Capt.

Sr. Oper. Repr, "00 NKVD",
Regt. 129, 45th Guards Inf.
Div, LENINGRAD Front.

Approx. 28 years old, very tall,
blond, blue eyes, near-sighted
squints. Well educated.
Drinks heavily. Involved in
a drunken brawl and demoted.

In 1947 worked at the Comanda-
tura in LENINGRAD.

At present in LENINGRAD,
position not known.

Home address ()

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No Photograph

()
CJW
Secretary and Code Operator,
"OO NKVD", 45th Guards Inf.
Div., Leningrad Front.

No description available.

No Photograph

() fnu Major
Chief of Investigation Section,
Eighth Guards Army OKR,
located at WEIMAR.

6X7(C)
About 35 years old, average
height, large round head, dark
hair. Married, wife employed
as typist at OKR.

No Photograph

() fnu Sr. Lt.
Chief of "OO NKVD" unit at-
tached to the 45th Guards
Inf. Div. Leningrad Front.
(1943).

Approx. 45 years old, average
height, light hair, blue eyes.

Arrived from LOSCOW.

Because of his outstanding
efficiency, it is assumed that
he is working with the IGB
Ministry (LOSCOW) at present.

CJW
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() fnu Sr. Lt.

Formerly employed in the
Secretariat, UKR POTS DM.

Transferred in 1946. Be-
lieved to have been sent
KIEV. ---

No Photograph

() fnu Major - Sr. Rep.
Sub-Dept 2, DEPT II,
UKR POTS DM.

Operates from his office
located at the railroad
station in BERLIN (SCHLESER-
SEL).

Description not available.

No Photograph

() fnu Capt - Asst. Chief
AKHO, UKR POTS DM.

32 or 33 years old, average
height, Brunette, dark eyes,
thin. Married.

In Germany since 1947.

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No Photograph

(b)(7)(C)

Sr. Lt.

Commander of the Special Guards Company attached to the OKH, Second Assault Army.

Approx. 30 years old, average height, brown hair, athlete.

In 1945, at own request, was transferred to a Division of the Second Assault Army.

Present whereabouts not known.

(b)(7)(C)

Sr. Lt.

Chief of UKI Prison, NOTED.

Born 1908 (approx.), average height, blond, blue eyes. Rude character. Married, his wife is 18 years younger than he. Ukrainian.

Arrived in Germany late in 1947. Formerly employed as an investigator in a concentration camp.

Owns a DKV car

(b)(7)(C)

Sr. Lt.

Commander of the Special Guards Company attached to the OKH, Second Assault Army.

About 35 years old, taller than average, brunette, thin.

Moved with army to BERGELSK. Present whereabouts not known.

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No Photograph

(b)(7)(C)

() Inu Capt. - Field
Repr., Sub Dept 2, DEPT I
UKL. PCTSD.M

Approx. 40 years old, tall,
stout, full face, brunette,
dark eyes, full long nose.
Tiny red streaks under skin
on both cheeks. Jewish
nationality.

() Capt.

Deputy Chief, Fourth Section OKR,
Second Assault Army.

Has worked in counter-intelli-
gence organs for a long time.

Approx. 32 years old, taller than
average, dark hair, thin.

(b)(7)(C)

Until 1944 was Sr. Repr. in the
Third Section. Moved to ARCHAN-
GELSK in Feb 1946. It is believed
he is still there.

No Photograph

() Sr Lt.

Oper. Repr. First Section,
Hqs., OKR Second Assault
Army.

No Photograph

() Inu Major General

Chief of OKR, First Guards
Mechanized Army, at DIESDEN.

27 or 28 years old, shorter
than average, light brown
hair, round face, stout.

Arrived in the unit in 1945
and moved with it to ARCHAN-
GELSK where he is working at
present.

Description not available.

(b)(7)(C)

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~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

No Photograph

(b)(7)(C)

() Capt

Sr. Representative, Fourth
Section, OKH, Second Assault
Army.

Approx. 34 years old, taller
than average, dark hair and
eyes, full face, stout.

Prior to the war attended
school in MOSCOW which trained
resident agents for operation
outside the USSR borders (School
of Special Assignments). Subject
studied for a French assignment.
Also finished the VINODEVCHESKI
Institute in CRILE..

(b)(7)(C)

When Second Assault Army moved to
ARCHANGELSK, subject was trans-
ferred to another Division which
remained in Germany; later
assigned to Oper Sector.

Present whereabouts not known.

No Photograph

(b)(7)(C)

() Infantry Major

Until end of 1948 was Sr. Repr.
in Personnel Section, UKR
POTSDAM. Sent to MOSCOW for
reassignment.

About 40 years old, tall, blond,
blue eyes, well build.

() Sr Lt.
Inspector at LKH0,
UKR POTSDAM

Born 1912 (approx), average
height and build, black hair,
long nose, dark eyes, married,
has 3 children. Pock marked
face.

In 1948 was with the Field
Stockade (FTT).

During the war was chauffeur
for a counter-intelligence
officer (IGB executioner).
Lived in GORKI.

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~~Secret~~

No Photograph

(b)(7)(C)

() fnu Sgt. - Telephone
Technician, UKR POTS DAN.

Approx. 26 years old, taller than average, light brown hair, dark eyes, long thin face, slender. Married to the daughter of Code Section Chief, UKR POTS DAN.

Arrived in Germany prior to 1946.

No Photograph

() fnu Capt.

Chief of "OO NKVD" with the 45th Guards Inf. Div. (LENINGRAD FRONT) 1942.

Approx. 50-years old.

Replaced late in 1942.

Present whereabouts not known.

No Photograph

(b)(7)(C)

() fnu Sr. Lt

Sr. Investigator, OKR, Third Assault Army, at MAGDENBURG.

Approx. 28 years old, average height and build.

Recent arrival from the USSR.

No Photograph

() fnu Lt.

Platoon Commander, Special Guard Company.

About 26 years old, married, has 2 children.

Arrived in the unit in 1944.

Moved with the army to

ARCHANGELSK in 1946.

In 1947 was transferred to LENINGRAD. In March 1949 was employed with OBKhS (LENINGRAD).

Lives at: ()

Office phone: Kommutator (Militia) 02, Ext 405.

No Photograph

() fnu Lt.

Representative ("OO NKVD") 134th Regt, 45th Guards Inf Div, LENINGRAD Front.

26 years old average height, brunette, dark eyes, average build. Finished infantry school in LENINGRAD.

Later assigned to OKR Second Assault Army. Present whereabouts not known.

307

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No Photograph

(b)(7)(C)

() Lt

Sr. Repr., "00 HKVD" 45th
Guards Infantry Div.
(LENINGRAD Front) 1943)

Approx. 30 years old, tall,
dark thick hair, combed back,
brown eyes, large long hands
long face, large nose, coarse
type, little schooling.

() (full name not known)

Employed in the Surveillance
Section, UKR POTS DAM.

Approx. 26 years old, average
height, blond wavy hair, light
eyes, average build.

In Germany for some time.

Was assigned to 129th Regt
as Sr. Operative Representative

Present whereabouts not known

(b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(C)

() Lt. - Sr. Repr.

Surveillance Section
UKR POTS DAM.

() Major

Former Asst. Chief, Over-Statistical
Section, UKR POTS DAM.

38 years old, bald, average
height, light eyes, normal
build. Russian.

No special training.
Present whereabouts not known.

Approx. 31 years old, average
height, thin, brunette, light
eyes, bowlegged. Attends
Marx-Lenin school. Ardent
communist. Married.
1945 to 1947 Interpreter in
DEPT IV.

308

Attended counter-intelligence
school in MOSCOW during the
war.

Makes weekly trips to Bkk
to contact agentura there.

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(b)(7)(C)

(Wife of Lt

(nee

Approx. 28 years old, average height, brunette, hazel eyes, Comes from

She is a doctor and works as a consultant in the children's hospital (Soviet) in POTSDAM.

Arrived in POTSDAM in 1945, to join her husband.

Sr. Lt.

Investigator,
Sub-Dept 1, DEPT IV,
UKR. POTSDAM

Born near average height, thin, almost bald (blend hair), blue eyes, long nose. Married, has one child.

In Germany since 1947.

Formerly with counter-intelligence in BAKU.

(b)(7)(C)

No Photograph

Major

Chief of Investigation Section
OKR, Second Assault Army,

Approx. 36 years old, dark, average height, light eyes, stout, heavy drinker.

Arrived in 1943 from UKR, Leningrad Front. Loved with OKR Second Assault Army to Archangelsk.

At present working with UKR at Leningrad Military District

Wife of Sr. Lt.

(b)(7)(C)

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~~Secret~~

No Photograph

() fnu Sr. Lt. - Oper.
Repr., Sub-Dept 2,
DEPT I, UKR POTSDAM

Approx. 32 years old, average height, light brown hair, fair, thin.

Covers the warehouses at TE which supply all Soviet PX's, and Soviet shops in POTSDAM.

No Photograph

() fnu Major
Former Chief of DEPT III, UKR POTSDAM.

About 40 years old, dark hair, average height, stout. Born in MOSCOW.

Chief of DEPT III, until 1948. Present whereabouts not known.

No Photograph

() fnu Lt Col
Former Chief of DEPT I, UKR POTSDAM.

Approx. 36 years old, average height, blond, very stout, round full face, blue eyes.

In 1947 transferred to SVERDLOVSK.

Parents killed by bandits in USSR.

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No Photograph

() fnu Lt Col
Former Chief of DEPT V, UKR POTSDAM (this Dept. abolished handled Military Commandatura in POTSDAM).

About 40 years old, very tall, gray hair, dark eyes, stout, intelligent and cultured.

At present handles the Soviet Colony in BERLIN.

No Photograph

() fnu Sr Lt.
Formerly with UKR POTSDAM.

About 29 years old, average height, brown hair, thin.

In 1947, when on a mission to BERLIN, disappeared into the French zone for 5 days. He was arrested when he re-entered the Soviet Zone and sentenced to 10 years in prison.

No Photograph

() fnu Sr. Lt. - Oper.
Repr. Code Section,
UKR POTSDAM.

Approx. 30 years old, average height, blond, stout, blue eyes, bachelor. Does not drink. In Germany since 1947.

310

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(b)(7)(C)

() fnu Sgt -
Clerk in Company Headquarters,
Second Assault Army.
Ukrainian. Approx. 26 years
old.
Was returned to the USSR in
1946.

(b)(7)(C)

No Photograph

() fnu Lt Col.
Chief of Operational-Statistical
Section, OO NKVD, Leningrad
Front.
No description available.
Present whereabouts not known.

(b)(7)(C)

No Photograph

() fnu Major - PX Office.
Sub-Dept 2, DEPT I
UKA POTSDAM.
Approx. 35 years old, above
average height, thin, dark
Georgian type.
Has been in Germany for some
time.
Suspects everyone of being a
spy.

No Photograph

()
Chief of Fourth Section, OKR,
Second Assault Army.
Approx. 43 years old, average
height, thin brown hair,
slight build, bowlegged,
liked to drink. Thick in-
distinct speech. Old chekist.
Prior to the war worked in
LWOW regional District.
Very good worker. Average
education.
Present whereabouts not

311

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

No Photograph

(b)(7)(G)

() fnu Capt.

Asst. Commander of Special Guard Company attached to OKR Second Assault Army.

About 40 years old, taller than average, brown hair, normal build.

Moved with army to ARCHANGELSK. Present whereabouts not known.

No Photograph

(b)(7)(G)

() fnu Lt Col.

Chief, Second Section, Hqs. OO NKVD, LENINGRAD Front.

Very tall. (no other description available).

Present whereabouts not known.

(b)(7)(G)

() fnu Major

Former Sr. Repr. in Personnel Section, UKR POTSDAM.

Transferred from POTSDAM. Present whereabouts not known.

312

~~Secret~~

No Photograph

() fnu Major

Sr. Repr. Fourth Section, OKR Second Assault Army.

About 40 years old, blond, average height, stout.

In 1943 transferred to another Division.

Excellent counter-intelligence worker. Present whereabouts not known.

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No Photograph

(b)(7)(C)

() fnu Lt - Sr. Investi-
gator, DEPT IV, UKR
POTSDAM.

27 years old, light brown hair,
average height, good looking,
well educated.

Arrived from MOSCOW early in
1949. Prior to that worked
as investigator for MGB in
MOSCOW.

Will remain in Germany for
some time.

No Photograph

(b)(7)(C)

() fnu Sr. Lt. - Oper Repr.

Oper. Repr. 1st Section Hqs.
(OKR) Second Assault Army.

Arrived in 1944. Left with unit
for ARCHANGELSK.

Present whereabouts not known.

No Photograph

(b)(7)(C)

() fnu Sr. Lt.
High Guards Army - WEIMAR.
s in charge of Prison for
Border Crossers.

No description available.

() Maj. -
Chief, Sub-Dept 2,
DEPT IV, UKR POTSDAM.

Approx. 37 years old, ta-
than average, dark rough
features, stout. Marri-

Finished Pedagogic
Attends Marx-Leni
Primitive in in
In Germany f

313

~~Secret~~

No Photograph

~~Secret~~

(b)(7)(C)

()fnu
Chief of Secretariat, OKR
Third Assault Army,
M.GDEBURG.

Formerly was Sr. Investigator in DEPT IV, UKR POTSDAM, became extremely nervous and was transferred to the OKR.

(b)(7)(C)

() (nee ())
Wife of Major ()
Employed in the Oper-Statistical Section.

About 28-years old, average height, thin, light hair, blue eyes, village-born. Received her education in the army.

Before her marriage, flirtatious and irresponsible.

In Germany since 1945.

(b)(7)(C)

()
Major - Deputy Chief, Sub-Dept 1,
DEPT IV, UKR POTSDAM

Born () in () Tall dark curly hair, hazel eyes, well educated. Graduated from an NKVD school in LENINGRAD in 1939 (territorial school). Plays a guitar, good tenor voice. Married. One of the best investigators. Snubbed by fellow officers because of his good education - for same reason held back from promotion. Could be convinced to desert (because of marital life and dissatisfaction with treatment from his own government.).

314

() Capt. - Sr. Invest.
Sub-Dept 2, DEPT IV, UKR POTSDAM.

Approx. 34 years old, she light brown hair (balding) blue eyes, stout. Attended Marx-Lenin school. Children of school to return to the

~~Secret~~

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No Photograph

() fnu Sr. Lt. - UKR
POTSDAM

On special assignment.

29 or 30 years old, shorter
than average, light brown
hair, blue eyes, average build,
married.

No Photograph

() fnu Sr. Lt. - Deputy
CO, 10th Special Guards
Bn, UKR POTSDAM.

About 30 years old, shorter
than average, light brown hair,
stout, married,

In Germany for a long time.

No Photograph

() fnu Colonel

Asst. Chief, "OO NKVD"
LENINGRAD Front.

Was in charge of investiga-
tions.

Description not available.

Present whereabouts not known.

No Photograph

() fnu Major - Sr.
Oper. Repr., DEPT III,
UKR POTSDAM

About 40 years old, average
height, light brown hair,
thin, married, has 2 children
of school age.

Has been in Germany for some
time.

No Photograph

() fnu (Civilian)
Oper-Statistical Section
UKR POTSDAM

About 26 years old, above
average height, light brown
hair, blue eyes, thin.
Single.

Formerly store-room keeper
for AKHO.

In Germany for some time.

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No Photograph

(b)(7)(C)



() fnu Maj. - Chief,
Sub-Dept 2, DEPT II,
UKI POTSDAM

approx. 34 years old, taller
than average, blond, thin,
married.

His mission is to locate
deserters in both Eastern
Western Sectors of BERLIN.
Operates a net somewhere in
BERLIN.

(b)(7)(C)


() fnu Major

Typographic Section, Second
Assault Army.

Jewish nationality. About 35
years old, tall, thin, brunette,
dark eyes.

At present in Leningrad.

No Photograph



() (German) Interpreter
DEPT II, UKI
POTSDAM

32 years old, taller than
average, light brown hair,
dark eyes, average build.

Has been in Germany some time.
In her present position since
1948.

(b)(7)(C)

() Common-law wife of Major

316

~~SECRET~~

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~~Secret~~

No Photograph

(b)(7)(C)

() Inu Capt - Asst. Chief,
Investigation Section,
Second Assault Army.

34 or 35 years old, average height, brunette, a Don Juan.

Arrived late in 1943 (or early 1944), remained with the unit until 1946.

Present whereabouts not known.

No Photograph

() Cart.

Sr. Oper. Repr, 3rd Section, OKR, Second Assault Army.

About 32 years old, average height, thin.

In 1944 assumed duties of OKI Deputy Chief, of a Division

Present whereabouts not known


No Photograph

(b)(7)(C)

() Inu Sr. Lt. - Repr.
Surveillance Section
UKR FOTS.D.M.

Approx. 33 years old, shorter than average, dark hair and eyes. Large round head. Married.

Has been in Germany for some time.



No Photograph

(b)(7)(C)

() Inu Lt. General

Until 1945 was Chief of UKR FOTS.D.M., prior to that was Chief of UKR, White Russian Front.

() Jr Lt -

Motor Pool Officer, OKR Second Assault Army.

approx. 37 years old, taller than average, brunette, dark eyes, long face, average build. Speaks very rapidly.

Moved with unit to ARCHANGEL

At present working in LI B-GRAD.

317

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~~Secret~~


No Photograph

(b)(7)(C)

() Maj.

Until Spring of 1949 was Sr.
Repr. in DEPT III, UKR POTSDAM.
Was transferred to LWOW.

About 40 years old, taller
than average, brunette, dark
eyes, stout. A good specula-
tor. Owned his own car, an
Opel Olympia.



() fnu Madam - UKR
POTSDAM

Possibly a typist in the
typing pool (UKR).

No Photograph

(b)(7)(C)

() fnu Sr Lt.

Representative in the Second
Section, "CO NKVD" Leningrad
Front.

No description available.

Present whereabouts not known.



No Photograph

(b)(7)(C)

() fnu Sr. Lt.

Representative, OKR, Second
Section Hqs, Second Assault
Army.

About 30 years old; very short,
dark hair.

Moved to ARCHANGELSK with the
unit.

Present whereabouts not known.

318

() Capt - Sr. In-
vestigator, Sub-Dept 1,
DEPT IV, UKR POTSDAM

Born 1917 or 1918. Short,
light brown hair, grey eyes,
thin. Married has 2 children
Speaks fluent German. Owns
car. Will be returned
(children of school age)
Would like to remain in Germany


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(b)(7)(C)



No Photograph

() fnu Major

Until middle of 1948 a
Special Representative with
UKR POTS.D.M. Transferred
to MOSCOW.

About 40 years old, average
height, brunette, dark eyes,
average build.

() Capt - Sr. Inv.
Sub-Dept 2, DEPT IV,
UKR POTS.D.M.

About 30 years old, tall, dark,
hair and eyes, thin. Married
has one child. In Germany
since the end of the war.

No Photograph

() fnu Lt Col.

Formerly with UKR POTS.D.M.,
DEPT III.

About 40 years old, average
height, brunette, dark eyes,
stout.

In 1948 transferred from
UKR POTS.D.M.

Present whereabouts not known


(b)(7)(C)

In 1947 worked in a Repatria-
tion Camp in BLANDEMEIR G.

Began his career with the
"OO NKVD".

With UKR since early 1948.

(b)(7)(C)



() fnu - Wife of
Capt ()

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~~SECRET~~

(b)(7)(C)

() fnu Lt

Code Officer, OKR Second Assault Army.

Moved with the unit to ARCHANGELSK.

Married, wife employed as typist in OKR.

No Photograph

() Jr Lt

Typist, OKR Second Assault Army.

At present in ARCHANGELSK, with OKR.

Wife of Lt ()

No Photograph

() fnu Lt Col - Spec 1
"00" representative
Personnel Section,
UKR POTSDELM.

320

() fnu Lt Col - Chief, Oper-
Statistical Section,
UKR POTSDELM

40 years old, tall, blond, blue eyes, thin. Completed his schooling in LENINGRAD. Arrived in POTSDELM late 1948, or early 1949. Married, has one child. Continues with his political studies.

34 or 35 years old, above average height, blond, comb. his hair straight back, blue eyes, average build. Arrived in Germany late 1948, from UKR LENINGRAD. Married.

Member of Partburo.

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No Photograph

~~Secret~~

6X7X6

() Infantry Sgt. - Supervisor
at UKR Prison, POTSDAM

27 years old, above average height, brunette, large features, protruding lower lip, stout. Bachelor.

Has been in Germany for some time.

() Major
Deputy Chief,
Secretariat UKR
POTSDAM

38 years old, tall, blond blue eyes (recently shaved his head), stout, married has one adopted daughter and his own daughter.

6X7X6

()
Chief of Investigation Section,
24th Air Force, WELDER.

Approx. 40 years old, bald, average height, blue eyes, stout.

Formerly Sr. Investigator with DEPT IV, UKR POTSDAM. Prior to the war was in charge of a concentration camp.

Promoted to present position early in 1948.

Has been in Germany for some time.

() Interpreter
DEPT IV, UKR POTSDAM

Born () in ()
Tall, dark hair, light eyes, broad face, well built. Married, has one child. Politically trained and considered to be loyal.

Wife active communist worker among Soviet women; deals heavily in the black market. (Wife's maiden name is ())

Has been in Germany since 1947.

321

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~~Secret~~

No Photograph

(S)(u)

() fnu Major

Until Spring 1949, Sr. Repr. with
UKR POTSDF (in charge of the
Medical Administration).

Transferred to RIGA.

About 38 years old, average
height, blond, blue eyes,
stout.

No Photograph

() Captain

About 35 years old, tall, brown
hair, dark eyes, thin.

Representative (Rear Echelon)
"OO PKVD", 45th Guards Infantry
Division, LENINGRAD Front.

Arrived from the LENINGRAD Front
where he had worked as Sr. Repr.
in the Oper-Statistical Section.
In 1944 was returned to the UKR
LENINGRAD Front where he later re-
ceived rank of Major.

No Photograph

No Photograph

() fnu Major - Chief, Sub-
Dept 2, DEPT I, UKR
POTSDF

Approx. 36 years old, average
height, light brown hair, blue
eyes, stout. Married. Has been
in Germany for a long time.

Previously Asst. Chief, Ops.
Section, OKR Second Assault Army.

322

() Capt.

34 years old, very short,
light brown hair, blue eyes.
Jewish nationality.

OKR Division Chief, Second
Assault Army.

Prior to that was Sr. O.
Repr, Third Section, O.
Second Assault Army.

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~~SECRET~~
No Photograph

() rnu Major -

Asst. Chief, Investigation Section,
Eighth Guards Army, WEIMAR.

36 or 37 years old, average
height, dark hair, (crew cut),
stout, fat pudgy fingers. Very
stupid.

On one occasion arrested 20
German border crossers as spies.
It was allegedly an American
counter-intelligence attempt to
confuse the Soviet intelligence.
All 20 received sentences.

NO PHOTOGRAPH

() (nickname for)
(last name not known) Sgt.
Photograph Section, UKR
POTSDAM.

About 30 years old, light brown
hair, light eyes, thin. Married.
Has been in Germany for some time.

His wife formerly employed as
interpreter in DEPT I.

() rnu Lt Col. - Chief
DEPT II, UKR POTSDAM

Approx. 50 years old, thin,
bald with slight brown fringe
clean shaven, deeply lined
face, large nose, back of
slightly deformed.

Old chekist. Has worked with
intelligence organizations for
15 years.

Formerly, Chief of the Oper
Division, Southern Germany,
prior to that with OKR in Far
East.

No Photograph

() rnu Col.

Chief of OKR Eighth Guards
Army, WEIMAR.

About 45 years old, taller
than average, brunette, dark
eyes, stout. Old chekist.

Returned to USSR at end of
1948, charged with appropriat-
ing gold and withholding it
from Soviet government.

Present whereabouts no.

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No Photograph

() Lt General

Former Chief of UKR POTS.D.M.
In 1947 replaced by ()

About 45 years old, shorter
than average, blond, blue
eyes, thin.

Present whereabouts not known.

() (soldier) - Guard,

UKR POTS.D.M.

Born 1925 (approx), above average
height, dark hair and eyes, little
education - village born.

No Photograph

() Capt.

Sr. Lepr. Third Section, 1st S,
OKR Second Assault Army.

Approx. 33 years old, taller
than average, dark hair and
eyes, thin.

Arrived in 1944, after the
war was transferred to
another Division, in Germany.

Present whereabouts not known.

No Photograph

() Sr Lt.

Chief of Secretariat, "OO NKVD"
LENINGRAD Front (67th Army).

Approx. 30 years old, average
height, brunette, average build.

Present whereabouts not known.

No Photograph

() Jnu Major - Asst.

Chief, Sub-Dept 1,
DEPT I, UKR POTS.D.M.

34 or 35 years old, above
average height, light brown
hair, average build, long
face. Married, has 3 grown
children. In Germany for
some time.

Formerly in 1st Division

No Photograph

() Jnu Lt Col.

Asst. Chief, OKR, Eighth Guards
Army.

No information available.

324

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No Photograph

(b)(7)(C)

() Capt.

Asst. Chief, Second Section, Hqs,
OKR Second Assault Army.

Approx. 33 years old, taller than
average, light brown hair, long
face, long nose, stout. Rough
features.

placed in 1945. Present where-
abouts not known.

(b)(7)(C)

()

() fnu - Typist at
UKR POTSDAM

About 30 years old, shorter
than average, light brown hair,
dark eyes, very thin.

Uses much make up; loves to
dress well.

One of the best typists at
UKR POTSDAM.

(b)(7)(C)

() fnu Jr Lt (nicknamed

Sr. Oper. repr., Second Assault
Army OKR.

24 years old, tall, stout.
Village born, however, well
educated.

At present adjutant to Chief of
OKR, ARCHANGELSK Military
District.

325

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As of MAR 19 1980 all material
(Date)

included in this file conforms with

DA policies currently in effect.

(b)(6)
(b)(6)
(Signature)

MAR 19 1980
(Date Signed)

(Printed Name)

GS-05
(Grade)

REVIEWED FOR
UP AR 381-1
REVIEWER

DATE 9/11/92

326

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1 Sep 72

m/kilm A
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CRITERIA UP AR
REVIEWER

DATE 8 Aug

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Investigative Records Repository (IRR)
reviewed for retention criteria UP
Date 15 Aug 82

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- ☐ Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.
- ☐ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.
- ☒ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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Page(s) 327-394

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It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.


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Page(s) 395-402



6

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HEADQUARTERS

MILITARY DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON, U. S. ARMY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2

EDA

CounterIntell

P-60271

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07396

062.1471

IN REPLY REFER TO
ANWG2-01

21 December 1959

SUBJECT: [Soviet Bloc Attempts to Subvert
Army Alien Enlistees (U)]

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

20

X 004.1471
X 004.1413
X 004.1423
XR: cross ref
to names in
brackets in
the report

1. (U) Inclosed Summary of Information (DA Form 568) pertaining to subject is forwarded for your information.
2. (U) Original copy of report has been submitted to DCSI, CONAH in compliance with previously published instructions.

6200

✓ Incl
SOI, 21 Dec 59

20

Colonel, GS
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

LtCol GS
Executive Officer

Carded

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90-4-67-909

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013966

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2

no file

ARMG2-01

21 December 1959

SUBJECT: Soviet Bloc Attempts to Subvert
Army Alien Enlistees (U)

TO: Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
United States Continental Army Command
Fort Monroe, Virginia

1. (U) Reference is made to your letter, ATINT 000.7 (C), 7 March 1958, subject as above.
2. (U) Inclosed Summary of Information (DA Form 568) pertaining to subject is forwarded in compliance with cited reference.

(b)(7)(C)

1 Incl
SOI, 21 Dec 59

Colonel, GS
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

INFO COPY FURN: (w/incl)
ACSI
CRF

LtCol GS
Executive Officer

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DOD DIR 5200.10

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Major General
US Army
26 Dec 1959

DATE 21 Dec 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

116th CIC Group, Military District of Washington, Washington 25, D.C.

SUBJECT

SOVIET BLOC INTEREST IN
SUBVERTING ARMY ALIEN ENLISTEES

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. On 2 December 1959, () Specialist Fourth-Class, RA 10813375, Company M, United States Army Engineer Center Regiment, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, reported to the Staff Judge Advocate's Office, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, that he had received a copy of a Hungarian newspaper article which mentioned him and his work in the U.S. Army. () a Hungarian displaced person now in the U.S. Army, reported this fact because he feared Communist reprisals against his family, which is still in Hungary. (F-6)

a. On 3 December 1959, () reported to a CIC agent that the newspaper article, which was sent to him by () another Hungarian displaced person who is now stationed in Germany with the 101st Airborne Division, appeared in Free People, a Communist daily newspaper published in Budapest, Hungary. () made an English translation of the article, entitled "Boys, Where Are You?", a copy of which is attached. (F-6)

2. Examination of the translation revealed that the article attempts to show that young Hungarian men who left Hungary seeking education and a rich, easy life in the United States, are being forced into the United States Army. The writer of the article asserts that these men are being trained to carry on espionage and sabotage against Hungary, in the interests of the U.S. Government, which hates Hungary and does not want peace. Specific individuals are mentioned by name, along with information about their families in Hungary and their U.S. Army duty stations. In addition to () the following Hungarian displaced persons who are now in the U.S. Army are mentioned: () and () (F-6)

3. () does not know who sent the information to Hungary. He knows most of the Hungarians mentioned in the article, having taken basic training with them, and he knows of no one in the group who was disaffected or dissatisfied with the United States. Since his arrival in the United States, () has not been contacted for information by any person, nor has he been contacted by the Hungarian embassy or any legations. () hears regularly from his family in Hungary. Remaining in Hungary are his mother, two brothers, and a sister. () father has not been heard from since he was taken to Siberia by the Russians during World War II. (F-6)

- 6 405

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1 DEC 51

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ON 5 NOV 2001 GPO 924585
BY USAINSCOM POL/PA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

3 December 1959

BOYS, WHERE ARE YOU?

(Translated by Sp4 [redacted] A 10 813 375,
Company M, USAECR, Ft Belvoir, Va.)

In the American films you see a good life, rich and easy. The boys who left Hungary were looking for this. Hungary was too small for them. They left Hungary and they went far but they did not get what they were looking for. They got camps, being on relief, no hope - and they are thinking they may be the next one to go. Would it not be better to go back home? More promises, threats and more CARE packages. After that Italy. They didn't want to stay there in Italy. There it is not good for the working people.

One day American officers came to the camp. They looked over the boys and asked them, "What do you want? Do you want to work or go to school? What did you do back home?" More looking and more questions. "Are you in good health?" There were physical examinations - the heart, the lungs. "Are the eyes all right?" (They said) "Now just sign a paper and volunteer for the US Army." They were told in the camps that they would be well cared for but now everything is changed. Where are again the lights, the bars, the jazz, the dancing women? One of the boys was dreaming about the schools, where he would go, what he would do, working in the laboratory.

[redacted] was 20 years old when he left his home in [redacted]. Today he is 23 years old. He was an airplane mechanic in Hungary. His father said, "My boy wanted to see the world. He was afraid nothing would happen to him in Hungary. I was a truck driver before I retired. For 7 years I drove for an export company." He said that he couldn't understand the younger generation. He would not tell him to stay and he would not tell him to go. He told his son it was up to him to do what he wanted. If he wanted to work, to see the world, then go. The boy hid in an airplane hoping to see other places. The boy said he wanted to get more experience in his mechanics profession. That is why he left Hungary. He believed he wanted this but did he get it? Today he is in the US Army uniform and was trained as a soldier in the airborne to go back to spy on Hungary instead of being a mechanic. The reporter asked if the father knew about what the boy was trained for or what he is doing. The father said the boy had to be in the Army if he wanted to get his citizenship. The reporter asked what if he was not just a simple soldier. What will happen if he goes against his country, against Hungary? He answers that it is not true, his son would not do something like that. The father said, "One and one-half months ago he wrote me he is working in Columbia in a factory making airplanes." His mother said, "He wouldn't come against Hungary. He is just a working man over there." The reporter told them, "Your boy is in Panama on duty." "It is in the US," said his father.

(b)(7)(C)

The reporter said, "If you know your geography it is not in the States but the US has military bases in Panama, and at one of these bases are [redacted] and many more Hungarian boys."

(b)(7)(C)

The reporter talked to a man at the market in Budapest whose son is named [redacted]. He thought his boy was in a good place until he got word he was in the US Army. His boy, when he left Hungary, was 14 years old. Today he is 17 years old. In one of his letters he wrote his father he is in Fort Jackson. His father is worried about his boy since he is only 17 and just a kid. He hopes his boy will grow up in the States, will learn to work and will live somewhere. After this boy waited a long time, at last he went to the States. He was working in a restaurant in the US as a waiter. A fire burned the restaurant and the boy was out of a job and out in a strange world. He wrote a letter home and when his father read the letter he knew his boy was scared because he was alone. After that the father got letters from his boy from Fort Jackson. The US Army had made a soldier out of him. He could not do anything else other than becoming a soldier. He is good for a soldier because he doesn't have any relatives there or any job that he can perform. The boys in the US don't like the hard Army life so they take people like the Hungarian boys so the boys in the US can keep out of the Army. He got very good training - not only him but the other boys too - to die for the US. His father wrote a letter to his boy, saying "My boy, come home. Where are you? I don't want to lose you. I don't like this Army profession for you." After a little while the father got a letter that the boy was in New York. He went there for two weeks leave. He said, "They let me go on two weeks leave from this Hell." The boy said, "I am here for four weeks now. I have no more money, I am a deserter now and maybe I am going to jail." His father got the next letter from jail. The boy wrote in the letter, "I am in jail and I am crying because they won't let me go home." They tried to send him back to the camp, to Fort Jackson. In his training at Fort Jackson they taught him things that are vital secrets to the US Government and it would be bad for the US if he told them in Hungary. The boy asked his parents to do something so he can get out of the Army and go home.

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The reporter asked the father if he knew what the US wanted with his boy. He is guessing now, he is worried about him, and he said he is going to write to President Eisenhower to ask him to give him back his boy.

(b)(7)(C)

"Many Hungarian boys from Budapest are in Fort Jackson. One is [redacted] Other boys from the same country, Csongrad, Ambrozfalvaros are: [redacted] and his brother, [redacted] and many more."

The reporter asked what they do over there at Fort Jackson, and he answers himself - gas training, mine detection, the laying of mines, airborne training. About 30 miles from the camp there is a swamp. They are taught to crawl through this swamp. This is their training.

(b)(7)(C)

The reporter mentioned a boy and gave the name of his mother, Mrs. [REDACTED]. She was going to work when the reporter met her. She is working in a restaurant and bar. It is on the corner of Honved and Szalaly Streets. Her son was working in a small bakery in Budapest. In November 1956 he left Hungary. The American officers got him into the US Army in the State of North Carolina. He is in the Fort Bragg Training Camp under Col or Lt Col [REDACTED] his Commanding Officer. He is in the 82d Airborne, 503d Infantry, Company D. He made PFC and his service number is RA 10 813 584. Not a long time ago his mother got a letter stating that on May 25, 1959 at 1030 hours, he had an accident and died. His CO wrote to his mother that he is very sorry about this.

Fort Bragg is under the Special Warfare Division. Besides this Special Warfare Division there are other special divisions like the 77th Special Airborne Division. At Fort Bragg boys are trained to go back in peacetime to Russia and Hungary to commit Sabotage and to spy on the people. The Commanding Officer of the 77th is Col [REDACTED]. The training is conducted in the Pisgah Forest near Fort Carson and at Camp Hale.

(b)(7)(C)

A former named [REDACTED] has a small place of about 5 acres. His address in [REDACTED]. His son is [REDACTED]. His son wrote to him he is learning geology in the US. It sounded very good. Geology is a beautiful profession. That is what his son thought. The reporter said the boy really is in South Korea as a soldier in the US aggressor Army. Hungarian soldiers - cheap blood. They can do whatever they want with him. His service number is RA 10 313 147. Not long ago he died. He was killed by a rifle shot. His father got a letter with a return stamped envelope so that he can answer it and tell them what he wants done about the funeral. His father and mother asked the US Army headquarters to send his personal possessions back to them.

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rs. [REDACTED] has 5 children. The 22-year old [REDACTED] is the oldest. Before he left Hungary they lived in a city named Nyfeszemen. He learned to be a lathe operator in Hungary. The reporter asked the mother, "Where is the boy?" She said he was in San Francisco. She gets letters from there. The reporter said, "No, he is far from California, he is in South Korea with the US Army ready to attack China. Is it good for him?" He answered his own question. "It is not certain that it is good for him. He has a very dangerous profession." He is guessing now, "Maybe he didn't want it, maybe he didn't have any choice." His mother took a letter out of the drawer and the reporter asked her if he wrote very much. The mother answered that he was in San Francisco and put back the letter. The reporter talked about the lost boy who was with Antal in South Korea. He said there is a special demolition school near the Chinese border at the 38th Parallel and about 6 American atomic rocket bases in Korea near the Chinese border. There are in Korea [REDACTED] and many more young Hungarian boys.

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Mrs. [redacted] lives in the same house with her daughter and her daughter's husband. The address in [redacted] Her son was in his second year of high school when he left Hungary. The high school is Istvan Gimnazium. He went to the store for bread with a boy who lived in the same house and never came back. The other boy was lucky. He was an actor back in Hungary in a theater. Now he is in Montreal, Canada, as a singer. [redacted] wanted to go to the US. After 9 months in Italy he signed a paper so he could get in the Army. Now he too sends his letters from San Francisco. The reporter asked if the mother knew her son is in South Korea. The mother says yes, she knows it. She said she asked her son how long has he been in Korea and what will be after that. The reporter said the boy would not answer this question - maybe he doesn't know himself.

Boys, where are you? What will happen to you? Cars, dancing girls, tom-tom drums - this they didn't get but they got Fort Jackson and Fort Bragg. Their teachers are not professors but US Army Sergeants. The reporter said these boys thought they would get everything - good teachers, they would go to American University, Howard, Harvard, University of California, Oregon, Pennsylvania or New York. The reporter said, "These universities are not for you. They teach you to go back to Hungary with radios, pistols with a silencer, with codes, with poisons and other things. Don't do it, it is a very dangerous profession."

The parents hope that this will not happen to them. They are confident that they will not do this. Some of the parents don't care what happens to their boys. Many of the parents don't believe that they are going through this sort of training. The officers, before the boys came to the States, gave them physical examinations and they made them sign enlistment papers. They are on duty for the US Government which hates Hungary and does not want peace. Because the boys are going to do these things for the US Government their souls will go to Hell. That is what the US wants to happen to them.

The boys are yearning to get out of uniform. If you go against your country and against your parents it is very dangerous for you because you will be a traitor to Hungary.

[redacted]

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FROM:

CO 66TH CIC GP BAD CANNSTATT

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

TO:

G2USAREUR

4-13027 OPR FOR CICOE FROM CICOE

SUBJ IS USAREUR WEEKLY INTEL SUMMARY NR FOUR SIX PAREN UNCL PAREN
 CONCERNING PARA ONE REF TO WITHDRAWAL OF MVD TROOPS PD WOULD APPRECIATE
 FULL DETAILS ON SPECIFIC UNITS WITHDRAWN AND INSTL IN WHICH
 FORMERLY BIL PD WOULD SIMILARLY APPRECIATE ALL AVAL INFO ON
 REMAINING MVD TROOPS CMM UNIT DESIGNATIONS CMM LOC CMM NAMES OF KEY
 PERS CMM ASSIGNED MSN AND ALL INFO BEARING ON OPR COOP AND COORD
 WITH KGB AND RU INSTL PD ABOVE INFO NEEDED TO COMPLEMENT EXISTING
 FILES THIS GP REF SIS AND TO SERVE AS BASIS FOR EVAL OF INFO
 CONCERNING INTEL ROLE OF MVD PD

MR: Ref Weeka contained rept of withdrawal 13,000 MVD troops from
 WEIMAR, LEIPZIG, DRESDEN and WISMUTH areas. Aprx 10,000 still
 remaining.

30 Oct 56 DB/gb/CF

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 Hq 66th CIC Group

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 MONTH 30 YEAR 1956
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PHONE	8244	PAGE NR.	1	NR. OF PAGES	1	
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION						

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ROUTINE

I DA

CO 66TH CIC GP BAD CANNSTATT

G2 USAREUR

OPR FOR G2CICE FROM CICOE

SUBJ IS RUSSIAN INTEL SVC CASE OFFICER FILE PAREN CONF PAREN
PAREN ALPHA DASH TWO ZERO SEVEN FOUR PAREN REF YOUR LTR DATED
FOUR APR CURR CMM FILE ALPHA ECHO ALPHA GOLF BRAVO DASH CHARLIE
PAREN ALPHA ECHO PAREN THREE THREE THREE PD FIVE GOLF BRAVO PD
THIS HQ DOES NOT HAVE PHOTOS AND COMPLETE IDENT DATA ON RUSSIAN
INTEL SVC CASE OFFICERS PAREN PRESUME REF IS MADE TO SOV HANDLING
ACT PAREN PD SOME SKETCHY DATA IS AVAL ON SOME SOV INTEL SVC AGTS
BUT NOT CONSOLIDATED IN WORK BOOK FASHIONS PD AT PRESENT TIME ALL
FILES THIS GP PERTAINING TO SOV INTEL BEING REORGANIZED IN
CONFORMANCE FILE SYSTEM OPS MEMO FOUR DASH FIVE FIVE AND PRESENT
EST OF MINIMUM OF THREE MONTHS BEFORE COMPLETION PD AT THIS TIME
WORK BOOKS WILL BE TURNED OUT PD A NUMBER OF PICTURES OF SOV
PERSONALITIES ARE AVAL WHICH STEM FROM FORMER FOUR THREE ZERO CIC FILES
CMM BUT THESE ARE NOT CONSIDERED PERTINENT TO TRADE ISSUE PD

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AEUC-OZE

Capt. QMC

Major, Infantry

8244

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CO 66TH CIC GP BAD CANNSTATT

REF PARA FOUR OF ABOVE CITED LTR CMM INFO FROM REGISTRY FILES

TOGETHER WITH CASE OFFICER COMMENTS REF MEMO CONCERNING MEETING

WITH () WILL BE FURN PRIOR ONE JUNE CURR PD

(b)(1)

(b)(7)(D)

M/R:

27/4/56

G2 Analysts committed G2 to trade with () ref info Sov agts.
Such data not avail this Hq until files consolidated and work
books published. Analysts did not check with this Hq beforehand
nor with Major ()

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Page(s) 615646

Soviet KGB

Shifting Espionage Tactics, Growing In Strength

London (AP)—The Soviet espionage service, the KGB, is shifting tactics and growing in strength, according to intelligence sources in Western Europe.

The sources report a decreasing reliance by the KGB on agents who enter a Western country legally and work in embassies under diplomatic cover. Instead they see an increasing use of two other types of spy.

One is the "illegal," the agent smuggled in, such as a spy who steps off a freighter at an unwatched port. The other is the citizen of a Western country "turned around" to work for the Soviets.

Extensive Efforts

William E. Colby, director of the U.S. Central Intelligence

Agency, says the KGB's effort to recruit Americans remains extensive.

He told the Associated Press annual meeting last month that "some 400 approaches" were made to Americans abroad in the last four years.

Some of these efforts, he added were appeals for aid to the Community side or were an exertion of pressure on individuals thought to be vulnerable.

An important arm in spying today is the research and analysis of nonsecret material, Colby said. He added that the KGB "is beginning to learn" lessons from the CIA about this.

He said the KGB's Institute for the Study of the United States of America is a carbon copy of similar institutes the

CIA has set up for the study of the Soviet Union.

Thus a spy in modern times could be someone who simply reads newspapers and other publications of an "enemy" country for the nonsecret material that aids researchers and analysts back home.

But apparently there still is a need for operatives with specific missions and the European sources indicate the KGB remains active in this sort of spying as well.

Smuggling a Russian spy into Britain, for example, is as easy as stepping off a boat.

A dozen British ports, among them Halifax in northern England, Ayr in Scotland and Barry in South Wales, have no immigration or customs offi-

cers. Russian freighters carrying crews of 30 and maybe 10 passengers call at these ports from time to time.

It is fairly simple to walk off one of these ships unnoticed and hide in the largely working class districts near the docks where many people are sympathetic to the local Communist party.

More Cost Effective

"The KGB is rationalizing its clandestine activities," one Western intelligence source said. "The illegals are more cost effective."

By that the source meant that an agent working as a diplomat can be costly if he defects and blows the cover of other Russian spies. Illegals and local nationals can be just

as effective, and less damaging if caught.

The KGB suffered a major blow here in 1971 when the British government expelled as spies 105 Soviet officials working in the embassy or the trade mission. At the time the British estimated 75 per cent of the Russian diplomats accredited to London were spies. Their identities are known and it may be difficult for Moscow to place them abroad again in other embassies.

The Institute for the Study of Conflict, a London group which has access to some British, European and U.S. intelligence reports, estimates, however, that three out of every four Soviet diplomats in Western Europe still works for the KGB.

Western sources say the proportion of Russian spies working under diplomatic cover has been a noticeable shift toward other types of agents such as illegals and locals. These tend to concentrate in areas where the United States has large installations.

Weaker On Periphery

"The U.S. is the main target for Soviet espionage in Europe," a British source said. According to him the prime Soviet goals are to infiltrate into the U.S. Defense Department, the State Department, the National Security Council, the CIA and the FBI.

These organizations are weaker on the periphery than at the center and this is why the

Russians "try to infiltrate around the edges in Europe," he added.

"Western governments do not have the resources to match the Soviet effort," the British source said. "The Soviet clandestine effort at information gathering is five times that of the United States and Western Europe combined."

The current questioning of the role of the CIA in the United States is viewed by intelligence agencies in Western Europe with rising concern, because the CIA is a prime source of information for them.

"If the CIA is made completely accountable, we will be less effective," the British intelligence man said.

THE EVENING SUN, BALTIMORE, WEDNESDAY, MAY 7, 1975

647

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT

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2. SUBJECT: Principles, Modus Operandi, and New Image of KGB in Leningrad
3. ISC NUMBER:
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 4 December 1973
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ:
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE INFORMATION 6
7. SOURCE:
8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 218 1704 75 (5005-01) (A)
9. DATE OF REPORT: 11 December 1974
10. NO. OF PAGES: 42
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12. ORIGINATOR: 66th MI Gp. APO NY 09108
13. PREPARED BY: [signature]
14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: [signature] COL, MI Commanding

15. SUMMARY: (u) This report outlines the background of the all-powerful Secret Police (now the KGB), under STALIN; its reorganization under KHRUSHCHEV; and its present authority and modus operandi. To eliminate the authority conferred upon the Secret Police by STALIN, KHRUSHCHEV subordinated the KGB to all levels of the Communist Party, and forced it to adhere to a new Criminal Procedures Code. However, although the KGB now tries to operate within the law (or appear to), it still has great authority - exercising control over foreign tourists, as well as over Soviet citizens. The report describes the various limitations imposed on present KGB power and describes in detail (as experienced by individuals arrested by the KGB), the KGB's investigation and arrest procedures; preparation of and control of court cases, including sentencing; and retention of control over prisoners throughout their prison terms and for the rest of their lives.

Rec'd DS-4D/ 11 FEB 75
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REPORT:

1. (b)(1) (b)(7)(D) (c) Introduction

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NOTE:

2. (b)(1) (b)(7)(D) (u) General Characteristics of the Secret Police Under STALIN

STALIN elevated the secret police of Czarist times to a position of absolute authority in the USSR, even over the Communist Party. In doing this he expanded the personnel enormously, replaced the type of personnel assigned to secret police with a new type of personnel, and gave the new force a new mission. The Czarist secret police were originally small in number, and most of the personnel were from the middle class. Their primary mission at that time was to protect the Czar and his family. Under STALIN, however, the lowest level of the personnel assigned to the secret police were workers and peasants who were fanatic Communists. The top level were educated, were often Jewish, and were equally fanatic Communists. They had the power to arrest top-level members of the Party and of the government. Their mission under STALIN consisted of directives to kill all real and/or potential, or suspected potential anti-Communists, or anyone who disagreed with STALIN's interpretation of Communism.

Source summed up the principles of the MO (modus operandi) of the Stalinist secret police as follows: "Everyone was a potential enemy of Communism.

There was no one who was not a potential enemy.

Arrest first, and investigate the case later, if at all. Life imprisonment or death will be meted out to everyone - even those under suspicion - and without trial. Enemies of the State have no rights; they are worse than common criminals and, although sent to the same prisons, they are to be treated there far worse than common criminals. They may not be arrested, nor released early for good behavior; on the contrary, it is better to keep them in prison than to let them return to their homes. They should therefore be resented, without trial, and kept in prison."

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3. (C) Present Theoretical and Actual Limitations on KGB Power

After STALIN's death, KHRUSHCHEV took action to curb the power of the KGB over the Party. He appointed a new KGB chief from the ranks of the national staff of the KOMSOMOL (Communist Youth Party), and instructed him to replace the old cadre with a new type of personnel. In 1960, he also either instigated, or approved publishing an altered Criminal Code to which the KGB were required to adhere (at least in form), and a new Criminal Procedures Code (see Encl 2), to which the KGB are now required to adhere (at least in form). KHRUSHCHEV reorganized the post-Stalin secret police and made them subordinate to the Communist Party at all levels from the Politburo down to the city districts, industries, and offices. He completed the reorganization by 1970.

a. Relationship to the National Communist Party

Until 1972, the KGB chief was only a member of the Party's Central Committee and not a member of the Politburo. Therefore, until BREZHNEV elevated KGB Chief, General ANDROPOV (fnu), to membership in the Politburo, the KGB chief was only a candidate for membership. According to Central Committee member CHRENNIKOV, Tichon, chief of the Union of Musical Composers in the USSR, ANDROPOV was elevated to the position of KGB chief because of his friendship with BREZHNEV. [ANDROPOV replaced SIMICHASTNI (fnu), after the latter was demoted for allowing STALIN's daughter to leave the USSR to visit India, where she defected.] According to CHRENNIKOV, BREZHNEV and ANDROPOV live in apartments with a common stairwell, at an unknown address, and not only are they friends, but their wives are also friends. However, according to a KGB officer (name unrecalled), in LENINGRAD, the KGB had always been represented by an U/I official in the Politburo and therefore elevation of the KGB to membership was only a de jure recognition of an actual fact.

Although the possibility exists that the KGB chief could develop some kind of coalition within the Politburo which could influence specific policies, it is not likely that the KGB could usurp the Politburo's power and thereby reestablish its former absolute authority. As an example of KGB power in the Politburo, Source cited its policy, since 1970, of allowing Soviet Jews to emigrate. Source did not know who initiated the policy in the Politburo, but was certain that it could not have been accomplished without KGB approval. Despite the fact that in 1970 the KGB had no membership in the Politburo. He also felt that if the KGB wanted to stop the emigration of Soviet Jews, it could easily do so. Source felt that the KGB supports the emigration of Soviet Jews only because this provides a vehicle whereby KGB agents can legally penetrate the West with papers indicating that they are Jews; married to Jews; or related to Jews. On the other hand, Source pointed out in reference to KGB influence in the Politburo, that it was the Politburo which dismissed KGB chief SIMICHASTNI after he allowed STALIN's daughter to visit India.

b. New Type of KGB Personnel Under KHRUSHCHEV

KHRUSHCHEV's primary task in subordinating the KGB to the Party involved eliminating the old cadre and replacing it with a new cadre which would be loyal to the Party. SIMICHASTNI, who had previously been an official in the KOMSOMOL (Young Communist Party), was selected for this task, and turned to the ranks of his former KOMSOMOL colleagues and the Soviet Army for the new KGB recruits. Source was convinced that SIMICHASTNI's task of achieving a loyal cadre of KGB officers was accomplished. He based his belief on various remarks made by KGB officers (there are no EM in the KGB), which indicated that they believe that the KGB is an important political instrument of the Party, and that its policies are those of the Party and Politburo.

The Party also safeguards its power in other ways. It is now impossible for the KGB to arrest any member of the Politburo or Central Committee without first informing the Politburo, unless the arrest is of great urgency; i.e., imminent danger to the State; imminent defection; or destruction of evidence by the culprit. In a purely criminal case involving members of the Central Committee or Politburo, the KGB,

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and not the regular police of the Ministry of the Interior (MVD), makes the arrest. However, the chief of the KGB must discuss the arrest with the Politburo prior to making it. In fact, the KGB may not arrest a Party official at any level without first informing the pertinent Party staff unless, as stated above, the arrest is based on imminent danger to the State, imminent defection, or destruction of evidence by the culprit.

c. Relationship to Regional and City Levels of the Party

The headquarters of the Leningrad Regional Communist Party (OBKOM: Oblastnoi Komitet Partii) is in LENINGRAD, the capital of the Region. It is located in the same building as the headquarters of the Leningrad City Communist Party (GOROKOM: Gorodskoi Komitet Partii), and Source believes that the two have parallel organizational structures. The building in which they are located is the former Smolnvi Institute on Proletarskoi diktatury Polshchneky (Square).

Each Regional Party staff has a Secretary for KGB affairs. In 1970, the Secretary for KGB affairs for the Leningrad Region was PANSHTN (fnu). Source stated that the KGB makes reports and receives instructions from the Regional Party headquarters through the Secretary. The KGB chief of the Region is a member of the Regional Party, but as he is not an official in it he is not present at staff meetings. If the monthly report on the KGB's current and/or planned activities contains anything of specific importance, the Secretary for KGB affairs calls in the First Secretary of the Regional Party to inform him, and in the event that the two disagree as to how to handle any problem, the Party viewpoint prevails. Despite this authority, however, Party policy is non-interference in routine KGB activities and acceptance of KGB decisions in KGB cases. However, since the KGB is subordinate to the Party, the Party must accept final responsibility for all KGB decisions. (Source stated here that because some KGB decisions may not please the Politburo, the KGB is not unhappy that the Party is held responsible for them). Nevertheless, Source was certain that at the Leningrad Regional and city staff levels, the Party's decision prevails in disputes with the KGB. In the event of a serious dispute, the chief of the KGB is called to the Regional Party for a discussion of the problem.

KGB

Source doubted that there is any discussion of policy matters at the regular KGB monthly Party meetings held at Regional and/or city levels. He believed that these meetings are probably confined to a routine discussion of general political subjects, although he assumed that the lectures given to the KGB personnel are different from those given to the personnel of other organizations. Source stated that a few years ago, however, a system was worked out whereby whenever changes occurred in government policy, a team of local Party staff members was sent out to industrial plants, other firms, institutes, etc. to explain them.

Source stated that every KGB officer has two loyalties, loyalty to the KGB, and loyalty to the Party but that loyalty to the Party always prevails. He pointed out, however, that individual KGB officers are never confronted by a situation in which they must choose between the KGB and the Party, because that type of situation develops only at staff levels. He further stated that he knew of no instance of a KGB officer being assigned by the Party to take an active part in any activities outside of the KGB. Source had no knowledge of Regional and/or city relationships at higher levels.

d. Relationship to the Soviet Army

Source was certain that, given a reason to do so, the KGB initiates a dossier on everyone in the USSR, including Soviet Army officers and EN; however, since the Army has its own security section, there is probably no need for close KGB control over individual Army officers. Source did not know the extent of cooperation between the KGB and the Army security section, but was certain that if an Army officer or EN is arrested by the KGB, he remains in the custody of the KGB. Classified information in the possession of Army organizations operating in industrial plants, institutes, etc. where Army contracts are involved, is an object of KGB interest.

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Social relations between the Army and the KGB are formally separated. Army officers have their own club in LENINGRAD. The KGB and MVD staff, and the members of the regular police (Milice), and the fire department have a joint club.

Source stated that there is a close relationship between the KGB and the Border Guard units of the Soviet Army. He heard that the Border Guard units are subordinate to the KGB, but had no evidence to support this. He believed, however, that although civilian defectors caught by the Border Guards are turned over to the KGB, military defectors caught by the Border Guards are not. According to Source, if the KGB should find it necessary to pressure an army officer to obtain his cooperation, it would be done through the Party which would inform the officer's CO that the matter involving the officer was vital to national security.

e. Relationship to the Regional and City MVD (See Figure 3)

(1) General

The headquarters of the Leningrad Regional Ministry for Internal Affairs (MVD), and the headquarters of the Leningrad Regional and city KGB units are in the same building, located on the SE corner of Voinova Ul and Leteiny Prospekt (Boulevard). The entrance (10, Fig 3), used by the MVD is on Kalajeva Ul, and Source saw high-ranking MVD officers entering and leaving through this entrance. The Minister for Internal Affairs is a member of the Central Committee, but he is not a member of the Politburo.

Source knew nothing concerning the official or personal relationships between the KGB chief and the Minister for Internal Affairs. However, on one occasion, he observed the chief of the MVD carrying on a friendly conversation with the Leningrad chief of the KGB, in the joint KGB-MVD club in LENINGRAD. The club is located between Poltavskaja Ul, Charkovskaja Ul, and Virgorodskaja Ul. All ranks and grades of the MVD, including members of the police and fire departments, their families, and guests, use this club.

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Source stated that the KGB's annual budget is far larger (details unknown), than the MVD's, although the KGB has less personnel. However, he had no details on the budget.

(2) Respective Areas of Jurisdiction of the KGB and Police (See Encl 1)

A new Criminal Code, with Commentaries, published in 1971 (see Encl 1, photocopy), contains all of the laws to be enforced by the KGB, police, or both. The following are the titles of the Chapters and Articles of the Code:

General Information

- Chapter 1. General Principles (Articles 1 - 3)
- Chapter 2. Limitations of the Criminal Code (Articles 4 - 6)
- Chapter 3. Meaning of the Term "Criminal" (Articles 7 - 19)
- Chapter 4. Concerning Punishments (Articles 20 - 36)
- Chapter 5. Reasons for and Purposes of Various Types of Punishment (Articles 37 - 57)
- Chapter 6. Use of Medical Treatment for Physical and Psychological Causes of Crimes

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Special Section

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- Chapter 1. Crimes Against the State
Section: Serious Cases (Articles 64 - 73)
Section: Less Serious Cases (Articles 74 - 88)
- Chapter 2. Crimes Against Socialist Property (Articles 89 - 101)
- Chapter 3. Crimes Against the Life, Health, Dignity of all Individuals (Articles 102 - 132)
- Chapter 4. Crimes Against the Civil and Working Rights of the People (Articles 133 - 144)
- Chapter 5. Crimes Against Private Property (Articles 144 - 151)
- Chapter 6. Crimes in Industry, Fishing, Forestry, Collective Farms, Firms, Businesses and Trade (Articles 152 - 169)
- Chapter 7. Crimes Against Laws Requiring Certain Duties in Certain Positions (Articles 170 - 176)
- Chapter 8. Crimes Against the Soviet Judicial System (Articles 177 - 190)
- Chapter 9. Lies About the Soviet Border (Articles 190 - 205)
- Chapter 10. Crimes Against the Physical Good of the Population (Articles 206 - 230)
- Chapter 11. Crimes Based on Religious Traditions (Articles 237 - 269)
- Chapter 12. Crimes in the Military (Articles 237 - 269)

All articles under "General Information" are binding on both the police and the KGB.

Source stated that it is evident to both the KGB and the police that the KGB is solely responsible for enforcing Articles 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 70, 71 and 73 of Chapter 1, of the Special Section, and Articles 190.0, 190.2 and 190.3 of Chapter 9 of the Special Section. Although the jurisdiction is not clearly expressed in all of the other Articles in the Chapters of the Special Section the KGB has established precedents based on its power and authority.

Source had no information on the origin or history of the jurisdictional guidelines used by the KGB, or how they were established, but he stated that at the present time the KGB is not interested in any criminal case unless it involves a certain type of crime, or a certain type of person. These crimes include anything under the above mentioned articles in the Criminal Code; any crimes involving Westerners, group activities; and crimes involving large amounts of money or valuable property. In addition, the KGB is responsible for enforcing mandates issued by the Politburo in its various efforts to improve the system; i.e., pressure under KHRUSHCHEV on farmers who fed bread to their pigs thereby deriding the people; the drive to arrest Jews who owned valuable property, or much wealth; and pressure campaigns against alcoholism, drug abuse and prostitution. Source stated that the individuals in whom the KGB is interested are those with high positions in government, industry, research, etc, even if their crimes are non-political. The KGB has complete authority in these areas and the police do not intrude; in fact, if they uncover evidence relating to common crimes committed by VIPs (over which the KGB has jurisdictional authority), they immediately turn the evidence over to the KGB.

The KGB also has jurisdiction over a person arrested by the police for an ordinary crime if there is evidence that the person is also involved in a political crime. Conversely, the KGB turns over evidence relating to ordinary crimes involving working class people to the police for any action the police may wish to take.

According to Source, even if the political crime is sufficient evidence in itself, the KGB frequently enjoys supplementing it with evidence of non-political crimes. Source stated that occasionally the KGB takes over an unsolved case from the police and solves it, simply to show the KGB's superiority. The KGB has the authority to demand to see any police records it requires, but the police are not cleared to read KGB files. The already overworked police, however, are not interested in extending their jurisdictional authority. The KGB, on the other hand, though primarily interested only in a certain type of case or person, can extend its jurisdiction over the jurisdictional area of the police, and does so whenever it wants to.

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Source stated that although he did not want to imply that the police and the KGB live in a continuous, open state of confrontation, the basic differences between them in authority, prestige, working conditions, salaries, and privileges are always present. These differences have made the police envious and fearful of the KGB, and the KGB contemptuous and arrogant toward the police.

(3) KGB Authority in MVD-Administered Prisons and Prison Camps

All prisons and prison camps in the USSR are administered by the MVD. However, the political prisoners in these installations are under KGB authority in certain matters. These matters include keeping them under continued interrogation to check on their past; keeping them under surveillance through an informer network among the prisoners and camp authorities; and partial authority (with penal camp or prison authorities) over granting them release at the end of their prison terms, or resentencing them. Prosecuting attorneys and judges are used when a prisoner is resentenced. They are brought in from the local courts for this purpose.

Political prisoners are not incarcerated in the Leningrad Region and Source believed that this is probably because this area is too close to the West. To the best of Source's knowledge there are only two areas in the USSR where political prisoners are confined, and these two areas include one prison and ten prison camps. The single prison is in VLADIMIR, which is located about 250 km from MOSCOW. This prison also houses common criminals, but the political prisoners are segregated from them. The political prisoners in this prison are under the authority of the KGB in VLADIMIR (the capital of the region) for those aspects pertaining to political prisoners outlined in paragraph one (i.e., KGB Authority in MVD Administered Prisons and Prison Camps), above.

The other area of confinement is the Mordovij Region of the R.F.S.S.R., located about 130 km SE of MOSCOW. According to Source, there are ten penal camps in this area housing approximately 10,000 political prisoners. These prisoners are under the authority of the KGB in SARANSK (the capital of the region), for those aspects pertaining to political prisoners outlined in paragraph one, above.

Source did not know why all political prisons are concentrated in two areas not more than 300 km from MOSCOW, but theorized that it might be because KGB Headquarters in MOSCOW can maintain better surveillance and control over the prisoners at this distance. Political prisoners are now never confined in prisons or penal camps with other types of criminals, and Source stated that this constitutes a great change from the system under STALIN. The severity of the punishment imposed on political prisoners depends on the prison or penal camp in which they are incarcerated. However, the prisoners prefer the camps because they are free to move around and talk with the other prisoners.

(4) Contrast in Salaries and Working Conditions of the KGB and Police

With the exception of civilian clerical personnel and guards, all KGB personnel are officers. The guards are Army-recruited but are apparently assigned permanently to the MVD to serve as guards at prisons and penal camps, and as drivers and guards at KGB headquarters. All personnel assigned to the KGB are required to have a college or university degree, and inasmuch as the KGB gets far more money from the MVD's annual budget than the police, the personnel are much better paid than the police. Source had no details on the salaries of either but stated that because of the difference the police are very susceptible to corruption. In contrast, he stated that he had never heard of a case of corruption in the KGB.

In addition to a higher pay scale than the police, the KGB have special privileges regarding housing and vacation homes and, because of their influence, they are also able to obtain high-quality consumer goods without waiting for months or years.

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In addition to lower salaries, the police also have a much lower standard of education than the KGB personnel, and none of the privileges accorded them. However, perhaps the main reason for police discontent is the great pressure under which they must work to solve crimes. This is in contrast to the KGB officers who boast that they can take as much time as they need to obtain evidence. Source was told by a female friend on the investigative staff of the police force that the police also have far less time than the KGB to prepare a case for a prosecuting attorney. Therefore, because of the pressure under which they have to work, they are unable to solve difficult complicated problems.

The KGB, on the other hand, has built up a network of informers inside the police. Most of these informers were trapped by involvement in some type of corrupt activity and threatened with exposure unless they became informers. The KGB may also commandeer a room in any police station for purposes of interrogation. However, they never leave any official papers or files in the room overnight because they do not trust the police, whom they openly despise for their incompetence and corruption.

(5) Police Fear of KGB Officers

According to Source, the police do not dare to demand the ID card of anyone who claims to be a KGB officer. Source and some friends were once stopped in their auto by a traffic policeman for a minor traffic offense, and told the policeman they were KGB on duty, and to get out of their way. The policeman did so without a word. Source once saw and heard a car full of KGB officers (the car and passengers are easy to identify for an observant citizen of LENINGRAD) simply tell a traffic policeman to "Go to hell," and drive on. They were stopped for a minor traffic violation.

f. Relationship to the Regional and City Governments

As far as Source knows, there is no special KGB liaison person or department in the Leningrad regional government headquarters in LENINGRAD or in the Leningrad city government (GORISPOLKOMA - Gorodskoi Ispolnitelnyi Komitet). However, anything required by the KGB from these governments, or from any department in them, can be easily acquired through the services of the Communist Party at the appropriate levels. These requirements would be passed from the chief of the KGB through the Communist Party Secretary for KGB Affairs of the Regional Communist Party.

g. Relationship to the Legal System (See Encls 1 and 2)

The Criminal Code and Commentaries were published in the same volume for the first time in 1971. (See Encl 1, photocopy) The volume was available to the public, in any bookstore, soon after its original printing. It is required reading for the KGB, police and everyone in the legal or judicial systems. Since the Code's publication, changes have been made to it by the Soviet Supreme Court; by the Russian R.F.S.S.R. Supreme Court; by the Soviet Supreme Parliament; and by the Russian R.F.S.S.R. Parliament. The Commentaries are of major importance because they contain guidelines for the application of the laws. Therefore, a citizen who has a copy of the Code and Commentaries can learn what the KGB's interpretation of a specific law can be expected to be, what his rights are vis-a-vis the KGB, and the best approach he can use in a confrontation with the KGB both before and after arrest. Source stated that the Criminal Procedures Code, attached as Encl 2, is the most recent. However, it was published in 1960, and changes may have been made in it by the above-mentioned authorities. This volume is always seen on the desk of every member of the KGB Examining Department during the interrogation of a prisoner held in detention. Any changes made in either the Criminal Code or the

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Commentaries appear in two monthly bulletins titled Soviet Justice (Sovetskaya Iustitsiya) and Socialist Law (Sotsyialisticheskaya Zakonnost) published by an unknown agency. The changes also appear in four publications which are available only after sessions of the Courts or Parliaments of the national and republic level. These publications are the Bulletin of the Supreme Court of the USSR (Byulleten Verkhovnogo Suda SSSR), the Bulletin of the Supreme Court of the R.S.F.S.R. (Byulleten Verkhovnogo Suda RSFSR), the Publication of the Supreme Soviet SSR (Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR); and the Publication of the Russian R.S. F. S. R. (Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR).

Theoretically, the police and the KGB are required to adhere to the law and to the legal procedures, and Source stated that the KGB stays within the law to a greater extent than the regular police. He stated that in many situations the police make no attempt to appear to adhere the laws or legal procedures but the KGB goes to great lengths to make it appear that the KGB does adhere to the law. Apparently all of the present KGB cadre have been thoroughly convinced that the new KGB differs greatly from the terrorist secret police of the Stalin era inasmuch as it is now an organization which operates legally. Source often heard KGB officers make this distinction - either proudly or defensively. Source believes that this fact constitutes a definite and important change since the end of the Stalin era because in a conflict with the KGB an ordinary citizen can remind the KGB officer that the KGB prides itself on adhering to the law and to legal procedures.

h. Relationship to the Judicial System (See Encls 1 and 2)

The judicial system consists of State prosecuting attorneys, defense lawyers and judges. Theoretically the KGB has no authority to influence the judicial system, and no authority to ignore the procedures set forth in the Criminal Procedures Code. However, although the KGB appears to be staying within the limits of its authority, it actually not only controls the arrest, investigation and subsequent detention and interrogation of a prisoner while building the case for the prosecuting attorney, but it also controls the sentence imposed on the prisoner, and maintains surveillance over him during his prison term and after his return to civilian life.

(1) Prosecuting Attorneys

Source stated that there is a chief Soviet prosecuting attorney; a chief prosecuting attorney for the R.S.F.S.R.; a chief prosecuting attorney for the city of LENINGRAD; and a chief prosecuting attorney for each city district in LENINGRAD. Source did not know the number of regional or city prosecutors, but he believed that they are all cleared to handle KGB cases involving classified material. All KGB cases originating outside of the city of LENINGRAD are handled by the regional prosecuting attorneys, and all KGB cases originating in LENINGRAD are handled by the city's prosecuting attorneys, regardless of the district in which they live. Prosecuting attorneys for the city districts of LENINGRAD usually do not handle KGB cases.

The offices of the Leningrad regional and city prosecutors are all in the same building. The building is located on the SW corner of Liteinov Prospekt and Belinskogo Ul., and is not very far from the regional and city headquarters of the KGB. Source often saw prosecuting attorneys he knew personally, entering the KGB headquarters building and, on that basis, he assumed that the KGB officers cannot go to the prosecutor's office because classified materials cannot officially be taken out of KGB headquarters.

In accordance with the Criminal Procedures Code, both the police and the KGB are required to obtain written approval from the appropriate prosecuting attorney (i.e., regional, city, or city district attorney), before making an arrest, a house search, installing electronic equipment, or conducting surveillance of mail. In an urgent situation, however, both the police and the KGB can undertake these activities and obtain written permission afterwards. Source stated that although a

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prosecuting attorney could refuse to authorize the activities, this would probably result in his downfall because the KGB could request the Communist Party to dismiss him on grounds of malfeasance or some other false charge. Source stated that prosecuting attorneys enjoy lifetime appointments unless they are removed for malfeasance by the next higher level of the judicial hierarchy.

Theoretically, the KGB is legally responsible for preparing all aspects of a case presented by a prosecuting attorney during trial. In accordance with the Criminal Code the prosecutor is responsible for determining the length of punishment; place of incarceration (i.e., prison or penal camp); type of reprimand while incarcerated; whether property and/or valuables should be confiscated, and whether or not the individual should be exiled from his place of residence after he has served his sentence. In fact, however, the KGB not only provides the prosecutor with the record of interrogation containing the evidence against the prisoner (and signed by the prisoner), but confers with the prosecutor at the end of the trial to determine the length of the sentence to be imposed, and where the prisoner will serve it. In the event the prosecutor and the KGB disagree on these points, the KGB's decision prevails.

On completion of a trial, all records of the court proceedings and the sentence imposed, are filed in the archives of the main courthouse. This is required in the event that the sentence is subsequently annulled by the accused's lawyer. Copies of the KGB records on each case are filed in the same archives and copies are also kept in the KGB's dossier on the individual, but Source did not know whether or not copies are also sent to the KGB unit of the prison in which the prisoner is confined.

(2) Judges

Source stated that there is a Chief Justice of the USSR (the highest echelon), a Chief Justice of the R.S.F.S.R.; a Chief Justice of the Leningrad region; and a chief judge in the city of LENINGRAD, as well as judges at the city district levels. The judges at both regional and city levels are elected every four years by popular vote. Since the election is controlled by the Party, however, if the KGB wants to remove a judge, it is a simple matter to remove his name from the list of candidates.

The offices of the regional and city judges are in LENINGRAD's main courthouse located on the S side of Fontanka Ul, about 200 m S of Pestelja Ul. As all cases prepared by the KGB are tried only in the main courthouse, only regional and city judges preside over KGB trials, and the city district judges never try KGB cases.

There are 10-20 judges at city level in LENINGRAD, and an unknown number at regional level, and Source was certain that the KGB has a dossier on each judge, with complete data on his character. Despite this, however, the KGB cannot name a specific judge to preside over a specific trial.

There are very few options open to a judge in a KGB trial because if the KGB decides to exert control it can do so through the Party, of which all of the judges are necessarily members. When contacted by the KGB, the Party simply informs the judge that the case is very serious and that he should not be lenient. In this event, the judge refuses to allow defense witnesses to be called, and imposes the full sentence demanded by the prosecutor. The option ordinarily open to the judge to close the case and demand reinterrigation, cannot be exercised in these cases. Under different circumstances, however, the judge allows the defense to call witnesses, and usually reduces by one year the length of the sentence demanded by the prosecuting attorney.

(3) Trial Procedures

All defendants are tried without benefit of jury. The closest approximation to a jury consists of two laymen elected by popular vote every four years, who are excused from their regular occupations to assist the judge in exercising

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his limited options. Source did not know what compensation they receive. Their function is to stand on each side of the judge and, after he renders his verdict, to show their approval. Source did not think that all laymen selected for this job are required to be Party members, but he presumed that during KGB trials of special significance the judge's assistants are probably not elected to fill the position, but are selected Party officials or KOMSOMOL members.

According to the dictates of the KGB, some trials are held openly and some secretly, but Source believed that most trials are held secretly. Source attended a few open trials and observed that outside of the judge; his two assistants, the prosecuting attorney; the defendant; his defense lawyer; and two guards (for each prisoner), that the other people present (whose attendance must be approved by the KGB), consisted of the families and friends of the defendant, or selected Party and/or KOMSOMOL members. Usually the KGB officer (or officers), who has the most knowledge of the case is also present incognito.

The only type of trials held openly and reported on in the newspapers, are those involving the defendant in some type of connection with the West; for example, a statement signed by the defendant admitting involvement with the Nazis during WW II. Defendants are not handcuffed during their trial unless they become obstreperous, but they are handcuffed after the sentence is imposed.

There are several courtrooms in the main courthouse and the trials are held between 1000-1700 hours, with one hour for lunch. The lunches for the defendants are brought into the courthouse from the KGB detention kitchen. Defendants from the KGB detention prison enter the main courthouse from a parking lot at the rear of the building, and friends and relatives often stand there hoping to get a glimpse of the prisoners when they leave the prison van to walk into the courthouse.

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(c) (4) People's Courts

(b)(1)
(b)(7)(D) In 1973, the KGB also organized a People's Court to try Prof of Literature (fnu), of the German Institute of Pedagogy in LENINGRAD. The KGB prepared an indictment of () accusing him of associating with and assisting SOLZHENITSYN to collect the information contained in the Gulag Archipelago. The indictment of () was read aloud to the People's Court by the Institute's Party Secretary in the presence of the accused and his colleagues, and the colleagues voted that () should be dismissed.

(5) Defense Lawyers

Source's information on defense lawyers was limited to those at the city level. He stated that Leningrad has a City Chamber of Advocates (Advokatskay Kontora), and he believed that the chief of this chamber is elected to the position by the entire membership of the chamber. No Jew can expect to be considered for this position, but the chamber has subordinate offices at the city district levels and there are many Jewish lawyers in these offices. In general, the salaries of the defense lawyers are good. They consist of a percentage of set fees for accepting the case; for studying the KGB's interrogation of the defendant; for visiting the defendant, and receiving visits from his relatives or friends; and for being present

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in court. Despite this, most lawyers attempt to extort extra payment from the defendant's relatives on the grounds that they know the judge personally and can influence his decision. Source stated that if a defendant has no relatives, and no money, he has to pay the lawyer from the meager pay he gets for the work he does in the prison.

The defense lawyers can only advise the defendants whether they should, or should not, plead guilty in court. The lawyers are not allowed to discuss the case with the prosecutor prior to the trial, and, therefore do not know the charges.

There are approximately 300 lawyers at the city and city district levels in LENINGRAD but only about 100 of them are cleared to defend individuals accused by the KGB. Source assured that they are probably cleared by the KGB since all defense lawyers are required to have clearance because they must have access to the KGB's interrogation records and all other records relating to KGB cases, and they must also have access to the KGB building where the defendant's records are filed. Source stated here that a clearance can be revoked for cause. He knew of one lawyer who lost his clearance because he broke a regulation banning communication between a prisoner and his family. In this case, he carried a message to the prisoner from his family and the prisoner betrayed this fact during his trial. Some lawyers, even though cleared to handle classified material by the KGB, are known to be indiscreet. Therefore, in particularly sensitive cases the KGB makes certain that the lawyer the defendant selects has been carefully screened prior to being assigned to the case.

4. (C) Leningrad Regional and City KGB

a. Present Objectives and Operational Criteria

The KGB's main concern now in LENINGRAD is to perpetuate its powerful image thereby insuring that it gets a lion's share of the annual national budget. To do this, the KGB must continue to keep the Politburo convinced that an internal, as well as an external, threat to Communism exists, and that individuals involved in anti-Communist activities should be arrested by the KGB before danger to the State becomes imminent. The KGB brings its activities to the attention of the Politburo and the public, through public trials, whenever possible. Source stated that he once told a KGB officer in LENINGRAD that if there were no actual enemies of the State the KGB would have to invent some - the implication being that this would be the only way that the KGB could justify its existence - and the officer laughed.

Source pointed out, however, that the KGB's basic modus operandi has changed considerably since the STALIN era. The KGB no longer arrests first and investigates later; arrests indiscriminately; or invariably imposes a death sentence or lifelong imprisonment. Prior to an arrest the KGB allows as much time as necessary to obtain all of the evidence, unless the case is one which requires immediate arrest as a preventive measure. As proof that the KGB no longer arrests on flimsy, superficial evidence, Source pointed out that there are now relatively few prisoners (possibly 10,000), confined in the prison camps for political prisoners in the Mordovia Region, and in the prison in VLADIMIR (not over 2,000). When the KGB makes an arrest, the accused signs a full confession and when this is presented as evidence in court, he is convicted. Source stated, however, that recently the KGB has been issuing a warning prior to arrest, and arresting only if the warning goes unheeded.

The KGB has also refined and narrowed its categories of potential enemies of the State, and has practically eliminated young people and members of the working class. Now when a member of either category comes to the attention of the KGB and there is evidence that they are involved in anti-Communist activity, a careful investigation is made and, if possible, they receive only a warning. Apparently the KGB believes that young people and working class people are not basically anti-Communist, but that they may easily be influenced by foreign propaganda, and that sentencing them to prison would only expose them to older anti-Communists and intellectuals who would effectively turn them into hard-core anti-Communists. The elimination of these

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two categories narrows the field of potential anti-Communist sources to professional level people, and Source stated that the KGB applies the laws for those who are in this category much more strictly. For example, the warning may be omitted; a stiffer penalty may be demanded (including confiscation of property, a longer prison term and severe regimentation while imprisoned); confinement in a prison, rather than a prison camp, recommended; and resentencing while still in prison recommended. However, even here the KGB's approach is far different than it was during the STALIN era. Before warning or arresting, the KGB first evaluates the following factors: age; sex; education; parental background and class; marital status; number of children; attitude toward job as evaluated by employer; past criminal and political records; mental and physical condition (including consumption of alcohol); connections with the West or any Soviet group; potential as an informer for the KGB; and Soviet nationality. Source stated here that ethnic Germans and Soviet Jews are in a separate category from Russians and other ethnic groups or nationalities. If the KGB learns that an individual on a professional level, or a Jew or ethnic German is engaged in anti-Communist activities and has contacts with a Western country (via people, radio broadcasts or printed material), or contacts with any group of Soviet citizens, he is immediately arrested.

b. Categories of Individuals of Special or Potential Interest

(1) Individuals to be Protected

This category includes all government and Party officials. Thirty of the top officials live with their families in an apartment house located on the NE corner of Revolucciya Square and Petrovskaya Ul. The apartment house is guarded by the regular police, but the KGB is responsible for protecting the officials outside of their homes, on the way to their offices, in the offices, and while attending public ceremonies on national holidays. In addition, whenever a public ceremony includes grouping officials on a reviewing stand, the stand is guarded by the regular police from the moment its construction begins until the end of the ceremony. The KGB makes an extensive search of the surrounding area, which includes any room, hallway, or rooftop where an assassin might have a direct line-of-sight to the reviewing stand. Party members are then assigned to these areas during the event, and KGB officers armed with U/I weapons and field glasses are stationed on the roofs of the buildings in the area.

In 1968, a cadet from the Pushkin Military Academy in LENINGRAD attempted to assassinate an U/I cosmonaut and his VIP government escort in an open automobile in MOSCOW, and the KGB has since taken very strict measures to protect public officials. In 1970, everyone living in apartment houses located on Voinova Ulitsa (known as Government St. because of the many government office buildings located on it), were investigated, and some were apparently found to be politically unreliable and were evicted. The apartments in which they lived were then converted to office space.

(2) Specific Categories of Individuals Under Suspicion

In addition to members of the professional class, Source listed the following special, smaller categories of individuals whom the KGB considers potential sources of anti-Communism. First on the list are Western newsmen and journalists, because the publicity they give to KGB arrests of important individuals in the USSR arouses Western interest and sympathy and frequently frustrates the KGB's plans. By way of illustration, Source pointed out that public opinion in Western countries is the only reason why the KGB has failed to arrest (), a Soviet Jew and dissenter, who is Prof of Physics at the University of MOSCOW, and that public pressure from the West is also the only reason why General GRIGORIENKOV was released from the mental hospital to which he was committed by the KGB.

People arriving in LENINGRAD from the Estonian and Latvian SSRs, also comprise a category of suspicious individuals - especially if they are of ethnic German background - but Source had no further information on this category.

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Soviet Jews are another category of suspicious individuals although, since 1970, their emigration has been officially permitted. Source stated that when a Soviet Jew files an application to emigrate with the O.V.I.R. (The Passport and Visa Section), the O.V.I.R. is required to inform the KGB of this fact because the KGB is the final approving authority. After an application is filed, the applicant is automatically protected from arrest by the KGB in approximately fifty percent of any incidents in which he may be involved. Although Source did not know the reason for this, he theorized that since an application to emigrate was already on file, the KGB favored a "hands off" policy to avoid possible publicity. With permission from the KGB, Soviet Jews overcome the red tape involved in emigrating, by holding frequent meetings to discuss the requirements and procedures. Despite this, however, the KGB does not allow the Jews in LENINGRAD to travel to MOSCOW on national holidays. To prevent them from doing so, KGB agents who are good at identifying Jews, are assigned to RR stations and airports and, if they spot a Jew, they signal the regular police assigned to these areas, and the police intercept him on some pretext and take him to the nearest police station.

Many tourists from Western countries flock to LENINGRAD (mainly in the summer), and they are automatically under KGB suspicion. However, the KGB cannot keep approximately 5,000 tourists under observation, so to obtain evidence against foreigners which is sufficiently incriminating to keep them under surveillance, the KGB relies on KGB officers assigned to Soviet embassies and consulates in Western countries, on KGB officers assigned to INTOURIST hotels; and on the network of KGB informers in INTOURIST. Although the KGB could doubtless exert pressure on the Politburo to stop the flow of tourists into the USSR, their prime importance as a source of foreign currency apparently outweighs their potentially bad influence on Soviet citizens, or their role as potential spies.

Source stated that since 1972, approximately forty Western countries have established consulates in LENINGRAD. The consulates have been concentrated as much as possible in one general area near the Neva River presumably, Source believed, on orders from the KGB. Source never learned anything about the methods used by the KGB to keep the Western personnel employed by the consulates under surveillance in their homes, offices, or elsewhere. He also never heard of any attempts by the KGB to approach Westerners with the aim of recruiting them, blackmailing them, or obtaining information from them. However, that the Cuban consulate in LENINGRAD was under close surveillance by the KGB. He also heard that the Leningrad officials won out in a conflict with US officials regarding who would be responsible for supervising and performing alterations on the building in which the US consulate is located.

c. Recruitment of KGB Personnel

(1) Qualifications

The KGB does not accept volunteers and when each department of the KGB in LENINGRAD was apparently recruiting its own personnel. Recruitment appeared to be based primarily on suggestions from the personnel in each department, who recommended individuals they knew personally, or who were known to other reliable people. Although Source stated that recruits for the KGB today are not always from the ranks of the KOMSOMOL or Army, they must be Party members when recruited, and must remain Party members while they serve in the KGB.

Although a potential recruit may reject an offer to work for the KGB, this rarely occurs because individuals are soundered out prior to being approached. In addition, since only strongly-convinced Party members are approached, they consider it an honor and a privilege to work for the KGB. The material benefits are also excellent.

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All recruits must be of Russian nationality; high school graduates with various degrees of higher learning; and must have a clean police and political record. Jews and ethnic Germans are automatically excluded because they are not allowed to belong to the Party. Source stated that the three major departments in the KGB in LENINGRAD each have different requirements regarding what type of higher learning a recruit should have.

(2) Privileges

The salaries of the KGB officers are good. They are based partly on the officer's grade and partly on his duty assignment. Source believed that the KGB chief in LENINGRAD, who is a General, receives about 400 rubles per month, plus fringe benefits. This is higher pay than that paid in the Soviet Army for the equivalent rank. Source had no further information on salaries.

Housing is guaranteed to all KGB officers in LENINGRAD. Source stated that it is not concentrated in any single area but is scattered throughout the city. The quality of an apartment depends on the officer's rank and the size of his family. There are a specific number of apartments over which the KGB has jurisdiction, and there is always a waiting list of KGB officers who want apartments of better quality and size. Source did not know which KGB department handles housing but he assumed that it is probably the Personnel Department. All apartments have a telephone which is paid for by the KGB.

KGB personnel are all also eligible for low-rental cottages on the beach in the Karelski pereshechek area NW of LENINGRAD on the Finnish Gulf. The annual rental for these cottages is approximately 40 rubles, in contrast to approximately 40,000 rubles to build a vacation cottage privately. The cottages used by the KGB are scattered throughout various villages in the area. They are not located in compounds, and have no special security, such as guards or dogs. This helps to preserve the anonymity of the KGB officers most of whom (if asked by their neighbors), disclaim any connection with the KGB. Those cottages in KAMAROVA, in the Karelski pereshechek area, that are occupied by top government and Party officials are located inside a guarded compound (or compounds).

Officials of any organization in the USSR are forbidden to use their official positions to obtain privileges. For example, a KGB officer cannot enter a shop, show his ID card, and ask to see or buy high-quality merchandise, without risking dismissal from the KGB if the shop manager, or anyone else, reports this. Obtaining high-quality merchandise is accomplished, however, by a go-between who is a mutual friend of the shopkeeper and the KGB officer - preferably someone who has a position in the Party - who asks the shopkeeper to help the KGB officer, as a personal favor to him. Source stated here, however, that there is a shop in LENINGRAD in which high-quality Western merchandise is set aside for top KGB, Party and city officials. The shop is the brainchild of (fnu), the manager of (fnu) and was conceived by him to curry favor with these officials in hopes of being promoted to a better job. Entrance to the shop can only be obtained by these officials, or their families, and the procedure is to first make a telephone call to inform the shopkeeper that some member of the family plans to visit the shop. Source stated that (fnu) is no longer there but the present manager does not dare to close the shop for fear of reprisals from the officials who continue to use the shop.

Source never heard of an official shop of any kind which is for the exclusive use of Party, regional or city officials. However, he stated that there is no need for such a shop, since the officials can obtain whatever they want through pull and connections.

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(3) Promotions and Dismissals

Source had no inside information on promotions or dismissals, but observed that although officers remain in one assignment for various lengths of time, the average length of time is usually well over three years. It takes an average of two years to become a CPT in the KGB, and approximately five years to be promoted to MAJ, and becoming a COL is more than a matter of time, since few achieve this rank. KGB officers are not mentioned in the newspapers by name or rank, so it is difficult to know when they have been promoted or transferred to or from Leningrad. And, although the obituary section of the newspapers mentions all Party, government, and MYD members by name, rank and service, deceased KGB officers are merely named with no mention of either rank or service.

Source stated that assignment to the KGB in VLADIMIR or SARANSK is considered to be punishment for inefficiency, and is doubtless meant as such. Both posts involve surveillance over the prison and prison camps in these areas, and the officers assigned to them are required to visit the prison and prison camps, which is unpleasant duty. Source stated that all KGB officers hope to be transferred to the KGB's national Headquarters in MOSCOW, which is apparently a much wanted assignment.

Source also knew of only one dismissal from the KGB. In 1968, a COL (fnu), who was assigned to the Operations Department of the KGB in Leningrad, tried to cover up an assault on a Soviet female guest at a party at which he was present. The woman was assaulted and beaten up by a drunken guest, and lost an eye as a result. The incident came to the attention of the police, however, and was subsequently dismissed by the KGB. A strange, and yet unsolved, sequel to his dismissal occurred in 1972, when his wife, and his mother-in-law were found brutally murdered in their apartment with their throats cut and their eyes stabbed out. Robbery did not appear to be a motive, and the assailant (or assailants), was never discovered. Although the murder was never reported in the newspapers, everyone in Leningrad knew about it.

Although it is common knowledge that KGB chief SIMICHASTNI (who was replaced by ANDROPOV), was dismissed primarily because he allowed Stalin's daughter to go to India (allegedly to attend her husband's funeral), Source believed that it is possible that other reasons were also involved.

(4) Personnel Known to Source

Source believes that the chief of the KGB has three deputies, but their names were unknown to him, and he also believes that the chiefs of the various Otdel (departments), are all colonels.

In 1972, the KGB chief was GEN SHUMILOV (fnu). Source stated here that the newspapers are allowed to give the name and grade of the chief of the KGB, and put his photograph in the paper when describing official functions he has attended. The newspapers are not allowed, however, to mention the names of any other KGB officers, or show pictures of them.

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d. Location of Leningrad Regional and City HQs of the KGB (See Fig 3)

Both the Leningrad regional and the Leningrad city headquarters are in a building in LENINGRAD, which is located on Liteiny Prospekt (a boulevard) between Voinova Ul and Kalateva Ul. The MVD regional headquarters is also located in this building and the entrance is at (10, Fig 3). There is temporary parking space for VIP visitors at (1a, Fig 3), on Vionova Ul, and for all other employees at (5, Fig 3) on Kalateva Ul.

In the central courtyard of the headquarters building there is another building (2, Fig 3) which contains 35 detention cells for KGB prisoners awaiting trial. There are 7 cells on each floor with three beds in each cell. Except when the prison is overcrowded, which to the best of Source's knowledge has not occurred during the past eight or more years, not more than two prisoners are assigned to each cell. A tunnel (4, Fig 3), is used by the prisoners to get to their exercise area in the courtyard of the former police prison (7, Fig 3). Source did not know who occupies the former prison now.

The headquarters of the Leningrad City Police is located in a building (8) across the street (Kalateva Ul), from the KGB building. The KGB maintains a reception room (9, Fig 3), in building (8), for non-VIP visitors, invited or uninvited, since it does not allow people without clearances to enter the main KGB building.

e. Probable Regional Table of Organization

Source doubted that there are two administrative structures in the KGB headquarters building: i.e., one for the Leningrad Region and one for the city of LENINGRAD. He believes that the administrative aspects of both are probably combined, mainly because the major potential areas for anticommunism are cities where large groups of people live. LENINGRAD is the largest city in the Leningrad region, therefore there is probably not much for the KGB to do in the remainder of the regional area and, consequently, a large staff is unnecessary. Another factor contributing to Source's belief that the administrative functions are probably combined, is the fact that there is only one block of detention cells in the entire region; those at the KGB headquarters in LENINGRAD.

Source also believes that there is only a small staff, at each KGB headquarters in the capital cities throughout the Leningrad region, and that they consist of members of the regional KGB Department of Operations (see Fig 2), in LENINGRAD. In the event that extra personnel is needed, they can be sent out from the Leningrad headquarters.

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f. KGB Administrative Departments in the Hqs Building in LENINGRAD (See Fig 2)

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Based on Source's peripheral observation of the KGB over a period of at

and information obtained extraneously, he felt qualified to outline the administrative departments of the KGB in the headquarters building (See Fig 2). In this context he stated that the structure of the KGB is the same as the military inasmuch as every major duty performed is reflected in the composition of the staff. He also stated that the Operations Department in the headquarters is the only department which maintains an office in each city District, but he could not estimate the number of people the department employs. The chiefs of the various departments are all colonels.

(1) Operations Department (Operativni Otdel)

(a) Personnel and Assignments

This department recruits personnel with a specialized type of higher education: i.e., journalists, philosophers (Marxist-Lennist), or psychologists. Any legal training required is given after the individual is hired. Source did not know what type of duties in the Department require a knowledge of languages other than Russian. However, he knows that language training is given if necessary in the new Training Center of the Leningrad KGB in LENINGRAD, where drivers' training is also given if necessary.

The KGB personnel are required to present their ID cards before searching a house or a person, and before making an arrest. Although they wear civilian clothes, they are easily identified by an experienced eye because of the uniformity of the dark color of their suits and coats. When on a mission involving transportation by car they carry a change of headgear to help them avoid detection. Each officer is issued a pistol, probably a 9-mm Makarov pistol.

Source believes that there are officers in the Operations Dept who are responsible for surveillance of the University of LENINGRAD, Leningrad's underground transportation system, and all foreign visitors entering the region and city. As mentioned previously, approximately 40 Western consulates were established in LENINGRAD, in 1972, all of them concentrated in the area of the Neva River.

Nearby apartments have probably been assigned to the KGB officers who are responsible for keeping the consulates under surveillance. There is probably also an officer in charge of the various secret apartments maintained throughout the city by the KGB; e.g., in the Hotel Astoria, and one on the NW side of Isaakv-veskaja Ploched, opposite the city's government's garages (so marked outside), and next door to the Museum of Music. Source also believes that there is probably an officer assigned to administer the KGB detention prison (2, Fig 3), in the headquarters area who is additionally responsible for maintaining liaison with the Soviet army unit assigned to the headquarters as exterior prison guards and drivers.

Source was told by a KGB officer that the personnel assigned to the Operations Department are often sent on trips to the West during their vacations as guides or leaders of Soviet tourist groups. He was also told that the Operations Department handles requests from plants and firms for permission to send their employees to Western countries on business. Source learned from these employees that they were given various missions to take care of for the KGB while they were outside the USSR and if they refused the missions they were not allowed to make a second trip. Source had no information on the nature of the missions.

Source did not know if the Operations Department is responsible for providing security clearances (there are four levels, in all) upon the request of firms, plants or institutes, and he also did not know if the Operations Dept processes applications to emigrate received through the O.V.I.R. (Passport and Visa office).

The Operations Department also maintains a small office in each of the buildings housing the City District government, the City District Communist Party, and the City District KOMSOMOL. (Each City District has its own building). The Operations Department offices in these buildings have signs on their doors which clearly indicate that they are KGB offices. The offices are staffed with probably not more than ten KGB officers headed by a COL. Source doubted that these offices contain any files or dossiers because the personnel assigned to them are in daily contact with the headquarters staff. He also doubted that they are equipped to tap telephones. The officers assigned to the offices have cars at their disposal, and any other equipment or personnel required can be obtained from headquarters. There are no police in these buildings.

(b) Cooperation with Other KGB Departments

The work of the Operations Department depends greatly upon some of the other departments. The Technical Department, provides the surveillance equipment, and probably also the 9-mm Makarov pistol which is issued to each Operations officer. The automobiles used by the Operations Department officers are also provided by the Technical Department.

The Operations Department usually functions without coordinating with the Examining Department (Sledstvenni Otdel) but in difficult or important cases, a team may be formed to handle the matter before an arrest is made, and while the Examining Department interrogates the prisoner. At times, the local knowledge of the Examining Department may be needed by the Operations Department. Source stated that the Operations Department does not terminate investigation of a case after an arrest has been made, and may continue to give the Examining Department information which is helpful during the interrogation of the prisoner and which may also be helpful in preparing the case for the Public Prosecutor.

Another department on which the Operations Department depends is the Archives, which is a repository for all dossiers collected by the KGB which are often required by the Operations Department to accomplish its mission. Source stated that the Operations Department usually consults the Archives to find out if there is a dossier on anyone who has ever been associated with an individual who is being considered for a warning or an arrest. If there is no dossier the Operations Department will then initiate one.

(c) Cooperation from the Police (Miliz)

The regular police are required to turn over any potential defector to the KGB, as well as any case they uncover involving a foreigner, or any case which involves a foreigner and a Soviet citizen. Many foreigners are arrested for taking illegal photographs, or selling foreign merchandise to Soviet citizens, and both types of cases are of interest to the KGB. However, a Soviet citizen who is arrested by the police for conversing on the streets with a foreigner, can be held for 10 days by the police without being turned over to the KGB. If a snuppler from the West is caught by the police he must also be turned over to the KGB. According to Source, these cases receive a great deal of publicity to show up the capitalistic West. Any Soviet citizen who gives the police a tip which is known to be of interest to the KGB is referred to the KGB, or the tip is passed on to the KGB.

Source stated that the police make no attempt to extend their field of jurisdiction because they already have too much to do.

(d) Modus Operandi

(b)(1)
(b)(7)(C)
(b)(7)(D)

(b)(1)

(b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(D)

1 Preliminary Investigation

Source did not know how authority is obtained by the Operations Department to begin an investigation of an individual; that is, he did not know whether the Department chief has to request permission, or is only required to inform the Chief of the KGB that an investigation will be initiated. He also did not know at what exact point action is taken in a case, but knew that there are two types of action taken; i.e., either warning an individual, or arresting him.

The KGB is required to take action on any tip (oral or written), that it receives, or on any tip passed on by the police or the Party. Source did not know whether this regulation is written or unwritten, or what level it comes from, but he pointed out that it is logical because the KGB encourages the public by means of films and other media, to inform on their family, friends, neighbors, colleagues and foreigners.

(b)(1)

(b)(7)(D)

In addition to acting on tips, the Operations Department collects information continuously on everyone and, if the information constitutes evidence of anti-Communist thought or activity, a dossier is set up on the individual concerned. Source stated that the purpose of collecting information is to attempt to find individuals who are consciously or unconsciously breaking law; who have once broken the law; who are continuously breaking laws; or who plan to break the law.

Source did not know the standards the Department uses when (1), it decides to establish a dossier on an individual; (2), initiate intensive and exhaustive interviews of all persons close to the individual; or (3), employ more sophisticated types of surveillance. He also did not know at what point an officer in the headquarters is assigned as the Case Officer, but he believes that one is assigned to each case. The methods used in collecting information on individuals who are not specific suspects, and those used in collecting information on individuals who fall into the category of suspects, differ only slightly, and will be discussed further in this report.

Source stated that in important cases (importance being determined by the nature of the suspected crime; the status of the individual involved; and whether or not there is imminent danger to the State), that the KGB district office (which is limited in personnel and equipment), probably requests assistance from headquarters. Such assistance includes personnel, cars and electronic, photographic and/or optical equipment. (See Technical Department for details).

It is possible, however, that although evidence has been obtained proving involvement of an individual in some type of anti-Communism, the Operations Department may not take action of any kind; in fact, the individual may not even be called in for a warning. Source suggested that in such cases the following standards probably prevail: If the individual is young; is Russian; is from the working-class;

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is well-thought of at his place of work; is only peripherally or temporarily involved; has no contact with foreigners; does not belong to a group; and, otherwise, has a clean record, the KGB may (after all evidence has been collected), file his dossier away without further action. If, however, he is a Party member the Party will be informed and it may, or may not, issue him a reprimand, dismiss him from the Party, or even see that he is dismissed from his job.

In line with the KGB's collection of information, the mission of the KGB officers assigned to the city districts is to establish and maintain contact with as many individuals and as many categories of trades and professions as possible, in their districts. Source stated that most intelligent people can easily identify the KGB officers assigned to their district and, therefore, attempts by a KGB officer to obtain information anonymously, are usually unsuccessful. However, a KGB officer who asks a direct question without presenting his ID card, usually gets an answer because the person he questions recognizes and fears him.

A special KGB officer (presumably attached to the Operations Department), is assigned to the University of LENINGRAD, which covers an area as large as a city district. However, Source did not think that any dossiers on the students or faculty members are filed on the University's premises because he believes that the officer assigned to the University sends all information on both groups to headquarters. Source did not know the name of the KGB officer now assigned to the University of LENINGRAD, but stated that he maintains close contact with the Party and KOMSOMOL groups at the University, and attends student meetings of all kinds, although not in uniform. Nevertheless, Source heard that it is well-known to the students that he is a KGB officer.

Source stated that an individual who gives many parties, or has many visitors, is not necessarily of interest to the KGB because the network of informers is so enormous that the KGB probably relies on them to inform on anyone making serious anti-Communist statements, or engaged in anti-Communist activities. Among Source's large circle of acquaintances he stated that there were only a few whom he was certain were not informers. The informer network is anonymous and widespread.

In addition to KGB surveillance of foreign tourists through INTOURIST (see g. and h. under Section 4, Pre-Arrival Controls over Foreign Tourists, and Controls over Foreign Tourists on Arrival in the USSR), Source listed the following types of individuals who inform on a regular basis: Building superintendents, restaurant waiters, taxi drivers (who report to the KGB through the police assigned to LENINGRAD's taxi headquarters); prostitutes; and street sweepers. The informers are interrogated by the KGB at "safehouses" (locations unknown), or in a room in the building housing the KGB district office.

Informers are not paid to inform. They are motivated by fear of the KGB, and or hope of assistance in obtaining a better job; a promotion; better housing; etc. Since the KGB can, and does, read the police records, and can demand that a prisoner be turned over to them, they frequently find prisoners who have been apprehended in some petty crime and then threaten them with prosecution unless they are willing to become informers. This method also works with police who have been caught in some petty crime (usually involving corruption of some sort). Other informers include the personnel chiefs of plants and firms, who presumably inform through the local Party secretary assigned to the plants and firms, or to KGB officers who visit the plants incognito.

Soviet citizens making official trips to the West are always recruited as informers by the KGB (although not necessarily by the Operations Department), and those who refuse to carry out an assignment are not allowed to make a second trip. Because their assignments often involve informing on other Soviet citizens in the same travel group, Source believed that it is probably the Operations Department, however, which recruits the traveller, rather than the Espionage or Counter-Espionage Departments.

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Source stated that whenever the regime initiates special campaigns such as anti-alcohol, anti-drug, and anti-prostitution campaigns, or campaigns against absenteeism, individuals who have any information on these subjects are recruited by the KGB as informers. Hospitals and medical doctors are also required to make their records available to the KGB upon request. Therefore, since treatment for venereal disease must be reported to the police and is incorporated into the individual's dossier, many people avoid going to public hospitals by consulting a private physician who blackmails them by overcharging for promising not to report their VD to the police. Source stated that VD is widespread in LENINGRAD and he wonders if there was any connection between this fact and the fact that a VD specialist, Dr. (nu), was given an apartment in the building near Revolucii Sq in LENINGRAD which houses approximately thirty top government officials. Source added that although hospitals in the USSR can legally perform abortions, they are done in such a brutal, painful way (sic), that many women go to private physicians who charge a great deal of money for their services, although they know they are forbidden by law to perform abortions.

2 Warning

The KGB gives warnings (both official and unofficial), to people involved in any activity which is considered illegal. An unofficial warning is given orally, and an official warning is in the form of a written statement. The warnings are designed to persuade the individuals receiving them to discontinue a specified activity, and also to let their acquaintances (who may also be involved), know that the KGB is aware of their activities and expects that they will discontinue them. If an oral warning is given it may be accompanied by a demand that the person who receives it become an informer if he wants to avoid arrest. However, Source never saw any example of a written agreement to this demand.

A written warning is issued on an official form and in accordance with an amendment to the Criminal Procedures Code, dated 25 December 1972, the KGB is authorized to demand that the person receiving it indicate that he has read it by signing it. The signed form is retained by the KGB for their use in the event that the individual is subsequently prosecuted. The individual is not given a copy of the form for his own records. In addition to the warning, the KGB may also succeed in getting the individual dismissed from his job.

The warning interview is held either in the KGB's district office; a non-KGB office; police offices; in an office on Party or KOMSOMOL premises; or in some other area selected by the KGB. After the warning is issued, the KGB keeps him under continued surveillance to insure that he complies with the warning.

3 Arrest

In discussing the subject of arrest by the KGB, Source pointed out that it is virtually impossible to form an organization in the USSR today in the traditional sense of the word: i.e., an organization with a list of members; elected officials; regular meetings; minutes of meetings; and a program of activities. First of all, no organization may exist in the USSR without official sanction and this is never given and if an underground organization was activated the KGB would soon learn of its existence through its network of informers and those involved would be picked up. Therefore, open political dissent is rare, and the only consistent and continuing effort along these lines is the efforts of certain individuals Source knows who are engaged in collecting the names and case histories of persons interned in political camps and in the political prison in VLADIMIR (see IIR 2 218 9906 74, KGB Attitudes and Actions Toward SAMIZDAT).

Source did not know what standards are used, or at what point a decision is made to arrest, but he believed that the decision is made by the Operations Department in conjunction with the Examinee Department, which subsequently prepares the case for the Prosecuting Attorney, and possibly, in conjunction with the Chief of

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the KGB or his deputy. This doubtless depends upon the complexity of the case and the status of the individual. Source believed that the main factors precipitating arrest are the imminence of any actual danger to the State (either to persons or property); damage to the State such as sabotage, etc; anti-Communist propaganda from individuals, foreign literature, or foreign broadcasts; any group making anti-Communist statements or engaged in anti-Communist activities; or any group reproducing and distributing anti-Communist literature.

4 Investigation and Arrest Procedures (See Encl 2, Criminal Procedures Code)

When a suspect's name comes to the attention of the Operations Department, an immediate check of the Archives is made to see if there is a dossier on the individual. If there is no dossier, and the address of the individual is unknown, the Department then checks the Police Registry. A permit has to be obtained from the local City District's Prosecuting Attorney before the KGB can make a house search, or establish postal and telephone surveillance but these permits can be obtained ex-post facto. If a house search is necessary, two KGB officers are assigned to make it, but a witness must also be present. The witness is usually an official from the local city district's KOMSOMOL office. Although a house search may be made in the suspect's absence, a member of the family must be present when the house is searched. If the KGB wants to search a house in the suspect's absence, the Operations Department may call him in for an interview, and the search will be made while he is being interviewed.

Source stated that prior to 1971, when the KGB made a house search a list was made of all of the valuables in the house in the event that the court ordered confiscation of the valuables as part of the accused's sentence. Nevertheless, despite the list (which was not very exact), the family had an opportunity to either sell the valuables before they were confiscated, or replace them with cheaper items. Since 1971, however, permission to confiscate has been included in the permit authorizing the search signed by the Prosecuting Attorney and the KGB now confiscates everything of value at the time they make an arrest. The valuables are stored by the KGB (Source did not know where), until the court has sentenced the accused. If confiscation is not included in the sentence the valuables are returned to the family, but if confiscation is ordered the valuables then become the property of the State. Source stated that valuable paintings usually go to museums, but he did not know how the other items are disposed of. However, he stated that a white Mercedes automobile which was confiscated from a Finnish citizen who was caught smuggling, was put up as first prize in a lottery open to KGB officers and is now seen in LENINGRAD driven by the officer (nu), who won it.

In addition to searching a suspect's home for valuables and cash, the KGB also searches his weekend cottage, if he has one. Funds in bank accounts are also confiscated in anticipation of a possible fine imposed by the court but very few Soviet citizens keep any money in a bank. Source stated that it is usually hidden in their home, or given to friends to keep for them. Source never heard of any KGB officer who appropriated items during a house search for his own use, and stated that the officers consider themselves above such things.

Prior to making an arrest, the KGB interviews the suspect's friends, co-workers and neighbors and their remarks are recorded on an official form which is not signed until the arrest is made. After the arrest is made the KGB officer may, or may not, return to obtain the signatures. Any statements made after arrest, however, must be recorded and signed immediately by the person making them. The forms used for signed and unsigned statements have different headings, but Source had no other details on them. When a KGB officer interviews a suspect's co-workers, he usually does so through the personnel office, or the Party secretary assigned to the co-worker's job site, rather than interviewing the co-worker personally.

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An arrest is always made by two KGB officers, accompanied by a witness, and it is made as quietly and inconspicuously as possible. To accomplish this, the suspect may be called at his home or office and told on some pretext to report to the Housing Office, Draft Board, or Ministry of Defense. When he complies with the request he is arrested. If the KGB wants to delay an arrest but also wants to prevent the possible flight of the suspect, it may request the Draft Board to contact the suspect and assign him (if he is young enough), to three months of military duty, where he will be under constant surveillance until the KGB completes its investigation. Although the KGB cannot order the Draft Board to do this, if the Draft Board refuses, the KGB can request the Party to contact the military and inform them that the request has been made in the country's best interests.

The former technique of employing an "agent provocateur" to sit in a public place and goad a person into taking an action for which he could be promptly arrested, is no longer in vogue.

5 KGB Interest in Ex-Prisoners

Source knew of several instances where the Operations Department telephoned an ex-prisoner within three days after his return from a prison or prison camp, and invited him to the City District KGB office. Here he was asked by an officer if there was anything that the KGB could do to help rehabilitate him. If an ex-prisoner accepts such an offer he may be placing himself under obligation to act as an informer for the KGB. However, Source believed that the KGB's real aim was to make it clear to the ex-prisoners that the KGB knew that they had returned. Source knew that in some cases the Operations Department made arrangements which made it impossible for an ex-prisoner to return to his home town, but Source had no information on how this was done. However, he thought that this type of exile takes two forms: one form is to allow the ex-prisoner to live within a certain distance of his former home and the other form is to require him to live in some specific area - usually Siberia. Source presumes that the ex-prisoner is probably re-sentenced while in prison on orders from the KGB and then subjected to such exile.

(e) Pre-Arrival Controls over Foreign Tourists

If a foreigner plans to visit LENINGRAD unofficially as a tourist, he must arrange his trip through a tourist agency in his own country, which obtains a visa for him by turning in his passport to the local Soviet embassy or consulate. The KGB officer assigned to the embassy or consulate is responsible for screening his passport to learn whether or not he was born in the USSR; to ascertain what his job is (students of Slavic languages and social sciences are immediately suspect); and, if necessary, to send a photograph of the applicant (which is attached to his application for a passport), to the USSR as a check on his identification.

The KGB does not place a tourist under any special surveillance unless the above conditions exist.

(f) Controls over Foreign Tourists on Arrival in the USSR

All foreign tourists visiting the Leningrad area are hosted either by some official organization which invited them, or by INTOURIST, the Soviet travel agency, which has a branch office in LENINGRAD and headquarters in MOSCOW. INTOURIST provides tourists with hotels, group excursions, interpreters and guides. Source knew of at least one INTOURIST office in LENINGRAD, which is located in the Yeropeska Hotel on Iskusteva Plosche (Square), and he thought that there might be another office or offices in the city but did not know their locations.

During the summer influx of foreign tourists there are approximately ten hotels in LENINGRAD which are exclusively assigned to INTOURIST and Source stated, that if a mistake is made in the bookings and a tourist does not have a room for the night, Soviet citizens can be barred from other hotels. There is also a special hotel - the Hotel Baltiska - for the exclusive use of foreign VIPs, which is located on

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Nevsky Boulevard (street number unknown), E of Vladimsky Place. The Foreign Youth Organization (Source could not recall the Russian name), runs a hotel for young people, known as the Druzba (Friendship) Hotel, and the rates are cheaper in this hotel than in those run by INTOURIST. Source stated that the interpreters in the Druzba are all KGB informers. There is also a carmine site for tourists located 40 km N of REPINOW, a city NE of Leningrad on the Gulf of Finland.

Source did not know if a KGB officer is assigned to the Leningrad airport. However, he suspects that the KGB officers who are assigned to the embassies and consulates abroad probably instruct KGB headquarters in Leningrad to tell Soviet customs authorities at RR stations and airports to carefully check the luggage of specific tourists on their arrival. He also suspects that the stewardesses on Aeroflot planes are told to keep specific tourists under surveillance and report anything unusual about them to the customs officials when the plane lands.

On their arrival in Leningrad, all foreign tourists, except those driving their own vehicles, are met by INTOURIST drivers and interpreters (or drivers and interpreters from the official organization hosting them), and taken to their hotels. The drivers and interpreters are all KGB informers. Source stated that those tourists who have already been placed under suspicion by the KGB officers assigned to the embassies and consulates in their countries (or for some incident which may have occurred enroute to Leningrad), are all assigned to hotel rooms equipped with electronic listening devices. The VIPs assigned to the Hotel Baltiska are all assigned to such rooms. The following activities by tourists in Leningrad automatically insure that they will be under police or KGB surveillance while there: The presence of a foreign tourist in restricted areas near shipyards; blackmarketing - i.e., selling personal items to Soviet citizens (which, with some exceptions, is usually handled by the police); importing and reselling items which should have been declared at the border customs office but were not; and failure to eat, sleep or take the tours offered by INTOURIST, since all tourists are required to pay for their hotel rooms, meals, and tours in advance. Source stated that tourists are allowed to hire an INTOURIST car with a driver and interpreter, but are not allowed to drive more than 30 km beyond the city limits.

Telephone calls placed through the hotel switchboards are monitored by the operator, and if there is anything in the conversation which is cause for suspicion, the conversations are reported to the KGB. In addition, a female is assigned to sit at a desk in each corridor of the hotels with all of the doors on the corridor visible to her. Any Soviet citizen who wants to visit any of the rooms must tell her to which room he or she is going, and give their name so that she can telephone the person they want to visit and announce them. In performing this function she has a legitimate reason for asking each visitor their name, which she later reports to the KGB, along with the names of the people visited. Source stated that these women often buy items from foreign tourists which they later resell - presumably at a profit. KGB surveillance also includes surveillance over hotel personnel and interpreters.

(b)(1)
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In 1972 - 1973, the chief of Leningrad's INTOURIST () (fnu), was arrested on charges of corruption. According to rumor, the MOSCOW KGB was tipped off that () possessed a great deal of money - far more than could be accounted for by his salary. The money was found by the KGB and () was arrested, and when investigation by the KGB was still underway. Apparently () incriminated many other top regional Party members and city government officials, because a wave of other arrests followed. However, the police had made no effort to investigate the case because () had formerly been Chief of Transport Police in Leningrad and still had many friends on the police force.

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Source stated that five highways lead out of Leningrad, to the south but only one of them is open to foreign tourists. Many tourists arrive by train from the port of TALLIN, and others from BREST-LITVSK via MOSCOW. In addition, the Leningrad airport has incoming and outgoing traffic direct from the West. The major tourist route for tourists traveling by car to Leningrad, however, is from Finland, which is only 200 km north of the city. According to Source the tourists arriving by car from Finland constitute a major headache for the KGB because maintaining surveillance over them inconspicuously is very difficult.

The town of VYBORG on the major route from Finland is close to the border, and it is literally crawling with KGB officers. In addition, the local villagers along the highway and the Drushins (Police Helpers), in the villages, are asked to keep any suspicious activities by foreigners under surveillance and to inform on them at once, and are given time off from their jobs to carry out this mission.

The first KGB checkpoint is at a bridge spanning a river north of VYBORG. A police station, occupied by KGB officers, is located close to the bridge and since all cars have to slow down before crossing the bridge, the KGB officers in the police station have time to record the type of car, license plate number, number of passengers, and the exact time the car crosses the bridge. There are many more police stations located along the 186 km long highway, and the end police station is on the outskirts of Leningrad at UN 426536. The police assigned to these stations are all in contact with each other via radio and/or telephone transceivers, and if a car driving along the highway fails to come within view of each station within a certain specified length of time (no details) a KGB auto is notified to look for it. (KGB cars with two-way radios patrol the highway at all times.) If the KGB finds the car parked somewhere to allow the passengers to rest, picnic, or swim, no action is taken. However, if a passenger appears to be missing, the KGB sends out an alarm and a search is launched immediately. All of these activities are carried out inconspicuously without the tourists' knowledge, if possible.

When a car carrying tourists arrives at the end police station (i.e., nearest to Leningrad), the KGB is responsible for insuring that the passengers check into the INTOURIST hotel in which they were booked by their tourist agency. Source stated that there is radio communication between the end police station and the reception desks at INTOURIST, the Foreign Youth Association, and Camp REPINOV, and that surveillance over these three installations by the KGB takes two forms, either by KGB officers on the spot, or through hotel informers.

A basic problem for the KGB, however, is that the lower-level hotel employees do not understand or speak foreign languages and although INTOURIST offers them on-duty language classes they derive little benefit from them. Therefore, lower-level personnel pass on any information they obtain to higher level personnel who, in turn, pass it on to the responsible KGB officers. Source saw KGB officers in various INTOURIST hotels, and heard from friends in the hotel service that there are rooms reserved for KGB use in each hotel. No files are kept in these rooms but presumably the electronic listening devices installed in certain hotel rooms are connected with the rooms occupied by the KGB. As previously indicated in this report, there is a KGB apartment in the Hotel Astoria, and Source assured that this, and other apartments located in, or near other INTOURIST hotels, are used to gain surveillance over foreign tourists during the tourist season. Source stated that the KGB uses so many cars to check on the VIPs booked at the Hotel Baltica, that the local population refers to the parking space in front of the hotel as a "merry-go-round".

Source thought that it is possible that in cases where the evidence collected indicates espionage, that the Operations Department probably refers them to the Counterespionage Department.

(2) Examining Department (Sledstvenni Otdel)

This department either hires people with legal training or gives them on-the-job legal training. The department obtains the dossier on an arrested person from the Operations Department. However, legal advice and sometimes the presence of officers from the Examining Department is often required by the officers of the Operations Dept when they are in the process of obtaining evidence (e.g., searching a house), to justify an arrest, or a warning. Source did not know the extent of cooperation but pointed out that the Operations Department cannot make an arrest unless there is sufficient evidence to justify it legally.

The Examining Department is responsible for examining the evidence, interrogating the accused, and interrogating the witnesses; in short, it is responsible for preparing the case for the Prosecuting Attorney. The essence of building a case for the Prosecuting Attorney is to put every detail related to the case into writing and then obtain the signature of the accused to the written evidence. The Department is also responsible for cooperating with the Operations Department and, if the case is an important one, to cooperate with the Chief of the KGB and OGBKOV (Regional Communist Party) officials to determine the length of the sentence to be asked by the Prosecutor; obtain a defense lawyer for the accused; and see that the accused is present at the courthouse for trial. The Examining Department also administers the detention cell block.

(a) Detention Conditions

An informer is sometimes put into the same cell with an accused to obtain information which is used against him during subsequent interrogations.

Only in cases of necessity are three prisoners kept in one cell; the usual number is two. In 1968, thirteen cells were empty, and in 1972 there was only one prisoner in each cell. Prisoners are interrogated by the KGB officer in his office in the main building. (fnu), told Source that physical torture of any type is now not only forbidden, but is unnecessary because "we have other, better methods". Source heard from friends who had been in the cells that they believed that they were given an U/I drug in their food while in detention and during the actual court trial. (fnu) and interned in a prison camp, told Source, after his release that he felt a vast improvement physically and mentally, the moment he returned to his cell after his trial. He said he felt sure that he had been subjected to drugs introduced into his food, during his interrogation and trial. He was 34 years old at the time and a sportsman and boxer, and he stated that there was no other explanation for his hysteria (either laughing or crying), while in detention and on trial, in view of the fact that he returned to normal within 24 hours after his trial. Another friend (fnu) told Source that he believed that he was hypnotized by his interrogator. Subsequent to the interrogation he felt as though he had come out of a hypnotic state of some kind.

Source stated that there is no paragraph in the Legal Procedures Code which forbids the use of drugs for the purpose of interrogation. Furthermore, according to rumor, it is even possible to use physical torture if the Chief Soviet Prosecuting Attorney (fnu) (who, according to rumor, has the power to authorize it), gives his permission.

The prisoner's physical condition is recorded in writing by the prison superintendent when the prisoner is signed back into his cell after interrogation. A written record is also made of any complaint by the prisoner at that time that the interrogator mistreated him physically. Source stated that three such accusations from different prisoners ends the career of the interrogating officer as an interrogator.

The prisoner can also demand that a written record be made of any claim he makes to having been beaten and forwarded to higher officers by the interrogating officer. The prisoner can also mention the fact that he was beaten during his court trial. A prisoner is not allowed to see his defense lawyer during his interrogation.

Prisoners get one hour of daily outdoor exercise while in detention (6, Fp 3). Detention conditions in the KGB cells in MOSCOW are allegedly better than those in the detention cells in LENINGRAD, and Source thought that the reason for this is that more foreigners are detained in the detention cells in MOSCOW. The prisoners in MOSCOW are interned in Lefortova Prison, which was used for the same purpose in Czarist times. Detention conditions in LENINGRAD differ mainly in that the prisoners are not allowed to sleep during the day and are given less bread and less sugar daily. Source gave the following description of Lefortova Prison: Each cell is 2.3 x 3.5 m in size, with a locked window which has been painted except for a narrow strip. The windows are all barred on the outside and outside the bars is a metal blind, immovably attached to the outer sill and slanted upward, which permits a view of the sky only. The door has a peephole in it which is used by the guard to observe the prisoners. Since the outside corridor is carpeted, the approach of the guard is not audible to the prisoners inside the cells. The door to each cell has a small trap door in it through which the food is passed. There are three folding type beds in each cell, three stools, and an unenclosed flush toilet. A lamp hangs from the ceiling, containing a 60 or 70 watt bulb, and it is on day and night. The bedding and towels are exchanged every ten days and when a cell must be entered, one guard enters and another stands at the open door. The prisoners are allowed to take a bath every ten days. Their hair is not cut, and no uniforms are issued. The prisoners are allowed to lie on their bed during the day. They are not allowed to put a blanket over their heads but can place a strip of cloth over their eyes. They are also given an hour a day to walk outside in an enclosed area but may refuse to do so if the weather is bad or if they have the doctor's permission to stay inside. Medical attention is available in the prison. Breakfast consists of as much bread as the prisoner wants, a pot of hot tea (both items can be kept by the prisoner all day if he wants to eat them later) porridge with oil (sic) and, since 1972, 20 grams of sugar. Lunch consists of soup, potatoes or porridge with pieces of meat, or a cutlet. Supper consists of fish soup or porridge. The library contains books in many languages, probably confiscated from former prisoners. A prisoner can check out a new book every ten days. Pravda is the only newspaper available.

Any money over 25 rubles which a prisoner has in his possession when he is jailed is confiscated and after he has spent the 25 rubles he is authorized to receive money from relatives or friends. A prisoner is allowed to spend 5 rubles a month in the prison shop for cigarettes, butter (not more than 200 gm per month), sugar and sausage, and each prisoner is authorized to receive one package a month from friends or relatives containing cigarettes or food. The package is deliverable by mail, or in person, but a receipt must be issued if it is delivered personally. All packages are opened and searched - including loaves of bread. The prisoners are not allowed to receive any canned food, but if any is included in a package, the contents are removed and given to the prisoner. Prisoners are allowed two packages a month if they can obtain permission from their interrogators, which is granted solely on the basis of their cooperation with him. All letters written or received by the prisoners are censored by their interrogators. If a prisoner fails to cooperate with his interrogator, the interrogator can forbid him to use the prison shop, or receive packages or, if necessary, give him ten days of solitary confinement in a poorly heated cell where he is allowed to wear only trousers and a shirt, and gets only one hot meal a day.

(b) Legal Aspects of Detention

A Soviet citizen may not be held in detention longer than six months before being arraigned or released. This requirement is valid for the KGB as well as for the police. However, under certain circumstances, this period can be prolonged for up to two years. This happened to a friend of Source.

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(b)(1)
(b)(7)(D) who was held by the KGB in MOSCOW, after being () because his case was complicated and the KGB needed time to unravel it.

Prolongation is obtained for successive short periods as follows: The City District Prosecutor must grant it first; then the City Prosecutor, then the Chief Prosecutor for the Leningrad Region; then the Chief Prosecutor of the Russian S.S.R.; then the Chief Prosecutor of the USSR; and, last, the Council of the Soviet Parliament (Praezidium Verkovnogo Sovjeta).

As previously stated, the defense lawyer is not allowed to communicate with the prisoner in any way until after the KGB has finished interrogating him and has obtained his signature on the interrogation record, which consists of a full confession. Prisoners are not allowed visits from their relatives or friends, and communication with anyone outside the prison is permitted only through the interrogator, who censors all communications.

Since the prison guards stationed outside the prison are never in contact with the prisoners, it is not possible for them to transmit any communications to the prisoners. The guards are all Soviet Army recruits who are assigned to this duty for a relatively short period of time, presumably to eliminate the possibility of any of them staying long enough to establish any contact with the prisoners. Recruits from LENINGRAD or the regional area are never assigned to the prison as guards, probably for the same reason.

After a prisoner has been allowed to select a lawyer to defend him, the lawyer is allowed to come to the KGB headquarters to discuss the case with the prisoner. This is done in the interrogation room which has probably been wired for sound during the interrogator's absence. The defense lawyer is not allowed to transmit any verbal or written messages between the prisoners and anyone outside the prison. He is also not allowed to discuss the case with the Prosecuting Attorney before the trial. Therefore, he does not know what charges will be made against the prisoner, or what sentence will be demanded. He is only allowed to read the record of the interrogation, and based on this he must decide whether to advise the prisoner to plead "guilty" or "not guilty".

(c) Interrogation Procedures

An interrogation is usually conducted by one interrogator, although sometimes two interrogators - one of whom plays the tough role, and the other, the understanding role - are used. The interrogator may ask the Prosecuting Attorney to be present during an interrogation, or the Prosecuting Attorney may request to attend one, or more, of the interrogation sessions. This is done to give the Attorney an opportunity to assess the prisoner's character and psychological makeup so that during the trial the Attorney can refer to his "personal knowledge of the accused". The prisoner cannot request the presence of the Prosecuting Attorney during the interrogation, but he is allowed to write to him. Sometimes an officer in the Operations Department who has handled the case prior to the prisoner's arrest, is also present to strengthen the interrogator's attempt to convince the prisoner that the KGB knows everything already and merely needs the prisoner's signed statement to confirm it.

The interrogator is also interested in obtaining the prisoner's views on matters apparently unrelated to the case. This is done to assist him in preparing a separate report on the prisoner's character and psychological makeup, which is used by the Prosecuting Attorney and the KGB to assess two factors which are essential to their joint determination of the length of the sentence to be asked. These factors are the degree of remorse shown by the prisoner for his misdeeds, and the degree to which he has altered his thinking and, therefore, his predictable behavior in the future.

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It is made clear to every prisoner prior to his interrogation that despite his arrest and the mass of evidence against him already in the possession of the KGB, he still has two alternatives: namely, that he can either cooperate, or not cooperate. He is usually told that if he cooperates he will return home sooner than he will if he refuses to cooperate.

A daily record of the statements made by the prisoner and by the interrogator (or interrogators), is kept on a form with a pre-printed statement as a heading, indicating that the contents are a record of an interrogation of a prisoner, and not of a witness. The interrogator is usually a master at twisting words and, therefore, by the end of the day the prisoner may no longer recall exactly what he has said. Nevertheless, he must sign the record at the end of each day. If he refuses to do so, two KGB officers are called in to witness his refusal and sign a statement to that effect. However, a prisoner can legally tell an interrogator that the record was obtained by threats - in which case, rather than enter this accusation in the record, the interrogator may elect to tear up the record and start over again.

A prisoner can also legally refuse to talk during the interrogation, but this problem can generally be overcome by placing a drug in his food as previously mentioned. Prisoners can also address a letter, through the interrogator, to the Prosecuting Attorney, which the interrogator must forward. The prisoner is authorized to complain about the interrogator in any way in the letter, even to the extent of stating that he does not like the interrogator - in which case the interrogator will be replaced by another.

In addition to interrogating the prisoner, the Examining Department also calls in witnesses for interrogation. The statements of the interrogator and the witness are entered on pages with a pre-printed statement as a heading, to that effect. Although a prisoner is legally allowed to remain silent, a witness may not. Witnesses are also required to sign the daily record of the interrogation. Source stated that a prisoner is allowed to read all of the records of his interrogation and make notes from them which he can use during his trial.

There are various ways of cooperating, from the KGB point of view. The prisoner may confess everything concerning his own guilt; he may incriminate other people directly or peripherally involved in the illegal deed; he may agree to act as an informer to lead the KGB to other people who are guilty of other illegal actions, planned or actual; or, he may, after he is sentenced, behave in a certain prescribed manner while in the prison camp or prison. A full confession will obtain a reduced sentence for a prisoner; i.e., the lower limit of the number of years prescribed by law.

Incriminating others will also obtain a prisoner a reduced sentence and, possibly, even an early pardon. Source was certain that (fnu), who were (fnu) and (fnu) for collecting and disseminating printed matter considered to be anti-Communist under Article 70 of the Criminal Code, were released after serving only one year of their two-year sentences because they had incriminated others. They claimed to have done this after a promise by the KGB not to arrest those incriminated. Source stated that the KGB invariably keeps its promises, and that it did not arrest the individuals whom (fnu) and (fnu) incriminated. Source also stated that if a prisoner is sentenced to a political prison camp, he can guarantee that he will not be resented while in the camp if he keeps his mouth shut (there is a network of informers at every prison camp); volunteers for extra duties such as cleaning, painting, etc, in addition to doing his daily job (for which he is paid); and joins the S.V.P. (Sektzia Vnutrennovo Poryadka - Section of Internal Order), which is an arm of the prison camp's administration.

If a prisoner is released from detention and never tried in court, there is every reason to believe that he had made a deal with the KGB. In this case, everyone avoids him from then on.

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Source talked with many individuals who have been arrested by the KGB, interrogated, tried and imprisoned and he stated that the main type of evidence they want from a suspect is evidence of any connection he, or other people he knows, have with the West, and any connection he, or other people he knows, have with a group of other Soviet citizens. Source stated that the KGB has all of the necessary resources to obtain evidence of guilt from a suspect, including the use of drugs; the threat of a death sentence which is not usually authorized for the crime under consideration; the threat to confiscate the suspect's valuables, thereby leaving his family destitute; the threat of a long prison sentence under the most severe prison conditions, or the use of promises of a reduced sentence and/or less severe prison conditions, plus a promise not to resentence the prisoner while he is still in prison.

Theoretically, a successful ploy is to refuse to talk during interrogation, and then speak up in court. This technique will catch the Prosecuting Attorney off guard because he has no signed confession in his possession and therefore does not have enough knowledge of the case to refute the statements made by the accused. This technique is dangerous to employ, however, because it prompts the use of drugs during interrogation, or, even worse, commitment to a mental hospital prison.

Source felt that the majority of prisoners who undergo interrogation decide to cooperate. He knew of only one case - that of a seaman arrested for smuggling - in which even the probable use of drugs to obtain his testimony, failed. The seaman spoke up only during his trial. The majority of those accused, however, try to take a middle course; that is, they cooperate to the extent of incriminating themselves, but try not to incriminate others.

Source believed that certain factors can lessen the severity of the sentence imposed on an accused. For example, the KGB places great value on a request for leniency from the State which is included in an accused's signed statement expressing remorse for the crime he committed and promising to abandon all criminal activities after his release from prison. A signed statement of this type is taken into consideration, along with the interrogator's assessment of the accused's psychological makeup, prior to imposing the sentence at the end of the trial.

(d) Commitment to Special Mental Hospitals (Prisons) (Spetsialna bolnitsa)

Source knew several former inmates of special mental hospitals located throughout the USSR, including a hospital in LENINGRAD, R.S.R.S.R. This hospital is located near the Finlandskiy RR station in LENINGRAD, but Source did not know the street address. The hospital's administration includes a Commission which is responsible for determining who will be committed or released from the hospital. To obtain commitment of a prisoner to the hospital the KGB in LENINGRAD refers his case to the Commission.

The basis for commitment varies; e.g., the KGB may cite the prisoner's family history, which includes someone who had a nervous breakdown, or may submit the fact that the prisoner once had an accident which resulted in a head injury. (See charge against GEN GRIGORENKO, outlined below)

Commitment is most often employed when a prisoner refuses to cooperate during interrogation - either by remaining silent or refusing to sign the daily record of his interrogation - and it generally involves prisoners who have no family or influential friends. Source stated that a prisoner whom the KGB can prove to have connection with capitalistic countries, or to have had connections with Nazis,

is never committed to a mental hospital. Source stated here that the recent release of Soviet Army GEN GRIGORENKO (fnu), from one of these hospitals was definitely the result of Western interest and verbal intervention. The charge used to commit GRIGORENKO was that he was anti-Stalin, and publicly transferred his loyalty from STALIN to KHRUSHCHEV.

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The condition in all of these hospitals are similar to those in a prison. However, since the inmates have never been legally tried, they are not sentenced to specific terms, but must remain in the hospital until they are "cured". U/I types of drugs are used as a matter of course. If a prisoner requests release he is usually released to another non-prison type of mental institution and, possibly later, to the custody of his family. However, it usually takes two years before a prisoner is transferred to a non-prison mental institution, and this is possible only with the aid of his family or friends. To obtain a transfer, the prisoner is required to write a letter to the KGB pleading temporary insanity as the cause of the crime, and stating that he regrets committing the crime and believes that he is now cured.

Other mental hospital type prisons in the USSR include the Serbakovo Institute (address unknown), in the Moscow Region; a hospital in ORLOVSKAYA in the Orlovskaya Region; a hospital in DNEPROPETROVSK in the Dnepropetrovsk Region of the Ukrainian SSR, and another in CHERNIGOVKA in the Chernigovskaya Region.

(c) KGB Collusion with Prosecuting Attorney in Trial Procedures

After the Examining Department has collected all of the evidence in a case, it is turned over to the Prosecuting Attorney with the written record of interrogation which the accused has signed, thereby acknowledging his guilt. As previously stated, failure to cooperate during interrogation is frequently the basis used to commit a prisoner to a mental hospital, but this does not occur if a prisoner refuses to talk during his trial because he has already acknowledged his guilt by signing the interrogation record. Remaining silent during the trial, however, will guarantee a prisoner a longer sentence. Court procedures require the Prosecuting Attorney to interview any individual the defendant wants to call as a witness during interrogation, but upon instruction from the KGB, he can refuse to allow the witness to be called during the trial.

The articles of the Criminal Code define the maximum and minimum lengths of the various sentences imposed for each type of crime committed; the levels of severity of the prison reprobation imposed (i.e., harsh, severe, etc); the conditions for confiscating personal property (which exclude confiscation of an accused's bed, table or chairs); and the conditions under which a prisoner may be exiled after he has served his prison sentence. The Criminal Code does not mention exile to any point outside of the USSR, and Source believed that exile of this type is determined only at Politburo level, and only if it is requested by the Chief of the KGB. Source stated that although it is better to be exiled than to remain in prison life, exile to a foreign country constitutes a peculiarly subtle form of punishment, because no true Russian is happy away from his homeland.

The KGB not only directs the Attorney as to prison term length to be asked but also prescribes the level of severity to impose on the prisoner while in prison, determines if his personal possessions will be confiscated; and decides whether or not he will be exiled after serving his prison term. The KGB also decides whether the prisoner will serve all or only part of his term in a prison camp, or in a prison, and if the sentence includes both, the KGB decrees which he will serve in first. Source stated that there are many variations in the punishments imposed. The KGB judges each case individually and bases the sentence on the degree of guilt, the nature of the crime; intransigence during interrogation; personal status; and, when presented, a signed statement admitting guilt and expressing remorse for the crime committed.

As previously indicated, the KGB continues to exercise control over a prisoner for the rest of his life. For example, when a prisoner is serving his prison term, the KGB may resentence him to a longer term; may subsequently exile him to a remote area of the USSR; or may subsequently send him to the prison in VLADIMIR. Source cited the case of AMALRIK, Andreif, who wrote a book titled Life in the USSR in 1984, who was sentenced to three years in a penal camp in the Mordovii area. The KGB planned to resentence him while he was still in this penal camp but, according

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to rumor, the interest shown by the West in his case precipitated his exile to Siberia at the end of his prison term. Source stated that in a sentence ten years long, the first five years are usually spent in the prison in VLADIMIR (where three prisoners are assigned to one cell), the next two years in a political prison camp, and the last three years the prisoner is returned to the prison in VLADIMIR. Source assumed from this that conditions in that prison are so bad that no prisoner could survive them for ten years.

Although all of the prisons in the USSR are administered by the MVD, the KGB retains jurisdiction over prisoners incarcerated under political articles 64 through 88 (i.e., Crimes Against the State - see Encl 1). As indicated, the levels of severity imposed on the prisoners in the prisons and penal camps vary. The prison administration responsible for the group of ten penal camps in the Mordovii Region officially impose two levels of severity. (Source stated that there are apparently three or four levels which can be imposed officially, but the least severe - which permits prisoners to work in civilian plants outside of the prison complex - does not exist in these penal camps). He further stated that although there are several levels of severity which can be imposed, only one level is imposed in each penal camp. Source did not know what level is imposed in the prison in VLADIMIR, but he stated that all of the political prisoners in this prison eat in their cells and are not allowed to leave them except to go to work, or to go outside for their daily exercise. The prisoners can spend the money they earn at work in the prison store.

(3) Technical Department (Technicheskii Otdel)

This Department employs mainly engineers and technically-trained people, but former burglars are also hired who are listed as drivers or repairmen on the payroll, but who are used to pick locks on doors, windows, safes, etc. The KGB officers assigned to the Department are equipped with unknown quantities of 9-mm Makarov pistols; cars equipped with radio transceivers (and occasionally with TV cameras); electronic listening devices; long-range cameras; and telephone tapping equipment. Much of the photo equipment (telephoto, and miniature cameras, and lenses), and the long-distance listening equipment, was made in Western countries. The equipment used to tap telephones consisted of two types (no details): one type taped a telephone conversation, and the other type could be used to tape and listen to a conversation simultaneously. Source knew that there is usually a delay of three days before a taped conversation gets to either the Operation, or the Examining Departments.

All cars used by the KGB in LENINGRAD are black Volgas, which seat five passengers, and have car radios which operate on ultra shortwave bands which can be picked up by amateurs. Therefore, the KGB officers driving these cars do not identify themselves, or the areas they are driving in. The horsepower of these Volgas exceeds the vehicle's normal horsepower, but Source did not know to what extent. The license plates on the Volgas driven by the KGB in LENINGRAD were changed frequently (often with MOSCOW license plates substituted), to conceal the fact that they were driven by the KGB. (The plates could be easily and rapidly changed by using some type of adhesive instead of standard nuts and bolts.) The cars assigned to the Technical Department were parked in a single-story building, which was formerly a stable, located on the S end of Moike Ulitsa, along the S bank of the Moike river, about 50 m E of Konuschenaja Plosched (Square). Repair and maintenance facilities, as well as a gas pump, were also located in the garage. However, the drivers were also allowed to gas up at any public gas station.

Source stated that the Volgas driven by the KGB can be recognized immediately because there are always five occupants in the cars, and they often change their hats while in the cars to conceal their identity. However, Source, or anyone in LENINGRAD who has watched them over the course of the years, can immediately see that they are KGB officers. Source stated that when they shadow, or pursue, another car, they use two or more cars.

Source did not know if there is any relationship between the Technical Department and a new KGB training school in Leningrad; i.e., whether or not the Technical Department is responsible in any way for the school's training equipment.

(4) Espionage and Counterespionage Departments (Rasvedka Otdel and Contrar-asvedka Otdel)

Source had very little information on these departments, as neither he nor his friends were ever involved with them. However, he knew that an officer working in a Western country in a camouflage job, is paid a double salary; that the personnel assigned to these Departments never appear in uniform; and that the cases the Departments handle are never publicized. Source assumed that anything relating to espionage and/or counterespionage uncovered by the KGB's Operations Department in its surveillance of Soviet citizens or Western tourists, is automatically turned over to these departments. Source did not know to what extent, if any, the Examining Department assists in the preparation of espionage and counterespionage cases, but he doubted that it gives any assistance at all.

(5) Archives (Archiv)

All KGB dossiers are kept in the Archives, but Source did not know whether or not the records are on microfilm. A KGB officer once told him that his own dossier (i.e., Source's), was approximately 8 cm thick. The police do not have access to these dossiers, which are strictly for KGB use. Source assumed that, among other uses, they are probably useful to the KGB when firms and industries request information on employees they want to clear to handle classified material. A friend of Source who is a computer technician, was offered a job in the Archives in 1971.

(6) Supply Department (Snabzhenia Otdel)

Source had no information on this department, but assumed that the Department probably found it difficult to obtain many supplies - particularly office equipment, which was difficult to find.

(7) Finance Department (Russian unknown)

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(b)(7)(D) The only information Source had on this Department was () a friend of his, () (fau), () was asked by the Department to prepare an analysis on how the KGB used its funds. The analysis required two full months of work to complete, during which time () issued a special pass which authorized him to enter the headquarters building.

(8) Personnel Department (Russian unknown)

Source had no information on this Department.

(9) Training Facilities

(a) In Leningrad

In 1971, a seven-story building, approximately 100 m long, was constructed at UTM UM 572496, on the west bank of the Bolshoiia Octa River. Source was told by a KGB officer that it was the KGB's "new training school", and that it included classrooms; language laboratories; a firing range for practice firing of 9-mm Makarov pistols; and driver training facilities. The classroom training included legal training for those who needed it (i.e., the journalists employed in the Operations Department and the personnel assigned to the Espionage and Counterespionage Departments).

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All officers under a certain age were expected to participate once a week after work in some form of athletics at the Dynamo Sports Club stadium, and many officers went there to box and wrestle. Their families were also authorized to use the Club, which is located on the N corner of the juncture of Malaya Nevka River and Petrogradskaya Ulitsa. The use of the stadium is also authorized for the members of the MVD (police and fire department), and both the MVD and the KGB share the costs of operating the Club. A KGB officer is always appointed to the honorary position of Sports Officer. Tennis courts are also available, and Source was taken into the Club by his friend ()

(b) In MOSCOW

(b)(1)
(b)(7)(D)

There is a KGB school in MOSCOW, but Source did not know how many KGB officers in LENINGRAD attended the school, if any. His information was derived from casual conversations with a professor of Marxist-Leninist dialectics at the school. ()

Source once heard () say that he taught Marxist-Leninist dialectics, and told Source that his father's students were all in their forties, and that, in addition to Soviet citizens, some of them were from Sovbloc countries. Source also saw () KGB (red) ID card. ()

5. (c) (u) Overt Efforts by the KGB to Establish a New Image

a. Communications Media

The KGB makes use of films, books, and newspaper articles to project its new image to the public, to persuade the public to inform on anyone who may possibly be engaged in anti-Communist activities, and to persuade the Politburo that the KGB is indispensable.

About every three years, the KGB in LENINGRAD publishes a book (nu) consisting of a collection of the cases in which the KGB has successfully detected and combated foreign espionage and foreign propaganda. The book contains no classified material and is on sale in bookstores.

An article appeared in Izvestia, the Leningrad newspaper, which indicated that in 1973 the KGB arrested 16 foreigners for anti-Communist activities, ranging from smuggling; blackmarketing; taking photographs in unauthorized areas; actual espionage; and importing and disseminating anti-Communist literature. The article also stated that the KGB confiscated 6,000 pieces of anti-Communist literature in 1973.

The KGB encourages the production of any films in which the KGB is portrayed as the omniscient protector of the Communist system from foreign enemies, assisted by tips from the ever-watchful public, or by citizens who have inadvertently become involved in espionage and who reported it to the KGB (who would have discovered it sooner or later anyhow).

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The KGB offers advice and technical help in the production of these films in order to guarantee the quality of the image projected and to censor any classified materials which may appear in the films. One example of the KGB's failure in this respect was in the production of PROSMOTR, a full-length feature film. The producer () a friend of Source, failed to inform the KGB that the film was being made. It concerned a western agent sent into the USSR to obtain information about civil defense. When the KGB learned that the film had already been made and was ready for the usual showing to the Kremlin chiefs prior to release to the public, it angrily demanded to see the film, and then requested that the film be edited to eliminate what the KGB considered classified material. This demand was rejected, and when the film was shown at the Kremlin it was passed as it was.

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b. General Public Opinion of the KGB

The presence of the KGB and its capacity to discover every small, single anti-Communist activity is one of the central facts of life in the USSR. Thus because there are absolutely no grounds for hoping that any organized, overt, anti-Communist activity will not be discovered by the KGB, there is no organized resistance to Communism. There is only an unorganized, but widespread, network of persons engaged in concealing and distributing literature of varying degrees of anti-Communism. (See IIR 2 218 9906 74, KGB Attitude and Actions Toward SAMIZDAT). According to Source, the working class is gradually coming around to belief that they are not the KGB's main target; that, on the contrary, the KGB is protecting them against evil foreign influences.

Even the professional classes, who know that they are suspected by the KGB of anti-regime activities, are not so frightened by this idea that they are too paralyzed with fear to perform professionally. They have learned to handle the problem by either avoiding all anti-Communist activities, or they actively engage in milder forms and make no attempt to maintain secrecy. Source thought that pursuing his activities openly is what prevented his arrest, because he stated that in his conversations with KGB officers, he never made a secret of his anti-Communist viewpoint. However, he further stated that, in general, only the top Communist Party officials at city, regional and higher levels, are truly unafraid of the KGB, and this is only because they know they have more power than the KGB.

The traditional and long-standing fear of the old Czarist secret police and the Stalinist KGB has not altogether disappeared, however. Friends of Source, as a joke, have occasionally approached a stranger on the street, flashed a driver's license, and said "KGB. Come with us." Invariably the stranger turned pale, and followed obediently, without realizing that he saw only a driver's license.

Finnish tourists are almost abjectly afraid of the KGB, but Source did not know to what extent this results from either the power or presence of the KGB in Finland.

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


Figure 1 (a) Organizational Chart of the Structure of the KGB on the Leningrad Regional, City, and City Districts Level

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


Figure 2 (u) KGB Administrative Departments in the Headquarters Building in Leningrad

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


Figure 3 (c) Location and layout Sketch of Leningrad Regional and City HQs of KGB and Čajkovskogo Ulitsa Regional MVD HQs in LENINGRAD.

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Legend to Figure 3

1. HQs of Leninrad region and city KGB, and the regional MVD
 - a. Temporary parking for KGB officers
 - b. VIP parking area
2. KGB detention prison
3. Museum of Criminal History
4. Tunnel to exercise area
5. Parking lot for KGB personnel
6. Prisoners exercise area
7. Former police prison
8. HQs of regular city police (Miliz)
9. Entrance to reception room used by KGB headquarters
10. Entrance to offices of the regional MVD
11. Entrance to offices of the OVIR

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
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Chris

ment came under attack in
Washington Post 2 Dec 65

Pravda Sees CIA Coverup Of 'Failures'

Reuters

MOSCOW, Dec. 2 (Thursday)—Pravda charged today that "scandalous failures predominate" in the work of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, and implied that book "The Penkovsky Papers" was published to cover up failures.

The article in the Soviet Communist Party paper was aimed at America's NATO allies, they were often targets of subversive activities by CIA, "One of the most fidious instruments of imperialist policy," which "all the time spinning a web of intrigues and spiracies in the Middle and Africa" as well as "interfering in the affairs of American countries with particular brazenness."

The Pravda article, written by Viktor Mayevsky, quoted by Tass, said, "It would be unwise to neglect the danger of the subversive activities of the American espionage concern. But the reactionary press has to admit that scandalous failures predominate in the work sheet of the CIA work."

It said that, after the failure the CIA sought to justify through publishing the book.

It repeated the Russian description of "The Penkovsky Papers," which purport to be the memoirs of Col. Oleg Penkovsky, a Russian intelligence chief who gave vital military information to the West, as an "anti-Soviet forgery" perpetrated by the CIA.

On Several Fronts

Penkovsky Dispute Continues to Boil

The Washington Post today includes publication on Page A23 of the Penkovsky Papers, a book which has swirled much controversy as to their source and authenticity.

The Soviet Union on Saturday protested the publication. In addition, a letter to the editor of The Washington Post from the Soviet embassy, printed today on Page A21, calls the papers "a crude forgery cooked up two years after Penkovsky's conviction by those whom the exposed spy served."

The Washington Post also is printing, on Page A22, the first of two articles by Victor Zorza, Soviet affairs expert of The Manchester Guardian, analyzing the papers. He writes that "the book itself contains the evidence showing certain parts of it to be a forgery even though other sections of the book are evidently made up of intelligence information provided by Penkovsky long before his arrest."

Last month Zorza had written

ten Vladimir E. Semichastny, chairman of the Soviet State Security Committee, asking for evidence to support the charge that the papers were forgeries. On Saturday an official from the Soviet embassy in London asked to meet Zorza and declared that the book is "a fabrication from beginning to end."

Zorza said the official gave only one piece of evidence, an inconsistency of dates. At one point Penkovsky had said that recruitment of Communist Party members in the West for work with Soviet intelligence had resumed in 1955. At another point it said this occurred in 1960.

Officials at the Central Intelligence Agency, whose agents dealt with and interrogated Penkovsky before his arrest, say that they read the papers only to determine whether their publication would compromise intelligence sources. They refuse to pass judgment for the press on authenticity.

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SECTION E

SUNDAY, OCT

When West Had

A Red War Hero Prepared U.S. For Its Confrontation With Mr. K on Cuban Missiles

By Frank Gibney

ON APRIL 12, 1961, at an unobtrusive meeting in Moscow, a high Russian official quietly handed a double-wrapped, double-sealed envelope to an English acquaintance. He asked that it be given to "interested parties" in the West.

Later that same month, the Russian said, he would himself be in London and wanted to talk to people in the West—"to tell them what conditions in the Soviet Union are really like." The time was short, he said, and it was a critical time.

With this action, Col. Oleg Penkovsky, Russian war hero, senior officer in Soviet military intelligence, graduate of the Staff College and the Missile Academy, friend and confidant of Soviet marshals and generals, began his secret career as a volunteer spy for the West.

A Scientific Cover

GREVILLE WYNNE, the British businessman to whom Penkovsky entrusted his message, knew Penkovsky only in his capacity as an official of the Soviet State Committee for Coordination of Scientific Research, the huge subministry in charge of all Soviet business and technical exchanges with foreigners. He had then little idea of Penkovsky's true function and the importance of his action to the West.

Penkovsky's work as deputy chief of the Committee's foreign department was merely a cover for his function as a General Staff Intelligence officer. And as a former aide and confidant of the chief marshal of Soviet tactical missile forces, Marshal Sergei Varent-

sov, Penkovsky was privy to the most intimate details of high Russian military and political planning.

For the next 16 months, Penkovsky conducted the most amazing single-handed campaign of espionage in modern history. He rocked Nikita Khrushchev's policy to its foundations. For 1961 and 1962, the two years in which Penkovsky worked for British and American Intelligence, marked the freezing point of the Cold War.

In June, 1961, Khrushchev risked war with his decision to force an Allied retreat in Berlin. In August, he put up the Berlin Wall. In September, 1961, he resumed nuclear testing, breaking agreements with the United States. His missile buildup of 1962 was climaxed in the Cuban confrontation with the United States, when Khrushchev almost threw the world into total war.

Throughout this time, Penkovsky furnished the West with high-priority information on Soviet missile strength, Soviet nuclear capabilities and the Soviet plans for a localized shooting war in Germany. Ultimately, he was a key factor in our ability to identify so swiftly the configurations of Soviet missile installations on Cuban soil. He also prepared American intelligence for Khrushchev's decision to use them.

Three London Visits

THREE TIMES Penkovsky made his way to London and Paris, ironically using his confidential Soviet intelligence assignments as a cover for his real espionage work with American and British officers. Three times he went to Moscow to get further informa-



This military pass

tion for the West. In October, 1962, he was finally detected and arrested by the Soviet secret police, the State Security.

How badly he hurt Moscow's plans for an aggressive breakthrough against the West in those two critical years can be gathered from the public aftermath of his arrest: one chief marshal of the Soviet Union demoted and disgraced; the chief of Soviet military intelligence, Gen. Ivan Serov (the "Hangman of Hungary" in 1956) demoted; some 300 Soviet intelligence officers recalled to Moscow from their foreign posts.

Penkovsky had exposed them all. Soviet military intelligence has not yet recovered from the blow.

The recapitulation of matters covered in Penkovsky's Soviet indictment suggests the extent of his intelligence achievement: "Top secret information of great value . . . of an economic, political and military nature . . . Soviet space secrets

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look

THE METROPOLIS
THE NATION
THE WORLD
EDITORIALS
COLUMNISTS

BER 31, 1965

PAGE E1

Man in Kremlin



ПРОПУСК № 024278
Пенковский
Олег Владимирович
Командир

11221

Col. Penkovsky privileged access to General Staff headquarters and the Defense Ministry.

material on Soviet troops in the German Democratic Republic . . . new Soviet war material . . . command personnel of the antiaircraft defenses . . . material on atomic energy, rocket technology and the exploration of outer space . . .

The trial of Col. Penkovsky and his British contact, Greville Wynne, began in Moscow May 7, 1963, and lasted four days. It was carefully organized by the Soviet authorities.

Penkovsky and Wynne had been under interrogation in Lubyanka Prison for six months preceding it. Both prisoners admitted their "guilt." Penkovsky apparently did so in an effort to secure decent treatment for his family.

Wynne was sentenced to a long prison term but was released in 1964 in exchange for the Soviet spy Kononov, who had been arrested by the KGB under the name of Gordon. Penkovsky was sentenced to

death. Soviet authorities said he was shot May 16, 1963.

Until now, Penkovsky's remarkable feat was a secret, locked in the intelligence files of three countries. The Penkovsky Papers, excerpts of which begin here today, were smuggled out to the West two years ago and translated by Peter Deriabin, himself an escaped Soviet State Security officer.

The Papers have never before appeared anywhere. They will be published in book form by Doubleday Nov. 19.

The Penkovsky Papers comprise a strange, arresting document—partly a day by day account of Penkovsky's personal struggle against the Soviet regime; partly a running fever chart of Khrushchev's drive for aggression in Berlin and Cuba. They were written at great personal risk while Penkovsky was living his double life as a secret agent for the West.

He wrote them because he was not content merely with transmitting his intelligence reports. Col. Penkovsky was a single-minded zealot who hated the Khrushchev regime because he feared that Khrushchev was leading the world into a nuclear war. He wanted ordinary people in the West, not just intelligence officers, to hear his story and his reasons for breaking with a lifetime of service to the Soviet regime.

In a real sense of the word, for the brief 16 months in which he worked, Oleg Penkovsky was our man in the Kremlin. Without his guidance and information, Washington could not have acted in either Berlin or Cuba with the sureness it did.

Only by reading Penkovsky can Americans finally understand the pressures and tensions that were driving the Soviet leadership to risk war in 1961 and 1962, two years when the Cold War almost became hot.

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Why the Soviet Colonel Chan

By Oleg Penkovsky

MY NAME is Oleg Vladimirovich Penkovsky. I was born April 23, 1919, in the Caucasus, in the city of Ordzhonikidze (formerly Vladikavkaz), in the family of a salaried worker; Russian by nationality, by profession an officer of military intelligence with the rank of colonel.

I have received higher education. I have been a member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union since March,

1940. I am married; as dependents I have my wife, one daughter and my mother.

I have never been on trial for criminal or political offense. I have been awarded 13 government decorations (five orders and eight medals). I am a resident of the city of Moscow and live on Maxim Gorky Embankment, House No. 36, Apartment 59.

I am beginning the notes that follow to explain my thoughts about the sys-

tem in which I live and my revolt against this system. I am fully aware of what I am setting out to do. I ask that you believe in my sincerity, in my dedication to the real struggle for peace.

I must write hurriedly, hoping that I will some day have the time to elaborate or explain. I am unable to do this all at once—or to write all I know and feel—for the simple physical lack of time and space.

When I write at family's sleep (our two rooms and typ. During working hours, running like the visiting (foreign) military intelligence offices of my country.


My evenings are a part of my job. Friends in the country. Someone may always be here at home. A hiding place in Moscow in my apartment. I can only hope that whose hands they find them of interest the truth they say.

White Russian

I WAS BORN in the Civil War, during was lost. Mother told me for the first time I was only four months old.

My father was a White Army. I became a Soviet. I still do not know the whole truth about Security forces here that he was in the (though I was only a child at the time), every door closed to me: for an membership in the party for the intelligence.

Yet I began my life in the Soviet system. In a Soviet environment, very first, when I



Col. Penkovsky, flanked by guards, hears the death sentence at his Moscow trial May 11, 1963.

A Kremlinologist Tries to Strike a Balance

By Edward Crankshaw

The following is a condensation of the foreword to "The Penkovsky Papers" by the British journalist and expert on Soviet Russia.

I M AGINE that the general reader will be most fascinated by Penkovsky's inside account of the workings of the Soviet intelligence system. He may very well be appalled and dismayed by their scope and sheer magnitude. But I think we should try to keep a sense of proportion here.

I am not for a moment suggesting that neither the British nor the American secret services are anything like so heavily staffed as the KGB and GRU. The Russians, not to put too fine a point on it, have always been nuts about espionage and counterespionage and they have always been hair-raisingly reckless

I am quite sure that the material the Russians receive from their agents is not worth anything like the expenditure of manpower, ingenuity and cash which they consider an appropriate price. I am not an expert in these matters, but there is one thing that stands out even to a layman: that is, that some of the most valuable intelligence coups ever achieved by the Russians have fallen into their laps, contributed by oddities like Nunn-May and Fuchs, acting from individual conviction.

Conversely, invaluable information presented to us by Penkovsky was obtained not as a result of the efficiency of our own secret services but as a free gift arising from the idiosyncratic behavior of an individual Russian.

Penkovsky was shocked by the size and magnitude and malevolence of the Soviet intelligence system.

behavior of Khrushchev and others. Here, I think, he can be very misleading.

He was brought up as a young Communist and developed into an eager careerist in the regular army, on the lookout for patronage, keen for promotion, cultivating the sort of gifts which enabled him quite naturally and easily to make an extremely useful marriage, one of the privileged new class and enjoying it. It is impossible to decide from his papers the precise point at which the whole thing went sour, and why.

That he took violently against the whole system, for the reasons he gives is entirely understandable; tens of thousands of intelligent Russians—hundreds of thousands, indeed—feel the same way. But this does not lead them to spy on their own country for the benefit of the West.

One thing is very clear—and this is the only thing that is clear—and this is that he was not a spy.

when considering Penkovsky's statement of Khrushchev as he was preparing to launch a campaign—and that is that, like factory from the West, army colonel was in an unbalanced. (A man who upon himself to betray his country because he is convinced that he is right is by definition wrong.) And almost certainly, balance made it impossible to distinguish between intentions and government actions. Or, like so many confused, loose, men, tight-lipped calculation, planning with purposiveness. Having said all this, Penkovsky was for the light on the Soviet world, during his years of service.

el Changed His Color

The Penkovsky
Papers: Part I

and my revolt
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to do. I ask
sincerity, in
struggle for
hoping that
the time to
am unable to
write all I
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When I write at home, I disturb my family's sleep (our apartment is only two rooms and typing is very noisy). During working hours, I am always busy, running like a madman between the visiting (foreign) delegations and military intelligence headquarters and the offices of my Committee.

My evenings are generally occupied; it is part of my job. When I visit my friends in the country, it is worse. Someone may always ask what I am doing. Here at home, at least I have a hiding place in my desk. My family could not find it even if they knew. And they know nothing.

It is a lonely struggle. As I sit here in Moscow in my apartment and write down my thoughts and observations, I can only hope that the persons in whose hands they eventually fall will find them of interest and use them for the truth they say.

White Russian Parentage

I WAS BORN in the thick of the Civil War, during which my father was lost. Mother told me that my father saw me for the first and last time when I was only four months old.

My father was a lieutenant in the White Army. I learned this only recently. My father fought against the Soviets. I still do not think they know the whole truth about him. If the State Security forces had known all along that he was in the White Army (although I was only a few months old at the time), every door would have been closed to me: for an officer's career, for membership in the party and especially for the intelligence service.

Yet I began my life as a believer in the Soviet system. I was brought up in a Soviet environment and from the very first, when I went at 18 to the

Second Kiev Artillery School, I wanted to be a commander in the Soviet army. During the war, I commanded a battalion. By the end of the war, I was a lieutenant colonel. After one action, Marshal Konev recommended me for the Military Staff College.

In 1945, I began the three-year course at the Frunze Military Academy and in 1948 I pinned on my chest the diamond-shaped insignia of a Frunze graduate. At the end of 1949, I was transferred to the Military Diplomatic Academy, the training school for the military intelligence service.

I learned how to conduct military espionage and completed a three-year course in the English language, which I mastered, I believe, fairly well. In September, 1958, after serving as assistant military attaché in Turkey, I was sent to the Dzerzhinsky Military Engineering Academy to attend a nine-month academic course for the study of missile weapons.

Deeds Belied Words

IT WAS DURING the struggles of World War II that I first became convinced that it was not the Communist Party which moved and inspired us all to walk the fighting road from Stalingrad to Berlin. There was something else behind us: Russia.

Even more than the war itself, my eyes were opened by my work with the higher authorities and general officers of the Soviet army. I happened to marry a general's daughter and quickly found myself in a society of the Soviet upper class. I was one of the privileged.

But I soon realized that their praise of the party and communism was only in words. In their private lives, they lie, deceive, scheme against each other, intrigue, inform, cut each other's throats. In pursuit of more money and advancement for themselves, they become informants for the State Security on their friends and fellow workers. Their children despise everything Soviet, watch only foreign movie films and look down on ordinary people.

Our communism, which we have been building for 45 years, is a fraud. I myself am a part of this fraud. Some disease or infection is gnawing and eating at our country from within.

The ideals that so many of our fathers and brothers died for have turned out to be nothing more than a bluff and a deceit. I know the army and there are many of us in the officer corps who feel the same way. But they are afraid to unite for action. So we all work separately. Each man here is alone.

Government of Adventurers

I ASSOCIATE with highly placed, important people: ministers and marshals, general and senior officers, members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. I see our le-

adventurers covering themselves with the banner of the struggle for peace. But Khrushchev has not renounced war. He is quite prepared to begin a war if circumstances turn favorable to him. This he must not be permitted to do.

In the past, our general staff and our foreign representatives condemned the concept of surprise attack such as Hitler used. Now they have come around to the viewpoint that there is great advantage to the side which makes a sudden massive attack first.

From what I have learned and what I have heard, I know now that the leaders of our Soviet state are the willing provocateurs of an atomic war. At one time or another they may lose their heads entirely and start an atomic war. See what Khrushchev is doing over Berlin.

In Moscow, I have lived in a nuclear nightmare. I know the extent of their preparations. I know the poison of the new military doctrine as outlined in the top-secret Special Collection—the plan to strike first at any cost.

I know the design of the new missiles and their warheads. I am describing them to my friends in the West. Imagine the horror of a 50-megaton bomb with an explosive force almost twice what one expects. The people of Moscow congratulated themselves on this.

Using the Peacelovers

THE SOVIET leaders know that the Western world, and especially the Americans, do not wish an atomic war. They try to use the Western desire for peace to their own advantage.

It is necessary somehow to drain the energy and to divert the great material and living strength of the Soviet Union to peaceful purposes — not to bring about a great world conflict. I think it is necessary to have meetings secretly conducted, not summit meetings. Those Khrushchev welcomes. He will use the decisions reached at summit meetings to increase his own prestige.

This you must understand. That is why I write these observations of mine to the people of the United States and Britain. I ask only that you believe the sincerity of my thoughts. Henceforth I am your soldier, pledged to carry out everything which is entrusted to me.

In presenting the above, I want to say that I have not begun work for my new cause with empty hands. I understand perfectly well that to correct words and thoughts, one must add concrete proof confirming these words. I have had and do have now a definite capability for doing this.

Condensed from the forthcoming book, "The Penkovsky Papers," © 1964, Doubleday & Co., Inc.

ke a Balance

others. by mis- young into an army, keen sort of the nat- an ex- of the ing it. am his ch the why. at the as he tenia plans ted— is not coun- this when considering Penkovsky's indictment of Khrushchev as a man actively preparing to launch a nuclear war —and that is that, like so many defectors from the West, this Soviet army colonel was in some measure unbalanced. (A man who will take it upon himself to betray his government because he is uniquely convinced that he is right and it is wrong is by definition unbalanced, although he may also be a martyr.) And almost certainly, this lack of balance made it impossible for him to distinguish between government intentions and government precautions. Or, like so many others, he confused loose, menacing talk with tight-lipped calculation; contingency planning with purposive strategy.

Having said all this, read Penkovsky as for the light he throws on the Soviet world, which is an illuminating touchstone for

11241

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West's Spies Active, Wynne Hints



GREVILLE WYNNE
"I shall never forget him."

By Flora Lewis
Washington Post Staff Writer

NEW YORK, Nov. 11—The Englishman who was freed from a Moscow jail in exchange for Soviet spy Gordon Lonsdale today indicated that there are top Western spies now functioning in the Soviet Union.

Greville Wynne, who served as contact for Western intelligence with Soviet State Security Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, appeared at a press conference here to help launch The Penkovsky Papers. The book, now being serialized in The Washington Post, is said to be Penkovsky's memoirs smuggled to the West before the writer was convicted of spying and executed in Russia.

Wynne was arrested in Hun-

gary ten days after Penkovsky was arrested in Moscow. The Englishman was taken to Russia immediately, tried, sentenced to eight years in prison but sent home after 18 months in return for Lonsdale.

He spoke with ardent admiration for Penkovsky, whose main aim in providing valuable information to the West was "to prevent a war," Wynne said.

"There are other people like him," he said, "But, of course, you don't hear about them until they get caught."

Penkovsky "was in the holy of holies and he blew it sky high," Wynne said, describing his late friend's importance. "They (the Russians) haven't recovered yet and they won't

for a long time." Wynne said he did not believe that Russians were aware of his own real role in the espionage link despite his prison interrogation and learned the story only when he came back and made public disclosures. He is writing his own book about the affair.

Lonsdale, now back in Russia has also published a book about his activities in the West. Wynne said this extraordinary change in Soviet policy against discussing Moscow's intelligence activities was almost certainly provoked by word that The Penkovsky Papers would be published.

Lonsdale's book naturally puts Soviet espionage in a good light while The Penkovsky Papers does exactly the opposite.

Our Man in the Kremlin

Penkovsky Fate Never in Doubt

Twelfth in a Series
By Frank Gibney

"On May 7, 1963, in Moscow in the Court of Session Hall of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R., there began an open trial in the criminal case of the agent of the British and American intelligence services and citizens of the U.S.S.R. O. V. Penkovsky and the subject of Britain and spy go-between, Greville Wynne."

Information release. Military Collegium of the Soviet Supreme Court.

The trial of Col. Penkovsky and Greville Wynne lasted all of four days, and one of these days was occupied by a closed session. The verdict was never in doubt. Penkovsky was sentenced to death, Wynne to 16 years' imprisonment.

Both defendants confessed their guilt, as agreed on during the long months of brutal State Security interrogation. Wynne displayed some obvious reservations, however, and he left little doubt about the extent of his coaching and coercion.

Penkovsky had agreed to the humiliation of a Soviet "show" trial for only one reason: to safeguard the lives of his family.

As Wynne later said, it was clear that he had made

that without a public trial, nothing would be known of his fate.

In the pretrial interrogations Penkovsky, who had obviously had a rough time of it, made no attempt to disguise his motives and actions. He told his interrogators that he had acted not primarily to help the West, but in the best interests of his own people, the Russians. This was hardly a defense which a Soviet court would permit him to repeat in public. (It is of interest that the final statements of both defendants were made in a closed court session.)

The two defense attorneys assigned to Wynne and Penkovsky went through the motions of talking to their "clients," but only after the interrogators had finished. (Wynne's attorney, who spent most of his time in court agreeing with the prosecution, later presented him with a capitalist-sized bill.)

Defendants Rehearsed

When the trial was finally staged, both defendants had been rehearsed thoroughly, even to the point of visiting the courtroom in advance.

The military court, presided over by Lt. Gen. V. V. Borzoglebskiy, called four wit-



ness intelligence services the Soniya (Sony) radio receiver which he had received from the foreign intelligence services and which he used to receive enciphered radio messages from the intelligence headquarters, and the typewriter on which Penkovsky typed his reports.

There was no doubt, either, whom Penkovsky had been dealing with. Witness the prosecutor's angry tirade:

"A leading role in this belongs to the Central Intelligence Agency of the U.S.—the support of the most adventurous circles in the U.S. Like a giant octopus it extends its tentacles into all corners of the earth, supports a tremendous number of spies and secret informants, continually organizes plots and murders, provocations and diversions. Modern technical means are put to the service of espionage: from the miniature Minox cameras which can see

ten after Wynne returned from Soviet captivity. Wynne was the last Westerner to see Penkovsky alive.

Oleg Penkovsky was a most extraordinary man. It was an unforgettable experience to accompany him, particularly during his first visits to London and Paris, and to see the tremendous impact of our free society on a decent, and by Soviet standards, sophisticated man, but a man who had been sheltered all his life inside the prison of the Soviet system.

It was the people in the West who impressed him most. He was amazed, for example, to find that the assistants in department stores were clean, neat in dress and well groomed, that nearly all the young ladies there were attractive, smiling and anxious to please.

I had often visited the gloomy GUM department store in Moscow and the drab shops in Gorky street with their drab, surly attendants. So I had some idea of the mental contrast he must have been making.

He was interested in

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early interrogators. If he played the game, as they ordered it, his wife and children would be spared the imprisonment they might ordinarily have expected, as close relatives of an "enemy of the state."

He was probably safe in assuming the bargain would be kept. The Stalinist terror has left such a bad taste in the mouth of all Russians that reprisals against a political prisoner's family are generally unpopular. Penkovsky's wife and children never suspected the dangerous crusade to which he had committed himself. He naturally wanted to spare them the worst of its consequences.

Wynne Freed in Exchange

Wynne was released in 1964, in exchange for the Soviet spy Konon Melody, who under the name of Gordon Lonsdale had been passing information to Moscow from London. Although "Lonsdale's" espionage against the British can hardly be compared to the magnitude of Penkovsky's disclosures to the West, he was a professional Soviet intelligence officer and they wanted him back in Moscow.

The very fact that a trial had to be held must have been embarrassing to the Kremlin. But Penkovsky had to have a public trial. Eight British and U.S. diplomats in Moscow had been declared persona non grata for their connections with him. A foreign national, Wynne was directly implicated.

But Penkovsky himself was too big a fish to dismiss with the minimal notice reserved for most such offenses. The wave of transfers and demotions in the Soviet intelligence service and the army, following Penkovsky's arrest, was too large to avoid explaining. (Some 300 intelligence officers alone were hastily recalled to Moscow.)

Finally Penkovsky's associates in the Army were too highly placed to avoid the most public sort of warning.

Trial Planned 6 Months

For six months the prosecution had worked out the details of those four days in court. Wynne was interrogated steadily, since the day—Nov. 3, 1962, when he was flown to Moscow after his abduction in Budapest by Soviet and Hungarian security men.

Inside the Lubianka Prison, the State Security arranged a meeting with both Penkovsky and Wynne. There Penkovsky begged Wynne to cooperate in a public trial. Wynne agreed to cooperate within limits.

After six months in the

and produced nine experts to certify the equipment found in Penkovsky's apartment, the security nature of the information which he gave, and other things.

In the orderly process of question and answer the whole story of Penkovsky's espionage against the Soviet Union was repeated, from the first meeting with Wynne in Moscow and the confrontation with the British and American intelligence officers in London.

Lt. Gen. A. G. Gornyy, the chief military prosecutor, summarized it at the outset: "... the accused Penkovsky is an opportunist, a careerist and a morally decayed person who took the road of treason and betrayal of his country and was employed by imperialist intelligence services."

"By the end of 1960 he attempted to get in touch with the American intelligence service, further exploiting the undeserved trust placed in him and his position as deputy head of the Foreign Department of the State Committee for the Co-ordination of Scientific Research Work — having, through the nature of his work, the opportunity to meet foreigners visiting the Soviet Union as members of the various scientific and cultural delegations."

No Doubt of Guilt

There was no doubt that Penkovsky had engaged in the most serious sort of espionage. The catalogue of material confiscated in his apartment as read off at the Soviet trial would in itself offer ample grounds for an espionage conviction:

"During the search at Penkovsky's apartment, in addition to the already mentioned records with the telephone numbers of the foreign intelligence officers, six message postcards with instructions for them, the report and the exposed rolls of film, the following articles were discovered in a secret hiding place installed in his desk, and were attached to the file as tangible evidence: a forged passport, six cipher pads, three Minox cameras and a description of them, two sheets of specially treated paper for writing secret text, a memorandum with an indication of the frequencies on which Penkovsky received instructional radio transmission from the foreign intelligence services, the draft of a report from Penkovsky to the intelligence headquarters, the article which Penkovsky had received from the foreign intelligence services and which he intended to publish in the Soviet Union, 15 unexposed

film, 'spies in the sky'."

Important Facts Hidden

But what the Soviet prosecutors could not do was admit the two most important facts in the whole case: (1) Penkovsky's real identity as a colonel in Military Intelligence and the real extent of his contacts with the Soviet hierarchy; and (2) Penkovsky's real motive in betraying the Soviet regime.

In the Soviet record, he could be a drunkard, a philanderer, greedy and a girl-chaser — all these motives the prosecution clumsily attempted to adduce. But the Communist system is too brittle and insubstantial to admit that such a highly placed official could revolt against it because he thought the system was bad and wrong.

As a result the trial showed up as a farce. (Even witnesses from Military Intelligence had to be disguised as officers from the "educational branch" of the Ministry of Defense.) The Soviet prosecutors left only an agonizing question mark, when they tried to show how such a brilliant and promising officer had gone wrong.

Time and time again Penkovsky's past credentials were certified: a war hero, a brilliant officer (and even more brilliant if one included his real record in Intelligence) and a responsible Soviet official.

Then suddenly came The Fall in 1960. Despite all the prosecutors' attempts to trace the beginning of "careerism," it was, as they depicted it, a fall as abrupt as original sin and about as rationally explainable. An extraordinary gap yawned between the able, hard-working, trusted Soviet official and the cringing specimen of "moral depravity" which Gen. Gornyy presented, in a summation titled "Penkovsky's path from careerism and moral degradation to treachery."

"Penkovsky is dead," the prosecutor told Izvestia and the world, a few days after the trial ended. "The sentence was carried out on 16 May, in the second half of the day . . . When it was announced to him that the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. had denied his petition for mercy and he was to be executed, there was not a trace of the poseur's manner which he had maintained in court. He met death like a despicable coward."

So ended the career of the most extraordinary volunteer spy of this century.

The Free World is forever in his debt.

baptized himself by his pious mother. In London one day we were passing the Brompton Oratory. He asked me whether it was a church and whether he could go in to look around.

He was fascinated. "This is good," he said. "Perhaps the religious doctrine is not entirely correct, but at least it gives us a principle to guide our life. At home in the Soviet Union we have nothing. There are no principles—only what the Party tells us."

Wherever we went he was accepted as my friend. This first amazed him, but also pleased him immensely. Such a terrific contrast from the Soviet system where it is still highly dangerous for citizens to mix socially with Westerners.

He was bitter about the Soviet regime. He would weep, quite literally, when he talked about its misdeeds and the sufferings or unhappiness of his friends in the Soviet Union.

At the very end of his Paris trip he worried about going back. He knew he could stay. I shall never forget that day when I picked up Oleg in the early morning for a drive to the airport in thick fog. Then we waited for over four hours for the plane to take off. He almost stayed. His face was tense with his decision. Finally he made up his mind, turned to me and said, "Oh Greville, I must go back. I have more work to do."

Knew He Was Watched

It was then July, 1962 and he knew that the State Security was watching him. He was a lonely man in those last months in Moscow. What a burden he carried.

The more I knew him, the more I realized that Penkovsky was an extraordinarily high-minded man. He did what he did because it was the one way he, as an individual, could strike back at a system that had debased his country. I never saw him waiver from this basic decision from the moment we first met.

He had thought things through many months before I first made contact with him. He was willing to put up with the basic deceptions of spying and the tremendous strain of this lonely life, because he believed in a cause. He believed simply that a free society should emerge in the Soviet Union, and that it could only come by toppling the only government he knew. He was a heroic figure.

I shall never forget him.

Condensed from the forthcoming book "The Penkovsky Papers," © 1964, Doubleday & Co., Inc.

SUNDAY: What Penkovsky sent to the West extraordinary top secret letters on

Our Man in the Kremlin

How Penkovsky Was Seized


Aided in Flight of English Associate

By Frank Gibney
Eleventh in a Series

Early in the morning of July 6, 1962, Col. Penkovsky drove to Sheremetevo airport and met Greville Wynne in the passenger waiting room.

Using his Party card to overawe customs and security personnel, Penkovsky changed Wynne's tickets, rushed him through the departure formalities, and saw him aboard the first west-bound plane, an S.A.S. flight headed for Copenhagen.

Coming on the heels of their surveillance at the Peking Restaurant the night before, the hasty departure must inevitably have deepened the suspicions of the State Security Police. But Penkovsky knew that Wynne was in some danger. Heedless of his own risk,



he wanted at all costs to assure Wynne's safety.

Over the next three months the Colonel succeeded in getting several packets of information out to his Western contacts, mostly through the use of "dead drops" and prearranged messages.

On Sept. 5, he brought some film to an American Embassy reception, but he could find no safe opportunity to transfer it.

The next day he tried to establish contact with one of his British sources. That effort, too, proved fruitless. The net had tightened.

On Oct. 22, according to official Soviet record, Col. Oleg Penkovsky was arrested by representatives of the State Security, in Moscow, and taken to Lubyanka Prison. On Nov. 2, Greville Wynne was kidnaped by State Security Police in Budapest, where he had gone to make preliminary arrangements for a mobile trade exhibition in Eastern Europe. He was flown to Moscow in an aircraft commanded by a State Security general and thrown into Lubyanka for interrogation.

The "interrogation" of Penkovsky and Wynne was to last fully six months.

What finally betrayed Penkovsky? It was certainly not the result of a long cat-and-mouse game played by an all-seeing State Security. Penkovsky's high rank and access to the Kremlin's secrets made him far too dan-

See PENKOVSKY, F14, Col. 1127 Spectators wave



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PENKOVSKY-
From F1

How Soviet Net Closed

When Lumumba was temporarily in power in the Congo, the Soviets sent 23 plane-loads of officers (including generals) there via Egypt and Sudan. The aircraft were of the IL-14 and IL-18 types; heavier types could not land on the Sudanese airfield, and other countries would not give permission for the Soviet aircraft to land for refueling.

A good friend of mine, Maj. Aleksey Guryev, was the first one to fly to the Congo with the Soviet generals. The primary task of this mission was to establish Soviet control over the uranium ore in the Congo.

On Sept. 8, 1961, there was a regular experimental atom-

ic explosion of a 16-megaton bomb. This was the first test explosion of a bomb of such force in the Soviet Union. An R-12 missile was used in this test. The missile was launched from the base at Kapustin Yar. Varentsov was present when the missile was launched.

Later, when a 80-megaton bomb was tested, to everybody's surprise the explosion's actual force equaled that of 80 megatons. Such great force was not expected.

It was believed that some unforeseen chemical changes in the charge must have taken place after it was prepared. It is now thought that such a bomb with a cal-

culated force of 100 megatons may actually produce an explosion equaling that of 150 or 160 megatons.

Why did Khrushchew unexpectedly begin to conduct new nuclear tests?

(The Soviets resumed nuclear testing on Sept. 1, 1961. They continued the practice until the nuclear test-ban treaty of 1963.)

All nuclear tests have had and some still have two phases. The first phase deals with the explosive force in TNT equivalents.

In these tests the bombs were dropped from aircraft or from special masts. The second phase tests nuclear payloads lifted by missiles.

The present tests are almost exclusively on the sec-

on Penkovsky and Wynne

nd phase type. Almost all of them are conducted with missiles.

Why is Khrushchew pushing these nuclear tests? Why is he unwilling to sign an agreement forbidding nuclear weapons tests? Because most of our missiles have not even passed the necessary tests, let alone of missile production, as regards quality and there have been many instances of missiles and satellites exploding in the air or disappearing completely.

But Khrushchew persistently does everything possible to improve missile weapons. He wants to seize the initiative and to show the West that he is ahead in the field of missile production,

as regards quality as well as quantity.

Khrushchew and our scientists are still quite far from being able to prove such a superiority; but they are working hard to improve all types of missile weapons.

Gen. Kupin says there are insufficient defense facilities in case of war, particularly as regards defense against radioactive substances.

Although we tell our people working in defense plants that everything is under control and that there is no danger of contamination, they are still afraid.

Many become ill, after working for six months or a year. Even our nuclear-

powered icebreaker Lenin is a floating deathtrap because of its badly designed valves which allow radioactive leakage.

ED. NOTE: On Aug. 25, 1962, Col. Penkovsky added the following personal note to the Papers. It was one of the few entries with a date affixed. It was the last thing ever received from him.

I have already grown used to the fact that I note periodically some degree of surveillance and control over my movements. The "neighbors" continue to study me. There is some reason for this KGB activity. I confuse and lose myself in guesses and suppositions. I am very far from exaggerat-

ing the dangers. Still, I am an optimist and I try to evaluate the situation objectively.

I am not disappointed in my life or my work. The most important thing is that I remain full of strength and desire to continue this work. To tell the truth about the Soviet system—it is the goal of my life. And if I succeed in contributing my little bricks to this great cause, there can be no greater satisfaction.

Condensed from the forthcoming book, "The Penkovsky Papers," © 1964, Doubleday & Co., Inc.

FRIDAY: The arrest and trial of Col. Penkovsky and Greville Wynne, after six months' interrogation in the Lubianka cellars. 1128

PENKOVSKY- From F1

H

gerous an enemy for the Soviet high command to temporize with, in an effort to learn more about his contacts, sources, etc.

The minute his spying was discovered, it would have to be stopped. So the discovery must have been made just before his arrest.

The State Security's original discovery that Penkovsky's father was a White Russian officer—a damaging item in any Soviet file—undoubtedly started an investigation. In the course of the investigation, the State Security Police noticed Penkovsky's frequent meetings with foreigners.

Even though Penkovsky's position in intelligence permitted such associations, there must have been a great many dangerous foreign contact reports in his security file.

The expensive gifts he brought back from the West, for high army and Party officials, also aroused some suspicion. Wynne still believes that Penkovsky was first suspected of black-marketeering—not an unusual crime among Soviet officials.

There was another important factor. Through the spring and summer of 1962, as tension with the West was built up by Khrushchev, the State Security had been ordered to tighten its surveillance on all foreigners—and Russians who associated with them.

Ironically, the same "collision course for war" which Penkovsky warned about was responsible for the intensified surveillance that brought on his arrest.

At some point the State Security searched Penkovsky's apartment. Once the searchers found the secret drawer with Penkovsky's espionage apparatus—cameras, radio and instructions for Western contacts—the Colonel's doom was sealed.

Could Penkovsky have saved himself before that time? Probably yes. In July, for instance, after Wynne's return to London, Penkovsky could have sent a message to London announcing that he was breaking off communication, temporarily cut his Western contacts and, above all, destroyed the incriminating materials in his desk drawer.

He did not do this precisely because he thought it necessary to the very last

In the following article from the Papers, one of the last he wrote, he discusses the Soviet nuclear menace—and Khrushchev's disregard of any test ban in 1961 and 1962.

(We must remember that Khrushchev agreed to a test ban in 1963, only after the U. S. faced him down in Cuba.)

By Oleg Penkovsky

Many of our nuclear explosions (tests) have been conducted in the central part of the U.S.S.R., mostly in Kazakhstan. Some of the smaller tests were not noticed at all and were not recorded by the Western states.

The large nuclear explosions are reported by Tass and the Soviet press, but nothing is ever said about the smaller ones. At the General Staff we sometimes know of tests being conducted on a certain type of nuclear weapon, and we wait to see what Tass will say about this. If Tass keeps silent, then we keep silent, too.

Tests of various new types of nuclear weapons are conducted daily. Nuclear test explosions take place more often than reported by Tass or the Soviet press. All this talk about the Soviet Union advocating the prohibition of nuclear tests is nothing but lies.

Khrushchev will fire anyone who mentions complete suspension of nuclear tests. He is not ready for it.

He will sign an agreement prohibiting nuclear tests only after he becomes convinced that the U.S.S.R. is ahead of the United States in the use of nuclear energy for military purposes. The negotiations could last another ten years without any results.

There is a shortage of atomic raw materials needed for the atom bombs and missiles with nuclear warheads. Almost all the ore containing uranium comes to the Soviet Union from Czechoslovakia.

Recently some uranium ore deposits have been found in China, but they are very insignificant. Soviet monazite sands and ore deposits are not particularly rich either in elements necessary for atomic energy.

In view of this shortage of atomic raw materials, it is small wonder that our government is so interested in establishing Soviet control in the Congo. The largest uranium ore deposits are in the Congo.

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Our Man in the Kremlin

Spy Lecture Brought Out

Penkovsky Smuggled Training Data to Warn America

In describing a person, Americans often use the expression, "He knows how to make money," which means that such a person has a lot of money.


The other side of the question, specifically, where the money comes from or how it is "made," is not, as a rule, of interest to anybody.

It can be said that Ameri-

cans encourage any method of getting rich.

American bourgeois propaganda tries in every way to convince the population that anyone can make money if he is sufficiently resourceful.

Such a one-sided upbringing engenders in some of the people an indifference to everything unconnected with



business, profits, and gain. The American love of money can be exploited by paying an agent for his work in order

The Washington Post

SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 1965

FOREIGN NEWS

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P1

increase his personal interest in working for us.

Payments must be prompt and equitable. This disciplines the agent and improves the Soviet officer's authority.

To encourage an agent, monthly payments are increased or bonuses, awards, or valuable gifts are given.

Thus, for example, Agent B, who was on a monthly salary, reduced his production appreciably. His attendance at

meetings and visits to dead drops were irregular. Despite rebukes by the intelligence officer, the agent's work did not improve.

The intelligence officer decided that he would have to use material inducement. With the Center's permission he began to pay the agent only for those months during which the agent actually worked and performed his operational activities.

Soon B realized that further backsliding would result only in the loss of all his extra income. He began to perform his tasks more efficiently.

An American's circle of interests is often rather small. Many Americans do not read books. Their main interest lies in advertisements, sports news, and cartoons; on the front pages they only glance at the large sensational headlines.

Generally speaking, bourgeois society demoralizes people.

Every American family tries to save money for a "rainy day"; therefore a certain amount is set aside from each pay check.

Wall Street does everything possible to keep Americans from devoting their free time to meditation and deliberation. Movies, cheap concerts, See PENKOVSKY, P7, Col. 1

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Our Man in the Kre

Spy Le

Penkovsky Smugg

Thirteenth in a Series

By Frank Gibney

A Soviet Spy's Guidebook to the United States: a top-secret lecture, given to Soviet intelligence officers in Moscow at the Military-Diplomatic Academy, by Lt. Col. I. E. Prikhodko, officially titled: "Characteristics of Agent Communications and of Agent Handling in the U.S.A."

In the vast amount of intelligence material which Col. Oleg Penkovsky smuggled out of Moscow — Soviet prosecutors at his trial in 1963 themselves admitted he had passed on 5000 separate photographed items—Penkovsky apparently thought this one item, in particular, should receive the widest distribution.

This training lecture was given in 1961 to acquaint Soviet intelligence officers with some of the problems and opportunities of espionage in the United States.

Served in U.S.

Its author, Lt. Col. I. E. Prikhodko, had himself served as an intelligence officer in New York, from 1952 to 1953, under 'cover' of a post with the Soviet Mission to the United Nations.

Penkovsky first read it in the course of a briefing session in Moscow while preparing for a mission to the United States, which was later canceled. He sent it along, with the Papers, as "a warning to the American people" of the extent to which Soviet espionage has expanded, in fact, formalized, its widespread undercover activities in the United States.

Although the language of the Prikhodko lecture is professorial, its content is hair-raising. It is literally a professional working manual for Soviet intelligence officers in the United States, complete with instructions on how to 'recruit' American 'agents' to do their spying work—a most sinister variety of 'how-to-do-it' book.

As his first step, Col. Prikhodko tries to give his pupils—most of them Soviet intelligence officers of major's or lieutenant colonel's rank—an objective introduction to the strange ways and customs of Americans, regarded in the Soviet classroom as virtual citizens of another world.

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everything in a Communist context. While the finds the Americans, on the one hand, "energetic, enterprising and open people, resourceful, courageous and industrious," they are at the same time "demoralized" by "bourgeois society" and constantly diverted by "mamopolists" into spending their time in silly amusements instead of "meditative and deliberative activity."

They have "a natural love of freedom and independence," but they are always "swayed by money" and "indifferent" to anything not connected with business.

If this clinical Soviet appraisal of Americans is unintentionally funny, it is also frightening. For the Soviet intelligence officers who study lectures like this are the very men the Kremlin relies on to make estimates of American responses to Soviet actions.

The Lecture

Agent communications and agent handling involve first and last working with people as a rule from the bourgeois world. For this work to be successful, it is necessary that Soviet officers know these people well, their characteristics and their personality traits, and the political and economic circumstances which condition their behavior.

In the recruitment of agents, preference should be given to Americans because they are highly trusted both in the U.S.A. and in the countries of Europe. It is much easier for an American agent to deliver mail for the "Center" "i.e. intelligence headquarters in Moscow" from the U.S.A. to one of the West European countries (a neutral country or an ally of the U.S.A.) and mail to our residences in the U.S.A.

An intelligence officer, however, who does not know the characteristics of the American way of life or who neglects those aspects cannot be trusted to handle and control American agents working for us.

Traits Studied

The way of life, customs, temper, demeanor, and personality traits of Americans have specific significance. Most Americans are energetic, enterprising, and open people, with a great sense of humor.

They can be described as having business acumen and as being resourceful, courageous, and industrious.

The over-all situation and the absolute power of money in the U.S.A. arouses just one desire in many people — to make more money.

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PENKOVSKY—
From P1

Penkovsky Smuggled Spy Le

boxing, parks, horse races, nothing of foreigners, to get baseball, football, restaurants—all these are used to divert the masses from the realities around them.

In general, an American's wants consist of having his own automobile, a comfortable apartment, and a good time. Most Americans, both men and women, smoke.

Concerned Over Clothes

Americans are very concerned about clothes and outward appearances. They try always to have a clean suit, well pressed with a good crease in the trousers, a clean shirt, and shoes well polished. They send their suits regularly to the cleaner and their shirts to the laundry, both of which are everywhere in the U.S.A. It is customary to change white shirts and socks daily.

into some golf clubs, if they do not have a certain position in society.

With club memberships so difficult to obtain it is advisable to use public golf courses.

The technical knowledge of the average American is rather high. In his everyday life he makes wide use of machines, equipment, and instruments. Therefore the training of an American agent in operational technology is all the easier.

Yet it should be emphasized that the national characteristics of American agents are such that they are often careless in their operations. Americans make poor conspirators. They therefore need extremely careful briefing.

When necessary, the intel-

ligence officer must brief the agent on how to smuggle material out of an installation, how to return it undetected, and how to reproduce the material at home or at work. It is very important that our American agents know how to develop proper and plausible cover stories for their extra income and for their periodic absences.

The Soviet intelligence officer can skillfully put to use such American traits as efficiency, resourcefulness, boldness, and perseverance. These will help an American agent to carry out operational tasks and to exploit his operational capabilities fully.

Americans, to a larger degree than representatives of many other peoples, have a natural love of freedom and

independence, and do not like discipline. The officer must respect this characteristic and not resort to open pressure on the agent.

Realizing that the majority of Americans are open, straightforward, and happy people with a great sense of humor, the intelligence officer can prepare for and conduct a conversation with an agent that is not dull but lively and witty.

When preparing for a meeting he must try to anticipate the agent's questions, prepare good answers to them, and at the meeting to answer the agent in such a manner that the agent will feel that the intelligence officer is being frank with him.

Americans, like other people, are patriots. They are

Picture

proud of their country's achievements; they honor their national heroes, and value their cultural monuments.

Therefore the intelligence officer must be careful not to indiscriminately criticize things American, but must remember that an unfortunate statement, for example, about some popular U.S. President (George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, Thomas Jefferson) might offend the agent. A negative result might also come from an officer's underrating American culture.

Condensed from the forthcoming book "The Penkovsky Papers," 1944, Doubleday & Co., Inc.

MONDAY: Part 2 of the Colonel Prikhodko lecture—the ways and means of communicating with Soviet agents in the U.S.



AUTHOR—Frank Gibney interviewing workers behind the Iron Curtain.

THE WASHINGTON POST

Sunday, Nov. 14, 1943

P7

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From PI
boxing, parks, horse races, baseball, football, restaurants—all these are used to divert the masses from the realities around them.

In general, an American's wants consist of having his own automobile, a comfortable apartment, and a good time. Most Americans, both men and women, smoke.

Concerned Over Clothes

Americans are very concerned about clothes and outward appearances. They try always to have a clean suit, well pressed with a good crease in the trousers, a clean shirt, and shoes well polished. They send their suits regularly to the cleaner and their shirts to the laundry, both of which are everywhere in the U.S.A. It is customary to change white shirts and socks daily.

It should be noted, therefore, that an intelligence officer who has an outwardly slovenly appearance will not command respect from an American agent.

In American clothing, light colors predominate. Americans like loose-fitting shoes, as a rule one or two sizes larger than necessary.

In his free time, when not at work, and especially during the summer, the American wears sports clothes: light trousers, short-sleeved shirts, no necktie. Sunglasses are in common use.

Outside the office an American's behavior is free and relaxed. Many Americans like to keep their hands in their pockets and chew gum.

Americans listen to the weather forecast and, if bad weather is predicted, they take an umbrella and raincoat; Americans do not wear rubbers. Both men and women use umbrellas. Thus, before going to a meeting, an intelligence officer should listen to the weather forecast and, if necessary, take an umbrella or a raincoat.

Time Spent in Bars

Americans like to spend their time in bars. Many bars have no tables. Customers sit on high round stools next to the bar. As a rule, bars do not provide snacks or hot dishes. One can order only drinks: whisky, gin, beer, etc.

In order not to attract undue attention the intelligence officer must know how to order sufficiently well. It is not enough, for example, to ask, "Give me a glass of beer." It is also necessary to name the brand of beer: "Schlitz," "Rhine," etc.

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daily in large cities, have almost become department stores. Therefore they are never without customers. Drug stores can be used to hold short meetings with agents, as well as for other agent activities, e.g. signaling, clandestine phone calls.

Even American movie theaters are distinctive. Most movie theaters in large cities are open from 12 noon to 1 a.m. Moviegoers enter as soon as they get their tickets and they may take any unoccupied seat. Films are shown continuously. Americans are not content with only a single feature film. Therefore, movie-theater proprietors show two films, one after the other, which last three to four hours.

Intelligence officers can make extensive use of movie theaters when organizing agent communications by spending a certain amount of time in them before a meeting. The fact is that there are few people in most movie theaters, especially on weekdays during working hours.

Golf Course Meetings

Golf is the most popular sport among the well-to-do in the United States. Agent meetings can be held at golf courses as easily as in other athletic clubs. During the week there are very few people at the golf courses. On week days the intelligence officer and his agent can arrive at the golf course (preferably at different times, twenty to thirty minutes apart), each can begin to play alone, and at a previously designated time can meet at, let us say, the sixteenth hole or at some other hole (there is a total of eighteen holes).

Saturdays and Sundays are less suitable days for holding agent meetings at golf courses because on these days many players gather, tournaments are held, and single play is not permitted. Golf courses are found on the edges of wooded areas or parks in broken terrain where there are many hidden areas. These hidden areas are the best places for holding meetings. In some cases, meetings can be held in clubhouse restaurants.

To hold successful meetings at a golf course, one should learn the conditions there ahead of time. A basic requirement is to know the game and how to play it. Therefore students should learn this game while still here in Moscow at the academy.

Golf club membership is rather expensive, however. Also, not all clubs are equally accessible to our intelligence officers. It is even difficult for local residents, to say

Our Man in the Kremlin 'Dead Drops' and Red Surveillance

Ninth of a series


By Frank Gibney

Col. Penkovsky's Paris visit was his last to the West. Although his superiors in Military Intelligence later made several proposals to send him on foreign assignments, it became clear that the State Security police were watching him, for some reason. Penkovsky himself believed that the State Security's surveillance arose from the belated discovery that his father had been a White officer in the Revolution. He correctly believed that they did not suspect the real truth: that he had volunteered to do espionage for the West.

Back in Moscow, he coolly continued to deliver information to his American and British contacts. He used three standard intelligence methods: 1) carefully arranged "chance encounters"; 2) meetings at the homes of British or Americans he might normally be expected to visit; 3) the device of the "dead drop," the inconspicuous hiding-place where a package can be left for a later pick-up, without the need for either party to the transaction to meet face-to-face.

On Oct. 21, just two weeks after his return from Paris, Penkovsky had his first meeting with one of his contacts. At 9 p.m. he was walking near the Balchug Hotel, smoking a cigaret, and holding in his hand a package wrapped in white paper. A man walked up to him, wearing an overcoat, unbuttoned, and also smoking a cigaret. "Mr. Alex," he said in English, "I am from your two friends who send you a big, big welcome." The package changed hands. Another board of documents and observations on Soviet military preparations was on its way westward.

"Alex," for such was his code name, kept on collecting and transmitting information, without skimping on his normal daily rounds. More than ever, he maintained contacts with his friends in the Army. He exuded confidence.



Soviet war preparation: unrestricted chemical warfare.

By Oleg Penkovsky

It is not enough for Khrushchev to prepare for atomic and hydrogen warfare. He is also preparing for chemical warfare. A special 7th Directorate in the general staff is involved in working out methods of chemical and bacteriological warfare.

The Chief Chemical Directorate of the Ministry of Defense is also concerned with the problems of chemical and bacteriological warfare. We also have the Voroshilov Military Academy of Chemical Defense, several military-chemical schools and scientific-research institutes and laboratories in the fields of chemistry and bacteriology. They are all working on these military projects.

Near Moscow there is a special proving ground for chemical defense. I know a new gas has been invented which is colorless, tasteless, and without odor. The gas is avowed to be very effective and highly toxic. The secret of the gas is not known to me. It has been named "American." Why this name was chosen, I can only guess.

Many places in the country have experimental centers for testing various chemical and bacteriological devices. One such base is in Kaluga. The commanding officer of this base is Nikolay Varentsov, the brother of Marshal Varentsov.

Near the city of Kalinin, on a small island in the Volga, there is a special bacteriological storage place. Here they keep large containers with bacilli of plagues and other contagious diseases. The entire island is surrounded by barbed wire and is very securely guarded. But my readers in the West must not be under any illusions. This is not the only place where there are such



SECRET EXPOSED—Contents of a secret drawer where Penkovsky kept camera, radio receiver and other tools of his trade while in Moscow. Photograph was made by the Soviet secret police after his arrest.

finely by him when the situation calls for it. The article specifically states, "The commander of the army (front) makes the decision to use chemical weapons."

The authors add that one of the most important uses for chemical missiles will be

the destruction of the enemy's nuclear strike capability. Specific mention is made of the "Little John," "Honest John," "Lacrosse," "Corporal," "Redstone," and "Sergeant" units, the width and depth of their dispersed formations under tactical conditions, and their vulner-


abilities to the chemical attack. Also American cruise missile and atomic artillery units. The article contains the usual precautions about the necessity to prevent damage to friendly troops, and discussed the operational situations in which chemical weapons could be used to greatest advantage. This is how it concludes:

"The purpose of this article is to present the main fundamental principles of using chemical missiles. Those principles should not, under any circumstances, be considered as firmly established, because they can be defined with greater precision as practical experience is accumulated."

Soviet officers generally consider Americans to be extremely lax in matters of training and discipline for defense against chemical attack. I have heard that American soldiers even boast of throwing away their gas masks and other protective equipment, claiming they have lost them. I can hardly believe this, but even if it is only partly true, it is a training deficiency which must be corrected immediately. Such crucial flaws in an enemy's defensive armor are not overlooked by Soviet planners.

WEDNESDAY: The surveillance net tightens around Penkovsky and Wynne; the party at Marshal Varentsov's villa; Marshal Malinovsky boasts how the Americans swallow their 'pill' over Berlin.

Condensed from the forthcoming book, *The Penkovsky Papers*, © 1945, Doubleday & Company, Inc.



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could be no doubt that the Soviet Army would use chemical weapons against its opponents. The political decision has already been made and our strategic military planners have developed a doctrine which permits the commander in the field to decide whether to use chemical weapons, and when and where.

I recently read an article entitled "Principles of the Employment of Chemical Missiles" of the Top Secret military publication "Information Collection of Missile Units and Artillery." It is being distributed this month, August, 1961. (This publication is intended to explain the latest in tactical and operational doctrine to the highest ranking officers, i.e., major general and above.)

The article wastes no time and minces no words. It opens with the statement that under modern conditions, highly toxic chemical agents are one of the most powerful means of destroying the enemy.

There is no mention made of waiting until the enemy uses chemical weapons; there is no reference to the need for a high-level political decision for the use of such weapons.

From the start to finish the article makes it clear that this decision has been made, that chemical shells and missiles may be considered just ordinary weapons available to the military commander, to be used now.

Through it all, Penkovsky continued to jot down his observations and his own warning to the West. The following excerpt discusses one of the most chilling aspects of

Later that month the same car appeared again at one of his meetings, a small brown sedan with the license plate SHA 61-45, driven by a man in a black overcoat. Penkovsky wrote a letter to a pre-arranged address in London, advising that no further meetings with Mrs. Chisholm be attempted.

From that time on, Penkovsky relied on the two remaining methods of communication. He either handed over material in the houses of Westerners, to which he was invited in the course of his duties, or relied on the relative anonymity of dead-drops which were, of course, the safest way to communicate. But they had their own peculiar suspenses and horrors. In effect, an agent working through dead-drops finds himself playing a grown-up game of blind-man's buff.

Through the spring of 1962 Penkovsky's existence was bounded by a collection of these inconspicuous hiding places. Drop No. 1 was located in the doorway of Numer 5-6 Pushkin Street, behind a radiator painted dark green. Messages to be sent were placed in a matchbox wrapped in light blue paper, bound with cellophane tape and wire, and hung on a certain hook behind the radiator.

When Penkovsky had something to leave there, he was to make a black mark on Post number 35 on the Kutuzov Prospect. He would then put the materials in the drop, and make two telephone calls to numbers G 3-28-87 and G 3-28-94, each with a set number of rings. . . . And so it went. Such are the complexities of a working intelligence operation.

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Our Man in the Kremlin

Penkovsky on Last Arrival in Moscow Knew Soviet Net Was Closing on Him

Tenth in a Series

By Frank Gibney


"I am under observation," Col. Penkovsky said, when his British businessman contact, Greville Wynne, arrived in Moscow for what proved to be his last visit before Penkovsky's arrest. It was July, 1962.

Penkovsky had continued to produce tremendous quantities of information for American and British intelligence, but by now he was considering means of making his escape.

He still could not be sure what the State Security Police suspected, but he realized that a net of surveillance was tightening around him.

A less bold or zealous man would have curtailed his activities. But Penkovsky knew the extent of Khrushchev's build-up in missiles, as well as his continued plans for military provocations over Berlin. He sacrificed caution, in his effort to get his warning across to Washington and London.

Wynne brought Penkovsky letters from his contacts in the West, which improved his spirits. Western intelligence officers had forged a new passport for Penkovsky to use, within the Soviet Union. In case surveillance increased to the danger point. He had previously discussed the possibility of leaving Moscow for Leningrad and somehow making a rendezvous with a submarine in



the Baltic. However far-fetched the plan seemed, he was also thinking of some way to get his family out, as well.

On the fourth of July, 1962, Penkovsky attended a reception at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, where he apparently succeeded in turning over information on the Soviet missile build-up to U.S. officers. On July 5, he and Wynne had a last meeting, at dinner, at the Peking Restaurant in Moscow. There they ran into the most obvious kind of surveillance by the State Security.

Penkovsky wrote down this account of the event, after it happened. "On approaching the Peking I noticed surveillance of Wynne. I decided to go away without approaching him. Then I became afraid that he might have some return material for me before his departure from Moscow. I decided to enter the restaurant and have dinner with Wynne in plain sight of everyone.

"Entering the vestibule I saw that Wynne was 'surrounded' (and that surveillance was either a demonstrative or an inept one).

Having seen that there were no free tables, I decided to leave, knowing that Wynne would follow me. I only wanted to find out if he had material for me and then to part with him until morning, having told him that I would see him off. I went 100-150 meters beyond into a large, through courtyard with a garden. Wynne followed me, and the two of us immediately saw the two detectives following us. Exchanging a few words, we separated.

"I was very indignant about this insolence, and on the following day, I reported officially to my superiors that State Security workers had prevented me from dining with a foreigner whom we respect, have known for a long time, with whom we have relations of mutual trust, with whom I have been working for a long time, etc. I said that our guest felt uncomfortable when he saw that he was being tendered such 'attention'."

"My superiors agreed with me that this was a disgrace, and Levin (the State Security representative) was equally indignant about the surveillance. Levin said that the Committee and I as its representative, granted the necessary courtesies to Wynne and that 'we' (State Security) do not have any claims on him."

Penkovsky's cool-headed bluff bought him time—almost three months' worth. He continued to photograph secret documents in the Gen-

eral Staff Library, rely on his good connections in Soviet military circles, hold off further action by the State Security police.

Later, the Moscow press strenuously attempted to play down Penkovsky's influence and associations with Soviet generals and officials.

Izvestia, for example, called him "... a rank and file official whose contacts and acquaintances did not go beyond a limited circle of restaurant habitués, drunkards and philanderers."

How true this characterization was may be gauged from the Papers themselves, a record of which the time was, of course, ignorant. In the following excerpt, Penkovsky described one of the many intimate gatherings at which he was nobbed with the Kremlin hierarchy: Marshal Varentsov's birthday party in September, 1961.

By Oleg Penkovsky
Marshal Varentsov's birthday

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GENERAL NEWS
COMICS

SECTION K

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 10, 1965

K1

A party was held at his country home. Many guests were invited, including the minister of defense, Marshal Malinovsky. My whole family, including even my mother, was invited long in advance. Yekaterina Karpovna, Varentsov's wife, asked me to be the master of ceremonies (temadan).

On the evening of September 16, 1961, the guests began to arrive: Marshal Malinovsky with his wife; Churayev, Khrushchev's right-hand man in the Central Committee Bureau for the Russian Republic (R. S. F. S. R.); Lieutenant Ryabchikov; Major General Semenov, and many others.

All the military were in civilian clothes with the exception of Malinovsky, who came wearing his uniform. Some of those invited could not come because they were busy, many of them out of town on business trips. They most important guests, of course, were Malinovsky and Churayev. Both arrived in Chaikas (the largest Soviet luxury car).

Malinovsky presented Varentsov with a large (3-liter) bottle of champagne.

Churayev gave him a large wooden carved eagle, someone even gave Sergey Sergeyevich a black dog. The best and the most original presents were those from me and my family.

They were the things I had bought in London. Varentsov openly admitted it by declaring loudly: "My boy has really outdone himself this time!" And my presents went from one guest to another. Everyone asked where and how I managed to get such beautiful things. Mrs. Varentsov and my wife quietly explained to the guests about my latest trip to London. The answer was always the same: "Oh, well, that of course explains it."

Mother's Question

At some point, while the party was in full swing, my mother approached Malinovsky and out of a clear sky asked him: "Forgive me, an old woman, Comrade Minister, my dear Rodion Yakovlevich, tell me please will there be a war? This question worries all of us so much!"

Marshal Malinovsky

See PENKOVSKY K2, Col.



VARENTSOV'S FRIEND—The spy, right, then an artillery major, when he served as an aide to Marshal Varentsov, center, in 1944. He remained a confidante of Varentsov's who after the war became marshall of the tactical missile force.

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Our Man in the Kremlin

Trickery Used by Russian Intelligence Against West Revealed by Penkovsky

Fourth in a Series
By Frank Gibney

Col. Oleg Penkovsky, the brilliant Soviet General Staff officer who volunteered to spy for the West, was almost the exact opposite of the drab, mousy professional spy, as celebrated in current "realistic" espionage novels. A sociable man who liked good food and good conversation, he had a ready wit and was prone to parlor card tricks.

When he arrived in London, in late April, 1961, he was consciously setting out to play an incredibly dangerous game of espionage against his own regime. But he managed to enjoy his stay, at least ostensibly, as thoroughly as any tourist.

The Colonel took long walks through the city, visited department stores, restaurants and theaters, generally in the company of Greville Wynne, his British businessman friend. The obvious freedom of the British people delighted him. He told Wynne, again and again, how different it was from the closed society of Moscow.

Personally, he was manifestly relieved for once to be out of the orbit of Soviet secret police surveillance. He even managed some discreet nightclubbing and a few dancing lessons. (Soviet intelligence circles in London, assumed that Penkovsky, a trusted officer, was attempting to "recruit" Wynne as a Soviet agent. So



his association with Wynne was not under suspicion.)

Penkovsky also did some guide work of his own, which considerably helped his standing in Soviet Military Intelligence. Shortly before he left Moscow, Gen. Serov, the chief of Military Intelligence, had called him into his office and informed him that his wife and daughter were also flying to London for an unofficial tourist visit. He asked Penkovsky to look after them and give them any help they needed in getting around in a strange city.

Accordingly, the Colonel helped Mrs. Serov and her attractive daughter Svetlana make their purchases (with money drawn from local So-

viet intelligence funds). He even managed to take Svetlana on a tour of the better London night spots without arousing undue attention.

Beneath this facade of socializing, however, Penkovsky's new work continued in earnest. On the basis of the information he had submitted, the British and American intelligence officers were now convinced that his desire to work with them was genuine.

In their nocturnal meetings, they gave the Soviet colonel a complete short course in clandestine radio communications, as well as a small Minox camera for photographing documents. It was arranged to make contact with him through Wynne or another Western emissary, if he found it impossible to return to Western Europe in the near future. If necessary, instructions would be transmitted to him by radio.

When he finally left Lon-

See PENKOVSKY, A23, Col. 1

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Trickery Used by Soviet Intelligence Revealed by Penkovsky

don on May 8, Penkovsky carried with him presents for his highly placed Soviet friends, including Gen. Serov, a full report of the trade and technical mission (which Moscow judged a great success) and a complete set of instructions and equipment for getting further espionage information out to his "new friends" in the West.

In the following excerpt from the Papers, Penkovsky has some more to say about the real nature of his own Soviet delegation—and the stern ground rules still laid down to cover all Soviet contacts with foreigners.

By Oleg Penkovsky

The State Committee for Co-ordination of Scientific Research Work is like a ministry. Our chairman, Rudnev, enjoys all the privileges of a minister in the U.S.S.R. The committee is in charge of all scientific and technical exchanges with foreigners, both in the Soviet Union and abroad. In fact, it is a large espionage apparatus, which not only collects scientific and technical information, but tries

to recruit Western technical specialists.

When I began my work in the committee, I was myself astounded by the number of intelligence officers working there. Eighty or 90 senior intelligence officers work in the foreign relations section alone. When one walks down the halls in our offices, one can see some of them saluting each other in the military manner. They have conspicuous difficulty getting away from military habits, even getting used to their civilian clothes.

The friendly contacts and "services" we provide visiting foreign delegations we might better call "friendly deceit." Often we Military Intelligence officers cannot understand ourselves why the foreigners believe us. Do they not understand that we show them in the U.S.S.R. only those things which are well known to everybody? If there is something new at a plant which foreigners are about to visit, we simply give orders to its director: "Show them everything, but have Shops 1 and 5 closed for repairs." That is all.

On my desk I have a list of pretexts and alternate proposals which we use to

keep foreigners out of certain areas of the U.S.S.R.:

1) The plant is under repair.

2) A bridge is closed.

3) There is no airport and the railroad tracks have been damaged by recent frost; therefore, for the time being there are no trains.

4) The local hotel is not ready for guests.

5) All hotels are completely filled with tourists, etc.


Sometimes we take foreign delegates through museums and parks in Moscow until the members are so tired they themselves call off the trip to a factory, preferring to rest. Or, instead of taking the delegation by plane, we put them on a train. As a result, the delegation has enough time to see only one or two installations in which they are interested, instead of five or six. Their visas expire and they have to leave after having seen nothing but vodka and caviar.

Recruiting Tasks

In Moscow our main task as intelligence officers inside the committee is to recruit agents among the foreigners visiting the U.S.S.R. Of course, this does not often happen. But we collect information by personal conversations, eavesdropping, examining baggage, literally stealing secrets from the visitors' pockets.

I have been assigned to British delegations visiting Moscow. My job is to establish friendly relations with these men, assess their intelligence possibilities, then

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PASS FOR SPY—This is Col. Penkovsky's pass as an "expert" of the Scientific Research Work Committee.

write a report on each to our intelligence people in London. It will be up to them to collect enough compromising information on these men — family problems, amorous adventures, personal finances, etc.—to secure their recruitment.

We are also to obtain as much scientific and technical information as possible of value to our Soviet industry — everything from cheaper methods of getting fresh water from sea water to the manufacture of artificial fur. Thanks to visits to our country by foreign delegations, we obtain vast quantities of extremely valuable information.

By contrast, all members of Soviet delegations traveling abroad are carefully instructed how to answer questions that might be put to them. I can honestly say that there is nothing new

that Western scientists and specialists could learn from the Soviet specialists — or Soviet exhibitions abroad. For example, the exhibits to be shown at our London exhibition in 1961 were first carefully checked by intelligence technicians to make sure there was nothing new which foreign scientists could see or steal. Some exhibits were purposely put together in a distorted way; the cone of the sputnik on display was not built that way, the spheres were of another type.

Trips of Soviet delegations to foreign countries require special preparation. The departure of any delegation requires a separate decree from the Communist Party Central Committee. And no delegation ever goes abroad without some form of State Security involvement.

After a Soviet delegation has been formed, we select certain scientists, engineers or other suitable members and instruct them individually on the type of information we need. Take my own 45-man delegation to London. Five of its members were employees of the Communist Central Committee. Ten Military Intelligence officers left for London at the same time in the guise of delegation members or tourists. There were also three other Military Intelligence colonels in the delegation, besides myself.

As a rule, Soviet scientists and technicians in missile production work are not allowed to go abroad. But lately, because these scientists must learn something about missile work in the U.S., a few have been given permission to travel—provided they have not partici-

pated in any missile production work for the last two years. Thus, if they defected to the West, their knowledge would not be so fresh.

Touring Instructions

Our intelligence instructions to traveling Soviet delegates are very specific. How many forms and autobiographies must be filled out before a trip abroad is processed! All of them in four or five copies! I myself had to submit 18 photographs before a single trip. What are they going to do with them? Marinate them? My wife and I worked on them for two days, and still could not finish all the forms.

Instructions we give to Soviet travelers stipulate that when traveling by train, you should always be seated with your own sex. Do not drink, do not talk

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too much and report any incidents on the trip to the consul or Soviet Embassy representatives. Do not carry any confidential materials with you, do not leave your hotel room, do not make any notes, but if this is unavoidable, keep them on your person.

I remember early in 1961 we sent a delegation to the Federal Republic of Germany. An engineer from Leningrad went with this delegation. He was co-opted, i.e., forcibly recruited by Military Intelligence. He had a notebook for making notes on the information he gathered. He left the notebook in a raincoat, then it disappeared. A search was conducted. We found nothing. The engineer became so upset that when his comrades went out shopping, he hanged himself in his hotel room. He used the cord of an electric iron which he found attached to the light fixture in the ceiling. (The delegation had taken the electric iron with them to save money on pressing.)

The engineer's body was sent to Leningrad by plane. Later, at the enterprise where he worked, it was announced that he was not normal and suffered from constant headaches. That is how things are done in our country.

Condensed from the forthcoming book, "The Penkovsky Papers," 1965, Doubleday & Co., Inc.

THURSDAY: Penkovsky arrives in London with new top-secret information taken from the Kremlin's files: the true story of how Khrushchev shot down the U-2 and the RB-47.

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Our Man in the Kremlin

U.S. Got True Account Of U-2 Plane Incident

(Fifth in a Series)


By Frank Gibney

Col. Oleg Penkovsky returned to Moscow on May 6, 1961, from his first visit to London and set about in earnest to gather more information for Western intelligence.

Some of this intelligence turned out to be the first accurate account of two troubling incidents on the Soviet-American policy frontiers — the downing of the U-2 reconnaissance plane in 1960 and the later Soviet attack on another American aircraft off the coast of Siberia.

When he returned to Moscow, he stored his new camera, film, radio receiver and frequency instructions in a secret desk drawer in the apartment which he and his family occupied on the Maxim Gorky Embankment. But he kept all knowledge of his new espionage role from them.

As far as Vera Penkovsky was concerned, her husband was busy at his normal confidential talks. Her own background as the daughter of a "political" general conditioned her against asking too many questions about his late hours or unexplained absences. The best Vera hoped for was another attache's assignment abroad, like their 1956 post in Turkey, where she could practice her French and enjoy



the better clothes and companionship of a foreign society.

Greville Wynne flew back into Moscow on May 27, to resume business negotiations with Penkovsky's committee on behalf of the British firms he represented. Penkovsky met him with a car at Sheremetevo Airport. On the way into the city, "Alex," as Wynne called him, handed the Englishman a packet of some 20 exposed films and other documents, including his own reports, for delivery to British and American intelligence.

The same evening Penkovsky visited Wynne in his room at the Metropol Hotel. Taking care to keep their conversation innocuous (the room of a foreign visitor like

See PENKOVSKY, A15, Col. 1



United Press International

THE SPY PLANE—Wreckage of the U-2 shot down over Russia in 1960 was displayed in Moscow.

PENKOVSKY—From Page A1

Soviets Downed One of Their Own

Wynne would probably be wired), Wynne gave Penkovsky a package containing 30 fresh rolls of film and further instructions from the Anglo-American intelligence team in London.

Far from suspecting anything strange in Penkovsky's meetings with Wynne, his superiors in Soviet Military Intelligence continued to think that he was "developing" a promising British contact. Penkovsky's work with the Soviet delegation in London was so highly regarded, in fact, that his pleased superiors arranged to send him there again in

July, to attend the opening of a Soviet Industrial Exhibition. This time he was to travel alone, without any delegation. American and British intelligence could hardly have wished for such a nice arrangement. One presumes that Western intelligence found Penkovsky's estimates of future Soviet plans, his reconstruction of recent events in Soviet-American relations — most of which served only to underline his warnings about Khrushchev's new policy of aggression.

For Penkovsky the intelligence information he gave was only a means to an end. His real purpose was to alert the American and British people to the danger of Khrushchev's "adventurist" tactics.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

By Oleg Penkovsky

The American U-2 pilot Gary Powers was shot down on May 1, 1960. Prior to the Powers flight, other U-2 flights had been made over the Kiev and Kharkov, but Khrushchev kept his mouth shut, because at that time there were no missiles that could be effective at the altitudes where the U-2 aircraft were flying.

When Powers was shot down over Sverdlovsk, it was not a direct hit but rather the shock wave that did it. The aircraft simply fell apart from it. During his descent Powers lost consciousness several times. He was unconscious when they picked him up from the ground; therefore, he was helpless to do anything and did not put up any resistance. On May 1 when this incident happened I was Duty Officer at GRU (Military Intelligence) headquarters. I was the first one to report it to the GRU officials.

At that moment, the KGB did not have an English interpreter. I was supposed to talk to him because I was the only one around who had some understanding of English—I had already reported the incident to some generals. If they had not found a KGB interpreter at

the last minute, I would have been the first one to interview Powers.

Ultimately, they called up to say that I was not needed. It seems that the KGB (State Security) chief, this young fellow Shelepin, who used to run the Komsomol (he replaced Serov at the KGB), wanted to make the report to Khrushchev personally. So he got an interpreter and picked Powers up himself. But the military had knocked Powers down and Powers was considered to be a military prisoner. He should have been turned over to the General Staff. Nonetheless, the KGB seized him, took him to Dzerzhinskiy Square, and made their own report. He needed medical treatment, because he was still in shock.

Earlier, when a U-2 flight came over in the direction of Kiev-Kharkov, there had been nothing to shoot with. As soon as the new rockets appeared, Khrushchev gave the order to use them. So they fired at Powers on May 1, 1960. Of course, we had antiaircraft defenses before, but not in quantity, and they were not able to go into action so quickly.

Marshal Biryuzov, then commander-in-chief of missile forces, was reprimanded because he had not correctly estimated the probable direction of the U-2 flights—he misgauged the importance of the targets. His forces wanted to fire when the aircraft from Turkey flew over Kiev, but there was nothing to fire with and the aircraft escaped. Powers would have escaped if he had flown one or one and a half kilometers to the right of his flight path.

On May 1 after Powers was knocked down, Khrushchev ordered a suspension of (secret) agent operations to avoid the risk of being caught by a Western provocation or, possibly, of furnishing material for Western counterpropaganda. There were many protests about dropping scheduled meetings and other contacts, but it had to be done.

The resident in Pakistan decided on his own to pick up material from a dead drop which was already loaded, in order to avoid possible compromise to the agent. For this he was severely reprimanded by his superior at the GRU even though he did the right thing. Thus, despite the damage it did to the agent network, Khrushchev ordered cessation of agent contacts during the period when he was going to capitalize on the Powers incident.

Khrushchev Lied

Khrushchev followed Powers' investigation and trial with great interest. He personally conducted the propaganda activity connected with the case. He was the first who began to

shoot about the direct hit, although actually there had been no such thing. Khrushchev wanted to brag about his missiles.

Khrushchev lied when he says that Powers was shot down by the first missile fired. Actually, 14 missiles were fired at his plane. The shock wave produced by the bursts caused his plane to disintegrate. The examination of Powers' plane produced no evidence of a direct hit; nor were there any missile fragments found on it. One of the 14 missiles fired at Powers' plane shot down a Soviet MIG-19 which went up to pursue Powers. Its pilot, a junior lieutenant, perished.

The U.S. aircraft RB-47 shot down on Khrushchev's order (in July, 1960) was not flying over Soviet territory. It was flying over neutral waters. Pinpointed by radar,

it was shot down by Khrushchev's personal order. When the true facts were reported to Khrushchev, he said: "Well done, boys, keep them from even flying close."

Such is our way of observing international law. Yet Khrushchev was afraid to admit what had actually happened. Lies and deceit are all around us. There is no truth anywhere. I know for a fact that our military leaders had a note prepared with apologies for the incident, but Khrushchev said: "No, let them know that we are strong."

Condensed from the forthcoming book, "The Penkovsky Papers," © 1965, Doubleday & Co., Inc.

FRIDAY: Penkovsky outlines Khrushchev's collision course of aggression in 1961 leading up to the Berlin and the great missile crises; the fear of the Soviet generals.

Our Man in the Kremlin


Penkovsky Fed Data To Keep Bosses Happy

(Start in a Series)

By Frank Gibney

Between July 15 and Aug. 10, 1961, Col. Oleg Penkovsky played out the second round of his harrowing espionage game in London. He spent part of each day working with Soviet delegates to the trade exhibition, or running through plans for Soviet espionage work in Britain with other Russian intelligence officers in the soundproofed basement room used by the intelligence "president" (i.e. the officer in charge) of the Soviet embassy at 48 Kensington Gardens.

At night, or during other off-hours, he would meet with the four American and British intelligence officers assigned to him in one of MI-6's "safe houses" for his real intelligence mission—explaining the documents he had obtained from the secret files in Moscow, exposing further Soviet intelligence missions in the West, elaborating on technical aspects of the Soviet missile program as well



as information on Khrushchev's political and diplomatic strategy. Rarely in the history of espionage has any country's high command been so thoroughly penetrated as the Kremlin was during the critical 16 months when Col. Penkovsky worked for the West.

Since Penkovsky had come to Britain again on a Soviet spying mission, it was necessary for the Brit

See PENKOVSKY, 433, Col. 4

Live for

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Penkovsky Fed 'Exchange' Data

ish and Americans to give him some intelligence material of apparent value to forward to his superiors in Moscow. This was provided. Penkovsky thus kept sending reports to Moscow of ostensibly new information on military as well as political objectives (e.g. "In traveling from London to Sheffield I observed for the second time in the southern outskirts of the city of Stamford a military airfield, on which British air force planes were based... I had the opportunity to study more carefully the indicated objectives..."). Such reports kept Penkovsky's superiors in Moscow happy and unsuspecting.

Amazing Coolness

With amazing coolness, the volunteer spy for the West also went on to advance his standing as a loyal Communist Party man with Moscow in other ways. One quiet morning he and Greville Wynne took a trip to see Karl Marx's grave in Highgate Cemetery and discovered it was in a bad state of neglect. Penkovsky wrote a letter of protest directly to the First Secretary of the Central Committee in Moscow. In the letter, Comrade Penkovsky told Comrade Khrushchev that, as "a loyal Marxist" he found such neglect an appalling reflection on communism and the Soviet Union.

Moscow took swift action. The London Embassy was ordered to set things right immediately and Penkovsky was commended for his "socialist vigilance."

All the while new assignments for Penkovsky came from Washington. It was a tense summer in Europe. The continent still shook from Khrushchev's threats to sign a treaty with East Germany and force the Western allies out of Berlin. If anything, the Vienna meeting of Khrushchev and President Kennedy had increased the political electricity. It was absolutely vital that the White House and Whitehall have every available piece of information on the extent of Khrushchev's military preparations and his political planning. Above all, they needed to know how far Khrush-



Camera Press-Pix

PENKOVSKY PROJECT—This is the grave of Karl Marx in London, which spy Oleg Penkovsky visited, reported to his Soviet superiors to be in a state of neglect and won praise "for his socialist vigilance."

ent time. But he is preparing earnestly. If the situation is ripe for war he will start it first in order to catch the probable enemy (the U.S.A. and the Western states) unawares. He would of course like to reach the level of producing missiles by the tens of thousands, launch them like a rain-storm against the West, and, as he calls it, "bury capitalism." In this respect even our marshals and generals consider him to be a provocateur, the one who incites war.

The Western powers must do something to stop him. Today he will not start a war. Today the Soviet Union is not ready for war. Today he is playing with missiles, but this is playing with fire, and one of these days he will start a real slaughter.

Look what happened during the Hungarian events and the crisis in 1956. We in Moscow felt as if we

were in Moscow. If the West does not maintain a firm policy, then Khrushchev's position will become stronger, he will think even more about his might and right, and in this case he might strike.

The people are very unhappy with Khrushchev's militant speeches. One can hear this everywhere. Listening to conversations. Now, at least, one can breathe a little easier than in Beria's time. So one can hear and say a few things.

On the other hand, the world can be thankful to Khrushchev for his militant words. They forced Kennedy, Macmillan and de Gaulle to double or triple their military budgets and defense preparedness. If Stalin were alive he would have done all this quietly, but this fool Khrushchev's loud-mouthed. He himself forces the Western powers to strengthen their weapons and military.

vately, it is a different story. At our embassy, I heard many good comments on Kennedy's speech. It was excellent. Everyone criticized Khrushchev, including the military intelligence and the security police residents: "There is no reason to be surprised." They all said, "Kennedy's speech is the answer to Khrushchev's saber rattling."

West Must Prepare

The West must be ready. They must be prepared to retaliate with tank and anti-tank forces, in the event of trouble over Berlin. The troops must be trained as well as possible. The Soviet plan to create a conflict in Berlin is simply a bid to win without a fight, but to be ready for a fight if it comes. When the time for a showdown comes, it is planned to use tanks to close all the roads and thus cut off all routes to East Germany and to Berlin.

The first echelon will consist of East German troops, the second of Soviet troops. As a whole, the plan provides for combined operations by Soviet and East German troops. If the first echelon is defeated, the second echelon advances, and so on. Khrushchev hopes that before events have reached the phase of the second echelon, the West will start negotiations in which East Germany will also participate. This will result in recognition of East Germany.

The Soviet and German troops will participate jointly in this operation because the Germans cannot be trusted to act independently. In the first place, the East German Army is poorly equipped and insufficiently prepared because we are afraid to supply them with everything. The Germans have no love of us, and there is always a chance that in the future they may turn against us, as it happened with the Hungarians.

Volodya Khoroshilov came home on leave. He is chief of the artillery staff of the tank army in Dresden under General Kupin. He was called back to duty, however, two weeks ahead of time. Before his departure, we went to a restaurant for dinner and he

Some of Penkovsky's sessions with the Anglo-American team lasted as long as ten hours at a stretch. Now that he had switched his allegiance, his dedication to the West was as single-minded as his youthful allegiance to communism. As a literal sign that he was now "your colonel," he asked his contacts to provide him with both a British and an American colonel's uniform. They did so. Pleased as punch, he had his picture taken in both.

As the following excerpt from the Papers indicates, Penkovsky was amazed that both the Western peoples and their governments seemed disposed to accept Khrushchev's boasts at face value. This only made Khrushchev's brinkmanship or "adventurism" grow more dangerous. A firm Western stand was needed, particularly in the case of Berlin.

By Oleg Penkovsky

In my considered opinion, as an officer of the General Staff, I do not believe Khrushchev is too anxious for a general war at the pres-

ent. He is against the "Khrushchev adventure." It was better to lose Hungary, as he said, than to lose everything.

Thanks to Khrushchev . . .

But what did the West do? Nothing. It was asleep. This gave Khrushchev confidence, and after Hungary he began to scream: "I was right!" After the Hungarian incident he dismissed many generals who had spoken out against him. If the West had slapped Khrushchev down hard then, he would not be in power today and all of Eastern Europe could be free.

Kennedy must carry out a firm and consistent policy in regard to Khrushchev. There is nothing to fear. Khrushchev is not ready for war. He has to be slapped down again and again every time he gets ready to set off on one of his adventures.

Kennedy has just as much right to help the patriots of Cuba as we had when we "helped" the Hungarians.

This is not just my opinion. Everyone at the General Staff said this. It was said in Marshal Varentsov's home, even on the street.

eral Staff have no love for Khrushchev. They are at no detriment. Why is this said? He is working to do as he pleases. He blabs too much about Soviet military successes in order to frighten the West, but the West is not stupid, they are also getting ready. What else can they do?

I believe Marshal Varentsov and Khrushchev's assistant Churayev; it was they who claimed that Khrushchev said, "I will drop a hail of missiles on them."

At the Soviet embassy in London I saw a short comment on Mr. Kennedy's recent speech. The speech was called "the militant speech of the President of the United States." That is all we say officially. The Tass intercepts, however, contain the entire speech point by point: first, second, third. First, Kennedy's references to the increase in the budget, next, the increase in the strength of the armed forces, in connection with the new army draft, then the new specific categories of naval flyers, etc. If necessary, the increases must be even greater.

But when we speak pri-

As soon as the treaty with Germany is signed, an alert will be declared immediately, and the troops in East Germany will occupy all the control points and will take over their defense and support. Our troops will stand by on alert, but they will not occupy these routes immediately because this might be considered a provocation. We will simply say, "Please, Americans, British, and French, go to Berlin, but you must request permission from East Germany."

"If the Americans, British and French do not want to confer with the East Germans and try to use force, the Germans will open fire. Of course, the Germans do not have enough strength, and then our tanks will move directly into Berlin."

I heard this from many officers, specifically from Gen. Pozdny, and also from Fedorov and Marshal Varentsov. Varentsov, however, added, "We are taking a risk, a big risk."

Importance of Tanks

In 1961, when Khrushchev decided to resolve the Berlin question, a tank echelon was brought to combat readiness on the border in the U.S.S.R., as well as in Czechoslovakia and Poland. That is the truth.

The NATO countries should give particular attention to antitank weapons. Why? Because East Germany has two tank armies in full readiness; this is in addition to the tank armies which are part of the second echelon located on the territories of the U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, and Poland.

Khrushchev personally attached a great deal of importance to tank troops, especially in the fight for Berlin. So much importance is attached to tanks, in connection with the Berlin crisis, that controversies have already broken out in the General Staff regarding finances. They are afraid that too much money has been allotted for the tank troops and that there will not be enough for missiles, electronics, and other types of equipment.

Khrushchev has lately become confused on the Berlin matter, particularly because he has realized that the West is firm there. He would like to pursue a hard policy and rattle his saber, but our country suffers from a great many shortages and difficulties which must be eliminated before the West is to be frightened further.

Condensed from the forthcoming book, "The Penkovsky Papers," 1963, Doubleday & Co., Inc.

Sunday: Sex and the Soviet bosses; Penkovsky's revelation of widespread immorality among the Kremlin elite; Khrushchev and Moscow's foreign policy.

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Anti-Soviet Campaign Charged

Russia Expels Post Correspondent Over 'Penkovsky Papers' Series

By Chalmers M. Roberts
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Soviet Union yesterday ordered the closing of the Moscow bureau of The Washington Post and the expulsion of this newspaper's correspondent, Stephen S. Rosenfeld, because of the publication of the Penkovsky Papers.

Rosenfeld, 33, was given seven days to leave with his wife, Barbara, and their two children, David, 16 months old, and Rebecca, born in Moscow three months ago. He opened The Washington Post's bureau there on Nov. 12, 1964.

Rosenfeld was called to the Foreign Ministry's press department at noon and was read a statement charging that The Washington Post had engaged in "an anti-Soviet campaign around the Penkovsky Papers" and that it had refused to halt their publication. A warning on Nov. 11 was given.

Old Penkovsky was a So-



The Washington Post
STEPHEN S. ROSENFELD
... told to leave Moscow

viet colonel executed by his government for serving as a spy for the West. The papers, serialized to newspapers from a just-published book, purport

to be his diary smuggled out of the Soviet Union. There has been considerable controversy as to the papers' authenticity but the value of Penkovsky's work for the West was acknowledged at his trial.

An editorial in The Washington Post today states that Rosenfeld's expulsion is "a deplorable exercise of arbitrary power" and an attempt by the Soviet government "to impose on the press of other countries, by treating the correspondents from these countries as virtual hostages, a control and dictation to which no reputable newspaper can submit."

The editorial also terms "a remarkable hallucination" the charge that the newspaper had launched a "campaign" against the Soviet Union, adding that it "will not be plunged" into any "campaign of denigration" because of the action.

Rosenfeld is the third American to be expelled from the Soviet Union. See ROSENFELD, 122, Col. 4

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Gibney Defends Penkovsky Papers

On two separate occasions the Soviet Government has attacked the authorship and the authenticity of *The Penkovsky Papers*. Both the Soviet Foreign Ministry and the press department of the Soviet Embassy in Washington have commented predictably.

Such terms as "anti-Soviet invention and slander," "provocative character," and "crude forgery" are commonplace in most efforts of the Soviet regime to discredit anyone who disagrees with it. It is typical of this approach that *The Washington Post* and other newspapers running the *Papers* were threatened by unspecified forms of Soviet retaliation, if publication continued.

Actually, there is no better evidence of the *Papers'* honesty, accuracy and authenticity than this loud, almost unprecedented protest from Moscow. As I said in the introduction to the *Papers*, the continuing power of state security apparatus over Soviet citizens is the greatest problem in the way of any real rapprochement between the West and the Russians.

Penkovsky felt this strongly himself, as the *Papers* reveal. The sharp protest of the Moscow leadership suggests that his arrow struck home.

A further charge of "forgery"—or partial forgery, if I interpret his article correctly—was made by Victor Zorza, of the *Manchester Guardian*. His comment relies on conjectures about what Penkovsky would or should have done. It abounds in phrases like "would hardly write," "it is curious that," "it is conceivable that," or "he is hardly likely to have produced."

This is understandable. I am sure that if Mr. Zorza had been in Col. Penkovsky's shoes, he would have behaved differently; and if a panel of Western Soviet experts had written the papers for Penkovsky, they would have undoubtedly written them differently. The fact is that Col. Penkovsky was very much his own man. He was a zealot and an individualist who lived with risk and whose desire to have his views known

drove him to take even more risks.

Mr. Zorza does have one point of factual criticism, which he interpreted incorrectly, however. He asserts that the account of Col. Penkovsky's movements which I gave in my introduction to the *Papers* and "the record of his trial" show that he was in London on Aug. 9, 1961, the day he found out about the proposed erection of the Berlin Wall. Mr. Zorza understandably questions why Penkovsky did not warn his Western contacts then about the building of the wall, since he had free access to them in London. From this he somehow concludes that *The Penkovsky Papers* are not genuine.

I owe him and other readers an apology for this confusion. In the process of editing, I incorrectly gave the date for Penkovsky's arrival in Moscow at that time as Aug. 10, 1961. Actually, it was Aug. 8—and I have since asked the publisher to correct this error in subsequent editions.

If Mr. Zorza rereads the Oct., 1963 transcript of Penkovsky's Soviet trial (page 24)—one of the principal sources of this book—he will discover that the correct date was Aug. 8. Hence, Penkovsky was in Moscow at the time he found out about the Berlin Wall—and unable to communicate immediately with the West.

Mr. Zorza points out that Penkovsky's writings were "often discursive, verbose, almost conversational." I am sure any expert on Russian-English translation would have his own pet way of rendering them into English—just as Mr. Deriabin, the translator, and I have ours. But this discursiveness hardly detracts from their authenticity.

On the contrary, I deliberately held all editing down to an absolute minimum. Neither Mr. Deriabin nor I felt we had the right to add any literary or factual embellishments to the words of a brave man, who wanted to get his own language out to the world.

FRANK GIBNEY.

New York City.

Penkovsky Papers Defended

As the translator of *The Penkovsky Papers*, I would like to make some comments on Victor Zorza's review. I do not want to get involved in polemics with Mr. Zorza, whose previous work I have admired. I know, better than anyone, that the *Papers* are genuine, but I also know that there is no way to prove this to the satisfaction of those determined to degrade Penkovsky's legacy as the Soviets sought to degrade Penkovsky.

I find it surprising that Mr. Zorza has made up his mind that "the Russian manuscript of the Penkovsky memoirs just does not exist" simply because I do not wish to release it in its original form. The published format is as true to Penkovsky's notes as it could be, even though Mr. Gibney and I inevitably had to translate, select, and edit them for publication. I will not, however, reveal how the *Papers* came to me.

Let me cite details from Mr. Zorza's critique. He says that "the English text is prepared with words and phrases no man with Penkovsky's Soviet background would use," i.e. he cites the terms "Soviet Russians" or "Soviets" in describing his countrymen. Mr. Zorza's quotes are in English, thus they are my translations. But Penkovsky clearly distinguished between the Russian people and the Soviet regime. In the *Papers*, Penkovsky used a variety of terms: "Soviet citizens," "the Soviet people," "Russians," etc. In translating I used the term "Soviet Russian" or "Soviet" for purposes of simplicity and consistency.

Penkovsky referred to Marshal Zhukov's removal because of his "Napoleonic characteristics." Mr. Zorza thinks that this should read "Bonapartist tendencies" and concludes that "no translator would depart so far from the original." The exact Russian term used by Penkovsky was "*Khrushchev ego ubral za napoleonovskiye zamashki*." Col. Penkovsky evidently knew Bonaparte's first name and preferred to use the term "*napoleonovskiye zamashki*."

Mr. Zorza also finds fault with the expression "Great

China." Obviously, Penkovsky was not writing an editorial for *Pravda*. "*Velikiy Kitay*" was what he wrote and that's how I translated it.

In Mr. Zorza's opinion no Soviet official would refer to a high party official as an RSFSR Communist Party leader. Colonel Penkovsky was well aware that there is no separate Communist Party of the RSFSR. The Russian original of the line on page 207 is, however, "*tak nazyvayemyy partiynyy vozhd RSFSR*."

With regard to Penkovsky's statement that several Soviet cosmonauts had lost their lives, I can only repeat that I merely translated what Penkovsky wrote — that some of them lost their lives.

About Marshal Chuykov: Mr. Zorza is correct in saying that Penkovsky was in error when he wrote that Chuykov was relieved of his duties when he took over the Civilian Defense command. However, I have simply translated what he wrote.

With regard to the anti-party group: again I simply translated what Penkovsky wrote. It is the Kremlinologist who is concerned with precision in the matter of dates of ousters; for Penkovsky, as for most Soviet citizens, it was apparently of little importance that Bulganin managed to hang on until 1958.

Mr. Zorza shows a lack of knowledge of the everyday Soviet language when he claims that a "Russian returning to Moscow would speak of a visit to the West, not to Europe." Penkovsky wrote "*Yevropa*" which means "Europe." Soviet intelligence officers do not normally talk of their travels to European countries as to "the West"; they refer to "*Yevropa*" or the country which they visited.

As far as the 50-80-100 megaton bomb is concerned, Penkovsky was apparently not in a position to measure the bomb's yield as accurately as Western experts or Mr. Zorza. If Western experts wrote *The Penkovsky Papers*, as Mr. Zorza seems to believe, why did they not use the correct figures?

PETER DERIABIN.

New York City.

an in the Kremlin

U.S. Got True Account Of U-2 Plane Incident

(Fifth in a Series)


By Frank Gilney

Col. Oleg Penkovski returned to Moscow on May 6, 1961, from his first visit to London and set about in earnest to gather more information for Western intelligence.

Some of this intelligence turned out to be the first accurate account of two troubling incidents on the Soviet-American policy frontier—the downing of the U-2 reconnaissance plane in 1960 and the later Soviet attack on another American aircraft off the coast of Siberia.

When he returned to Moscow, he stored his new camera, film, radio receiver and frequency instructions in a secret drawer in the apartment which he and his family occupied on the Maxim Gorky Embankment. But he kept all knowledge of his new espionage role from them.

As far as Vera Penkovsky was concerned, her husband was busy at his normal confidential talks. Her own background as the daughter of a "political" general conditioned her against asking too many questions about his late hours or unexplained absences. The best Vera hoped for was another attache's assignment abroad, like their 1956 post in Tur-



key, where she could practice her French and enjoy the better clothes and companionship of a foreign society.


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The same evening Penkovsky visited Wynne in his room at the Metropol Hotel. Taking care to keep their

See PENKOVSKY, A15, Col. 1

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Post Thurs 4 Nov 65



United Press International

THE SPY PLANE—Wreckage of the U-2 shot down over Russia in 1960 was displayed in Moscow.

PENKOVSKY—From Page A1

1153

Soviets Downed One of Their Own

conversation innocuous (the room of a foreign visitor like Wynne would probably be wired), Wynne gave Penkovsky a package containing 30 fresh rolls of film and further instructions from the Anglo-American intelligence team in London.

Far from suspecting anything strange in Penkovsky's meetings with Wynne, his superiors in Soviet Military Intelligence continued to think that he was "developing" a promising British contact. Penkovsky's work with the Soviet delegation in London was so highly regarded, in fact, that his pleased superiors arranged to send him there again in July, to attend the opening

the last minute, I would have been the first one to interview Powers.

Ultimately, they called up to say that I was not needed. It seems that the KGB (State Security) chief, this young fellow Shelepin, who used to run the Komsomol (he replaced Serov at the KGB), wanted to make the report to Khrushchev personally. So he got an interpreter and picked Powers up himself. But the military had knocked Powers down and Powers was considered to be a military prisoner. He should have been turned over to the General Staff. Nonetheless, the KGB seized him, took him to Dzerzhinskiy Square, and made their own report. He needed medical treatment, because he was still in

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Khrushchev lied when he says that Powers was shot down by the first missile fired. Actually, 14 missiles were fired at his plane. The shock wave produced by the bursts caused his plane to disintegrate. The examination of Powers' plane produced no evidence of a direct hit; nor were there any missile fragments found on it. One of the 14 missiles fired at Powers' plane shot down a Soviet MIG-19 which went up to pursue Powers. Its pilot, a junior lieutenant, perished.

The U.S. aircraft RB-47 shot down on Khrushchev's order (in July, 1960) was not flying over Soviet territory; it was flying over neutral waters. Pinpointed by radar,

it was shot down by Khrushchev's personal order. When the true facts were reported to Khrushchev, he said: "Well done, boys, keep them from even flying close."

Such is our way of observing international law. Yet Khrushchev was afraid to admit what had actually happened. Lies and deceit are all around us. There is no truth anywhere. I know for a fact that our military leaders had a note prepared with apologies for the incident, but Khrushchev said: "No, let them know that we are strong."

Condensed from the forthcoming book "The Penkovsky Papers," © 1965, Doubleday & Co., Inc.

FRIDAY: Penkovsky outlines Khrushchev's collision course of aggression in 1961, leading up to the Berlin and the great missile crises; the fear of the Soviet generals.

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travel alone, without any legation. American and British intelligence could hardly have wished for such a nice arrangement.

One presumes that Western intelligence found immensely valuable not only Penkovsky's estimates of future Soviet plans, but his reconstruction of recent events in Soviet-American relations — most of which served only to underline his warnings about Khrushchev's new policy of aggression.

For Penkovsky the intelligence information he gave was only a means to an end. His real purpose was to alert the American and British people to the danger of Khrushchev's "adventurist" tactics.

By Oleg Penkovsky

The American U-2 pilot Gary Powers was shot down on May 1, 1960. Prior to the Powers flight, other U-2 flights had been made over the Kiev and Kharkov, but Khrushchev kept his mouth shut, because at that time there were no missiles that could be effective at the altitudes where the U-2 aircraft were flying.

When Powers was shot down over Sverdlovsk, it was not a direct hit but rather the shock wave that did it. The aircraft simply fell apart from it. During his descent Powers lost consciousness several times. He was unconscious when they picked him up from the ground; therefore, he was helpless to do anything and did not put up any resistance. On May 1 when this incident happened I was Duty Officer at GRU (Military Intelligence) headquarters. I was the first one to report it to the GRU officials.

At that moment, the KGB did not have an English interpreter. I was supposed to talk to him because I was the only one around who had some understanding of English—I had already reported the incident to some generals. If they had not found a KGB interpreter at

Earlier, when a U-2 might have come over in the direction of Kiev-Kharkov, there had been nothing to shoot with. As soon as the new rockets appeared, Khrushchev gave the order to use them. So they fired at Powers on May 1, 1960. Of course, we had antiaircraft defenses before, but not in quantity, and they were not able to go into action so quickly.

Marshal Biryuzov, then commander-in-chief of missile forces, was reprimanded because he had not correctly estimated the probable direction of the U-2 flights—he misgauged the importance of the targets. His forces wanted to fire when the aircraft from Turkey flew over Kiev, but there was nothing to fire with and the aircraft escaped. Powers would have escaped if he had flown one or one and a half kilometers to the right of his flight path.

On May 3, after Powers was knocked down, Khrushchev ordered a suspension of (secret) agent operations to avoid the risk of being caught by a Western provocation or, possibly, of furnishing material for Western counterpropaganda. There were many protests about dropping scheduled meetings and other contacts, but it had to be done.

The resident in Pakistan decided on his own to pick up material from a dead drop which was already loaded, in order to avoid possible compromise to the agent. For this he was severely reprimanded by his superior at the GRU even though he did the right thing. Thus, despite the damage it did to the agent network, Khrushchev ordered cessation of agent contacts during the period when he was going to capitalize on the Powers incident.

Khrushchev Lied

Khrushchev followed Powers' investigation and trial with great interest. He personally conducted the propaganda activity connected with the case. He was the first who began to

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ROSENFELD—From Page A1

Moscow Expels Post Correspondent

can correspondent to be expelled from Russia this year. American officials view the action as part of the hardening Soviet attitude toward the United States over the war in Vietnam, in attitude not unrelated to the bitter Chinese Communist charges that Moscow has not acted firmly enough on the Communist side in that conflict.

It also was felt here that the charge of the Penkovsky Papers, commenting unfavorably on personal habits of high Soviet officials and officers, was particularly offensive to Moscow, which has always been highly sensitive about such criticism.

The most recent correspondent expelled this year was John Jaffe of the American Broadcasting Co. who was ordered out in September because of a report by ABC's Washington diplomatic correspondent on possible changes in the Kremlin. Adam Clymer of the Baltimore Sun was expelled in February after being accused of striking a Soviet policeman during a demonstration by Asian students in Moscow outside the U.S. Embassy protesting American Policy in Vietnam.

A Newsweek correspondent was expelled in 1962, a National Broadcasting Co. reporter was ordered out in 1963 and Time magazine's Moscow bureau was closed in 1964. Newsweek and NBC have since been allowed to reopen their bureaus.

Here is the chronology of the current case:

The Washington Post began publication of the Penkovsky Papers on Oct. 31. The last of 14 installments ran on Nov. 15. On Nov. 2 it was reported

to this newspaper that Soviet Embassy officials were saying the papers were a forgery. A Washington Post representative called on Embassy Counselor Alexander I. Zinchuk, by appointment, the following day to ask any proof of the accusation. Zinchuk was told that The Washington Post would publish any such proof. His reply was that he would look into it and be asked and was told how long the series would run.

On Nov. 5, at the Embassy's national day party, a representative of the newspaper was told by another Soviet official that he expected "a strong reaction" to the publication very shortly. He was told that The Washington Post would publish the reaction.

The "reaction" did not come until Nov. 13. On that day Rosenfeld was called to the Foreign Ministry's press department in Moscow. F. M. Simonov, a department deputy, read him a statement describing the Penkovsky Papers as "a falsified story, a mixture of anti-Soviet inventions and slander" and stating that their publication "cannot be considered otherwise than as an intentional act in the spirit of the worst traditions of the cold war."

Simonov said the press department was "authorized to invite the attention of the editorial board of The Washington Post to the provocative character of this publication," adding that "we expect that measures will be taken so that no articles and materials of such a kind will be published in The Washington Post in the future."

Simonov added to this threat

by saying that "if publication continues we reserve the right for ourselves to take necessary measures." The text of the complaint was published in The Washington Post the next day.

The same day it commented editorially that it would complete publication of the papers, adding that "we refuse to accept the inadmissible suggestion that this newspaper must not print material which the Soviet Government may find unacceptable."

On Nov. 15 the newspaper published a communication from the Embassy's press department condemning the papers as a "forgery" and a "spear" on the Soviet Union. It also published, as previously scheduled, the first of two articles by Victor Zorza, Soviet specialist of the Manchester Guardian, analyzing the papers. He questioned their authenticity and suggested they had been written in part by the Central Intelligence Agency.

On Nov. 18, Rosenfeld was told by a Soviet friend in Moscow that a decision had been taken to expel him. He also was told that the Central Committee of the Communist Party had given the Foreign Ministry permission to threaten Rosenfeld with expulsion unless The Washington Post ceased publication of the papers.

Under Party Pressure

After the newspaper ran the two concluding articles, the Central Committee was reported to have asked the Foreign Ministry why it had not expelled Rosenfeld. The informant said that the Ministry would have liked to forget the affair but that it was under

Communist Party pressure and so agreed to the expulsion.

It was reported here in Washington to The Post that the Embassy had recommended expulsion. Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin formally protested publication of the papers to the State Department, and in London the Soviet Ambassador called at the Foreign Office to complain about publication of the Penkovsky Papers in Britain. The London Observer serialized the papers as did more than 30 papers in the United States and elsewhere.

Then yesterday Rosenfeld was again called to the Soviet Foreign Ministry's press department to be read the following statement by deputy chief Pyatisnev:

"On Nov. 13 you were asked to the press department and the attention of the editorial board of The Washington Post was invited to the provocative character of the publication of the anti-Soviet entitled the so-called Penkovsky Papers."

"In our statement we pointed out that these so-called papers were a coarse fraud, a mixture of provocative invention and anti-Soviet slander. Publication of these notes in The Washington Post cannot be considered other than as premeditated action in the worst traditions of the cold war, which cannot but harm Soviet-American relations."

Demand Rejected

"In its statement the press department expressed the hope that measures would be taken so that no such articles and materials of the kind would appear in this newspaper in the future. Despite that statement, the editorial board of

The Washington Post continued to publish the and other material popularized this fraud.

"Considering such a member of the editorial board of the newspaper, which carries an anti-Soviet campaign around the so-called Penkovsky Papers, the press department is authorized to state that your future stay in the Soviet Union as correspondent of The Washington Post is undesirable and it is proposed that you leave the territory of the Soviet Union."

Pyatisnev, after reading the prepared statement, told Rosenfeld that "we would like to add that this measure is not directed against you personally but was made necessary by actions of the editorial board of your newspaper."

Rosenfeld asked how much time he had to leave. Pyatisnev inquired as to how much time he would need. When Rosenfeld suggested two or three weeks, Pyatisnev replied that he could have five to seven days. They agreed on seven.

Tass, the Soviet news agency, then made public the action. It included the statement that the papers "are an obvious forgery, fabricated by the U.S. intelligence service which the exposed spy had served."

The Tass statement added that "the publication of this forgery by The Washington Post can only be regarded as an attempt to vilify the Soviet Union and as a premeditated act in the spirit of the cold war."

Last night Rosenfeld was host in his Moscow apartment office at a Thanksgiving turkey dinner for 14 guests. He is returning to Washington

Soviet Expects Doubts Validity of Controversial Papers

Usage in 'Penkovsky' Said to Prove Forgery

By Victor Zorza

Washington Guardian

LONDON—So far as can be established, the Russian manuscript of Penkovsky's memoirs just does not exist.

When news of the imminent publication of the Penkovsky Papers was reported in the world press, the American publishers of the book were inundated with requests for permission to serialize the story in newspapers and to publish it in foreign languages.

Among these requests was one from a small Russian emigre publishing house in West Germany. All it could offer was \$250. This was accepted without any haggling, since all the proceeds from the book are to go to the "Penkovsky Foundation," formed in the United States for this purpose.

That the American publishers had accepted the book for publication in good faith is shown by their willingness to procure the Russian text for the emigre publishing house. But after several weeks and repeated requests to the "Penkovsky Foundation," the Russian text has not been made available, and it looks as if it never will be.

On Monday, the Russian emigre publisher made a telephone call from Frankfurt to Doubleday, the New York publishers, to get the final answer which had been promised for the beginning of this week. He was told by R. E. Banker, for Doubleday, that they were still unable to provide a Russian text. However, they were prepared to let the Russian publisher go ahead—if he was prepared to re-translate the Penkovsky text from English back into Russian. As for the Russian "original," Banker said, they had twice asked the "State Department" about it, but were still not able to provide it.

Strange Phrases

The English text is peppered with words and phrases that no man with Penkovsky's Soviet background would use. He is made to refer repeatedly to "Soviet Russians" or to "Soviets" in describing his countrymen. These terms would sound as strange in Russian as "United States Americans" or British Englishmen would sound in ordinary English usage.

These are not mistakes in translation, but they arise from ignorance of Soviet terminology. The stock Soviet phrase for the kind of political deviation for which Marshal Zhukov, the Defense Minister, was purged in 1957, is "Bonapartist tendencies." Yet Penkovsky is made to report Khrushchev as saying that Marshal Zhukov was displaying "Napoleonic characteristics." No translator would depart so far from the original. But if the remark was inserted in English by someone writing some time after he had read an account of the Zhukov affair, a faulty memory for phrases might have easily led him to use the associated, but incorrect, term.

Penkovsky is made to illustrate the change in Sino-Soviet relations by remarking that the phrase "Great China" has now been replaced by official terminology by was dorned "China." However, the official usage was never "Great China"—it was "the Great Chinese People."

Penkovsky is made to refer to a high party official as an "R.S.F.S.R. Communist Party Leader"—a phrase that would never be used by a Soviet official, who would know that the R.S.F.S.R.—the initials of the Russian Republic—has no Communist Party distinct from the Soviet Party. One of the chapters begins with a reference by Penkovsky to his recent trip to "Europe"—although a Russian returning to Moscow would speak of a visit to the "West." But the reference to a trip to "Europe" would have come naturally to an American compiler of the papers.

Among Penkovsky's many unlikely digressions, his excursion into the history of the Party appears particularly improbable—and factually wrong. He provides a long list of Party leaders over the years who, as successive editions of the Party history went to press, were purged and described variously as enemies of the people, traitors, and imperialist hirelings. This is an exercise beloved by anti-Communist propagandists and figures in many of their tracts. But a true professional would never make the mistake of listing Marshal Zhukov as "Khrushchev's enemy"—a phrase that would never be used in an official Soviet textbook. Penkovsky would certainly have known it to be wrong.

Meaningless Titles

In listing the official functions of high Soviet officers, he often describes them as "deputies of the Supreme Soviet"—a meaningless dignity on which the good spy that he was would not waste his breath. However, a western compiler might well have taken these and other details from any good reference book, just to fill out the picture for the inexperienced reader.

Penkovsky is made to show his indignation at Khrushchev's recklessness in 1961 in testing a 50-megaton bomb which he describes as having a yield of 80 and, elsewhere, of 100 megatons—although the accurate measurements taken by western experts have put it at under 60 megatons. Similarly, he reports that several Soviet launches of manned Sputniks took the lives of their crews. In fact, all Russian launches have been monitored by western

radio and radar tracking devices which would have revealed beyond any doubt, through the nature of the communications passing between the satellite and the base, the presence of a human being aboard. Western experts have repeatedly dismissed this particular rumor.

Confusion Over Events

The report attributed to Penkovsky that Marshal Chuikov, the commander-in-chief of the ground forces, was dismissed from this post in 1961 and appointed chief of civil defense is wrong. It is true that he got the civil defense job at that time, but he continued as the commander of the ground forces—and the Soviet military press referred to him repeatedly as such.

It was only in 1964 that he lost this post, nearly two years after Penkovsky's arrest. It would appear that someone compiling the "Papers" more recently has confused the two events and dates, making Penkovsky report something that occurred after he was executed in 1963. Similar confusion is evident in Penkovsky's references to the removal by Khrushchev in 1957 of the anti-Party group of Molotov, Malenkov, and Bulganin—although Bulganin remained prime minister until 1958, without at first being charged with membership in the group.

Virtually the whole section on the Soviet military doctrine appears to have been written by a western pen. It is here that the references to "Soviets" and "Soviet Russians" are most obtrusive. Penkovsky is made to explain that he had sent out the full text of the "Special Collection" on military doctrine to the

West—and at the same time to go on for pages on end, giving long quotations from it.

Would Penkovsky really have bothered to write out long passages from a publication which he had photographed and dispatched to his western masters? This whole section, and a number of others in the book, is accompanied by repeated warnings from Penkovsky about the Soviet determination to acquire a first strike posture, and to launch a surprise nuclear attack on the West.

The chapter on strategy is made the main vehicle for the message, and the long quotations from the "Special Collection" are designed to give it an air of authority. But the impression is false, for Gen. Gerasimov, on whose contribution the compiler relies to drive the first strike lesson home, was strongly contradicted by equally authoritative contributors to the "Special Collection." But the Penkovsky Papers give no hint of this.

Undoubted Forgery

Gen. Kurochkin, a respected Soviet strategist, went so far as to describe some of the more extreme views as "anti-Marxist." This is the chapter that can be described without any hesitation as forged. The compiler of the book adds insult to injury by making Penkovsky say that "I am sorry that I cannot copy here the entire 'Special Collection'—or is it, perhaps, a private joke inserted for the entertainment of the compiler's colleagues. The use—or misuse—of the 'Special Collection' in this way is a great pity. Its publication in full would have added greatly to the understanding of Soviet

strategy among students in the West. But there is now reason to fear that the account given in the papers will prevent the full publication which would inevitably show up the imbalance of the Penkovsky book.

It may be that some of the errors pinpointed in this article are not necessarily evidence of forgery, but the cumulative weight of the evidence is too great to support any other interpretation.

Work of CIA

The book could have been compiled only by the Central Intelligence Agency. No other organization in the West, apart from British Intelligence, and certainly no individual, could have had access to the information of which the book is made up. British intelligence officers did at one time entertain the idea of building Penkovsky up posthumously as something of a hero, but permission to proceed was withheld.

The CIA has been repeatedly stung and provoked by the attempts of the Disinformation Department of the Soviet intelligence organization to discredit its activities throughout the world. The Penkovsky Papers are the CIA's answer. But in psychological warfare of this kind the intelligence agencies of the democratic countries suffer from the grave disadvantage that in attempting to damage the adversary they must also deceive their own public. It is the function of a free press to uncover such deception. Some of my best friends are in the CIA, but if they want their psychological warfare efforts to remain undiscovered, they must do better than this.

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defense documents or NATO documents, with much wider circulation, it might have taken months to narrow the search. But in the brief period approximately thirty-six hours in which that particular French standing group document was in Paris for clearance, he took it home, photographed it and returned it to its proper place next day.

When the French identified the document on the basis of the number transmitted from Moscow to the British and Americans by Penkovsky, they immediately put a 24-hour tail on each of the six

who had signed for it—including the Minister of Defense. Within days, Paques was in contact with a member of the Soviet Embassy in Paris whom the French knew to be a KGB agent.

His arrest followed swiftly. He confessed promptly. At his trial, he testified in words reminiscent of some of Penkovsky papers that he had signed for Russia because he thought it would help preserve peace if the Russians were fully informed of NATO plans.

of the previous espionage the Freneuman had done. Paques served from 1958 to 1962 in the private office of French Defense Minister Pierre Messmer. He later became chief press officer at NATO with a "cosmic top secret" clearance, NATO's highest security classification.

Among the document identity numbers Penkovsky sent to the West was one with a very unusual and limited classification. It was a French NATO standing group document—in other words, a French position paper prepared for the NATO military standing group in Washington. When the French checked on the document, they discovered that it was the draft of a French position that eventually was altered and re-numbered before it was actually

submitted to the standing group.

The document, therefore, had received very limited circulation. It had been prepared in Washington by the French element on the standing group and sent to Paris for clearance at the Ministry of Defense. Only six persons signed for it at the Ministry when it was discussed, altered and sent back to Washington. One of these was Georges Paques.

Had Paques limited his activities to general Ministry of

His Greatest Service

Penkovsky Unmasked 3 Soviet Spies in West

By Don Cook
Los Angeles Times

PARIS, Nov. 17—Whatever the value of the spy papers of Col. Oleg Penkovsky, or even their validity, which is being questioned by some experts on Soviet affairs, his greatest service to the West was the unmasking of key Russian agents in Paris, London and Stockholm.

The three most important espionage cases in the West in the last five years were all broken by counterintelligence services on the basis of information passed to Britain and the United States by Penkovsky. The cases involved:

Georges Paques, a senior French civil servant who spied for the Russians in the Ministry of National Defense and later in NATO headquarters in Paris. He was caught and sentenced to life imprisonment in July of 1964.

Col. Stig Wennerstrom of the Swedish army, who spied for the Russians in the Swedish Defense Ministry and also while serving as Swedish military attache in Washington. He was caught and sentenced to life imprisonment in July, 1963, at about the same time that Penkovsky went on trial in Moscow with his British contact, Greville Wynne.

William J. C. Vassall, a senior clerk in the British Admiralty, who had been recruited by the Russians through homosexual blackmail during a tour of duty in Moscow. He was apprehended and sentenced to eighteen years in prison in September, 1962.

Penkovsky did not "finger"

these Russian agents directly. But he did pass to the British and American intelligence services information that enabled them to trap the three spies.

A Penkovsky speciality was sending the identity numbers on Western documents that were reaching the Russians. The identity numbers were sufficient to start the counterintelligence search for the spies in the West who were passing the documents to Soviet intelligence.

In the case of the British Admiralty documents and the Swedish Defense Ministry documents, the work of isolating Vassall and Wennerstrom went fairly rapidly. But the apprehension of Georges Paques was more complicated and took more time.

Partly this was because many hundreds of documents had to be sifted and checked. Partly it was because the French counterintelligence services, which are highly effective, do not as a rule respond very swiftly to information provided from American or British sources.

In the end, the break in the Paques case came as a result. See PENKOVSKY, A20, Col. 5

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
Monday, Nov. 15, 1963 THE WASHINGTON POST

1158

Soviet Expert Thinks 'Penkovsky Papers' Are a Forgery

First of Two Articles
By Victor Zorza
Manchester Guardian

LONDON—"Their authenticity," says the introduction to the Penkovsky Papers, the memoirs of the Anglo-American spy in Russia, "is beyond question." It is not. Indeed, the book itself contains the evidence showing certain parts of it to be a forgery, even though other sections are evidently made up of intelligence information provided by Penkovsky before his arrest.



Zorza

But the book does not, in fact, claim to be made up of Penkovsky's intelligence reports to the West. On the contrary, it is said to be a collection of "notes, sketches and fragments" accumulated during his spying in 1942 and "among" the Soviet Union. The author, Victor Zorza, in his arrest in 1962, at the time Penkovsky hoped

that they might eventually be published "to clarify his motives and to clear his name beyond question." It is curious that a work with so noble a purpose should include so much purely military and political intelligence. The "Low-down" Much of the book seems calculated to show the Soviet system in the worst possible light, but this would be consistent with Penkovsky's attempt to justify his defection. It is even possible to stretch the "low-down"—and it really is low—on the sexual mores, the drunkenness and cupidity of some of the people he knew in the higher ranks of the political, military and intelligence quarters. "I have absolutely no intention of defaming the marshals and generals," says, after giving some particularly choice details. He adds that he had "intentionally omitted the substance of moral degradation and drunkenness"—which he had not. "I know one thing for sure, though: all our generals have mistresses, and some

up on the launching pad, even Penkovsky hoped to have two or more." All? For sure? It is conceivable that western intelligence organizations might have been interested in the peccadilloes of members of the Soviet General Staff, just as Soviet intelligence would be interested in their western opposite numbers, and that Penkovsky thought it right to supply this information. But he would hardly write it all down for posterity. "The Intelligence Feat" The introduction says that the extent and ingenuity of Penkovsky's work add up perhaps to the most extraordinary intelligence feat of this century. If there is no Soviet spy now working at an even higher level in the West, then this claim may well be valid. Much of the intelligence information reproduced in the book is obviously genuine. Western government experts revealed their knowledge of it some time ago in the course of discussion about Soviet affairs. Penkovsky's information about the ignominious failure of Khrushchev's "secret weapon," which blew up on the launching pad, en-

abled the western leaders to treat Soviet threats and boasts with composure. Penkovsky's information about Khrushchev's plans during the German crisis of 1961 enabled the West to make the dispositions which warranted off the Soviet threat to Berlin. Penkovsky sent reports on the bickering over the building up of the Soviet missile force, favored by Khrushchev, and the maintenance of adequate conventional forces, favored by the marshals. Dispute in Kremlin This gave western intelligence analysts the clues that helped them to study between the lines of the Soviet press the most important political dispute that raged in the Soviet leadership in recent years—on the allocation of resources between civilian and military needs, within the military field itself. This contributed greatly to the western governments' understanding of the factors that caused the fall of Khrushchev, even though this occurred some two years after Penkovsky's arrest.

For some months before the Cuban missile crisis, Penkovsky and his western masters knew that he was being watched by Soviet counter-intelligence. He could therefore neither acquire nor send any intelligence on what was to prove the most fateful confrontation between East and West, and suggestions that he was asked to report on Soviet operations in Cuba just before the crisis would appear to be without foundation. Yet, paradoxically, his contribution was probably decisive.

He had sent out, earlier, details of the deployment pattern of Soviet missiles. This enabled U.S. air reconnaissance experts to identify the missile sites at an early stage of construction. The early warning made it possible for President Kennedy to make in secret the preparations that played so major a part in his later management of the crisis, and in compelling Khrushchev to withdraw. Lack of Time The most important part of the information he sent out consisted of some 5000 photographs of documents, sketches, etc., taken with a miniature camera. Yet we are asked to believe that this highly professional and valuable spy added to the great risks he was already running by keeping a detailed account of his activities and views, virtually every page of which contained enough secret information to send him straight to the firing squad. In the foreword we are told that "throughout the period of the West, he sat up at night after night composing a journal." Yet in a passage that has the ring of truth Penkovsky himself makes it clear that this is just what he could not do. He has to write hurriedly, he says, "for the simple lack of time and space."

When he writes at night in his two-room flat he disturbs his family's sleep. "Typing is very noisy." During the day he is "always busy." "Running like a madman," in a typically Russian phrase, between the offices of his two employers, the Committee for the Coordi-

nation of Scientific Research, and the Military Intelligence Headquarters. His evenings are generally occupied, nor can he write while visiting his friends in the country. "Someone may always ask what I am doing." At home, at least, "I have a hiding place in my desk." On his own showing, he is hardly likely to have produced in these circumstances the manuscript of what is now a sizeable book. Autobiography Questioned On one occasion the unit was visited by a number of Soviet military leaders, whom Penkovsky recognized, but he never seen before." He was told later that this was a certain N. S. Khrushchev. Yet for the past two years Khrushchev had been the first secretary of the Ukrainian Party, carrying out a ruthless and bloody purge, feared and hated by all—the virtual master of the Ukraine, the "Little Stalin," with his picture frequently displayed in public places and in the newspapers which would have been obligatory reading for an aspiring political officer. No doubt the account of the incident was inserted into the "papers" to make them appear more authentic, but the intended result, as happens so often when enthusiasm outruns good judgment, is the opposite of what was intended. There is much tedious repetition which is hardly accounted for by the explanation that the papers are arranged "with little attempt at order, and none at literary style." That this is so is painfully obvious, but it still does not explain why the book should contain several ac-


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abled the western leaders to treat Soviet threats and boasts with composure. Penkovsky's information about Khrushchev's plans during the German crisis of 1961 enabled the West to make the dispositions which warranted off the Soviet threat to Berlin. Penkovsky sent reports on the bickering over the building up of the Soviet missile force, favored by Khrushchev, and the maintenance of adequate conventional forces, favored by the marshals. Dispute in Kremlin This gave western intelligence analysts the clues that helped them to study between the lines of the Soviet press the most important political dispute that raged in the Soviet leadership in recent years—on the allocation of resources between civilian and military needs, within the military field itself. This contributed greatly to the western governments' understanding of the factors that caused the fall of Khrushchev, even though this occurred some two years after Penkovsky's arrest.

For some months before the Cuban missile crisis, Penkovsky and his western masters knew that he was being watched by Soviet counter-intelligence. He could therefore neither acquire nor send any intelligence on what was to prove the most fateful confrontation between East and West, and suggestions that he was asked to report on Soviet operations in Cuba just before the crisis would appear to be without foundation. Yet, paradoxically, his contribution was probably decisive.

He had sent out, earlier, details of the deployment pattern of Soviet missiles. This enabled U.S. air reconnaissance experts to identify the missile sites at an early stage of construction. The early warning made it possible for President Kennedy to make in secret the preparations that played so major a part in his later management of the crisis, and in compelling Khrushchev to withdraw. Lack of Time The most important part of the information he sent out consisted of some 5000 photographs of documents, sketches, etc., taken with a miniature camera. Yet we are asked to believe that this highly professional and valuable spy added to the great risks he was already running by keeping a detailed account of his activities and views, virtually every page of which contained enough secret information to send him straight to the firing squad. In the foreword we are told that "throughout the period of the West, he sat up at night after night composing a journal." Yet in a passage that has the ring of truth Penkovsky himself makes it clear that this is just what he could not do. He has to write hurriedly, he says, "for the simple lack of time and space."

When he writes at night in his two-room flat he disturbs his family's sleep. "Typing is very noisy." During the day he is "always busy." "Running like a madman," in a typically Russian phrase, between the offices of his two employers, the Committee for the Coordi-

nation of Scientific Research, and the Military Intelligence Headquarters. His evenings are generally occupied, nor can he write while visiting his friends in the country. "Someone may always ask what I am doing." At home, at least, "I have a hiding place in my desk." On his own showing, he is hardly likely to have produced in these circumstances the manuscript of what is now a sizeable book. Autobiography Questioned On one occasion the unit was visited by a number of Soviet military leaders, whom Penkovsky recognized, but he never seen before." He was told later that this was a certain N. S. Khrushchev. Yet for the past two years Khrushchev had been the first secretary of the Ukrainian Party, carrying out a ruthless and bloody purge, feared and hated by all—the virtual master of the Ukraine, the "Little Stalin," with his picture frequently displayed in public places and in the newspapers which would have been obligatory reading for an aspiring political officer. No doubt the account of the incident was inserted into the "papers" to make them appear more authentic, but the intended result, as happens so often when enthusiasm outruns good judgment, is the opposite of what was intended. There is much tedious repetition which is hardly accounted for by the explanation that the papers are arranged "with little attempt at order, and none at literary style." That this is so is painfully obvious, but it still does not explain why the book should contain several ac-

counted for by the explanation that the papers are arranged "with little attempt at order, and none at literary style." That this is so is painfully obvious, but it still does not explain why the book should contain several ac-

How Russian Agent

Last in a series.

By Frank Gibney

One of the most significant documents which Col. Oleg Penkovsky managed to smuggle out of Moscow to the West was the top-secret lecture given by Lt. Col. I. E. Prikhodko to a select audience of Soviet intelligence officers in Moscow, in 1961.

Titled "Characteristics of Agent Communications and Agent Handling in the U.S.A.," the lecture is nothing less than a detailed instruction manual for the use of Soviet spies and their American agents, in spying on U.S. secrets.

Probably never in the history of espionage has a document like this ever been surfaced to public view.

In yesterday's excerpt from the Prikhodko lecture, the Soviet "American expert," who had once done spying work in New York under cover of his nominal work as a Soviet U.N. delegation member, gave his Moscow listeners an outline of American national characteristics, with special reference to the virtues and defects of Americans in espionage work.


The following excerpt goes into the details of how Soviet intelligence spies in the United States, the signals Soviet officers use, the places they like to meet their agents, the methods they use to avoid surveillance and detection by the FBI.

The Lecture

Under modern conditions, when the U.S.A., as the principal imperialist power, is preparing to unleash a surprise war with the mass employment of nuclear/missile weapons, the basic task of our strategic agent intelligence is to give early warning of U.S. preparations for an armed attack against the U.S.S.R. and other socialist countries.

In view of the probable nature of a future war, an important task is the systematic collection of the most complete data on the following questions:

1. The locations of U.S. missile bases, depots for nuclear weapons, plants producing atomic weapons and



week, or consistently at 8 p.m., because such consistency in the activities of an intelligence officer makes the work of American counterintelligence easier.

Under present working conditions in the U.S.A., one should start for a meeting not later than two to three hours before the scheduled time, and establish a good "cover" story for the meeting.

For example: An intelligence officer in the U.S.A. had a Sunday meeting scheduled for the latter part of the day. After breakfast he took his family for a walk in the park. He usually took such a walk every Sunday. On the way, he invited a friend.

The two families chose some benches in the park and talked and glanced through newspapers and magazines which they had bought at a stand, while the children played nearby. They all visited the zoo together, and they also looked at some monuments.

While passing a movie theater, they looked at the advertising display and decided to see the new film. They all went inside. The intelligence officer, who had a meeting scheduled with an agent, quickly departed through a side door and left for the meeting site along a previously selected route. The meeting was successful. Toward evening the intelligence officer and his family returned home after a restful Sunday.

Meetings at Night

Most meetings are held in the evening, however. As a rule, the agent does not work in the evening and does not have to ask permission of his boss to leave. In addition, evenings provide the greatest security. It is not recommended, however, to hold meetings in a park, because, unlike Europeans, Americans visit parks only during the day.

by automobile. A white person is unsafe there, because the Negroes regard every white person who comes there as a curiosity-seeker who came to view them much as people go to the zoo to view the animals in cages.

We do not recommend that meetings be held in the area between 42d and 34th Streets. This is the busiest part of midtown and therefore has the widest coverage by the police and by counterintelligence.

Likewise, it is unadvisable to hold meetings in the vicinity of the U.N. Building (along the shore of the East River, between 42d and 48th Streets), near buildings of the permanent representations of various countries to the U.N. and, above all, the delegations to the U.N. of representations of socialist countries (the representation of the U.S.S.R. to the United Nations is located at 680 Park Avenue), nor in the vicinity of large banks, jewelry stores, etc.

Washington Details

In Washington, meetings should not be held in the central part of the city, where congressional buildings, the White House, departmental buildings and other governmental offices, large banks, stores and restaurants are located. Neither should they be held on the main streets of the city, or in areas where foreign embassies and, especially, the embassies of the U.S.S.R. and other countries of the socialist camp are located. Meetings should also not be held in areas near military objectives or in the Negro district.

Generally, an operation can be compromised through the improper selection of a meeting site. For example, an intelligence officer, who did not know the city well, once selected a meeting place with an agent on a street corner in the evening. A large bank stood on this corner.

The intelligence officer arrived for the meeting exactly at the appointed time. The agent was late. The intelligence officer was there for less than two minutes when a policeman approached, asked him what he was doing there, and

sons, scientific research centers, and laboratories developing and perfecting weapons of mass destruction.

2. Information as to the nature and results of scientific research work in the field of creating new models of nuclear and missile weapons and improving existing ones.

3. The status of anti-aircraft defense, including the entire radar detection and warning system.

4. The plans of U.S. military commanders on the use of nuclear/missile weapons.

5. U.S. military preparations in the various theaters of operations.

If the imperialists unleash a war, the U.S.A. will be the target of a crushing retaliatory strike causing damage to all the most important political and economic centers of that country. The most important task of intelligence is the prompt reporting of objectives in the United States against which we plan to carry out the first strikes.

Soviet intelligence, therefore, should adopt timely measures to guarantee the security of its intelligence net. To achieve this it is necessary to disperse our operating "residences" and to move some valuable single agents some distance outside the limits of large cities. As for agent nets engaged in collecting intelligence on atomic and missile bases, they should preferably consist of individual sources equipped with radio having direct communications with the "Center" in Moscow.

Meeting Vulnerable

A meeting between intelligence officer and agent is one of the most vulnerable means of communications. Therefore, in organizing meetings, our intelligence officers must anticipate everything in order to guarantee security.

In the U.S.A. where the counterintelligence effort of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is highly developed, planning and preparation for a meeting are of the greatest importance. In planning a meeting one should give the greatest consideration to the characteristics of the American people and of the country, which we have already mentioned, the working and family situation of the agent, his capabilities, etc.

Meetings should be varied as to time of day, days of the week, and dates of the month. For example, meetings should not be held on the fifth day of each month, on Wednesday of every

At that time of the day only criminal elements and persons who are mentally ill can be found in the parks. In the press one can find special warnings concerning the danger in going to parks in the evening. It is not unusual for the newspapers to publish detailed accounts of rapes and murders which were committed in the parks during the night.

In choosing a meeting place, it is necessary of course to consider the character of the country as a whole and, above all, the characteristics of the area. As a whole, conditions in the cities of New York and Washington, for example, are favorable for the organization of agent communications.

The existence of a subway in New York helps in locating different places in the city. It should be borne in mind, however, that the subway system there is quite complicated and it should be studied carefully before planning to use it for operational purposes.

In New York it is easy to establish a cover story for going downtown either during the day or at night, because New York has many public places. Skillful use of transportation facilities makes it possible to make a good check for the detection of surveillance. Finally, an intelligence officer who speaks with an accent in New York is quite acceptable since a large segment of the city's population speaks with an accent.

On the other hand the organization and utilization of agent communications in Washington are full of difficulties because of the city's small size, its limited number of public places, no subways, and an inadequate public transportation system, especially in the suburbs.

New York Problems

Differences exist not only among the sections and cities of the United States, but also among different sections of cities, often within the very same borough or area.

For example, let us take Manhattan, which is the business area of New York. Negro Harlem is unsuitable for the organization of agent communications in Manhattan. It is located north of Central Park, and the Chinese quarter, located downtown, is also difficult for agents. Extreme squalor distinguishes the Chinese quarter. A properly dressed person will stand out sharply there.

As for Negro Harlem, white people cross it only

to leave quickly. In this situation, two plainclothesmen followed him until he entered a subway station. The meeting was not held.

New York and Washington have numerous restaurants, many of them representing different nationalities. Each restaurant has its own distinctive characteristics. One may specialize in steaks (the most expensive steaks are sirloin and T-bone steak), another is seafood; some restaurants have orchestras, others have not. Before selecting a certain restaurant as a meeting site, one should learn everything about the restaurant; the system of service, the type of customers, whether it has a bad reputation with the police, etc.

It is the practice in all restaurants to tip the waitress ten per cent of the amount shown on the check.

Depending on the nature of the agent operation, the officer and agent may sit at the same table and hold the meeting during dinner. Or they may sit at separate tables, keeping only visual contact for the purpose of exchanging prearranged signals.

Avoid the Press

American stores periodically hold sales of their merchandise at lowered prices. At the beginning of the sale a large number of people usually gather at the store. In their efforts to advertise the sale, the proprietors invite newspaper photographers to the opening of the sale. To avoid being caught by the photographer's lens, our intelligence officers and members of their families should not visit the store during the beginning of the sale.

In New York there are no ticket collectors on the subway. The ticket office does not sell tickets but only metal tokens which cost fifteen cents. In passing through the revolving gate at the entrance, the passenger inserts the token in a special slot.

An intelligence officer should always have several tokens with him, especially on the day of a meeting, so as not to waste any time in buying them at the subway entrance.

It is hard to imagine how agent communications would be conducted in New York without using the subway, which, despite its complexity, facilitates one's orientation in the city. It also affords a convenient place to check on the existence of surveillance. In some cases, inadequate knowledge of the Subway System has forced offi-

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Communicate With Spies in U

ZORZA—From Page A22

'Penkovsky Papers:' They Lack The Ring of Truth, Expert Says

Berlin Wall four days before the Soviet government in Moscow, would he simply have made a bald statement of fact like that, almost conversationally, and then gone on with his discussion of Khrushchev's tactics on Berlin? Neither explanation seems credible, and no other answer is that the words attributed to Penkovsky were written by someone else—unless this was a remark he made in one of his subsequent conversations with a member of the Anglo-American team, who took it down, filed it, and it was then seen and used by the compiler of the "Papers." Indeed, the style of the memoirs is often discursive, verbose, almost conversational—the very opposite of what one would expect from a man writing in Penkovsky's difficult circumstances. At one point, when discussing Soviet military maneuvers, he is made to ask, "What is the point of these exercises"—and then proceeds to give a

Early Answers

the extremely unlikely that he had learned the Berlin Wall while in London, would he gone back to Moscow reported later to his master that he had known about the Wall four days in advance? Why would he do that show them after the fact how well-informed he was? The book is a genuine

collection of notes he kept. Would he really write like that, whether in an intelligence report or in his memoirs? Or was it perhaps, a question put to Penkovsky by one of his interrogators, and then, inadvertently, allowed to remain in the edited transcript of the conversation that might have formed the basis of this passage in the book? The "conversational" origin of a number of passages is betrayed in similar ways, thus giving the lie to the claim that the book is made up of Penkovsky's written "notes." This, however, does not mean that the book as a whole may be regarded as a genuine edited transcript of Penkovsky's conversations with western intelligence officers. There are many other passages, and sometimes whole sections, which betray the alien hand—or tongue.

© 1965 by Victor Zorza

Tuesday: An analysis of phrases in the Penkovsky Papers that no Russian would have written, as evidence of forgery—and speculation about who was responsible.

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cancel meetings with agents.

They also operate with conductors. The driver of the entrance and departure of passengers, change, and hands transfers (at the request of passenger). He gives for bills but only up to dollars. Thus the intelligence officer must be certain that he has change or one dollar and can be stopped anywhere. This is done merely by holding the hand or by shouting, "Taxi!" An empty car passes. The driver writes in his place a fare for taxi, the place he is, and the time. An intelligence officer must never take a

taxi directly to the meeting place.

There are many companies in the U.S.A. which rent cars. Use of rented cars in the organization of agent communications is recommended, because this has a number of advantages. For instance, an intelligence officer can drive to the city in his own car, check for surveillance, and then leave it in a suitable area or in a parking lot. He can then complete his job in a rented car. This makes the work of the American counterintelligence service more difficult.

Use of Dead Drops

'Dead Drops' (i.e. hiding places where material can be left for prearranged pick-ups) are extensively used for communication

within agent nets, or with individual agents.

Stationary 'dead drops' are selected or specially prepared in parks and squares, in trees, in the ground, in fences, in benches, in monuments, in public buildings, and beyond populated places such as forests, fields, seashores, riverbanks, etc.

In selecting and preparing a 'dead drop' in a park, one must bear in mind that a number of American parks (for example, Central Park in New York) have many squirrels which can destroy the dead drop (especially in hollow trees) and carry off our material.

The U.S.A. has up to two thousand daily newspapers with a circulation of about fifty-seven million, and more than seven thousand

magazines. Both newspapers and magazines give considerable space to advertisements and all kinds of announcements. Newspaper companies receive sizable profits from advertisements and announcements and therefore accept them very readily.

Advertisements published in American newspapers differ greatly in content and in length. The most common ones deal with the sale and rental of living quarters, the sale of personal effects, employment opportunities, announcements of weddings, divorces, births, and deaths, the loss of valuables and pets, etc. Below are several samples of advertisements which could be used in intelligence work. (Following samples appear in English.)

POSITION WANTED

Housework — Mature Colombian maid speaking a little English will give considerable care to children or invalid lady; do efficient general housework. \$25-\$30 per wk. Exeter 4-682, 7-10 p.m.

DOMESTIC EMPLOYMENT

Chauffeur, white—wanted. Age 35 married. 12 years exp. Intelligent alert neat. Fordham 4-767 before noon.

PUBLIC NOTICES AND COMMERCIAL NOTICES

My wife, Jane Smith Doe, has left my bed and board. I am no longer responsible for her debts. John Doe, 17 Leslie Lane, Dobbs Ferry, New York.

One can see from these examples that many advertisements can be adapted quite easily to the transmittal of information. Among the code words which can be used are: the names or description of a lost article; a description of the circumstances; the place and time it was lost; the size of the reward for returning the valuable or pet; etc.

Illegal "residences" have a greater opportunity to make use of the press in arranging agent communications. Residences under cover may use the press on a lesser scale, primarily to transmit information or signals from agent to intelligence officer. On the whole, the U.S.A. presents favorable conditions for the use of the press for intelligence work.

A sum of money is paid to place an advertisement or some kind of announcement in the press. The text of these advertisements will contain a prearranged coded secret message.

A thorough study of the specific features of the

country enables one to select the most natural ones. For example, our intelligence officer called an agent for an introductory meeting by sending the newspaper Washington Daily News to his apartment. The intelligence officer went to the city, made a careful check, and called the newspaper from a public telephone, asked them to start delivery on the next day to the address he gave the agent's address, after delivery started the agent appeared at the arranged meeting place.

Radio communications provide the most effective means for transmitting orders and instructions from the Center.

Because of our distance from the U.S.A., should need arise, we can set up radio relay stations which can be located on ships, marines, and aircraft, also must not exclude possibility that in the too distant future we shall have a radio station on earth satellite.

In certain special situations, we might consider the possibility of getting a courier to the American mainland by submarine. This must be remembered, however, that the U.S.A.'s shore defenses are stronger than those of other countries on the American continent. Therefore one should not always attempt to land an agent directly in the U.S. At times it is possible to send mail to a third country (for example, Mexico) and then deliver it over to the U.S.A. Mail sent in this manner can be placed in the Center's dead drops.

Condensed from the forthcoming book, "The Penkovsky Papers," 1965. Doubleday & Company, Inc.

Party Concedes Marcos Election

MANILA, Nov. 14 (UPI)—The chairman of President Diosdado Macapagal's ruling Liberal Party tonight conceded Sen. Ferdinand E. Marcos' election as the sixth President of the Philippines.

But Macapagal, who lost to Marcos by 632,000 votes in the latest tabulation by the Commission on Elections, remained adamant in his refusal to

The Organization Spies

WASHINGTON:

It was Oscar Wilde's contention that "Nature imitates art." The world's three most powerful intelligence agencies are now busily imitating the art of Ian Fleming. Moscow's KGB, Washington's CIA and London's MI-6 have produced competing spy-thrillers, to challenge Fleming's James Bond stories on the best-seller lists.

The KGB entry is *Spy: Twenty Years in Soviet Secret Service*, by Gordon Lonsdale. The joint CIA-MI-6 entry is *The Penkovsky Papers*, by Oleg Penkovsky.

Lonsdale, alias Konon Trofimovich Molody, was an agent in the service of the KGB (the huge Soviet espionage agency) in the United States and Britain, until the British caught him in 1961 and sentenced him to 25 years in prison. Penkovsky, a volunteer spy, was by far the most important and informative of all postwar Western agents. He provided invaluable intelligence to CIA and MI-6 from the spring of 1961, when he first made contact with MI-6, until the fall of 1962, when he was arrested by the KGB.

Lonsdale, who was exchanged for a British agent, is in Moscow. If he can get his hands on the proceeds of his book, he will be a Communist-capitalist—income from the book, a best seller in England, is already over \$130,000, and if the American edition is a best seller, there is more to come. Penkovsky's book will also make a lot of money, but Penkovsky is in no position to enjoy it—he was tried and executed in Moscow in 1963.

The Lonsdale book is undoubtedly a product of KGB-D, as the KGB's psychological war section is called. The style of the book strongly suggests that it was ghost-written by one of several British journalists who have defected to Russia. British intelligence suspects that Kim Philby, the diplomat-journalist-traitor known as "The Third Man" (the first two were diplomat-traitors Burgess and Maclean) ghosted the book. But it seems hard to believe that Philby, an educated man and a good writer, could have turned out the Lonsdale book, except perhaps as a sort of secret spoof.

The purpose of the Lonsdale book is to make maximum trouble between Americans and British, and especially between CIA and MI-6. Americans are pictured throughout as fools, bumblerers, or neo-Nazis, and the British as com-

paratively amiable—"I have never considered my work as being directed against the British." But it is a clumsy job, heavy-handed and unconvincing. Filtered through his KGB ghost or ghosts, Lonsdale-Molody emerges very clearly as a vain and silly man, more clown than James Bond.

Vanity is, for some reason, an almost universal characteristic among spies. Penkovsky shares this characteristic, but he is a much more interesting spy than Lonsdale.

The Penkovsky Papers could not conceivably have been published without the approval, and indeed the encouragement, of CIA and MI-6. CIA acknowledges this much—no more. But this reporter will bet a considerable sum that the portions of the book ostensibly written by Penkovsky were at the least very heavily edited, and perhaps written in toto, within the CIA and/or MI-6. The book is clearly based on as much of the information that Penkovsky supplied CIA and MI-6 as those agencies want the KGB to know that they know. Some of the information is fascinating. It ranges from marvelously fatuous instructions to fledgling spies on how to spy in America (motels and golf courses are, it appears, useful instruments of espionage) to revelations of high jinks in the Soviet Establishment. There is even a broad hint that chunky Nikita Khrushchev and Madame Furtseva, the equally chunky minister of culture, were having an affair.

But all this is frosting on the cake. The real purpose of *The Penkovsky Papers* is to make a lot of KGB faces red with anger—or possibly white with fear. KGB operations are described in detail and the identities of many KGB operatives are "blown," so that in many parts of the world the KGB is going to have to start again from scratch.

One can almost hear the CIA men purring with pleasure at the thought. The CIA itself has repeatedly had agents and operations disclosed by American journalists, sometimes on the basis of information supplied by the KGB. In any case, in this game of bookmanship, the KGB has very clearly been out-booked by the CIA and MI-6.

This game of booking and out-booking the opposition outfit is something very new in the spy business. It suggests how the spy business

itself has changed. Espionage used to be a hole-in-corner affair carried on by slinky characters out of sleazy apartments. Now both CIA and KGB are enormous bureaucratic organizations employing thousands of people, in vast edifices, and even MI-6 (which used to operate very effectively on a shoestring) has a skyscraper of its own in London. In short, as Karl Meyer of the *Washington Post* has pointed out, we have entered the era of the organization spy.

But the significance of the Penkovsky book goes deeper than that. The words may or may not have been Penkovsky's, but the information in the book, and the views which it expresses, sound authentic. Penkovsky was, moreover, a perfectly genuine member of the Soviet Establishment, with contacts reaching into the Praesidium itself.

He decided to become an agent for the West on his own initiative, because he was convinced that Khrushchev's policies involved the conscious risk of a nuclear war which would destroy civilization. Obviously, allowance must be made for a certain lack of balance—a man who takes it upon himself to spy against his own country for what he supposes to be the good of the world is not an entirely normal man.

Even so, what Penkovsky writes provides a useful antidote to a current creeping illusion about the Soviet Union. Since the Cuban confrontation of 1963 and the intensification of the Sino-Soviet quarrel, there has been a growing tendency in this country to regard the Russians as good guys—compared with the Chinese Communist bad guys—and even as potential allies and fellow democrats. Thus, of course, is nonsense.

The Soviet regime has changed in some ways, but it remains a Communist police state, inherently hostile to the West. Penkovsky's *Papers* serve as a useful reminder that the Khrushchev regime, with the support of the present Soviet hierarchy, twice in three years risked nuclear war, first with the Berlin bluff in 1960, then with the Cuban bluff in 1963. There is absolutely no reason to conclude that the new Soviet leaders may not be tempted to bluff again, if the mounting disarray of the Western alliance leads them to suppose that the bluff might work.

Stewart Alsop



Oleg Penkovsky



Gordon Lonsdale

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Khrushchev's Policies Could Have Meant War

Third in a Series

By Frank Gibney

On April 20, 1961, at 11 p.m. a trimly dressed foreign gentleman, handsome, red-haired and of medium height, walked without notice through the lobby of the Mount Royal Hotel in London and made his way to an inconspicuous suite upstairs.

The door was quickly opened. Inside the room, Col. Oleg Penkovsky had his first face-to-face meeting with British and American intelligence officers, the "interested parties" in the West whom he had been trying to contact for almost a year.

For hours, Penkovsky talked. He had brought with him from Moscow two packets of handwritten notes and documents, materials taken from Soviet top-secret files. The range of his information was almost encyclopedic—the design of new missiles, names of Soviet undercover intelligence agents in Europe, troop deployments in East Germany.

As the intelligence officers talked with him, they began to grasp not only the breadth of his knowledge about Soviet plans, but the intensity of his conviction that Moscow's dangerous "brinkmanship" in 1961 could well lead to war.

A lonely idealist, Penkovsky wanted neither money nor immediate asylum. Of the intelligence officers in London he asked only that



he be given either British or American citizenship and some employment commensurate with his experience. If circumstances ever compelled him to flee the Soviet Union.

On another floor of the Mount Royal Hotel, Penkovsky had housed members of the 45-man Soviet delegation he headed. The delegation had been sent to London ostensibly to discuss trade prospects, but actually to gather intelligence, of an industrial and military nature. It was a sign of the Communist regime's trust in Penkovsky that he was assigned to lead it.


Throughout this first two-week visit to London, Penkovsky continued to hold night meetings with the British and American intelligence officers, whom he knew only by their code names, the British intelligence officers called "Grille" and "Miles" and the Americans, "Alexander" and "Oslov."

Since the U-2 surveillance flights had been abandoned in 1960, the West badly needed fresh information on Soviet work in missilery and new rocket technology. As a missile specialist himself, Penkovsky had a wealth of technical background on the state of Soviet missile readiness—and most importantly, plans for missile production and deployment. The configuration of missile sites, the types of troops used, warheads, performance details—all this information Penkovsky possessed, from his own experience and his close association as aide to Marshal Varentsov, the Soviet tactical missile commander. In that London hotel room Penkovsky began the vital flow of information which, barely a year later, enabled the West to understand the seriousness of Khrushchev's threat, as well as recognize the exact nature of his missile weapons there.

In the following excerpt from the papers, Penkovsky outlines the real facts behind

See PENKOVSKY, A14, Col.

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Soviet MRBM Sandoz SS-4

KHRUSHCHEV'S PRIDE—A medium-range ballistic missile is displayed in Moscow. Below it are sites.

PENKOVSKY—From Page A1

Data Helped JFK in Cuban Crisis

hind the Soviet missile at fort. These notes represent only a tiny portion of the information Penkovsky revealed in this area. For 16 months he produced a stream of reliable intelligence, technical and strategic, on Khrushchev's missile build-up. His guidance lay behind the quick identification of the Cuba-based missiles in aerial photographs. Also, his reports of Khrushchev's lagging production on long-range missiles explained the reasoning behind the risky shipment of medium-range Soviet missiles to Cuba.

Millions breathed a sigh of relief over President Kennedy's face-down of Khrushchev's Cuban threat in October, 1962. But until now only a small group of intelligence experts knew the

the quality of production poor. Quantity is inadequate, also. Accidents and all sorts of troubles are daily occurrences. In this connection, there is much talk about shortcomings in the field of electronics.

There have been many cases during the test launchings of missiles when they have hit inhabited areas, railroad tracks, etc., instead of the designated targets, after deviating several hundred kilometers from their prescribed course.

Sometimes Khrushchev's pushing for premature achievement in missiles and Sputniks has disastrous results.

Several Sputniks were launched into the stratosphere and never heard from again. They took the form of several specially trained cosmonauts.

The sudden death of Ma-

and we also read about how these bodies were cremated, as well as other details about the funeral.

More Space Failures

This is not the first time that a missile accident took place. There had been others before this, but the government keeps silent about them.

When Khrushchev announced at the beginning of 1960 that the Soviet Union possessed a completely new and terrifying type of ballistic missile, he actually had in mind the order he had issued to invent or prepare this new type of propellant based on nuclear energy. Some of the work in this direction proved quite successful, even after Nedel'in's accident, but it is still far from what Khrushchev had in mind. There is a big lag in electronics.

There were more and

That is the slang expression we use for missile production. Many different towns have been specially built for these scientists and the technical and engineering personnel. Scientists and engineers not only have been awarded decorations and medals, but some have been awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor three or four times.

They have received the Lenin Prize, and other prizes. The work of these people is not publicized and their pictures do not appear in the newspapers.

I have already heard some talk about a woman astronaut being readied for a flight into the stratosphere in a Sputnik for propaganda purposes. All the higher commanders think that such a flight will have a strong propaganda effect. The launching is planned for the beginning of 1963.

THE VIGILANCE of the

of Penkovsky is this one victory.

By Oleg Penkovsky

Khrushchev is blabbing that we are ready, we have everything. That is so much idle talk. He talks about the Soviet Union's capability to send missiles to every corner of the world, but he has not done anything about it, because he knows that we are actually not ready.

Of course we can send our big missiles in different directions, as far as the United States or Cuba. But we are not yet capable of launching a planned missile attack to destroy definite targets long-range. As Marshal Varentsov, who commands the Ground Missile forces, tells me: "We still have a long way to go before we actually achieve the things about which Khrushchev keeps talking and boasting."

Of course, there have been fine achievements in developing tactical and operational short-range missiles. But it is too early to speak of our STRATEGIC missiles as perfected. Many of the big ones are still on the drawing boards, in the prototype stage or undergoing tests. There are altogether not more than a few dozen of these—not the "showers" of missiles with which Khrushchev has been threatening the West.

Only the smaller (IRBM) missiles are in production. The R-12 missile, now being mass produced, has a range of 2,500 kilometers (1,550 miles). Our "cruise" missile has been adopted for use by the submarine fleet as well as ground troops. But our big R-14 missile is only in the development stage. The range of the R-14 with a nuclear warhead is 4,500 kilometers (2,800 miles).

Often a new model missile is still only in the testing stage—in fact the tests may have proved unsuccessful. But there is Khrushchev, already screaming to the entire world about his "achievements" in new types of Soviet weapons.

Comments Die

All the money made available from the military reorganization is put into missile production, and a sputnik required the combined efforts of all available Soviet scientists and technical personnel, with the entire technological capacity of the country at their disposal.

Marshal Varentsov warns in private conversations that we do not have enough qualified people in the missile and sputnik programs, that training is inadequate

of our missile forces, was another case in point.

Khrushchev had been demanding that his specialists create a missile engine powered by nuclear energy. The laboratory work for such an engine had even been completed prior to the 43d Anniversary of the October Revolution in 1960, and the people involved wanted to give Khrushchev a "present" on this anniversary—a missile powered by nuclear energy.

Present during the tests on this new engine were Marshal Nedelin, many specialists on nuclear equipment, and representatives of several government committees. When the countdown was completed, the missile failed to leave the launching pad. After 15 to 20 minutes had passed, Nedelin came out of the shelter, followed by the others. Suddenly there was an explosion caused by the mixture of the nuclear substance and other components. Over 300 people were killed.

A few people miraculously survived, but all of them were in deep shock. Some of them died soon afterward. What was brought to Moscow were not Nedelin's and other victims' remains, but urns filled with dirt. Yet we all had read in the "truthful" official government statements printed in the newspaper Pravda and Izvestiya only that Nedelin died, "... in the line of duty—in an air accident."

respect my sympathies are with the Americans. If they have an accident, it is all in the papers; even I know about it. But in our country everything is kept secret.

For example: There were several unsuccessful launchings of sputniks with men killed prior to Gagarin's flight. Either the missile would explode on the launching pad, or it would go up and never return.

When Gagarin made his flight, it was said officially that there was not a single camera in his sputnik. This was a big lie. There was a whole system of cameras with different lenses for taking pictures and for intersection. The photographic equipment was turned on and off during the flight by the astronaut. But Khrushchev tells everybody that nothing was photographed. Photographic equipment has been installed on all sputniks, but this has been denied in order to prevent the Americans from launching espionage sputniks, or as we call them: "spies in the sky."

Right now we have a certain number of missiles with nuclear warheads capable of reaching the United States or South America; but these are single missiles, not in mass production, and they are far from perfect. Every possible measure is taken to improve the missiles and their production.

Money is saved everywhere and allocated to the building of "kindergartens."

weakened by the shortcomings mentioned above. If at the present time the Soviet ballistic missiles are still far from being perfect, in two or three years—perhaps even sooner—Khrushchev will have achieved his goal.

In 1961, a firm directive was issued to equip the satellite countries with missile weapons. This was by a special decision of the Central Committee CPSU. Marshal Varentsov made the following comment: "They say we must give our brother Slavs missile weapons. So we give them missiles now, and later they will stick a knife in our back."

In my opinion as a General Staff officer, it will take a year or a year and a half for us to be able to equip all the Eastern European countries with missiles. In order to stop this armament of Khrushchev's and his attempts to launch an attack, the Western countries must triple both their efforts at unity and increase their armaments. Only then will Khrushchev realize that he is dealing with a strong adversary.

Valentina Vladimirovna Tereshkova was launched into orbit on 16 June 1963. Penkovsky wrote this in early 1963.

WEDNESDAY: A Secret Ministry for Spies: Penkovsky exposes the real work of Soviet intelligence and security police in manipulating "peaceful" exchanges of scientific and technical information with the West.

Condensed from the forthcoming book, "Penkovsky Papers," © 1963, Doubleday & Co., Inc.

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DECISION—The spy paced the floor of Orly airport, debating with himself whether or not to remain in the West.

Our Man in the Kremlin

Spy's Choice: Home or Safety

(Eighth in a Series)


By Frank Gibney

Colonel Penkovsky arrived at Le Bourget Airport, near Paris, on Sept. 20, 1961. His British friend, Greville Wynne, met him at the airport.

Penkovsky obviously could not have informed Wynne of his exact arrival time without arousing suspicion among his superiors in Moscow. At the request of the British and American intelligence team, Wynne, still Penkovsky's safest contact, had flown to Paris and gone to the airport every day for two weeks, watching the arrivals on each flight from Moscow.

From the standpoint of western intelligence, his vigil was well-spent. The brilliant Soviet volunteer spy had brought a huge quantity of exposed film out with him—photographs of secret intelligence documents, technical processes, order of battle information on Soviet dispositions in Germany, and—most important of all—more top-secret details of the Kremlin's missile production and deployment.

As usual, Penkovsky checked in promptly with the Paris resident of the



Soviet's missile and Berlin of Khrushchev's was so important that they were concerned about his future personal security.

For days before his departure Oleg Penkovsky debated with himself as he walked the streets of Paris. He had pressing family considerations at home—a pregnant wife, a mother, a teenage daughter. Could he cut them from his life forever? And to leave the familiar world of Russia, much as he hated the Soviet regime, meant a cruel wrench. Yet everything in his immediate surroundings argued that he stay.

He almost did. The plane for Moscow was delayed by fog and the omen did not escape him. For hours he paced the floor of the waiting room at Orly Airport, virtually arguing out loud with himself, as Wynne patiently listened. He hesitated, lit a cigarette at the customs barrier, but at the last minute he said goodbye to

Ice. Shapovalov told me that it was uncomfortable to see so many State Security police surrounding Gargarin.

While he was in London, he lived in House No. 13, on the second floor (Kensington Palace Gardens). People by the hundreds stood in the streets in order to see him, and one British girl waited 18 hours to catch a glimpse of him. When Gargarin was told about this, he said, "What a fool! It would have been better if she had shared my bed for a couple of hours." Here is the new historical personality for you.

Berlin Crisis

During my second trip to London in July, 1961, there were a few representatives of the Central Committee CPSU in my delegation. They had a lengthy conference with Ambassador Soldatov. Later I was told by our deputy Resident, Pavlov and Shapovalov that they had brought money and special instructions for the British Communist Party.

Khrushchev had personally ordered Soldatov to meet with certain leaders of the British Communist Party in the expectation of obtaining information on the situation and on the probable reaction of the British

to missile troops of the American and British armies. We were also directed to obtain information about certain kinds of small American missiles launched from aircraft, which create various forms of interference in the air and disrupt radar scanning.

All operational intelligence officers were assigned the task of visiting chemical enterprises in France, America and England in order to learn the process and ingredients of solid fuel for missiles.

Information was desired on heat-resisting steel; there seemed to be some reason to believe that the USA had done some very good work in this field. The GRU considers that the French have an excellent solid fuel for missiles and have made great progress in this direction.

I told the resident in Paris that I would be traveling through France and could select suitable sites for dead drops. The resident replied that they had all the dead drop sites needed. He told me not to waste my time on this.

The resident also said that it was very easy to arrange agent meetings in France, to transmit and re-

and went over details of the Soviet intelligence assignment given him in Moscow as well as his cover job of looking after the Soviet Exhibition in Paris.

Three days after his arrival, however, the colonel began the real business of his trip. Wynne drove him to one of the Seine River bridges, where he met the members of the British and American intelligence team who had worked with him in London.

Through the next month he continued his secret conferences with them at various "safe" apartments in the city. As before in London, Penkovsky gave them a vast store of military and political information, supplementing the documents he had photographed with his own informed analyses of current Soviet plans and military preparations.

He also laid the groundwork for an even more widespread network of communications with Western agents in Moscow which would allow him to continue his secret communications with Washington and London with a minimum of risk.

Fresh Air

When he was not engaged with either set of intelligence officers, Penkovsky again turned tourist, with his British friend, Greville Wynne, acting as guide. The paintings at the Louvre and the night club extravaganzas at the Lido, Penkovsky viewed with apparently equal interest. Once again, he acted like a man who had suddenly been exposed to a draft of fresh air after long confinement in a closed place.

Without constant Soviet surveillance to worry about, occasionally he lost his normal caution. Once, when he and Wynne stumbled on an emigre Russian restaurant in Paris, Penkovsky could hardly be restrained from staying far into the night, singing and talking Russian with the proprietor—hardly the safe thing for a visiting Soviet intelligence officer to do, especially when he was actually working for the West.

Penkovsky liked London better, however. In Paris, also, he faced what he must have suspected was a final decision: to go back or remain in the West.

The American and British intelligence officers were perfectly willing to have Penkovsky remain then and there, to receive asylum and a job suitable to his talents in Europe or the United States.

The information already given

into a world from which he had just since emigrated in spirit.

Penkovsky explained his decision later in the Papers, when he wrote shortly after his return to Moscow: "I feel that for another year or two I must continue in the General Staff of the USSR, in order to reveal all the villainous plans and plottings of our common enemy, i.e. I consider myself as a soldier of the West, so my place during these troubled times is on the FRONT LINE. I must remain on this front line in order to be your eyes and ears, and my opportunities for this are great. God grant only that my modest efforts be useful in the fight for our high ideals for mankind."

The following excerpt from the Penkovsky Papers suggests how powerful some of Penkovsky's immediate efforts were. He discusses the extent of the Soviet intelligence network operating out of the Paris embassy. It is now clear that Penkovsky exposed most of the Soviet spy network in Western Europe to United States and British intelligence during the same month when he was a temporary member of Soviet Military Intelligence in Paris.

By Oleg Penkovsky

During my trips to England and France during 1961, I was given the mission, just as other military intelligence officers, of collecting information of a military and scientific nature.

As I was in charge of the delegation, I did not participate in "active operational work," as we call it. It established contacts, made acquaintances, collected literature which would be of interest to Soviet intelligence.

In France and England people talked to me freely, invited me to their homes, restaurants and offices. I was astonished by this because at intelligence staff school in Moscow I was taught entirely different things about the French and British "secret police."

After spending some time in those two countries I saw how natural and unaffected the people behaved, as though there were no such thing as the secret police. Even our military intelligence officer in London, Shapovalov, loves England— "Mother England," as he calls it.

While I was in London, I asked about the Cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin's visit to England. Gagarin does not speak English, but he had some excellent translators. Everyone assigned to him was selected from our "neighbors," the secret

beria crisis

Paylov, Shapovalov and Milovidov also said a directive had been received from the Central Committee and military intelligence to employ all agents and friendly contacts in England in order to collect information. The ambassador had a conference with the intelligence Residents and gave them instructions from the Center.

Shortly after this all the officers in the embassy took off in various directions all over England to gather the needed information. The entire force of operational, strategic, and political intelligence services was mobilized for this.

I cannot understand at all why the Communists are permitted to operate so freely in England and France. Why are they not shown who is boss? Where are the counterintelligence services of the Western countries? What are they doing?

Communist Contacts

Ananyev, our officer in Paris, told me that Soviet intelligence has very close working relations with Communists, especially those who work in the government, Army, and NATO. Ananyev and Prokhorov had both told me that it was very easy to carry on illegal operations in France, especially in Paris.

It is true that if we approach an ordinary Frenchman and he learns that he is speaking with Russians, he will immediately run and report the contact to the police. But French Communists, generally speaking, readily agree to work for us, asking only directions on how and what to do. They act as spotters and obtain military information.

According to Prokhorov, we could not work so well in France without Communist help. He actually made the statement that we bought France easily, and for a cheap price. "We bought the harlot cheap"—those were the words he used.

Military intelligence has levied a requirement on all residences, especially those in France, to obtain information on the new models of NATO weapons. They are to use all possible contacts, including all the representatives of the countries of the people's democracies, acquaintances, and Communists.

There were many other requirements regarding the collection of information of various sorts, including approximately 20 to 25 items directly concerned with electronics, especially elec-

tronic devices. These drops were seldom used because it was simple to arrange direct meetings with agents. These are not set up very frequently, however, only when necessary.

At the embassies in Paris and London, Tass intercepts and prints all communications which do not find their way into the Soviet press. This is done for all the ambassadors, ministers, and deputy ministers. In Military Intelligence they are read by everyone down to and including the chief of a directorate. This is how they learn about everything that goes on in the world but does not get into their own press.

TUESDAY: Penkovsky returns to Moscow; the State Security police begin to watch him; he describes the Kremlin's plans for chemical and bacteriological warfare.

Condensed from the forthcoming book, "Penkovsky Papers," © 1963, Doubleday & Co., Inc.

King Olav to Fly

OSLO, Nov. 7 (AP)—King Olav V of Norway will leave the royal yacht, Norge, at home when he goes to Ethiopia on a state visit in January. The royal palace announced the King would take a regular Scandinavian Airways System flight.

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Secret Police and Spying Do

wife was a general's daughter. Penkovsky was on the friendliest of terms with his boss, Gen. Ivan Serov, Khrushchev's secret police expert, who now commanded Military Intelligence. Through Serov and Marshal Varentsov, he had pipelines to the highest levels of the Soviet regime and almost unlimited access to secret files and documents.

Other Soviet officers had defected to the West, over the years, but never anyone this high up in the Kremlin's operating command structure. In his own biography, he gave one big reason for his anger at the Soviet regime. Only a year or two before the State Security had discovered that Penkovsky's father had been a White officer in 1919—thus putting a sudden black mark on his record (and probably blocking his promotion to general).

As a professional soldier and General Staff officer, also, Penkovsky was increasingly appalled by the network of spies and informers he found throughout his own government—fully eight years after de-Stalinization had supposedly thawed Soviet society.

In the following excerpt from *The Penkovsky Papers*, he writes about the secret police dominance over the Soviet regime:

By Oleg Penkovsky

The Soviet government goes in force for espionage on such a gigantic scale that an outsider has difficulty in fully comprehending it. Daily we



KEPT APART—Col. Oleg V. Penkovsky, at left, is in dress uniform with medals. Gen. Valentin Penkovsky, Col. Penkovsky's great-uncle, deliberately kept away from him, fearing secret police discovery that Penkovsky's father fought the Reds in the Revolution.

expand our already swollen spy apparatus. That is what Khrushchev's "peaceful coexistence" and "struggle for peace" really mean. We are all spies.

Any Soviet citizen who has anything at all to do with the work of foreign countries or who is connected with foreigners in the course of his work, is perforce engaged in intelligence work. There is no institution in the U.S.S.R. that does not have in it an intelligence officer or agent.

Here are some of the Soviet ministers and committees through which we conduct intelligence: Intourist and the

International Book Association (almost 100 per cent State Security); Ministry of Foreign Trade; Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church; The Academy of Sciences; Union of the Red Cross; State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. . . . The list is almost endless.

State Security officers and agents are everywhere, literally everywhere. I saw fewer of them under Stalin than now. They control our whole Army and Military Intelligence, too. These Security police scoundrels even forced my aunt to be an informer. She worked for them the whole time she was a housekeeper in the Afghan and the Italian embassies in Moscow.

My poor aunt often came to my mother, crying and complaining about the degrading and dishonest things she had to do. She eavesdropped, stole documents, cleaned out waste baskets, wrote reports on diplomats, helped with provocations against them. Many times she complained to me. But this was before I began working for Military Intelligence. I could give her no advice, only sympathy.

Khrushchev himself directly supervises the work of the State Security. In this matter he trusts no one else; he controls the State Security as First Secretary of the Communist Party. It is said that Shelepin, the State Security boss, spends more time in Khrushchev's office than in his own head. . . . I was on Dzerzhinsky Square. If it were not for the State Security police

and Gen. Serov, Khrushchev could never have become the "supreme commander in chief."

Spies Abroad

The majority of the personnel in Soviet embassies abroad are Military Intelligence or State Security employees. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Trade exist as such only in Moscow. Abroad everything is controlled by us. Three out of five Soviet embassy officers are either from State Security or Military Intelligence. Thus, it can be stated without error that 80 per cent of Soviet embassy personnel are serving officers in intelligence. In Soviet consulates the figure is almost 100 per cent.

In an embassy the State Security spies on everyone, including us in Military Intelligence. Security police watch absolutely everything that goes on: the purchases people make, how they live and whether it accords with their salary, where they go, which doctors they visit, how much drinking they do, their morals. Meanwhile we in Military Intelligence watch the Security police in return. We want to establish which of our own men are connected with them or work as their informants.

A Soviet ambassador is first of all an employee of the Central Committee of the Party, only secondly of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Often he is himself part of the Military Intelligence or the State Security police. A great many of the Soviet ambassadors in foreign countries are intelligence officers.

Before my duty in the embassy in Turkey, I thought that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the embassies were important organizations with authority. Now I know there is only the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the two intelligence organizations.

To process people traveling abroad, there is a special Commission for Trips abroad under the Central Committee. It consists entirely of State Security officers. Any person, even a tourist, going overseas comes for a conference to the Central Committee.

When I was leaving, the second Mr. Daluda from the State Security poked through my file for two hours. What was he looking for? He questioned me about all my relatives, living and dead, about my family life, whether

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Eliminate All Soviet Activities



United Press International

PENKOVSKY'S BOSS—Gen. Ivan A. Serov, secret police chief who purged Hungarian revolutionaries in 1956, was Penkovsky's boss in military intelligence headquarters and authorized his trips to the West.

...quarrel with my wife. He also asked me about international problems. This was done to me, an officer of the General Staff and the Military Intelligence.

Indiscriminate Espionage

We are engaged in espionage against every country in the world. And this includes our friends, the countries of the Peoples Democracies. Who knows, some fine day they may become our enemies. Look what happened with China. Months before the break with China became clear, instructions came direct from the Central Committee to begin intensive intelligence activity against China. Quietly, the Chinese section was transferred from the Directorate dealing with Peoples Democracies to that for neutral or enemy countries in the Far East.

Col. Pavel Demetriyevich Terzin was formerly the State security resident in Turkey,

where I knew him. Later he was promoted to the rank of brigadier general and appointed pro-rector of the Patrice Lumumba Friendship University in Moscow.

The entire faculty of this Lumumba Friendship University is made up of State Security police—even the people in charge of dormitories! Only a few professors are there as "co-optees," i.e. people who have agreed to work with the State Security. The basic task of the Friendship University is to prepare a fifth column for the African countries.

Many of the African students there have already been recruited. They are now working for the Soviet intelligence. They are studying Marxism and Leninism, preparing to become the future leaders of the African countries.

As a first step, after their return from now, they are directed to organize strikes, demonstrations to overthrow

governments, etc. At the university they live better than the average Soviet student. Almost everything is paid for.

Spies in Washington

The Soviet strategic intelligence service alone has special "residencies" (i.e. self-contained operative units) on the territory of the United States. One is in Washington, D.C.—"residency" personnel include individual Soviet Embassy secretaries, commercial representatives, and other employees.

There are two "residencies" in New York, one under the cover of the U.N. (The other, the "illegal residency," has direct independent contact with Moscow.)

The Washington "residency" has a great many Soviet operations officers and an insignificant number of agents; these are basically "old-timers" who were recruited a long time ago.

The New York "residencies" are of greater strength. They have new agents from whose ranks they build up the "illegal residency." Among the agents are many foreigners who reside and work in the United States.

Intelligence officers of legal "residencies" (i.e. officers who have legally entered the U.S. with an official "cover" position) always use their cover, such as: Tass correspondent, Aeroflot representative, Merchant Marine, member of a trade mission.

Sometimes, in order to evade FBI surveillance, Soviet intelligence officers stay in the embassy overnight, sleeping on desks, then get up early in the morning to leave the embassy unnoticed. In this way, they manage sometimes to avoid surveillance.

After the Powers affair (the U-2 incident of May, 1960) Khrushchev issued an order to all units of the intelligence service, especially those in the United States, to cease their active work temporarily—in order to take no chance of putting into enemy hands any evidence pointing to Soviet espionage against the U.S. and other countries. In November, 1960, this order was rescinded. Intelligence activities began again in full swing. Recent directives have ordered establishment of social contacts with as many Americans as possible.

Ivan Yakovlevich Melekh, a Soviet Intelligence officer with the military rank of lieutenant colonel. He knows East

very well. At one time he was an instructor of English at the Military Diplomatic Academy, which trains officers for Military Intelligence. After special training, Melekh was sent under the cover of the United Nations secretariat in New York to carry out his intelligence missions. That was in 1955. On October 27, 1960, he was arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation on charges of espionage. In April, 1961, the U.S. government dropped its charges on condition that Melekh leave the U.S. before April 17. This should help us to judge the value of Soviet protests and declarations at the U.N.

Friend of Serov

The present Chief of Military Intelligence, Gen. Alexander I. Serov, is not the most brilliant of men. He knows how to interrogate people, imprison them and shoot them. In sophisticated intelligence matters, he is not so skilled. Serov was a Beria man. Beria took a liking to him and pushed him to the top quickly.

Before coming to Military Intelligence, Serov was chairman of the State Security. After his appointment to Military Intelligence, he remembered my name from my Turkish assignment and became personally interested in my work. Eventually a certain degree of friendship developed between us and I visited him several times at his apartment and his country house. My personal relationship with Serov placed me in the forefront of Military Intelligence officers.

Serov lives on Granovsky Street. Many ministers, members of the Central Committee and marshals live there. Rudenko, the Chief Prosecutor of the U.S.S.R., lives on the same floor as Serov. When Serov was Chairman of the State Security, he arrested people and Rudenko signed the death sentence. One would drop into the other's place in the evening for a drink and they together would decide who should be put in jail and who should be shot. Very convenient.

Condensed from the forthcoming book "The Penkovsky Papers," © 1965, Doubleday & Co., Inc.

TUESDAY: Col. Penkovsky's secret meetings with U.S. and British officers in London; he tells the true story behind Soviet missile and space war, and Khrushchev's threats to bury the West with a "rain of missiles."

Our Man in the Kremlin

Trickery Used by Russian Intelligence Against West Revealed by Penkovsky

Fourth in a Series

By Frank Gibney

Col. Oleg Penkovsky, the brilliant Soviet General Staff officer who volunteered to spy for the West, was almost the exact opposite of the drab, mousy professional spy, as celebrated in current "realistic" espionage novels. A sociable man who liked good food and good conversation, he had a ready wit and was prone to parlor card tricks.

When he arrived in London, in late April, 1961, he was consciously setting out to play an incredibly dangerous game of espionage against his own regime. But he managed to enjoy his stay, at least ostensibly, as thoroughly as any tourist.

The Colonel took long walks through the city, visited department stores, restaurants and theaters, generally in the company of Greville Wynne, his British businessman friend. The obvious freedom of the British people delighted him. He told Wynne, again and again, how different it was from the closed society of Moscow.

Personally, he was manifestly relieved for once to be out of the orbit of Soviet secret police surveillance. He even managed some discreet nightclubbing and a few dancing lessons. (Soviet intelligence circles in London, assumed that Penkovsky, a trusted officer, was attempting to "recruit" Wynne as a Soviet agent. So



his association with Wynne was not under suspicion.)

Penkovsky also did some guide work of his own, which considerably helped his standing in Soviet Military Intelligence. Shortly before he left Moscow, Gen. Serov, the chief of Military Intelligence, had called him into his office and informed him that his wife and daughter were also flying to London for an unofficial tourist visit. He asked Penkovsky to look after them and give them any help they needed in getting around in a strange city.

Accordingly, the Colonel helped Mrs. Serov and her attractive daughter Svetlana make their purchases (with money drawn from local So-

viet intelligence funds). He even managed to take Svetlana on a tour of the better London night spots without arousing undue attention.

Beneath this facade of socializing, however, Penkovsky's new work continued in earnest. On the basis of the information he had submitted, the British and American intelligence officers were now convinced that his desire to work with them was genuine.

In their nocturnal meetings, they gave the Soviet colonel a complete short course in clandestine radio communications, as well as a small Minox camera for photographing documents. It was arranged to make contact with him through Wynne or another Western emissary, if he found it impossible to return to Western Europe in the near future. If necessary, instructions would be transmitted to him by radio.

When he finally left London, See PENKOVSKY, A23, Col. 1

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Trickery Used by Soviet Intelligence

don on May 6, Penkovsky carried with him presents for his highly placed Soviet friends, including Gen. Serov, a full report of the trade and technical mission (which Moscow judged a great success) and a complete set of instructions and equipment for getting further espionage information out to his "new friends" in the West.

In the following excerpt from the Papers, Penkovsky has some more to say about the real nature of his own Soviet delegation—and the stern ground rules still laid down to cover all Soviet contacts with foreigners.

By Oleg Penkovsky

The State Committee for Co-ordination of Scientific Research Work is like a ministry. Our chairman, Rudnev, enjoys all the privileges of a minister in the U.S.S.R. The committee is in charge of all scientific and technical exchanges with foreigners, both in the Soviet Union and abroad. In fact, it is a large espionage apparatus, which not only collects scientific and technical information, but tries

to recruit Western technical specialists.

When I began my work in the committee, I was myself astounded by the number of intelligence officers working there. Eighty or 90 senior intelligence officers work in the foreign relations section alone. When one walks down the halls in our offices, one can see some of them saluting each other in the military manner. They have conspicuous difficulty getting away from military habits, even getting used to their civilian clothes.

The friendly contacts and "services" we provide visiting foreign delegations we might better call "friendly deceit." Often we Military Intelligence officers cannot understand ourselves why the foreigners believe us. Do they not understand that we show them in the U.S.S.R. only those things which are well known to everybody? If there is something new at a plant which foreigners are about to visit, we simply give orders to its director: "Show them everything, but have Shops 1 and 5 closed for repairs." That is all.

On my desk I have a list of pretexts and alternate proposals which we use to

keep foreigners out of certain areas of the U.S.S.R.:

- 1) The plant is under repair.
- 2) A bridge is closed.
- 3) There is no airport and the railroad tracks have been damaged by recent frost; therefore, for the time being there are no trains.
- 4) The local hotel is not ready for guests.
- 5) All hotels are completely filled with tourists, etc.

Sometimes we take foreign delegates through museums and parks in Moscow until the members are so tired they themselves call off the trip to a factory, preferring to rest. Or, instead of taking the delegation by plane, we put them on a train. As a result, the delegation has enough time to see only one or two installations in which they are interested, instead of five or six. Their visas expire and they have to leave after having seen nothing but vodka and caviar.

Recruiting Tasks

In Moscow our main task as intelligence officers inside the committee is to recruit agents among the foreigners visiting the U.S.S.R. Of course, this does not often happen. But we collect information by personal conversations, eavesdropping, examining baggage, literally stealing secrets from the visitors' pockets.

I have been assigned to British delegations visiting Moscow. My job is to establish friendly relations with these men, assess their intelligence possibilities, then



PASS FOR SPY—This is C

write a report on each to our intelligence people in London. It will be up to them to collect enough compromising information on these men — family problems, amorous adventures, personal finances, etc.—to secure their recruitment.

We are also to obtain as much scientific and technical information as possible of value to our Soviet industry — everything from cheaper methods of getting fresh water from sea water to the manufacture of artificial fur. Thanks to visits to our country by foreign delegations, we obtain vast quantities of extremely valuable information.

By contrast, all members of Soviet delegations traveling abroad are carefully instructed how to answer questions that might be put to them. I can honestly say that there is nothing new


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ence Revealed by Penkovsky



Penkovsky's pass as an "expert" of the Scientific Research Work Committee.

too much and report any incidents on the trip to the consul or Soviet Embassy representatives. Do not carry any confidential materials with you, do not leave your hotel room, do not make any notes, but if this is unavoidable, keep them on your person.

I remember early in 1961 we sent a delegation to the Federal Republic of Germany. An engineer from Leningrad went with this delegation. He was co-opted, i.e., forcibly recruited by Military Intelligence. He had a notebook for making notes on the information he gathered. He left the notebook in a raincoat, then it disappeared. A search was conducted. We found nothing. The engineer became so upset that when his comrades went out shopping, he hanged himself in his hotel room. He used the cord of an electric iron which he found attached to the light fixture in the ceiling. (The delegation had taken the electric iron with them to save money on pressing.)

The engineer's body was sent to Leningrad by plane. Later, at the enterprise where he worked, it was announced that he was not normal and suffered from constant headaches. That is how things are done in our country.

Condensed from the forthcoming book, "The Penkovsky Papers," © 1965, Doubleday & Co., Inc.

THURSDAY: Penkovsky arrives in London with new top-secret information taken from the Kremlin's files: the true story of how Khrushchev shot down the U-2 and the RB-47.

Western scientists and specialists could learn from Soviet specialists — or det exhibitions abroad. For example, the exhibits to shown at our London exhibition in 1961 were first fully checked by intelligence technicians to make sure there was nothing new which foreign scientists could see or steal. Some exhibits were purposely put together in a distorted way; one of the sputnik on display was not built that way, the spheres were of another type.

After a Soviet delegation has been formed, we select certain scientists, engineers or other suitable members and instruct them individually on the type of information we need. Take my own 45-man delegation to London. Five of its members were employees of the Communist Central Committee. Ten Military Intelligence officers left for London at the same time in the guise of delegation members or tourists. There were also three other Military Intelligence colonels in the delegation, besides myself.

As a rule, Soviet scientists and technicians in missile production work are not allowed to go abroad. But lately, because these scientists must learn something about missile work in the U.S., a few have been given permission to travel—provided they have not participated in any missile production work for the last two years. Thus, if they defected to the West, their knowledge would not be so fresh.

Touring Instructions

Our intelligence instructions to traveling Soviet delegates are very specific. How many forms and autobiographies must be filled out before a trip abroad is processed! All of them in four or five copies! I myself had to submit 18 photographs before a single trip. What are they going to do with them? Marinate them? My wife and I worked on them for two days, and still could not finish all the forms.

Instructions we give to Soviet travelers stipulate that when traveling by train, you should always be seated with your own sex. Do not drink, do not talk

Kremlin Secret Police, Spying Dominate Regime and All Agencies Abroad

(Second in a Series)

By Frank Gibney


By mid-April, 1961, Greville Wynne, the British businessman in whom Col. Penkovsky confided, had taken Penkovsky's letter to British and American intelligence officers in London. In it, the Soviet General Staff officer described in detail his position in Moscow, together with his motives of volunteering to spy against the Soviet regime.

He promised to arrive in London later that month, in charge of a visiting Soviet delegation of technical and industrial experts. Many of these were in fact intelligence specialists from Penkovsky's own committee, the State Committee for Co-ordination of Scientific Research, which regulated all contacts and exchanges between foreign and

Soviet scientists and businessmen.

Penkovsky's own record and position were quickly checked out in London and Washington—and if Western intelligence had dreamed up the perfect man to penetrate the Kremlin's secrets, it could hardly have done better.

He was then 43 years old. Made a full colonel in the Soviet Army at 31, he had graduated both from the Frunze Military Academy (the Soviet Staff college) and the Military-Diplomatic Academy



cover name for the three-year Soviet military intelligence school. He had served as assistant military attache in Turkey in 1956, run an area desk in Soviet intelligence headquarters and helped select and train intelligence officer candidates—one of the most sensitive jobs in the Soviet system.

The Colonel was also a veteran artilleryman who had taken the special Soviet Army course in military missileery at the Dzhherzhinsky Artillery school. He was the former aide and still the confidant of Chief Marshal Varentsov, who commanded the Soviet tactical missile troops.

In almost every respect, Penkovsky was wired into the Soviet hierarchy. His great-uncle, Valentin Penkovsky, was a lieutenant general; his

See PENKOVSKY, A23, Col. 1

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Our Man in
The Kremlin

Immorality of Russian

Seventh in a Series

By Frank Gibney

Late in the afternoon, one bright September day in 1961, a smiling Russian gentleman stopped to watch three English children playing by a sandbox along Tsvetnoy Boulevard in Moscow.

He handed them a small box of candy, which the children brought obediently to their mother, who was sitting nearby.

The Russian gentleman was Col. Oleg Penkovsky, the English mother Janet Anne Chisholm, wife of a British Embassy attaché.

Concealed in the innocent-looking candy box was a package of exposed film, which Penkovsky urgently wanted to put in the hands of British and American intelligence, in the course of his extraordinary voluntary spy mission for the West.

The bizarre meeting with



the children was of course carefully planned. Penkovsky had met Mrs. Chisholm during his second trip to London and he had been drilled in this procedure by his Western intelligence contacts.

A few weeks before, the British businessman, Greville Wynne, Penkovsky's original contact with the West, had arrived again in Moscow to attend the French Industrial fair.

In Wynne's room at the Metropol, Penkovsky had turned over film and several packets of highly classified information from the Kremlin files, as well as a broken Minox camera (he had dropped it during one of his nocturnal photography sessions). Wynne had given him a replacement camera and the little box of candy lozenges to use in the contact with Mrs. Chisholm.

Risky for Foreigners

The meeting with Mrs. Chisholm was risky in a city where foreigners are as closely watched as they are in Moscow. Wynne, however, and Penkovsky continued to meet with impunity, because of Penkovsky's official dealings with him. When Penkovsky saw Wynne, he told him that he was about to take a trip to

Paris himself with another Soviet trade delegation, for the purpose of attending the Soviet industrial fair there.

As Wynne later recalled, Penkovsky seemed cool, self-possessed and happy in their conversation at that time. He was cheered by the way his intelligence information was registering with London and Washington and buoyed up, against the hazards of his lonely espionage mission, by the thought that he was materially damaging the Moscow regime which he hated so bitterly.

In the following excerpt from the Papers, he emphasizes his disgust at the immorality of the Kremlin hierarchy.

By Oleg Penkovsky

It is interesting to observe our prominent Soviet personages... What a difference there is between them when they are on the speaker's platform and when they are in their family circles with a glass of vodka in their hands.

They become entirely different types. They are very much like the personalities which are portrayed by Gogol in "Dead Souls" and "The Inspector General."

In writing these notes, I have intentionally omitted the subject of moral degradation and drunkenness among the top military personnel — because there are already too many dirty stories on this subject. I know one thing for sure, though: all our generals have mistresses and some have two or more.

Family fights and divorces are a usual occurrence, and nobody tries to keep them secret.

Immoral Behavior

Every month at our Party meetings in the GRU we examine three or four cases of so-called immoral behavior and lack of discipline among our officers.

The Party committee and the Chief Political Directorate of the GRU examine the cases involving generals and colonels, while those cases involving marshals are examined by the Central Committee CPSU. The Central Committee naturally discusses such matters behind closed doors, in order to conceal from the general public and the rank and file officers the dirt in which our high command personnel is involved.



CALLED POWER-MAD — Penkovsky regarded as a protégé of Khrushchev by Col. Oleg Penkovsky.

seva's ouster from the Presidium.

At one of the Presidium meetings, she had proposed that the additional pay the Soviet army officers get for their respective ranks be discontinued. The answer to her was:

"What is the matter with you? You want to leave them without pants?"

What a fool! And yet there she was, occupying the post of Minister of Culture. How can such a person carry culture to the masses.

Take my friend Brig. Gen. Ivan Vladimirovich Kupin. He is Marshal Varentsov's protégé and a distant relative of his; Varentsov's daughter Yelena is married to Kupin's nephew.

Kupin is the Commander of artillery and missile troops of the Moscow Military District. Prior to this post, Kupin served in the German Democratic Republic as commander of artillery of the 1st Tank Army.

Amorous Escapades

He was in a lot of trouble due to his amorous escapades. While in Germany, he lived with his cipher clerk Zaytseva. After Kupin's departure from Germany, she hanged herself.

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ers. In most cases they are just given a warning.

The explanation for this given by the Central Committee is the same simple answer once given by Stalin:

"A marshal and his services are more valuable than a female sex organ."

Khrushchev has shown special favor to our Minister of Culture, the lady Furtseva. In the anti-Party fight against Bulganin and the others in 1957 Furtseva helped him a great deal; she worked day and night dispatching planes, and some say that she herself made some of the flights campaigning for support for Khrushchev. She is powerful, everybody in Moscow calls her "Catherine the Third."

Later Furtseva fell from favor. After the Party congress in 1960, Furtseva was ousted from the Presidium of the Central Committee CPSU. As a result of this, her husband Firubin was unable to go to the United States as the Soviet Ambassador.

Ouster Pleased Army

The entire Army was happy about the news of Furt-

seva's dismissal. During the investigation, a photograph of Kupin had been found among her belongings.

Kupin confessed that he had lived with Zaytseva while concealing this fact from his wife; he admitted that he promised Zaytseva to marry her.

When he arrived in Moscow, General Krylov, Commander of the Moscow Military District, refused to see him, but, because the decision concerning Kupin's assignment had already been approved by the Central Committee CPSU, the case was hushed up. Varentsov persuaded Krylov to forget the whole thing.

This is the way it goes in our country. As long as the Central Committee approves, as long as one has connections, one can get away with anything, even crimes; but if a similar incident happens to an ordinary officer without any connections, he is punished immediately—either his rank is reduced, or he is discharged from the Army entirely.

Look at Krupchinskiy, head of the School of Nurses, and a friend of General Smolnikov. They drink together and indulge in usual orgies with girls attending the school. Krupchinskiy also provides girls for other generals of the General Staff.

Khrushchev's son-in-law Adzhubel got himself deeply involved with an actress that it almost led to divorce. He was given a warning by Khrushchev himself to be more careful in his adventures. Adzhubel is the chief editor of the newspaper Izvestia, and every day he writes articles about Communist morality.

Yet, look at his own behavior. All the other journalists hate him.

Even Satyukov, the editor of Pravda, has slid down to second place after Izvestia. Adzhubel received a Lenin prize for his so-called "work" about Khrushchev's trip to the United States. This "work" was compiled and written by the Central Committee. All Adzhubel did was put his signature on it as its editor.

In our own committee in Moscow, Yevgeniy Il'ich Levin, secret police (KGB) worker and Gvishiani's deputy, is a drunkard and a scoundrel. The stories he tells about the cheap life he frequents are hardly consonant with what the Party tells us about "Social morality."

After his nightly drunken escapades and amorous adventures, Levin invariably

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Associated Press

...Furtseva, who was
...Khrushchev, is de-
... "power-mad."

... until noon. Almost
... morning Gvishiani
... for him:

"Where is my deputy?"
... someone says: "He has not
... yet. Probably he is
... his other office (that is,
... B). Gvishiani is afraid
... Levin. He knows very
... that Levin is at home
... sleeping off his rough night,
... he will do nothing.

The relatives of the high-
... placed do very well in
... Socialist society. Almost
... of the marshals' sons
... have finished the Military
... Diplomatic Academy. All of
... them would like to be sent
... abroad to work, but the
... government will not let
... them.

There is a special decree
... of the Central Committee
... CPSU forbidding the sons
... of marshals to go abroad.
... Many of them tried, but to
... no avail.

Marshal Sokolovskiy's son
... was given a 25-year prison
... term. He belonged to a
... large group of sons of mar-
... shals and ministers—some
... of our so-called "Golden
... Youth"—who had organized
... drunken orgies at their
... country houses outside Mos-
... cow.

At one of these orgies, a
... girl who had just come to
... Moscow from Leningrad
... was raped by the gang. She
... was to be the niece of

... or something of that
... sort. He was released.

Marshal Konev's son, Ge-
... ly Ivanovich Konev, is a
... woman-chaser and a drunk-
... ard. He also is a member
... of that same group of sons
... of marshals and other high
... officials. He is a motorcycle
... enthusiast, and he loves to
... play the horses.

I studied with Gelly at
... the Military Academy. Dur-
... ing that time Gelly had an
... accident while riding his
... motorcycle. He hit a man
... who later died. Papa,
... however, took care of every-
... thing and Gelly was not
... jailed. He was graduated
... from the academy in 1963,
... and is now working in the
... Information Directorate of
... the GRU, on the American
... Desk. He knows English
... well.

Gorkin, chairman of the
... Supreme Court, has a son-
... in-law named Lieutenant
... Commander Ivanov, a GRU
... military intelligence em-
... ployee. (This is the same
... Ivanov who was connected
... with the Profumo scandal in
... England.) He and I studied
... together at the Military Di-
... plomatic Academy. At pre-
... sent he is the Assistant Na-
... val Attache in Great Britain.
... His wife is one of Gorkin's
... daughters. Ivanov loves
... going to night clubs in Lon-
... don.

As one can well see, all
... the sons and relatives of

... Soviet leaders and high
... level personnel are well tak-
... en care of. I have told only
... about those who work in
... the GRU. But the same
... thing may be said about
... those who are in the Cen-
... tral Committee, the Council
... of Ministers, the KGB and
... various other ministries.

All roads are open for
... them. They are the first
... ones who get promoted to
... higher ranks and better
... jobs. Everything is done by
... pull, through friends and
... family connections.

The newspapers scream
... that a struggle must be
... waged against such prac-
... tices. But what happens?

They punish some factory
... director for giving a job to
... his niece, and he is criti-
... cized for it in the newspa-
... pers. But we must look
... higher and see what is
... going on at the top level.
... That is where all the big
... crimes are committed. It is
... they who set the example
... for the others to follow.

Condensed from the following book:
"Penkovsky Papers," © 1964, Doubleday & Co., Inc.

MONDAY: Penkovsky is
... sent on a Soviet spy-mission
... to Paris, but meets secretly
... with Western agents; his
... revelations about the Rus-
... sian spy network in Britain
... and France.

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Girdled Men May Add Years

By DR. PETER J. STEINCROHN


"Chances are a wife will
... be a widow and her hus-
... band not a widower be-
... cause of one simple reason:
... scientists have been over-
... looking for years!

"She wears a girdle. He
... doesn't.

... the com-
... specially fitt
... belt or gird
... help the c

"There was an overweight
... businessman (and many
... like him) who could not
... lose weight. He was short
... of breath, although he had
... no heart disease. Climbing
... a flight of stairs knocked
... him out for the rest of
... the day. Nevertheless, he
... didn't ... or couldn't
... weight. So ... him
... with a ... to
... the heavy drag of

LOOK SLIMMER, FEEL
... BETTER, LESSEN
... END-OF-DAY FATIGUE



MANDATE

ABDOMINAL
... SUPPORT

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some minister.

After she was raped, the girl was placed in a car and taken somewhere behind the Byelorussian Railroad Station, where they dumped her. Because the whole gang was drunk, the driver of the car was driving very poorly. A militiaman noticed this and blocked the car. One of the boys in the car grabbed a pistol and fired a blank shot. The car was stopped.

25-Year Term Given

This happened under Stalin, and he said, "I respect Sokolovsky very much, but there will be a trial just the same." And so a trial was held, and Sokolovsky's son was given a 25-year prison term. He stayed in jail only three years, however, and then he "became ill," allegedly suffering from an ul-

blood. Thereby it takes an unnecessary load off the heart. And when one multiplies this by the heart beats which add up to a few billion in the normal lifetime, one can understand how a simple abdominal support might add years to a man's life.

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REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

August 15, 2002

Freedom of Information/
Privacy Office

SECRET
7F400105W

Mr. John Young
CRYPTOME
251 West 89th Street
Suite 6E
New York, New York 10024

Dear Mr. Young:

References:

- a. Your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of March 29, 2001, for records concerning various dossiers. Your request was received in this office May 8, 2001.
- b. Our letter of April 20, 2001, informing you that additional time was needed to review the records and we were unable to comply with the 20-day statutory time limit in processing your request.
- c. Our letter of January 22, 2002, providing you with the requested records.

As noted in reference c above, we were coordinating with other elements of the Army concerning the releasability of their information contained in the records.

Coordination has been completed and we have been informed by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence and U.S. Army Forces Command that the information is releasable to you.

We have completed a mandatory declassification review in accordance with Executive Order 12958. As a result of this review it has been determined that the information contained in the records no longer warrants security classification protection and is partially releasable to you. The records are enclosed for your use.

Since the release of the information deleted from these records would result in an unwarranted invasion of the privacy rights of the individuals concerned, this information is exempt from the public disclosure provisions of the FOIA per Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(6).



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535

August 27, 2003

John Young
251 West 89th Street, Suite 6E
New York, NY 10024

Request No.: GR 02-23
Subject: Soviet Intelligence Sources,
ZF400108W

Dear Requester:

The enclosed material was referred to the FBI by the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, in response to your Freedom of Information-Privacy Acts request. This information is being released without deletions.

Sincerely_yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "D. Hardy", is positioned below the "Sincerely_yours," text.

David M. Hardy
Section Chief,
Record/Information
Dissemination Section
Records Management Division



Federal Bureau of Investigation

Freedom of Information / Privacy Acts

Release

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

July 22, 1952

~~7-18-17-763~~

RE: SOVIET INSPIRED ACTIVITIES
IN CHINA

An Informant who has admitted service as an Agent of the Communist International and Soviet Military Intelligence between 1931 and 1939, has furnished the following information regarding the captioned subject:

Informant has advised that he was in Moscow in August 1933. At that time he was called to a conference by Alfred Langner, head of the anti-militarist Bureau of the Comintern, and by General Berzin, who was commanding the Fourth Department Red Army General Staff, which is better known as Soviet Military Intelligence.

The Informant states that Langner and Berzin advised him that he was to go on a mission to Manchukuo on behalf of the Fourth Department. Informant states, "My mission this time was mostly to be that of a courier to bring instructions to Captain Werner whom I have identified previously as an instructor at the Frunse Military Academy. Captain Werner at that time was conducting a Fourth Department espionage mission in Manchukuo and his cover company was a Ford dealership. In fact, he had organized several Ford agencies throughout Manchukuo and this cover was so effective that it was supporting the espionage mission. Captain Werner did not have to have financial help from Moscow since the profits from the Ford dealerships paid for the expenses of the espionage activity. My instructions to Captain Werner from Moscow were to put more emphasis on industries, particularly armament industries which had recently been created by Japan in Manchukuo and not to emphasize espionage activity against Chiang-Kai-Shek. Captain Werner's headquarters were in Dairen. I travelled overland through Russia on the Siberian railway to Manchukuo and it took me ten days and eleven nights. While in Dairen I remember seeing

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"an individual in Captain Werner's office who must have been a Fourth Department man. When this individual came in to Captain Werner's office I exchanged greetings with him and then Captain Werner asked me to step out of the room. I would describe this individual as follows: name unknown, nationality Englishman, 6'2", 170 lbs., slender build; he must have worn a monocle because the marks of a monocle appeared on one eye. He dressed well, typically English, has a dark full head of hair and he had a small Hitler-type moustache. He could have been in his middle 30's and he gave a typical English greeting to me. The only language I heard him speak was English. I recall seeing one or two other individuals in Captain Werner's office but I am unable to accurately describe them since there was nothing outstanding in their appearance like the Englishman above.

"As I have mentioned previously, the Manager in Dairen was Captain Werner. The Manager of the Ford dealership in Mukden was a German whose name I do not recall. He is described as follows: a typical German appearance; height 5'9" or 5'10"; weight 200 lbs.; age about 40; heavy build, a fat face with puffed up cheeks. He had thin medium blond hair. This hair was thinning on the sides and also on the top. He was clean shaven, no physical marks or scars on his face and he spoke German very fluently. He also must have been a Fourth Department man. Altogether I stayed in Dairen and Mukden about five weeks. I am unable to accurately describe any of the other individuals I saw in these two cities during this period. The above individuals I have mentioned are the only ones who made any kind of an impression on me. I returned to Moscow by the same overland route I used to come to Manchukuo.

"After returning to Moscow I made a full report to General Berzin, head of the Fourth Department, Soviet Military Intelligence.

"A few days after my return to Moscow in October or November, 1933 I was called to the office of Alfred Langner to discuss my next mission. General Berzin was also there. They wanted to know if I would like to return to China.

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"I consented. They told me my next mission was strictly a mission for the Fourth Department, Soviet Military Intelligence but that I would be also working in a Comintern apparatus under Harry Berger whose real name was Arthur Ewert. My mission was to go to China and work as a guerilla warfare expert. I was to train the Chinese in sabotage work under General Stern who was already in China. This whole action was to be directed against Chiang-Kai-Shek.

"In preparing for the return trip to China, five different passports were shown to me in Moscow. I only remember clearly the last one. I was to use a Swiss passport from Moscow to Helsinki. A Belgian passport was to be used from Stockholm to Copenhagen and then another Swiss passport from Copenhagen to Paris. At Venice I caught the Italian liner Conde-Rosso. This Italian steamship which was the fastest way to travel to the Orient at that time, journeyed from Venice through the Suez Canal, India, Singapore, Hong Kong and then Shanghai. The trip lasted twenty-one days.

"Before leaving Moscow I was given \$3,000 in salary and \$1,000 in expenses.

"In Moscow General Berzin told me also to pick up a cheque in Stockholm in the amount of approximately \$30,000 U. S. dollars. I was instructed to hand over this cheque to Harry Berger in Shanghai. I recall that the cheque was drawn on the Bank of Hong Kong. When I arrived in Stockholm, however, my contact told me that the cheque was not ready but that I would be given it in either Copenhagen or Paris. I do not remember in which of these two cities I was actually given the cheque.

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"I believe that I arrived in Shanghai early in January, 1934. I first stayed at the Hotel Astor or Astoria. In a short time I was contacted by a man who gave the proper recognition signal. A short time later Comrade Milton came to my room. I later remembered that Milton was in charge of trade union work for the Profintern but had been attached to the Comintern for this same mission to which I had been assigned.

"Milton was about 25-30 years of age in 1934, 5'11" in height; 170 lbs.; plentiful hair of a medium brown color, clean shaven; fair complexion; medium build. I believe he was American born and his clothes appeared to be of American origin. He had an American passport; I recall seeing the passport once and noted that the last name on the passport was Milton. He lived in the French settlement in Shanghai on rue Edward.

"Milton conducted me by ricksha to Arthur Ewert's home in the French settlement. There I found Ewert who was then using the name Harry Berger. Also present was Berger's wife and a Pole and his wife. I believe that the Pole's name was Ladislav.

"This was the first time I had seen Berger since 1926 at the K.P.D. school in Dresden, Germany. I believe that he had been recalled to Moscow about 1927 for re-education because of his rightist tendencies. Later, according to the story he told me, he was made representative of the South American Bureau of the Comintern at Montevideo, Uruguay. He spent several years there and was then transferred in late 1932 to become representative of the Far Eastern Bureau of the Comintern in Shanghai. His wife always accompanied him. I know he travelled on a United States passport in the name of Harry Berger both in South America and in China. At least I saw South American visas on his Berger passport. I also saw an Extension of stay on his passport which had been granted by some United States Consulate. Later on I am sure he used the same passport in Brazil in 1934 and 1935.

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"Harry Berger's mission in China was to organize Communist Party cells and to supervise the trade union movement. He also had a military staff which directed civil warfare in China against Chinag-Kai-Shek. General Stern, one of my former instructors at the Frunse Academy, was in charge of open warfare and I was placed in charge of guerilla warfare.

"At that time I would describe Harry Berger as about 45-50 years of age, 5'11" in height; 220 lbs.; fat build; fair complexion with red cheeks. He was of German origin and had medium blond hair which was thinned out. He had a tremendous capacity for alcoholic drink; I recall that he would consume between 40-60 ounces of whiskey a day as well as twelve bottles of beer. He dressed in a continental way. He spoke German, English, broken Spanish and Portuguese and a little Russian.

"His wife, whose name I cannot recall, was also about 45-50; of German origin, 5'4" in height; 120 lbs.; slender with dark brown hair. She was a quiet woman who always had a worried expression on her face. In 1935 in Brazil she was arrested and deported to Germany where she was imprisoned by the Gestapo. I know that she died in prison.

"Harry Berger had contact with a man from O.M.S. whom I never met. He was also in touch with a representative of Department Four who was connected with military espionage. This man was introduced as Comrade Abramov. He should not be confused with the Comrade Abramov who was head of the O.M.S. in the Comintern at Moscow.

It is noted that the subject advised that O.M.S. refers to a department of the Comintern which was responsible for the supply of funds and travel credentials to agents of the Communist International throughout the world.

The Informant continues, "I first met Comrade Abramov in January, 1934. As I have stated, I had in my

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"possession a cheque for \$30,000 which had been given me in either Copenhagen or Paris. In Shanghai I opened an account in the bank of Hong Kong. I immediately withdrew from the account \$10,000 U.S. dollars and gave this cash to Abramov at Berger's apartment. At the same time I made out a cheque payable to some company, the name of which I do not remember but which had been given to me by Abramov, in the amount of about \$18,000. This cheque I also gave to Abramov. A short time later I took the balance out of the account and paid it to Berger.

"Comrade Abramov was of Jewish origin, probably coming from the South Caucasian region. He was about 40-45 years of age in 1934; 5'10" or 5'11" in height; 160-65 lbs.; medium build; black hair, a little curly and combed straight back. He had a tanned complexion. He was clean shaven but had a heavy beard. He spoke English with an accent and I also heard him speak a few words in German. He had an oval face, an eagle nose which was not out of proportion. He also had a prominent small pointed chin. I never saw him wearing glasses.

"I do not know whether Abramov was married or where he lived. I saw him only on this one occasion. I believe that he was quite important as a Fourth Department agent; otherwise he would not have gone directly to Berger's home. When I gave him the money he thanked me, letting me know at the same time that he knew the money came from General Berzin. I do not know whether the name Abramov was this individual's correct name or his cover name.

"As I have mentioned, a Pole by the name of Ladislaw was also at the meeting. He may have been 'A man between'. I only saw him on this one occasion and have no further information relating to his espionage responsibilities, if any. He was about 5'6" tall, 140 lbs., thin build, black hair, weak physically, pale complexion, age 26-27 in 1934. I recall that he was constantly taking pills.

"During this first meeting Berger recommended that I live in the French section of the city. I was known to them as Comrade Harry. I disagreed with Berger and said that

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"I would prefer to live in the International Settlement of the city of Shanghai. Berger then said that General Stern was living in the International Settlement. I noted that there was still bad feeling between Berger and General Stern.

"The following day I called on General Stern in a luxurious apartment in the International Settlement. He was greatly surprised to see me and proceeded to tell me that he was highly dissatisfied working with Berger. He stated that he was forced to work under the political supervision of Berger, an arrangement which displeased him. I took up residence in a rooming-house run by a Mrs. Walter, a German Nazi who had lived all her life in Shanghai. My cover as a cattle rancher from Texas appeared to be working successfully; at least no one ever questioned me closely concerning my origin.

"About a week after my arrival in Shanghai I attended the meeting at which Comrade Abramov was present, as I have already recounted. After I had furnished the money to Abramov, he left. Shortly thereafter General Stern arrived. We began to work out plans to train Chinese Communists from the guerilla army. The training was to take place in Shanghai.

"By means of a Chinese interpreter I conducted a class in the Chinese section of Shanghai for some 15 students. It covered a period of four weeks. I was known to the Chinese as Comrade Chung. After their training was completed, they returned to the 8th Route Army which was then in Kiangsi province. I later taught a second class of some 20 students over another four week period. They too came from the 8th Route Army.

"At the completion of this course I was idle for about a week, then Berger, General Stern and myself met once again at Berger's home. The purpose of the meeting was to set up a route through which the Communists' 8th Route Army could break out from their encirclement in Kiangsi province, march across China northwesterly to Szechwan to combine

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"with the North Chinese Communist Army in the latter province. The country through which the Army would have to march was held by Chiang-Kai-Shek. The 8th Route Army had a strength of 122,000 poorly armed soldiers commanded by General Chu De. General Stern was trying to keep the military forces in Fukien neutral.

"At that moment they were not pro-Communist but on the other hand felt no sympathy to Chiang-Kai-Shek. General Stern and the Commander of the Fukien forces concluded a secret agreement to the effect that the Fukien Army would not permit Chiang-Kai-Shek to attack across Fukien against the Communist forces in Kiangsi.

"It was decided that Berger would make arrangements for me to travel through Fukien to Kiangsi to discuss the Army's march with General Chu De.

"General Stern had laid out a plan for the 8th Route Army's advance to the northwest which called for what I term 'open field warfare'. Berger, who wanted to force the Fukien forces to ally themselves with the Communist Kiangsi forces, rejected this plan because he felt it would cause the Fukien forces to become hostile and prevent their eventual alliance with the Kiangsi forces.

"At General Stern's suggestion I reformed the plan according to the rules of guerilla warfare. The plan was resubmitted to Berger who also rejected it for the same reason. General Stern told Berger that he would put the guerilla warfare plan into effect anyway and that night General Stern radioed General Berzin in Moscow for permission. I recall that General Stern had a radio transmitter in Shanghai with an operator whom I never knew. Berger had a radio operator whom I knew as Hans. Hans was assigned to the Comintern.

"Hans was 5'11" tall; about 30 years old; medium build; blue eyes; blond hair; 190 lbs.; spoke German, and apparently of German origin.

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"had taken training at German military schools and had later gone to Moscow for training. He spoke broken German, broken English and broken Russian. I know that now he is a Commander of the Chinese Communist forces under Mao Tse-Tsung.

"I accompanied the 8th Route Army for the next few days on its march toward the northwest. My mission then having been completed, I travelled with an elderly Chinese back to Shanghai. My orders to return to Shanghai had been received from General Stern by radio at General Chu De's headquarters. I reached Shanghai some time during September, 1934.

"I learned there that General Berzin had radioed General Stern that he considered my mission in China complete. General Stern was under orders to return to Moscow and returned shortly thereafter. I was alone in Shanghai for some four weeks with Berger.

"About the end of October, 1934, Berger, his wife, Comrade Milton, Berger's radio operator, Hans, and myself received orders to return to Moscow. I would like to note here that Hans spoke German and had been a former soldier. I believe he had been trained in a four-year radio school given by the Fourth Department in Moscow.

"The five of us took a British vessel to Vladivostok and then travelled by Trans-Siberian railway overland to Moscow, arriving there in the early days of November, 1934.

No report was required of me from the Comintern. General Berzin, however, asked us some questions in his office and when he heard of the close cooperation that existed between General Stern and myself, he stated that we should work together as a team.

The above concluded the Informant's activities in China.

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
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The withholding of the information described above is a partial denial of your request. This denial is made on behalf of Brigadier General Keith B. Alexander, the Commanding General, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, who is the Initial Denial Authority for Army intelligence investigative and security records under the FOIA. You have the right to appeal this decision to the Secretary of the Army. If you wish to file an appeal, you should forward it to this office. Your appeal must be post marked no later than 60 calendar days from the date of this letter. Your appeal will then be processed to the appellate authority. After the 60-day period, the case may be considered closed; however, such closure does not preclude you from filing litigation in the courts.

We are continuing to review records regarding other titles you have requested and will respond to you by separate correspondence when our review is completed.

If you have any questions concerning this action, please feel free to contact Mrs. Query at (301) 677-4060. Please refer to case number #574F-02 and 580F-02.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Russell A. Nichols". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Russell" being more prominent.

Russell A. Nichols
Chief, Freedom of Information/
Privacy Office

Enclosure

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- (u) ~~(c)~~ ^{CARDED} Pvt [REDACTED] - Albanian

(b)(6) An AE (alien enlistee) source of unknown reliability volunteered information that Pvt [REDACTED] (Item 6) and [REDACTED] (Item 18), Third US Army had claimed to be members of a redefection organization. Source voiced suspicion of their association with Subject and three other AEs. In January 58 Subject went AWOL and was subsequently tried and convicted. He was assigned to USARHAN in August 58.

- (u) ~~(c)~~ ⁷⁵⁹²¹⁰ ^{CARDED} Pvt [REDACTED] - Bulgarian

(b)(6) On 17 Apr 58 Subject and Pvt [REDACTED] (Albanian) (Item 5) deserted from Fort Devens, Mass and succeeded in leaving the US and reaching Guatemala, C.A. Subject wrote letter to several Bulgarian AEs stationed at Fort Devens. Subsequently, he wrote to his unit commander from Guatemala, stating he would like to return to the US to complete his service and qualify for citizenship. Instructions were mailed to him advising him to report to the nearest military post in the US or to the US Embassy. On 16 January 59, [REDACTED] returned to the US and was interrogated. No concrete indications were developed concerning possible assistance from persons other than [REDACTED] during the attempted desertion. [REDACTED] verified that [REDACTED] was in Guatemala and had been the instigator in leaving the country and the Army. [REDACTED] also identified [REDACTED] (Item 46), a PL 597 Alien Enlistee who deserted from Fort Jackson, S.C. on 4 Nov 57, as living in Guatemala. Subject has subsequently been tried and convicted; he will be dishonorably discharged upon completion of sentence.

- (u) ~~(c)~~ ^{CARDED} Pvt [REDACTED] - Hungarian

(b)(6) An AE source of unknown reliability volunteered information that he heard Subject talking with three other AEs. The conversation concerned 17 AEs who were planning to go AWOL to Washington, D.C. or to Mexico after receiving their next pay. Source did not believe these AEs to be pro-communist, but merely dissatisfied.

- (u) ~~(c)~~ ^{CARDED} Pvt [REDACTED] - Bulgarian

(b)(6) In May 57, [REDACTED] addressed a letter to "General of the Army" and complained of the mistreatment and false promises made to him. In June 57, he was confined for violation of article 86 after having accompanied several other aliens AWOL to visit the Polish Embassy in Washington, D.C. Intercept at that time disclosed that he continued to write to his mother of the horrors he was undergoing, that he attempted to leave Fort Jackson for freedom, but instead found prison. Continued investigation determined him to be a malcontent, troublemaker, liar, an individual who was continuously AWOL, and a discredit to the service. In May 58, Subject went AWOL in the company of Pvt [REDACTED] (Item 15). They were apprehended while attempting to cross the border into Mexico. Allegedly, both were induced to go AWOL by Pvt [REDACTED] (Item 20), but this

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(b)(6) which took place in early February 58; several AEs, including Subject and source, planned to desert with the assistance of Pfc [REDACTED] (Item 16), but their plan was thwarted when an outsider warned the group not to desert. Pvt [REDACTED] (Item 2) stated in a letter that Subject was able to obtain a better assignment by taking his complaints directly to Department of the Army.

(u) ~~(OFLUSE)~~ Pfc [REDACTED] - Russian

(b)(6) Subject, who was stationed at Fort Rucker, Ala, expressed his desire to return to Russia and be united with his family at any cost and he intended to make his problem known to a higher government agency or to the Russian Embassy. Subject's discontent was attributed to language barriers, degrading assignment and inadequate pay. Subject was transferred in July 58 to the overseas replacement unit at Fort Lewis, Wash.

(u) ~~(OFLUSE)~~ Pvt [REDACTED] - Bulgarian

(b)(6) Subject was AWOL from 2 to 8 Oct 57. While in the stockade at Fort Jackson, S.C. he wrote a letter to The President, but the IG received the letter. In the letter, he claimed he was physically unfit for military service but that his medical records had been destroyed by American personnel, and he was consequently forced into the Army. In September 57, he visited the Polish Embassy in Washington. Subject claimed he would return to his native country as soon as released from the stockade (in July 58, [REDACTED] was transferred to Hawaii). News had allegedly reached the ears of all AEs at Fort Jackson that Subject had visited the embassy and it seemed common opinion among the AEs at Fort Jackson that if they desired to return to their native countries they could go to the nearest embassy (Iron Curtain) or arrange to make their way to either Canada or Mexico.

(u) ~~(OFLUSE)~~ Pvt [REDACTED] - Hungarian

(b)(6) Subject enlisted 15 Sep 58 and on 16 Sep 58 stated he wanted to be discharged. He claimed that prior to his enlistment he was warned against enlisting by his father who had written from behind the Iron Curtain and stated that everyone in his home town knew of his decision to enlist. After receiving a series of letters from his homeland which implored him not to enlist, and which gradually increased pressure on Subject, (loss of his sister's job and loss of his parents social security benefits), Subject applied to First US Army for discharge in December 58. He has since been discharged and plans to obtain employment and with the money he earned, help support his family in Hungary.

(u) ~~(OFLUSE)~~ Pvt [REDACTED]

(b)(6) The IG at Fort Jackson, S.C. conducted an investigation in June 57 concerning Subject's uncooperative attitude. Subject

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expressed a desire to become a citizen of the US; however, he dislikes all armies and feels that he has been unjustly treated. He would either like to be discharged from the Army or be returned to Greece or Bulgaria.

- (u) CARDED
13. (c) Pvt [REDACTED] - Hungarian

(b)(6)
A source of known reliability advised that Subject had contacted the Legation of Hungary, Washington, D.C. and requested repatriation. Subject is presently assigned to Fort Jackson, S.C. and made this contact in May 58, approximately three months prior to his enlistment. The information from the above mentioned source was included as a component part of a favorable background investigation which was completed by Fifth US Army on 22 October 58, for the purpose of induction in the US Army.

- (u) CARDED 759210
14. (c) (OPLUSE) Pvt [REDACTED] - Bulgarian

(b)(6)
On 31 May 58, Pvts [REDACTED] (Item 36), [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] (Item 27) deserted and attempted to enter Mexico for the purpose of seeking asylum at the French Embassy there. They proceeded to the border where [REDACTED] was apprehended. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were later apprehended in Mexico. The three were returned to their station at Fort Devens, Mass, where they were charged with desertion. No trial was held. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were subsequently tried for refusal to obey orders and [REDACTED] had a portion of his sentence remitted and was transferred to Fort Dix for rehabilitation.

- (u) CARDED 759210
15. (c) Pvt [REDACTED] - Bulgarian

(b)(6)
In March 58, [REDACTED] wrote a letter to "Assistant Chief of Staff," Washington, D.C.; he wanted to know why he "was still in parachute school" and stated that he did not wish to remain a second longer. He wanted training in some other branch of service or "execution by the firing squad." Board proceedings were initiated 14 Mar 58, and the boards recommendation was that he be given a General Discharge. The Adjutant General approved the action on 12 May 58. In the meantime, [REDACTED] had gone AWOL on 31 March 58 in the company of Pvt [REDACTED] (Item 4). The two were apprehended while attempting to cross the border into Mexico and are currently in confinement at Fort Bliss, Texas. [REDACTED] had been dropped from the rolls as a deserter in April prior to effecting action on the recommended discharge.

- (u) CARDED 89740
16. (c) Pfc [REDACTED] - Bulgarian

(b)(6)
Allegedly, Pfc [REDACTED] gave Pvt [REDACTED] (Item 27) \$100.00 for use in financing the latter's desertion attempt, and [REDACTED] returned the money before departing AWOL. Subject received a letter from Pvt [REDACTED] (Item 29), who was AWOL at the time from Third US Army,

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(b)(6) requesting that [REDACTED] send him \$50.00 to assist him in deserting; [REDACTED] allegedly sent \$47.00 to [REDACTED] (later polygraph examination of [REDACTED] failed to substantiate this). In October 58, [REDACTED] allegedly encouraged Pfc [REDACTED] (Item 31) to desert; he told [REDACTED] he would furnish him with enough money to get out of the US. [REDACTED] who is suspected of being a defection agent at Fort Devens, Mass, is known to have visited [REDACTED] (Item 44), a former AE suspected of being a defection agent, in New York City. [REDACTED] is alleged to have encouraged disaffected AEs to desert, to have offered money to deserters and to have volunteered to put a potential deserter in contact with persons who would assist him in leaving the country. [REDACTED] is still under investigation by First US Army.

(u)
17. (CFLUSE) Pvt [REDACTED] - Hungarian

(b)(6) [REDACTED] reported in November 58 that he had mailed a picture of himself in uniform to his mother in Hungary in September 58. He had not received any mail after he sent the picture and feared that his relatives were in trouble. He has been counselled and assisted in initiating an inquiry through the International Red Cross concerning his mother.

(u)
18. (C) Pvt [REDACTED] - Bulgarian

(b)(6) An AE source of unknown reliability voluntarily reported that Subject and Pvt [REDACTED] (Item 6) were among the principle agitators at Fort Jackson, S.C. In November 57, Subject was named as one of the several AEs who, as communist sympathizers, plan to write to embassies of their homelands in order to make known their desires to be repatriated. In February 58, [REDACTED] was transferred to an overseas replacement unit at Fort Lewis, Washington.

(u)
19. (C) Pvt [REDACTED] - Hungarian

(b)(6) Subject came to the US in January 57 but did not enlist in the Army until March 59. In September or October 58, Subject received a letter from [REDACTED] Governor of the State of Gyor, Hungary, which stated that Subject should return to Hungary. [REDACTED] said that Subject's mother was sick because of his disappearance, and [REDACTED] assured Subject of either a good job, or the opportunity to continue his education when he returned to Hungary. [REDACTED] mother was sick at the time he left Hungary. A friend of his, [REDACTED] address unknown, Detroit, Michigan, who is also a Hungarian refugee received a similar letter and [REDACTED] sister, Mrs [REDACTED] (no relation to [REDACTED]), wrote to Subject saying that similar letters were sent to everyone who fled Hungary during the revolution in 56. [REDACTED] destroyed the letter from [REDACTED] without replying. He does not know how [REDACTED] obtained the address of [REDACTED] aunt in Michigan where

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24. ~~(C)~~ Pvt [REDACTED] - Polish

(b)(6)
Subject was contacted in 50 by two individuals whom he believed represented Soviet Intelligence. They inferred that they were interested in information on ammunition and supplies at La Rochelle, France, where Subject was assigned in a labor service unit. Subject claims he never saw these individuals again. In October 55, Subject was contacted in Paris by an individual apparently connected with the Polish Embassy in France. This individual had detailed background information on [REDACTED] including knowledge of his trips into Poland on behalf of US intelligence. Subject was told they "had plans for him when he joined the US Army"; they knew this to be his intention. In November 55, two individuals made a follow-up on the above approach. Subtle pressure was applied by mentioning the fact that Subject's mother is in Poland. They repeated the fact that they "had plans for him in the US Army."

In 1957, while in Korea, Subject received a letter urging him to return to Poland because of his mother's sickness. Subject reported that he could no longer trust himself and was transferred to the rear.

In August 58, Subject was informed that his mother had received a visa for travel in France in December 58. Subject requested leave or transfer to that area.

In December 58, Subject was reported to be on leave in Europe. He was to meet his mother in Paris, France; then he was to go to visit a relative in Belgium, for the explicit purpose of registering his mother as a political refugee. If unable to accomplish this, Subject plans to apply for a discharge and return to Poland. Subject has learned from a friend residing in France that he may request amnesty under a Polish law which grants amnesty to the people who departed from Poland after 46.

(u)
25. ~~(C)~~ Pvt [REDACTED] - Hungarian

(b)(6)
In August 57, Subject wrote to The President that the recruiting officer in Germany had promised he would be returned to Germany after he had been stationed in the US for six months. Subject felt that the Army was not living up to its agreement. Subject claimed to have a friend in Washington (Pentagon implied) who had helped other Hungarian soldiers to transfer to the 3d Inf Div, Fort Benning for shipment to Germany. [REDACTED] was transferred to USAREUR in November 57.

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26. ~~(C)~~ Pvt [REDACTED]

(b)(6)
Subject is under investigation for suspected Communist Party membership and for association with suspected defection agents [REDACTED]

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(b)(6) [redacted] and Pfc [redacted] Subject is under investigation by Fourth US Army and [redacted] by First US Army. [redacted] (Item 44) is suspected of being a cut-out of a redefection apparatus active among Bulgarian and Albanian AEs in First US Army area, [redacted] (Item 16) is suspected of being a contact man for the same apparatus.

(u)
(c) 27. Pfc [redacted] 769210 - Bulgarian

(b)(6) In May 58, Subject and two other AEs deserted to enter Mexico for the purpose of seeking asylum at the French Embassy there (See Item 14). Subject was apprehended and later charged with desertion but no trial was held. Pfc [redacted] (Item 16), suspected redefection agent at Fort Devens, Mass, allegedly furnished \$100.00 to Subject for use in his desertion attempt, but Subject returned the money before going AWOL. [redacted] believes that Pvt [redacted] (Item 46), presently in desertion in Guatemala, has returned to Bulgaria and is responsible for threats to [redacted] family. Due to these threats, Subject is applying for a hardship discharge.

(u)
(c) 28. [redacted] - Bulgarian

(b)(6) Subject went AWOL and attempted to enter Canada in November 58, and when apprehended by Canadian border authorities, he was allegedly in possession of \$1000.00; his records indicated that he had not been paid since September 58. According to statements made by [redacted] members of his family have been imprisoned for withholding agriculture production. Therefore, it is possible that Subject attempted to redefect as a result of pressure. Subject stated that he had attempted to leave the US to find a job in Toronto, Canada and after realizing the futility of crossing without proper documents, decided to return to his unit. Since Subject's return from Korea in September 58, he has had frequent visits from a person fitting the description of Pfc [redacted] (suspected redefection agent). Subject denied that [redacted] (Item 16) induced him to go AWOL. He claims that the money in his possession was saved while he was in Korea. Subject stated he was planning to visit an individual named [redacted], address unknown, and one named [redacted] both believed to be Bulgarians. Subject's reason for attempting to enter Canada was that the Army had failed to grant him a thirty day leave, although he knew that his records had been delayed in transit from Korea. He admitted that he would not have returned to the US Army if he had been successful in entering Canada and obtaining employment.

(u)
(c) 29. Pvt [redacted] - Bulgarian

(b)(6) Third US Army received information that Subject was among a group of AEs who had expressed intentions of going AWOL to an unknown destination. Source named Subject with AEs whom source claims are

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(b)(6) former members of communist organizations and present sympathizers with communism; these individuals were allegedly intending redefection by contacting the embassies of their native countries. Two AEs, apprehended in attempting to desert, named Subject as a prominent member of a group which was apparently the target of a redefection effort. In November 58 it was reported by First US Army that Pfc [REDACTED] (suspected redefection agent) had been asked by Subject, who was at the time AWOL and suspected of desertion, to send him \$50.00 for use in a desertion attempt. [REDACTED] reportedly sent \$47.00 to Subject. In January 59, Subject and Pvt [REDACTED] (Item 1) voluntarily surrendered to civil authorities in Houston, Texas. Both individuals stated they had gone AWOL because the Army had not fulfilled the recruitment promises made in Europe. Investigation and polygraph examination of these individuals revealed no indication of influence or aid in their attempted desertion. Subject was transferred overseas in July 58.

(u)
30. (C) [REDACTED] ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(6) An AE source of unknown reliability volunteered information that Pvts [REDACTED] (Item 6) and [REDACTED] (Item 18), Third US Army, had claimed to be members of a redefection organization. Source voiced suspicion of their association with Subject and three other AEs.

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31. (C) Pvt [REDACTED] - Bulgarian

(b)(6) Interrogation of an AE who had been apprehended while attempting to desert to Mexico revealed that Subject was one of a group at Fort Devens, Mass, which in early February 58 discussed plans to desert on 1 March 58. In early October 58, Pfc [REDACTED] (Item 16) allegedly attempted to induce Subject to desert. It was reported that Ivanov had told Rangelov that he would furnish [REDACTED] with enough money to leave the US but that [REDACTED] would have to finance subsequent travel by other means. [REDACTED] also is reported to have told [REDACTED] that he would furnish [REDACTED] with a list of contacts who would assist him in escaping from the US. In January 59, First US Army considered exploitation of [REDACTED] approach to [REDACTED] in accordance with AR 381-12, but after contacting [REDACTED] who was apparently willing enough, it was determined that he did not possess the necessary psychological attributes. [REDACTED] was then transferred to Hawaii in February 59 and he has since become a discipline problem.

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32. (OFFUSE) Pvt [REDACTED] - Yugoslavian

(b)(6) [REDACTED] reported that he and Pvt [REDACTED] (Item 41), had been approached by an elderly civilian in Columbia, S.C. and at Fort Jackson; the latter attempted to impress upon them that they were working for nothing and that Army conditions were poor. This person

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33. ~~(OFLUSE)~~ Pvt [REDACTED] - Hungarian

34. ~~(OFLUSE)~~ Pvt

35. (C) Pvt [REDACTED] - Albanian

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(u)
38. (C) Pvt [REDACTED] Hungarian

(b)(6) On 5 December 58, [REDACTED] who writes to his mother about once per month, received a letter from his mother with a comment to the effect that parents of other Hungarian refugees are being discriminated against as a result of their sons serving in airborne units of other countries. Subject's mother feared that she, too, would be discriminated against. [REDACTED] was unable to produce the above mentioned letter and stated that he had forwarded it to his brother in Los Angeles, California, and he will attempt to have it returned to him. The letter upset and confused [REDACTED]. For some unknown reason, he doubted that the letter was from his mother, so he wrote her a letter, still using his brother's address, and asked if she had written the letter he had received on 5 Dec 58. He also called his brother and informed him of the letter. The brother requested to see the letter and Subject mailed it to him. After several days of consideration, Subject decided it would be better to resign from the airborne unit rather than bring possible harm to his mother. Upon being referred to division security, he was asked to produce the letter, but he claimed that his brother had destroyed it. The veracity of [REDACTED] story is considered by Third US Army to be questionable.

(u)
39. (CFLUSE) Pvt [REDACTED] - Hungarian

(b)(6) While assigned at Fort Knox, Ky, Subject reported to his unit intelligence officer that he had received mail from his father in Hungary; he had sent his military address to parents in Budapest. According to his father's letter, the AVO (Hungarian Secret Police) had been to his father's home in Budapest and had searched, without success, for letters and pictures of Subject.

(u)
40. (CFLUSE) Pvt [REDACTED] - Albanian

(b)(6) In August 58, while traveling from Fort Lewis, Washington to the Panama C.Z. on military orders, Subject attempted to enter Canada from Chicago, Ill. He was taken into custody by Canadian authorities, turned over to American authorities and then sent on to the Canal Zone. The Canadian deportation order contained the following: "This person applied for permanent admission to Canada and has no intention of returning to the US except by force. Take all precautions while Subject is in your custody."

(u) CARDED
41. (CFLUSE) Pvt [REDACTED] - Yugoslavian

(b)(6) Subject, accompanied by Pvt [REDACTED] (see Item 32) was approached by a civilian who encouraged him to redefect. On another occasion while Subject was acting as interpreter during an interview of another AE, Subject mentioned to the interviewer that the news

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(g)(6) concerning the visit by Pvt [REDACTED] (Item 10) to the Polish Embassy had reached the ears of all the AEs at Fort Jackson, S.C., and it seemed common knowledge that if AEs desired to return to their native countries, they could do so by going to Mexico or Canada and contacting the embassies of Iron Curtain countries.

(u) 42. ~~(CPLUSE)~~ Mr [REDACTED] - Hungarian

(b)(6) Subject, an applicant for enlistment who was disqualified for physical reasons, received a letter in July 58 from his mother who is presently residing in Hungary. The letter stated that she had heard of Subject's impending enlistment in the US Army and requested that he not enlist because of the trouble that his enlistment would cause for her from the communists. She explained that she had already lost her job as a school teacher because of his impending enlistment. Subject claimed that he had never included any information about his intention to enlist in letters to his mother or anyone else in Hungary. In his mother's letter she stated that the full names, addresses, places of employment in the US, and social habits of the Hungarian escapees from his home town were in possession of the authorities in Hungary.

(u) 43. ~~(C)~~ Pvt [REDACTED] - Hungarian

(b)(6) In January 59, Subject was interviewed and gave the following information: He came to the US in December 56, and the following May received a letter from his mother in Hungary which stated in substance: "I talked to [REDACTED] He told me to write and call you home. [REDACTED] said nothing happens to you." Subject wrote and asked his mother what she meant by this letter, since she had previously expressed her happiness that Subject was in the United States. About one week later Subject received a letter from his brother in Hungary which stated in substance: "Do not believe anything in our letters, even if it is in our handwriting. Disregard mother's letter. Stay in the United States." Subject claimed to have destroyed these letters prior to entering military service.

(u) 44. ~~(C)~~ Mr [REDACTED] 15475X - Bulgarian

(b)(6) Subject, a former AE who was discharged from the Army by board action, is now living in New York City. First US Army reported that he is suspected of being the cut-out between Soviet Bloc diplomatic personnel and a redefection apparatus. He had been reported as having been in contact with a member of the Albanian Delegation to the UN while Subject was assigned to Third US Army. Pfc [REDACTED] (Item 16) is known to have visited [REDACTED] in New York City. [REDACTED] is known to have met Soviet Bloc diplomats while still a soldier; to have had an interest, after his discharge, in disaffected AEs and those involved in desertion attempts; and to have discussed these persons with [REDACTED] during the course of the latter's visits to [REDACTED]

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(u)
45. ~~(e)~~ Pvt [REDACTED] ~~(e)~~
Pvt [REDACTED]

(b)(7)(C)
An AE source of unknown reliability named above individuals as associates of Pvt [REDACTED] (see Item 6), one of the primary agitators among Lodge Act personnel at Fort Jackson, S.C. Source believes these individuals to be communist sympathizers. [REDACTED] was transferred to an overseas replacement unit at Fort Lewis, Washington, in February 58.

(u)
46. ~~(e)~~ Pvt [REDACTED] - Bulgarian

(b)(7)(C)
From information available to First US Army, it appeared that Subject (who went AWOL from Third US Army) was an agent of Bulgarian Intelligence and had returned to Bulgaria and carried out his threats to families of other AEs in at least two cases. Actually, [REDACTED] is in desertion in Guatemala and no credible evidence has been received that he is or was an agent of Bulgarian Intelligence.

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- (u)
1. (C) Pvt [REDACTED]

(b)(6)
An AE source of unknown reliability volunteered information that Pvs [REDACTED] (Item 7) and [REDACTED] (Items 7,20), Third US Army had claimed to be members of a redefection organization. Source voiced suspicion of their association with subject and three other AEs.

- (u)
2. (C) Pvt [REDACTED] - Bulgarian April 1958

(b)(6)
On 17 Apr 58 subject and Pvt [REDACTED] (Albanian) deserted from Ft Devens, Mass, and succeeded in leaving the US by an unknown route and reaching Guatemala, C. A. Subject has written letters to several Bulgarian AEs stationed at Ft Devens. Although he stated in his letters that he had not heard from any of his friends at Ft Devens since his departure, he was familiar with a desertion attempt made by three AEs which took place two months after his own departure. Subsequently, subject wrote to his unit commander from Guatemala, stating he would like to return to the US to complete his service and qualify for citizenship. Instructions were mailed to subject advising him to report to the nearest military post in the US or to the US Embassy.

- (u)
3. (C) Pvt [REDACTED] August 1958

(b)(6)
An AE source of unknown reliability named subject as one of the AEs whom Pvt [REDACTED] (Item 21), Third US Army has attempted to induce to defect.

- (u)
4. (C) Pvt [REDACTED] Hungarian November 1957

(b)(6)
An AE source of unknown reliability volunteered information that he heard subject talking with three other AEs. The conversation concerned 17 AEs who were planning to go AWOL to Washington, D.C. or to Mexico after receiving their next pay. Source does not believe these AEs to be

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pro-communist, but merely dissatisfied.

5. ~~(C)~~ Pvt [REDACTED] Bulgarian November 1957

5. ~~(C)~~ Pvt [REDACTED] Bulgarian November 1957

Subject was reported AWOL 21-24 Sep 1957 and 1-8 Oct 1957; and in May 1958 subject went AWOL in the company of Pvt [REDACTED] (See Item 18).

They were apprehended while attempting to cross border to Mexico.

Allegedly both were induced to go AWOL by Pvt [REDACTED] (Item 21).

Allegation against [REDACTED] has not been substantiated by investigation, nor has it been completely refuted. It has been claimed that [REDACTED] attempted to counsel [REDACTED] and others during their basic training, since these individuals were constantly in trouble. [REDACTED] allegedly accused them of bringing discredit upon the AE group by their conduct, and when he failed to influence them, he discontinued all association with them.

6. ~~(S)~~ Pvt [REDACTED] - Albanian (See Item 2 above)

April 1958

On 17 Apr 58 subject deserted from Ft Devens, Mass, in the company of Pvt [REDACTED] (Item 2). [REDACTED], who is negotiating for return to US Army of his own accord, blames subject whom he claims induced [REDACTED] to desert by stating that he, [REDACTED] could speak Spanish and that they would have a better life in South American countries. [REDACTED] claims that [REDACTED] used him because subject could not afford the trip alone.

7. (C) Pvt [REDACTED] - (See Item 1) September 1957

An AE source of unknown reliability voluntarily reported that subject and Pvt [REDACTED] were the principle agitators among Lodge Act personnel. They allegedly boasted of being members of a powerful organization and they advised other aliens to go to Mexico and seek asylum.

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When interviewed by G2 at Ft Jackson, SC, they stated that they were happy in the US and had no particular problems. No further information was obtained. Source claims that they had done more than the average amount of complaining and perhaps intended to create dissention or disaffection among the others with their complaining. Source, basing his statement on remarks he has overheard, is suspicious of their association with several other AEs; he considers subject and the others to be communist sympathizers. In November 1957, subject was named as one of several AEs who, as communist sympathizers, plan to write to embassies of their homelands in order to make known their desires to be repatriated.

8. (u) (OFLUSE) Pvt [REDACTED] Polish/Ukraine

December 1958

(b)(6) Subject is terminating five years as an AE and desires to be returned to Germany instead of becoming an American citizen. This is considered by First US Army as indicative of poor selectivity or inadequate orientation.

9. (u) (G) Pfc [REDACTED]

February 1958

(b)(6) In the course of interrogation of an AE who had been apprehended in the act of attempting to desert, the latter stated that [REDACTED] was one of the participants in a discussion which took place in early February 1958, wherein several AEs, including subject and source, planned to desert with the assistance of Pfc [REDACTED] (Item 19). The plan was thwarted when an outsider warned the group not to desert. Pvt [REDACTED] (Item 2) stated in a letter that subject was able to obtain a better

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assignment by taking his complaint directly to Department of the Army.

10. (u) (OFLUSE) Pfc [REDACTED] - Russian December 1957

(b)(6)
Subject, who is stationed at Ft Rucker, Ala, expressed his desire to return to Russia and be united with his family at any cost and he intends to make his problem known to a higher government agency or to the Russian Embassy. Subject was counselled by his unit; results not indicated but presumed successful. Subject's discontent is attributed to language barriers, degrading assignment and inadequate pay.

11. (u) (OFLUSE) Pvt [REDACTED] - September 1958

(b)(6)
Subject, who is stationed in Fifth US Army, reported that his parents have indicated in letters that they might lose their property if his release (from the Army) is not effected. Subject's parents reside in Leipzig, East Germany and although subject faces the threat of imprisonment if he returns, he appeared willing, and even unconcerned, about returning to Leipzig to assist his parents. In October 1958, subject reported that his parents had written saying that everything was all right now; the police do not watch them, and they are left alone.

12. (u) (e) Pvt [REDACTED] November 1957

(b)(6)
Subject expressed among other AEs his intention of going AWOL to an unnamed destination.

13. (u) (e) Pvt [REDACTED] November 1957

Subject was AWOL 2-8 Oct 1957. While in the stockade at Ft Jackson, S.C. he wrote a letter to The President but the IG received the letter. In the letter, he claimed he was physically unfit for military service but that his medical records had been destroyed by American personnel.

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and he was consequently forced into the Army. In September 1957, subject visited the embassy of an Iron Curtain country (probably Polish) in Washington. Subject claimed he would return to his native country as soon as released from the stockade. News had allegedly reached the ears of all AEs at Ft Jackson that subject had gone to this embassy and it seemed common opinion among the AEs at Ft Jackson that if they desired to return to their native countries they could go to the nearest embassy (Iron Curtain) and arrange to make their way to either Canada or Mexico. (Original report is not clear but probably means AEs could be repatriated by going to either Canada or Mexico and reporting to the embassy of their native countries.) Subject is among those AEs known to have been contacted by Pvt [REDACTED] (Item 21) who is suspected of being a defection agent. [REDACTED] in his explanation of his contact with subject, claimed that he had attempted to counsel subject and others during their basic training and that these individuals were constantly in trouble; [REDACTED] allegedly admonished them for bringing discredit on the whole group of AEs, but failing to influence them, he discontinued all association.

(b)(7)(C)

14. (u) (b)(7)(C) Pvt [REDACTED] - September 1958

Subject enlisted 15 Sep 58 and on 16 Sep 58 stated he wanted to be discharged. He claimed that prior to his enlistment he was warned against enlisting by his father who had written from behind the Iron Curtain and stated that everyone in his home town knew of subject's decision to enlist. After receiving a series of letters from his homeland which implored him not to enlist, and gradually increased pressure on subject, (loss of his sister's job and loss of his parents social

(b)(7)(C)

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security benefits), subject applied to First US Army for discharge in December 1958.

(u)
15. ~~(S)~~ (U) Pvt [REDACTED] November 1957

(b)(6)
The IG at Ft Jackson, S.C. conducted an investigation in June 1957 concerning subject's uncooperative attitude. Subject expressed a desire to become a citizen of the US; however, he dislikes all armies and feels that he has been unjustly treated. He would either like to be discharged from the Army or be returned to Greece or Bulgaria.

(u)
16. ~~(S)~~ (U) Pvt [REDACTED] September 1958

(b)(6)
A source of known reliability advised that subject had contacted the Legation of Hungary, Washington, D.C. and requested repatriation. Subject is presently assigned to Ft Jackson, S.C. and made this contact in May 1958, approximately three months prior to his enlistment.

(u)
17. ~~(S)~~ (U) Pvt [REDACTED] Bulgarian June 1958

(b)(6)
On 31 May 1958, Pvs [REDACTED] (Item 39), [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] (Item 29) deserted and attempted to enter Mexico for the purpose of seeking asylum at the French Embassy there. They proceeded to the border where [REDACTED] was apprehended. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were later apprehended in Mexico. The three were returned to their station at Ft Devens, Mass, where they were charged with desertion. No trial was held. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were subsequently tried for refusal to obey orders and [REDACTED] had a portion of his sentence remitted and was transferred to Ft Dix for rehabilitation.

(u)
18. ~~(S)~~ (U) Pvt [REDACTED] - Bulgarian August 1958

(b)(6)
In May 1958 subject went AWOL from Ft Bragg, N.C. in the company

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(b)(4) of Pvt [REDACTED] (See Item 5 above). They were apprehended while attempting to cross the border to Mexico. Allegedly both were induced to go AWOL by Pvt [REDACTED] (Item 21), suspected redefection agent.

19. (u) (C) Pfc [REDACTED] Bulgarian October 1958

(b)(4) Subject gave [REDACTED] (See Item 29) \$100 for use in financing the latter's desertion attempt. [REDACTED] returned the money before departing AWOL. Subject received a letter from Pvt [REDACTED] (Item 32), AWOL at the time from Third US Army, requesting that [REDACTED] send him \$50 to assist him in deserting; [REDACTED] allegedly sent \$47 to [REDACTED]. In October 1958, [REDACTED] encouraged Pfc [REDACTED] to desert; he told [REDACTED] he would furnish him with enough money to get out of the US. [REDACTED] who is believed to be the redefection agent at Ft Devens, Mass, is known to have visited [REDACTED] (Item 45), a former AE suspected of being a redefection agent, in New York City. [REDACTED] is known to have encouraged disaffected AEs to desert, to have offered money to deserters and to have volunteered to put a potential deserter in contact with persons who would assist him in leaving the country.

20. (u) (C) Pvt [REDACTED] - September 1957

(b)(4) An AE source of unknown reliability voluntarily reported that subject and Pvt [REDACTED] were among the principle agitators at Ft Jackson, S.C. (See Item 7 above). In November 1957, subject was named as one of several AEs who, as communist sympathizers, plan to write to embassies of their homelands in order to make known their desires to be repatriated.

(b)(4) ✓ 21. (u) (C) Pvt [REDACTED] - August 1958

An AE source (source "A") of unknown reliability stationed at Ft

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(b)(6)
Devens, Mass, voluntarily reported in February 1958 that while he was stationed at Ft Jackson, S.C. he suspected several other AEs of being communists or communist sympathizers. The most important one was a Bulgarian named [REDACTED] (fnu). Source understood from other Bulgarian AEs that [REDACTED] was a former Bulgarian Army officer and after he left the army he became a district attorney for the communist government. He escaped from Bulgaria two years ago via Turkey and he enlisted in the US Army in Frankfurt, Germany. [REDACTED] allegedly made pro-communist remarks while at Ft Jackson and frequently read communist political philosophy. Source claims to have heard [REDACTED] say, "Communism is good because communism works against capital". It was rumored among the aliens that [REDACTED] was an agent for Bulgaria.

(b)(6)
A different AE source (source "B") gave the following information on [REDACTED] in the course of interrogation upon apprehension for being AWOL and attempting to enter Mexico. Source first met [REDACTED] in 1956 in a refugee camp in Turkey. [REDACTED] real name is [REDACTED]. During March 1958, [REDACTED] approached source three times in an attempt to induce source to redefect to Bulgaria or another communist country in Europe. [REDACTED] claimed that money was no object and that all arrangements could be made through the Bulgarian Legation in Canada where [REDACTED] has connections. Source refused [REDACTED] proposal, and since going AWOL 31 Mar 1958, source has not seen [REDACTED]. Source named several other AEs known to have been approached by [REDACTED] (G2 Third US Army feels that source "B" is not telling the truth. Information from source "A" at Ft Devens coincides with [REDACTED] and tends to substantiate

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(b)(6) information received from source "B").

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22. ~~(CPLUSE)~~ Pfc [REDACTED] (Further identifying data not included in original report from First US Army)

November 1958

(b)(6) Subject reported that he was sending \$90 per month to his mother in Albania, but that the official exchange rate so reduced the value of his contributions that his mother was not receiving enough for her support and was asking him to send more money.

- (u)
23. ~~(C)~~ Pvt [REDACTED] - Hungarian November 1957

Subject's name was reported as a member of a group of AEs who planned to go AWOL to an unknown destination.

- (u)
24. ~~(C)~~ Pvt [REDACTED] November 1957

(b)(6) Subject was AWOL from 2 to 8 October 1957. He accompanied another AE, Pvt [REDACTED] (Item 13), when the latter went AWOL to Washington, D.C. to visit the embassy of his homeland (probably Polish). Subject is one of the AEs who was allegedly induced to redefect by Pvt [REDACTED] suspected redefection agent.

- (u)
25. ~~(CPLUSE)~~ Pvt [REDACTED] November 1958

(b)(6) Approximately four weeks after he was assigned to his unit at Ft Dix, N.J. from a reception company, subject declared himself to be a conscientious objector. Just prior thereto and for a week afterwards, he had been "riding the sick book". After consulting the regimental chaplain, who consulted with a civilian clergyman, it was decided that subject actually is a conscientious objector, and he was reassigned under appropriate regulations.

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(u)
26. (C) Pvt [REDACTED] - Poland August 1958

(b)(6)
Subject was contacted in 1950 by two individuals whom he believed represented Soviet Intelligence. They inferred that they were interested in information on ammunition and supplies at La Rochelle, France, where subject was assigned in a labor service unit. Subject claims he never saw these individuals again.

- In October 1955, subject was contacted in Paris by an individual apparently connected with Polish Embassy in France. This individual had detailed background information on subject, including knowledge of his trips into Poland on behalf of US intelligence. Subject was told they "had plans for him when he joined the US Army"; they knew this to be his intention. In November 1955, two individuals made a follow-up on the above approach. Subtle pressure was applied by mentioning the fact that subject's mother is in Poland. They repeated the fact that they "had plans for him in the US Army".

In 1957, while in Korea, subject received letter urging him to return to Poland because of mother's sickness. Subject claimed he could no longer trust himself and was transferred to the rear.

In August 1958, subject was informed that his mother had received a visa for travel in France in December 1958. Subject requested leave or transfer to that area.

In December 1958, subject was reported to be on leave in Europe. He was to meet his mother in Paris, France; then he was to go to visit a relative in Belgium, for the explicit purpose of registering his mother as a political refugee. Should he be unable to accomplish this, subject

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plans to apply for a discharge and subsequently return to Poland.

Subject has been informed by a friend residing in France, that he may request amnesty under a Polish law, granting amnesty to the people who departed from Poland after 1946.

(u)
27. (S) (C) Pvt [REDACTED] Hungarian

August 1957

(b)(6)
In August 1957 subject wrote to The President stating that the recruiting officer in Germany had promised he would be returned to Germany after he had been stationed in the US for six months. Subject felt that the Army was not living up to its agreement. Subject claims to have a friend in Washington (Pentagon implied) who has helped other Hungarian soldiers to transfer to the 3d Inf Div, Ft Benning for shipment to Germany.

(u)
28. (S) (C) Pvt [REDACTED] -

December 1958

(b)(6)
Subject is under investigation for suspected Communist Party membership and for association with suspected defection agents [REDACTED] and Pfc [REDACTED]. Subject is under investigation by Fourth US Army and [REDACTED] by First US Army. [REDACTED] (Item 45) is suspected of being a cut-out of a defection apparatus active among Bulgarian and Albanian AEs in First US Army area. [REDACTED] (Item 19) is suspected of being contact man for the same apparatus.

(u)
29. (S) (C) Pvt [REDACTED] -

Bulgarian

June 1958

(b)(6)
In May 1958, subject and two other AEs deserted and attempted to enter Mexico for the purpose of seeking asylum at the French Embassy there (See Item 17). Subject was later charged with desertion but no trial was held. Pfc [REDACTED] (Item 19), suspected defection agent at

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(b)(6) Ft Devens, Mass, furnished subject \$100 for use in his desertion attempt, but subject returned the money before going AWOL. [REDACTED] believes that Pvt [REDACTED] (Item 47), presently in desertion and believed to have returned his homeland, is responsible for threats to [REDACTED] family. Due to these threats, subject is applying for hardship discharge.

(u)
30. (C) Pvt [REDACTED] August 1958

- Subject is among those AEs who Pvt [REDACTED] (Item 21), suspected redefection agent, is alleged to have attempted to induce to desert.

(u)
31. (C) Pvt [REDACTED] - Bulgarian November 1958

(b)(6) Subject went AWOL and attempted to enter Canada in November 1958. When apprehended by Canadian border authorities, he was in possession of \$1000 and a Yugoslavian passport; his records indicated that he had not been paid since September 1958. During an interview prior to his going AWOL he stated that he was not in possession of a passport. According to statements made by [REDACTED] to individuals at Ft Devens, members of his family are known to have been imprisoned for withholding agriculture production. Therefore, it is possible that subject attempted to redefect as a result of pressure. Returning from AWOL, subject stated he had attempted to leave the US to find a job in Toronto, Canada and after realizing the futility of crossing without proper documents, decided to return to his unit. Since subject's return from Korea in September 1958, he has had frequent visits from an AE fitting the description of Pfc [REDACTED] (suspected redefection agent at Ft Devens). Subject denied that [REDACTED] (Item 19) induced him to go AWOL. He claims the money in his possession was saved while he was in Korea. Subject

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stated he was planning to visit an individual named [REDACTED]
address unknown, and one named [REDACTED] both believed to be Bulgarians.

(b)(6) 32. (u) (c) Pvt [REDACTED] - Bulgarian November 1957

(b)(6) Third US Army received information that subject was among a group of AEs who had expressed intentions of going AWOL to an unknown destination. Source included subject's name with AEs whom source claims are former members and current sympathizers with communism; these individuals are intending redefection by means of contacting the embassies of the native countries. Two AEs, apprehended in attempting to desert, name subject as a prominent member of a group which is apparently the target of a redefection effort. In November 1958 it was reported that Pfc [REDACTED] (suspected redefection agent at Ft Devens) had been asked by subject, who was at the time AWOL and suspected of desertion, to send him \$50 for use in a desertion attempt. [REDACTED] reportedly sent \$47 to subject.

(b)(6) 33. (u) (c) Pvt [REDACTED] November 1957

(b)(6) An AE source of unknown reliability volunteered information that Pvts [REDACTED] (Item 7) and [REDACTED] (Item 20), Third US Army, had claimed to be members of a redefection organization. Source voiced suspicion of their association with subject and three other AEs.

(b)(6) 34. (u) (c) Pvt [REDACTED] - Bulgarian June 1958

Interrogation of an AE who had been apprehended while attempting to desert to Mexico revealed that subject was one of a group which in early February 1958 discussed plans to desert on 1 Mar 1958 at Ft Devens Mass. In early October 1958, Pfc Ivanov (Item 19), suspected redefection

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(b)(6)
agent, attempted to induce subject to desert. [REDACTED] allegedly told [REDACTED] that he would furnish [REDACTED] with enough money to leave the US but that [REDACTED] would have to finance subsequent travel by other means. [REDACTED] also is reported to have told [REDACTED] that he would furnish [REDACTED] with a list of contacts who would assist him in escaping from the US.

(u)
35. ~~(OFLUSE)~~ Pvt [REDACTED] September 1957

(b)(6)
The above named AE reported that he and Pvt [REDACTED] another AE (See Item 42), had been approached by an elderly civilian in Columbia, S.C. and at Ft Jackson; the latter attempted to impress upon them that they were working for nothing and that conditions within the Army were not good. This person represented himself as a member of the Consolidated Free People of Yugoslavia or Consolidated Federation of Free People of Yugoslavia. He informed the aliens that they could escape to Mexico and report to their embassy in person or by telephone. The embassy then would furnish them free passage to Yugoslavia. This individual, who carried a lot of money and was accompanied by a woman, invited the AEs to dinner; both made several visits to Ft Jackson, S.C.

(u)
36. ~~(OFLUSE)~~ Pvt [REDACTED] - Hungary July 1958

(b)(6)
Subject, a former member of this command, presently serving in Hawaii stated his desire to return to Hungary. In a subsequent interview, he brought forth an application for repatriation which he had received through the mail; the envelope was postmarked Washington 15, D.C. and dated 10 June 1958. Subject had prepared his application for return with the intent of forwarding it to the Legation of Hungary. After being

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thoroughly counseled, he changed his mind and now desires to remain in the Army. Subject claimed that he had not written to the legation and does not know how the legation obtained his address.

(u)
37. ~~(OFLUSE)~~ Pvt [REDACTED] - April 1958

(b)(6)
Subject, stationed at Ft Bragg, N.C. went on pass to Fayetteville, N.C., in civilian clothes. Upon leaving a theater, he was approached by a civilian who called him by his first name, invited him to a cup of coffee, and then asked him if he would like to join the Communist Party again. Subject, a former member of the FDJ (Communist Youth) in East Germany, informed the stranger that he did not want anything further to do with Communist Party. Subject thereupon left and reported to local police, military authority, and FBI.

(u)
38. ~~(O)~~ Pvt [REDACTED] - Albania February 1958

(b)(6)
In January 1958, subject voluntarily reported to his unit at Ft Devens, Mass, and gave information in detail on his background and on communist activities which allegedly came to his knowledge at Ft Jackson, S.C. He made allegations against fnu [REDACTED] (probably identical to [REDACTED] Item 21) and involved several other AEs. Among other things, [REDACTED] explained that in August 1957 he had sent a package to relatives in Albania, giving his aunt's return address (Bridgeport, Conn). In November 1957 he received a telegram from his brother in Albania asking for money; the telegram was sent to his Ft Devens address. Subject did not believe that the telegram came from his brother but from some Albanian agency attempting to place pressure on him through his family. Subject was later named by two AE sources of unknown reliability as being one of a group

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of AEs who appear to be a target for Bulgarian redefection effort; subject is Albanian. In February 1958 subject attempted to desert and to enter Canada. He was returned to his unit where an effort was made to eliminate him from the service for desertion. DA reassigned subject to USAREUR in lieu of disciplinary action 14 July 1958.

39. (u) (OFLUSE) Pvt [REDACTED] - Bulgaria June 1958

(b)(6) On 31-May 1958, subject, together with Pvts [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] (Items 17 and 29), attempted to desert from Ft Devens, Mass and to seek asylum at the French Embassy in Mexico City. While on pass they proceeded to the Mexican Border where subject was apprehended at the border check point and the others were apprehended in Mexico. All three were returned to their stations where charges were prepared against them for desertion, but no trial was held. Pvts [REDACTED] and subject were subsequently tried for refusal to obey orders. [REDACTED] was transferred to Ft Jackson, S.C. for retraining and rehabilitation. Thus far efforts to rehabilitate subject have not met with success.

40. (u) (OFLUSE) Pvt [REDACTED] - Hungary May 1958

(b)(6) While assigned at Ft Knox, Ky subject reported to his unit intelligence officer that he had received mail from his father in Hungary; he had sent his military address to his mother and father in Budapest. According to his father's letter, the AVO (Hungarian Secret Police) had been to this father's home in Budapest and had searched, without success, for letters and pictures of subject.

41. (u) (OFLUSE) Pvt [REDACTED] - Albanian September 1958

(b)(6) In August 1958, while travelling from Fort Lewis, Washington to the Panama C.Z. on military orders, subject attempted to enter Canada

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from Chicago, Ill. He was taken into custody by Canadian authorities, turned over to American authorities and then sent on to the Canal Zone. The Canadian deportation order contained the following: "this person applied for permanent admission to Canada and has no intention of returning to the US except by force. Take all precautions while subject is in your custody.."

(9)(a) 42. (u) (OFLUSE) Pvt [REDACTED] - November 1957

Subject, accompanied by Pvt [REDACTED] (See Item 35), was approached by a civilian who encouraged him to redefect. On another occasion while subject was acting as interpreter during an interview of another AE, subject mentioned to the interviewer that the news concerning the visit by Pvt [REDACTED] (Item 13) to the embassy of the latter's homeland had reached the ears of all the AEs at Fort Jackson, S.C., and it seemed common knowledge that if AEs desired to return to their native countries, they could do so by going to Mexico or Canada and contacting the embassies of Iron Curtain countries.

(9)(a) 43. (u) (OFLUSE) Mr [REDACTED] - Hungary July 1958

Subject, an applicant for enlistment who was disqualified for physical reasons, received a letter in July 1958 from his mother who is presently residing in Hungary. The letter stated that she had heard of 'subject's impending enlistment in the US Army and requested that he not enlist because of the trouble that his enlistment would cause for her from the communists. She explained that she had already lost her job as a school teacher because of his impending enlistment. Subject claimed that he had never included any information about his intention to enlist in letters to his mother or anyone else in Hungary. In his mother's

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letter she stated that the full names, addresses, places of employment in the US, and social habits of the Hungarian escapees from his home town were in possession of the authorities in Hungary.

(b)(6) 44. (u) (C) Pvt [REDACTED] - November 1957

Subject's name was reported as a member of a group of AEs that planned to go AWOL to an unknown destination.

45. (u) (C) Mr [REDACTED] - Bulgarian November 1958

(b)(6) Subject, a former AE who was discharged from the Army by board action, is now living in New York City. He is suspected of being the cut-out between Soviet Bloc diplomatic personnel and the defection apparatus. He has been reported as having been in contact with a member of the Albanian Delegation to the UN while subject was assigned to Third US Army. Pfc [REDACTED] (Item 19) is known to have visited [REDACTED] in New York City. [REDACTED] is known to have met Soviet Bloc diplomats while still a soldier; to have had an interest, after his discharge, in disaffected AEs and those involved in desertion attempts; and to have discussed these persons with [REDACTED] during the course of the latter's visits to [REDACTED].

(b)(6) 46. (u) (C) Pvt [REDACTED] - November 1957

Pvt [REDACTED]

An AE source of unknown reliability named above individuals as associates of Pvt [REDACTED] (See Item 7), one of the primary agitators among Lodge Act personnel at Ft Jackson, S.C. Source believes these individuals to be communist sympathizers.

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47. (u) (C) Pvt [REDACTED] - Bulgarian

November 1958

From information available to First US Army, it appears that subject, currently AWOL from Third US Army, is an agent of Bulgarian Intelligence. He is believed to have threatened the families in Bulgaria of AEs, and to have returned to Bulgaria and implemented his threats in at least two cases.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE
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DAMI-DSC

5 DEC 1972

SUBJECT: Assessment of the Communications Intelligence Threat (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (U) Reference DA letter, DAAG-PAP-A(M) (18 Apr 72) DAMI-DSC, dated 10 May 1972, subject: National Policy on Secure Voice Communications (U).
2. (U) This letter forwards assessments of the foreign communications intelligence threat to unsecured Department of Defense voice radio communications.
3. (U) Availability of secure voice equipment will not increase significantly over the next four years. In the meantime, the NESTOR equipment (TSEC/KY-8/28/38) is being redistributed to obtain optimum benefits from that equipment by securing the most sensitive communications. Additional improvements in COMSEC during this time will depend on training and security awareness of individuals who use radios. Recommend that the inclosures be made available to appropriate members of your command and be used in the COMSEC training programs required by paragraph 22f, AR 530-2.
4. (U) Other information which may be useful in supporting your COMSEC program will be forwarded as it becomes available.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE:

Thomas W. Bowen

THOMAS W. BOWEN
Brigadier General, GS
Director of Intelligence
Support

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